Philosophy Now Forum

Here is what David Brink in Moral realism and The Foundations of Ethics wrote:

The preceding section has given us some idea of what Moral realism is, what it is not, and what its main rivals are.
But what interest do these metaethical views hold, and is there any reason to believe one rather than another?
In many areas of dispute between realism and antirealism, realism [moral] is the natural metaphysical position.

We begin as realists about the external world or the unobservable entities mentioned in well confirmed scientific theories.
Generally, people become antirealists about these things (if they do) because they become convinced that realism is in some way naive and must be abandoned in the face of compelling metaphysical and epistemological objections.

So too, I think, in ethics.
We begin as (tacit) cognitivists and realists about ethics.
Moral claims make assertions, which can be true or false;
some people are morally more perceptive than others;
and people's moral views have not only changed over time but have improved in many cases (e.g., as regards slavery).

We are led to some form of antirealism (if we are) only because we come to regard the moral realist's commitments as untenable, say,
because of the apparently occult nature of moral facts or
because of the apparent lack of a well developed and respectable methodology in ethics.8
I think there is more to this dialectical picture than just a suggestive thumbnail sketch of the history of twentieth-century metaethics.

Moral realism should be our metaethical starting point, and we should give it up only if it does involve unacceptable metaphysical and epistemological commitments.

This is why the following survey found a majority of moral philosophers are Moral Realists;

A survey from 2009 involving 3,226 respondents[6] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

Moral Realism claims there are moral facts which are supposedly mind-independent, proposition, truth-apt and thus objective just like scientific facts generated from the Scientific Framework and System.

Moral Realists claims comprised of 3 major types of facts;
(Brink, except the points in [] );

• 1. Ethical naturalism is the claim that moral facts and properties just are natural facts and properties.
  
  2. Ethical supernaturalism claims that moral facts and properties just are supernatural facts and properties (e.g., facts about and properties of the will of a divine being).
  
  3. Nonnaturalists such as Moore (1903), Broad (1930), Ross (1930), and Prichard (1949), however, claim that moral facts and properties are neither natural nor supernatural facts and properties; they [moral facts] are sui generis.
  Platonic Ethical universals can included in this group.

I believe the original moral facts deniers arose due to the revolt against religious "moral facts" from a God which were threatened and forced upon believers. Hume was one of those who rebelled against God's moral facts.

Personally I believe moral facts claimed within 2 [from a God] and 3 [intuitive and platonic] are not tenable. There are loads of proofs to support my point.

The moral facts claimed within moral realism - ethical naturalism are the default and thus has to be accepted as such unless proven otherwise.
To reinforce this default position I have demonstrated in the various posts they are justifiable as moral facts.

Meanwhile the moral facts deniers like Peter Holmes, et. al. as in
Is morality objective or subjective? by Peter Holmes
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=24531
could only argue with flimsy words and semantics [inherited from the bastardized philosophy of the LPs] which don't give a dent to Moral Realism as the default and its justified moral facts.

The onus on the moral-facts-deniers to provide justifications why there are no moral facts which are like any other natural facts and properties as with the natural sciences and others.

Do you agree Moral Realism is the default within the domain of Morality and Ethics?
Views.

Upon presenting his arguments why Moral Realism is the Default within Morality, he commented the following;

If my argument has been correct, general considerations about the nature of inquiry and considerations about moral inquiry in particular are most easily explained on the assumption that moral inquiry is directed at discovering moral facts that obtain independently of our moral beliefs and at arriving at evidence-independent true moral beliefs.

I take this conclusion to establish a presumptive case in favor of Moral realism and to shift the burden of proof to the moral antirealist.

That is, the burden of proof is on the antirealist to explain why the apparent realist presuppositions of commonsense morality are mistaken.

We begin as realists about the external world or the unobservable entities mentioned in well confirmed scientific theories.
Generally, people become antirealists about these things (if they do) because they become convinced that realism is in some way naive and must be abandoned in the face of *(seemingly) compelling metaphysical and epistemological objections.

yep









*an important addition, I think

henry quirk wrote: ↑Fri Sep 25, 2020 2:01 pm We begin as realists about the external world or the unobservable entities mentioned in well confirmed scientific theories.
Generally, people become antirealists about these things (if they do) because they become convinced that realism is in some way naive and must be abandoned in the face of *(seemingly) compelling metaphysical and epistemological objections.
yep
*an important addition, I think

So, ontological realism equals moral realism, equals the default position.

