What Does "Objective" Mean With Respect to Morality?
Posted: Fri Dec 04, 2020 7:36 pm
Just some random thoughts concerning morality and objectivity:
Suppose that everything in the world is as it currently is and that it is also the case that God exists. And suppose that God has ordained that X is morally right and that Y is morally wrong. Would that alone necessarily mean that X is "objectively" right and Y is "objectively" wrong?
For example, suppose that God ordained that it was morally right to wear green on Thursdays and morally wrong to wear orange on Thursdays despite the seeming fact that it should theoretically make no significant difference in any other way, shape, or form other than being God's "personal" or "subjective" preference. If God ordained something to be the case, would that alone make it morally "objective?"
Contrast this with God ordaining that murder is wrong and that kindness is right. Could the same be said of those things, that they are simply God's preference and not somehow "objective"? For example, if you murder someone you will still burn in hell and if you are kind you will still go to heaven, however, is it possible that it could be just as much God's "subjective" preference, albeit enforced with ultimate punishments or rewards.
And if a supreme reward or else punishment is what makes something morally "objective", what if humans could contrive some kind of great reward or most gruesome punishment for doing something? Would that make something "objectively" moral or immoral?
Would it be only the existence of some ultimate reward or else ultimate punishment that makes something objectively moral or immoral?
Suppose that everything in the world is as it currently is and that it is also the case that God exists. And suppose that God has ordained that X is morally right and that Y is morally wrong. Would that alone necessarily mean that X is "objectively" right and Y is "objectively" wrong?
For example, suppose that God ordained that it was morally right to wear green on Thursdays and morally wrong to wear orange on Thursdays despite the seeming fact that it should theoretically make no significant difference in any other way, shape, or form other than being God's "personal" or "subjective" preference. If God ordained something to be the case, would that alone make it morally "objective?"
Contrast this with God ordaining that murder is wrong and that kindness is right. Could the same be said of those things, that they are simply God's preference and not somehow "objective"? For example, if you murder someone you will still burn in hell and if you are kind you will still go to heaven, however, is it possible that it could be just as much God's "subjective" preference, albeit enforced with ultimate punishments or rewards.
And if a supreme reward or else punishment is what makes something morally "objective", what if humans could contrive some kind of great reward or most gruesome punishment for doing something? Would that make something "objectively" moral or immoral?
Would it be only the existence of some ultimate reward or else ultimate punishment that makes something objectively moral or immoral?