Is Psychology Science? (Peter Rickman)
Posted: Sun Aug 02, 2009 5:43 pm
THE OFFENDING ARTICLE HERE
I shall paraphrase
In seriousness the article failed to say anything substantive and was riddled with the kind of lazy reasoning and empty rhetoric that makes the 'academic-as-expert' within philosophy highly suspect.
At no point did Mr. Rickman bother to elucidate on the significance of the label 'science', either to him or at large. What does it matter if psychology is labelled a science or not, what consequences does it or should it have in the way that we treat it or its products? This would have been helpful, as it would have gone some way to explaining his peculiar bias, as well as providing us with a basis for creating criteria for measuring various disciplines as scientific or not.
After all, what is the need for this distinction of 'science' and 'non-science', what do we accord to one and not the other?
For the most part his article centred on things which purport to be psychology and purport to be science but which fail to be scientific. Yet, there are many things which purport to be scientific in all fields which, under scrutiny, fail to be scientific. All that he has established is that not everything which says it is science, and says it is psychology, is science.
His conclusion is that we should rule out 'psychology as science'. This conclusion is not valid. There are two possible valid conclusions. Either there is two kinds of psychology, the scientific and the non-scientific, or alternatively, as with all other disciplines, psychology is wholly scientific but there are many things which falsely purport to be psychology.
His argument against behaviourism is a particularly stark example of lazy argumentation. He uses the following joke:
Much as some behaviourists may take their perspective to be a universal theory of psychology I suspect Mr. Rickman has missed the point of the doctrine entirely. It is not that all psychology is reducible to behaviours, any more than physics that all existance is reducible to the read-outs on its machinery. Behaviourism states that the only scientifically observable element of the psyche is behaviour, and so a science-proper should only involve itself with these things.
He further goes on to talk about 'communications' as if these are seperate and distinct from behaviours; they are themselves behaviours and observable facts. While we cannot observe the rate of promiscuity within a population we can observe the rate of reported promiscuity within a population, and this is the proper limitations of any such claims. But, then, this is sociology, not psychology. Why on earth would I talk about sociology when I am supposed to be talking about psychology? Ah yes, because Mr.Rickman decided to conflate the two, along with history, as they are clearly precisely the same thing.
Perhaps the most grating thing within the whole article was where he said
Is Psychology Physics?
Peter Rickman tells us why it isn't.
I shall paraphrase
Thanks for that Pete.Peter Rickman wrote:Well, it isn't physics, is it?
In seriousness the article failed to say anything substantive and was riddled with the kind of lazy reasoning and empty rhetoric that makes the 'academic-as-expert' within philosophy highly suspect.
At no point did Mr. Rickman bother to elucidate on the significance of the label 'science', either to him or at large. What does it matter if psychology is labelled a science or not, what consequences does it or should it have in the way that we treat it or its products? This would have been helpful, as it would have gone some way to explaining his peculiar bias, as well as providing us with a basis for creating criteria for measuring various disciplines as scientific or not.
After all, what is the need for this distinction of 'science' and 'non-science', what do we accord to one and not the other?
For the most part his article centred on things which purport to be psychology and purport to be science but which fail to be scientific. Yet, there are many things which purport to be scientific in all fields which, under scrutiny, fail to be scientific. All that he has established is that not everything which says it is science, and says it is psychology, is science.
His conclusion is that we should rule out 'psychology as science'. This conclusion is not valid. There are two possible valid conclusions. Either there is two kinds of psychology, the scientific and the non-scientific, or alternatively, as with all other disciplines, psychology is wholly scientific but there are many things which falsely purport to be psychology.
His argument against behaviourism is a particularly stark example of lazy argumentation. He uses the following joke:
I would not denigrate the argument on the basis that it is a joke, as humor can make good points. However, the above joke does not make a good point, humorous as it is.Two behaviourists spend a night passionately making love. In the morning, one says to the other, “It was good for you. How was it for me?”
Much as some behaviourists may take their perspective to be a universal theory of psychology I suspect Mr. Rickman has missed the point of the doctrine entirely. It is not that all psychology is reducible to behaviours, any more than physics that all existance is reducible to the read-outs on its machinery. Behaviourism states that the only scientifically observable element of the psyche is behaviour, and so a science-proper should only involve itself with these things.
He further goes on to talk about 'communications' as if these are seperate and distinct from behaviours; they are themselves behaviours and observable facts. While we cannot observe the rate of promiscuity within a population we can observe the rate of reported promiscuity within a population, and this is the proper limitations of any such claims. But, then, this is sociology, not psychology. Why on earth would I talk about sociology when I am supposed to be talking about psychology? Ah yes, because Mr.Rickman decided to conflate the two, along with history, as they are clearly precisely the same thing.
Perhaps the most grating thing within the whole article was where he said
As if the principles of scientific methodology were produced not only because of, but wholly within, the practice of the physical sciences; as if the discipline of the philosophy of science is not its own distinct discipline with its own purview, but merely a commentary on the actions of these great eminent physical scientists.It follows that the human studies cannot naïvely ape physical science.
Is Psychology Physics?
Peter Rickman tells us why it isn't.