Well, that's a slam-dunk. Game over.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Sep 27, 2020 10:06 pm

henry quirk wrote: ↑Fri Sep 25, 2020 2:01 pm We begin as realists about the external world or the unobservable entities mentioned in well confirmed scientific theories.
Generally, people become antirealists about these things (if they do) because they become convinced that realism is in some way naive and must be abandoned in the face of *(seemingly) compelling metaphysical and epistemological objections.

yep

*an important addition, I think

So, ontological realism equals moral realism, equals the default position.

Well, that's a slam-dunk. Game over.

I don't know what all that means

what I do know is: VA's citation is on the money, the gist bein', folks are natural realists (moral & otherwise) and some get hoodwinked into rejectin' realism

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Sep 27, 2020 10:06 pm

henry quirk wrote: ↑Fri Sep 25, 2020 2:01 pm We begin as realists about the external world or the unobservable entities mentioned in well confirmed scientific theories.
Generally, people become antirealists about these things (if they do) because they become convinced that realism is in some way naive and must be abandoned in the face of *(seemingly) compelling metaphysical and epistemological objections.
yep
*an important addition, I think

So, ontological realism equals moral realism, equals the default position.

Well, that's a slam-dunk. Game over.

You are trying to be very deceptive here.
There is no mention of the typical 'ontological' [no empirical possibilities] entities at all, why do you bring it in?

Whatever that is establish as a moral fact, it must be justified empirically and philosophically similar to scientific facts.

Brink rejected any metaphysical or ontological [no empirical possibilities] elements and mentioned all over in his book and it is implied in the following in the OP,

We are led to some form of antirealism (if we are) only because we come to regard the moral realist's commitments as untenable, say,
because of the apparently occult nature of moral facts ...

But there are no occult nature of moral facts within moral realism.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Sep 28, 2020 6:20 am

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Sep 27, 2020 10:06 pm

henry quirk wrote: ↑Fri Sep 25, 2020 2:01 pm We begin as realists about the external world or the unobservable entities mentioned in well confirmed scientific theories.
Generally, people become antirealists about these things (if they do) because they become convinced that realism is in some way naive and must be abandoned in the face of *(seemingly) compelling metaphysical and epistemological objections.
yep
*an important addition, I think

So, ontological realism equals moral realism, equals the default position.

Well, that's a slam-dunk. Game over.

You are trying to be very deceptive here.
There is no mention of the typical 'ontological' [no empirical possibilities] entities at all, why do you bring it in?

Whatever that is establish as a moral fact, it must be justified empirically and philosophically similar to scientific facts.

Brink rejected any metaphysical or ontological [no empirical possibilities] elements and mentioned all over in his book and it is implied in the following in the OP,

We are led to some form of antirealism (if we are) only because we come to regard the moral realist's commitments as untenable, say,
because of the apparently occult nature of moral facts ...

But there are no occult nature of moral facts within moral realism.

don't let 'em grind your gears, guy

Here is one supporting point for Moral Realism;

Criticisms of moral skepticism come primarily from moral realists.

The moral realist argues that there is in fact good reason to believe that there are objective moral truths and that we are justified in holding many moral beliefs.

One moral realist response to moral error theory holds that it "proves too much"—if moral claims are false because they entail that we have reasons to do certain things regardless of our preferences, then so too are "hypothetical imperatives" (e.g. "if you want to get your hair-cut you ought to go to the barber").
This is because all hypothetical imperatives imply that "we have reason to do that which will enable us to accomplish our ends" and so, like moral claims, they imply that we have reason to do something regardless of our preferences.[5]

• If moral claims are false because they have this implication, then so too are hypothetical imperatives.
  But hypothetical imperatives are true.
  Thus the argument from the non-instantiation of (what Mackie terms) "objective prescriptivity" for moral error theory fails.

Russ Shafer-Landau and Daniel Callcut have each outlined anti-skeptical strategies.
Callcut argues that moral skepticism should be scrutinized in introductory ethics classes in order to get across the point that

• "if all views about morality, including the skeptical ones, face difficulties, then adopting a skeptical position is not an escape from difficulty."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_ske ... Criticisms

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Sep 29, 2020 4:02 am Here is one supporting point for Moral Realism;

Criticisms of moral skepticism come primarily from moral realists.

The moral realist argues that there is in fact good reason to believe that there are objective moral truths and that we are justified in holding many moral beliefs.

