Philosophy Now Forum

Thick Ethical Concepts
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thic ... -concepts/

2.1 The Is-Ought Gap and the Fact-Value Distinction
It is common to think that the intuitive contrast between is and ought marks an important gap between distinct domains, and sometimes this gap is identified as a distinction between “facts” and “values”.

Thick concepts may be thought to challenge such dichotomies between facts and values (Murdoch 1970; Williams 1985: 140–5; Dancy 1995; Putnam 2002: 34–45).

Here are the Contents from the above article;

• 1. What Are Thick Concepts? Background and Preliminaries
  2. Do Thick Concepts Have Distinctive Significance?
  • 2.1 The Is-Ought Gap and the Fact-Value Distinction
    2.2 The “Anti-Disentangling” Argument
    2.3 Reflection, Knowledge, and Priority
  3. The Combination Question: How Do Thick Concepts Relate Evaluation and Description?
  • 3.1 Separabilist Views
    3.2 Inseparabilist Views
  4. The Location Question: How Are Thick Concepts Evaluative?
  • 4.1 The Semantic View
    4.2 Pragmatic Views
  5. The Delineation Question: How Do Thick and Thin Concepts Differ?
  • 5.1 Thick and Thin Differ in Kind
    5.2 Thick and Thin Differ in Degree
  6. Thick Concepts Outside of Ethics

I suggest those Moral-Facts-Deniers read the above thoroughly to understand the above is a restraint to their arrogance and false claims.
This OP's point together with other Moral Facts arguments will expose their No-Moral-Fact theory* as false.

* in addition to the deniers' claim 'Fact Cannot be Evaluative' and NOFI [No Ought From Is]

Views?