One moral realist response to moral error theory holds that it "proves too much"—if moral claims are false because they entail that we have reasons to do certain things regardless of our preferences, then so too are "hypothetical imperatives" (e.g. "if you want to get your hair-cut you ought to go to the barber").
This is because all hypothetical imperatives imply that "we have reason to do that which will enable us to accomplish our ends" and so, like moral claims, they imply that we have reason to do something regardless of our preferences.[5]

• If moral claims are false because they have this implication, then so too are hypothetical imperatives.
  But hypothetical imperatives are true.
  Thus the argument from the non-instantiation of (what Mackie terms) "objective prescriptivity" for moral error theory fails.

Russ Shafer-Landau and Daniel Callcut have each outlined anti-skeptical strategies.
Callcut argues that moral skepticism should be scrutinized in introductory ethics classes in order to get across the point that

• "if all views about morality, including the skeptical ones, face difficulties, then adopting a skeptical position is not an escape from difficulty."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_ske ... Criticisms

Straw man. To reject moral realism - and therefore moral objectivism (the existence of moral facts) - as irrational is not to adopt moral skepticism, just as it's not to adopt moral relativism.

For example, I think capital punishment is morally wrong, and I can explain and (I think) justify that opinion. But others think capital punishment is not morally wrong, for reasons they find persuasive. The realist/objectivist claim that there's a moral fact of the matter is demonstrably false, which is precisely why there can be rational disagreement about the morality of capital punishment - as there is about other important moral issues.

The absence of moral facts is what makes moral judgement necessary and inescapable. That's our moral predicament.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Sep 30, 2020 6:58 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Sep 29, 2020 4:02 am Here is one supporting point for Moral Realism;

Criticisms of moral skepticism come primarily from moral realists.

The moral realist argues that there is in fact good reason to believe that there are objective moral truths and that we are justified in holding many moral beliefs.

One moral realist response to moral error theory holds that it "proves too much"—if moral claims are false because they entail that we have reasons to do certain things regardless of our preferences, then so too are "hypothetical imperatives" (e.g. "if you want to get your hair-cut you ought to go to the barber").
This is because all hypothetical imperatives imply that "we have reason to do that which will enable us to accomplish our ends" and so, like moral claims, they imply that we have reason to do something regardless of our preferences.[5]

• If moral claims are false because they have this implication, then so too are hypothetical imperatives.
  But hypothetical imperatives are true.
  Thus the argument from the non-instantiation of (what Mackie terms) "objective prescriptivity" for moral error theory fails.

Russ Shafer-Landau and Daniel Callcut have each outlined anti-skeptical strategies.
Callcut argues that moral skepticism should be scrutinized in introductory ethics classes in order to get across the point that

• "if all views about morality, including the skeptical ones, face difficulties, then adopting a skeptical position is not an escape from difficulty."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_ske ... Criticisms

Straw man. To reject moral realism - and therefore moral objectivism (the existence of moral facts) - as irrational is not to adopt moral skepticism, just as it's not to adopt moral relativism.

For example, I think capital punishment is morally wrong, and I can explain and (I think) justify that opinion. But others think capital punishment is not morally wrong, for reasons they find persuasive. The realist/objectivist claim that there's a moral fact of the matter is demonstrably false, which is precisely why there can be rational disagreement about the morality of capital punishment - as there is about other important moral issues.

The absence of moral facts is what makes moral judgement necessary and inescapable. That's our moral predicament.

I believe you are lost on the above.

If you don't believe there are moral facts i.e. moral properties, how can you use the term 'morally wrong' like "I think capital punishment is morally wrong." When rigor is necessary, this is not acceptable.

What you should assert is you do not agree with capital punishment based on your personal opinions and judgments.
If you ever use the term 'moral' that is a categorical error, i.e.
"a property is ascribed to a thing that could not possibly have that property"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake
and thus engaging in pseudo-morality.

The moral realist abstracted, abducted and inducted from observations and evidences there is a property of morality within humanity and justify his stance with justified true moral beliefs on the various principles and contents of morality.

Note, I have just directed attention to what is Moral Skepticism, i.e.

Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism) is a class of metaethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible.
Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism: the view that there are knowable and objective moral truths.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_skepticism

This is why the checklist is important for you to know where you stand.
Since you deny there are moral facts, moral propositions, moral knowledge, your stance is rightly that of moral skepticism.
Show me if I am wrong.

Note the other terms like Moral Nihilism, Moral Queerness, Moral Fictional, Moral Blindness, Moral Deficit and the likes.
You need to research to understand what they represent.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Wed Sep 30, 2020 7:56 am

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Sep 30, 2020 6:58 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Sep 29, 2020 4:02 am Here is one supporting point for Moral Realism;

Straw man. To reject moral realism - and therefore moral objectivism (the existence of moral facts) - as irrational is not to adopt moral skepticism, just as it's not to adopt moral relativism.

For example, I think capital punishment is morally wrong, and I can explain and (I think) justify that opinion. But others think capital punishment is not morally wrong, for reasons they find persuasive. The realist/objectivist claim that there's a moral fact of the matter is demonstrably false, which is precisely why there can be rational disagreement about the morality of capital punishment - as there is about other important moral issues.

The absence of moral facts is what makes moral judgement necessary and inescapable. That's our moral predicament.

I believe you are lost on the above.

If you don't believe there are moral facts i.e. moral properties, how can you use the term 'morally wrong' like "I think capital punishment is morally wrong." When rigor is necessary, this is not acceptable.

Well, let's see. Could it be that to call something morally right or wrong is not to ascribe a property, in the way we do when we call a house 'white'? Where's your evidence that moral rightness or wrongness are empirically verifiable properties like whiteness? If they are properties, how can people rationally call, say, capital punishment both morally right and morally wrong? Are we all stupid or blind to the supposed moral property belonging to capital punishment? Ffs, THINK.

What you should assert is you do not agree with capital punishment based on your personal opinions and judgments.
If you ever use the term 'moral' that is a categorical error, i.e.
"a property is ascribed to a thing that could not possibly have that property"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake
and thus engaging in pseudo-morality.

Is calling a painting 'beautiful' ascribing a property to it? And would calling it 'ugly' be to ignore the actual property it has? Ffs, THINK.

The moral realist abstracted, abducted and inducted from observations and evidences there is a property of morality within humanity and justify his stance with justified true moral beliefs on the various principles and contents of morality.

What a confused mess. That humans have the capacity to make moral judgements could be described as a property of humans. But that doesn't mean the things we judge to be morally right or wrong 'have' the property of moral rightness or wrongness. That's nonsense.

Note, I have just directed attention to what is Moral Skepticism, i.e.

Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism) is a class of metaethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal claim that moral knowledge is impossible.
Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism: the view that there are knowable and objective moral truths.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_skepticism

This is why the checklist is important for you to know where you stand.
Since you deny there are moral facts, moral propositions, moral knowledge, your stance is rightly that of moral skepticism.
Show me if I am wrong.

The comfort of labels? It's the actual claims and arguments that count. By all means call my position 'moral skepticism' if you wish. Or call it 'moral non-cognitivism'. But so what?

Note the other terms like Moral Nihilism, Moral Queerness, Moral Fictional, Moral Blindness, Moral Deficit and the likes.
You need to research to understand what they represent.

Fuck off. You need to actually think about the issues, rather than collect labels and give them capital letters, as though that makes them seem important.

The absence of moral facts is what makes moral judgement necessary and inescapable.

mebbe so

probably, though, moral judgement is necessary cuz man is not a robot but is instead a free will who must choose to abide moral fact or ignore it

henry quirk wrote: ↑Wed Sep 30, 2020 2:12 pm The absence of moral facts is what makes moral judgement necessary and inescapable.

mebbe so

probably, though, moral judgement is necessary cuz man is not a robot but is instead a free will who must choose to abide moral fact or ignore it

If a fact of any kind is what we say it is, then ignoring it makes no difference. It remains a fact. And if a fact is not what we say it is, then the claim that there's such thing as a moral fact is incoherent. Can't have it both ways.

Demonstrate the existence of a moral fact. And 'a person owns herself, so it's morally wrong to own her' doesn't do the biz, because the premise doesn't entail the conclusion.

If a fact of any kind is what we say it is, then ignoring it makes no difference. It remains a fact. And if a fact is not what we say it is, then the claim that there's such thing as a moral fact is incoherent. Can't have it both ways.

a man can choose to ignore that fire is hot...he can ignore fact, yes

and: I never said ignorin' moral fact invalidates it

henry quirk wrote: ↑Wed Sep 30, 2020 6:38 pm If a fact of any kind is what we say it is, then ignoring it makes no difference. It remains a fact. And if a fact is not what we say it is, then the claim that there's such thing as a moral fact is incoherent. Can't have it both ways.

a man can choose to ignore that fire is hot...he can ignore fact, yes

and: I never said ignorin' moral fact invalidates it

So we're back to the claim that there are moral facts, whether or not we ignore them. Fire is hot, and we can demonstrate it. How can we demonstrate that, say, slavery is morally wrong? Is that the same kind of demonstration?