Philosophy Now Forum

Has this meta-ethical justification for Utilitarianism been made?

We often hear criticism of Utilitarianism being made through examples of when a Utilitarian choice would appear heinous - e.g. the 'Utilitarian Monster'. The reply from Utilitarians tends to be that the criticiser has miscalculated the utility produced and only looks at the issue in a short-term vacuum. There are also conflicts like about whether Rule or Act Utilitarianism would be best, i.e. what would best maximise utility.

My proposed justification (which, forgive me, I don't know if already exists) is, however, a meta-ethical justification for the goal of maximising utility itself:
Nothing, not even modus ponens, requires no intuition at all. If we say that this means that we might just as well use our reactionary intuition for any judgements, we may land on a dangerous slippery slope. What if we instead say that we must accept our dependence on base intuition, but use it the least amount possible? In The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle tries to justify the egoistic eudaimonism of Virtue Ethics by saying that eudaimonia ('happiness', let's say) is what we should strive for because it is the ultimate end to all our choices, consciously or not. In asking why someone does a certain thing, again and again, we ultimately end up with 'because I expect it to make me happy'. This seems to be the ultimate goal for humans (and non-human sentient beings). Aristotle was, of course, not a Utilitarian, he only thought that this reasoning applied to oneself. I would argue, why stop there? If happiness is the ultimate for a person, it is so for people, and thus this ultimate goal should be universal. My conclusion is thus that the reason we should maximise utility is that it is the meta-ethical belief that requires the least amount of intuition and is, therefore, the most consistent. Absolutism or Atheistic Deontology require a new intuition-based judgement for each new complicated situation, for seemingly arbitrary grounds.

Using the least possible intuition is a principle we apply widely. In mathematics, we established basic rules (1+1=2) that we then use in complicated situations (13*2.56+64.12/0.5). Here, we do not look at the complex problem and use our intuition to check what we feel the right answer is; instead, we only use the base intuition of why 1+1 equals 2 and calculate the more complicated answer based on the principle. Can this 'Principle of Minimal Intuition' be used in ethics?

If so, then from there, no argument based on reactionary intuition to a certain Utilitarian judgement is an argument against the meta-ethical claim. No action, no matter how repulsed we are by it, is wrong because it seems wrong, as long as it maximises Utility. Utilitarians do not have to prove that every single Utilitarian judgement actually fits with our preconceived notions of right and wrong if we look at it with more nuance. This justification does not, however, say anything about how to maximise utility, i.e. whether Rule or Act Utilitarians are more right. All this would do is dismiss concepts such as preference-utilitarianism (unless it is a mechanism rather than an ultimate goal), Utilitarianism with Absolutist or Deontological limitations, Virtue Ethics, Atheistic Deontology, etc.


Has this been said before? What do you think of it?

I assume you mean lawful happiness and as such Kantian ethics seems part and parcel of your idea for ethics, that is, of course, there is no plausible grounding in allowing the insane to do evil in order to be happy.

Mind you, that Utilitarianism lacks legislative force because the moral character of being law-abiding must also be fundamental to this happiness. As such, you can't deny people police services because they may be "too happy" for your taste.

It seems thus a given that people who enjoy democracy and human rights (UDHR) are indeed happy in their own right to such end that no extra theory may be needed.

So the way forward in practical terms may simply be revolvers, pepper spray, lie-detection array, 5 methods+++ combined and radio-based "airport"-scanner portals for warts of corrupt minds and crazy people as well as 500 conditions in people and animals.

Crime fighting continues?

There is plausible grounding in allowing the insane to do evil in order to be happy, if we accept the aforementioned base intuition. However, in real life, that would affect others and thus minimise utility.

I had more of an ethical theory perspective than a practical ethics one (concerning the legislative force), but it is quite sure that people are more happy with a police service than without - in the long run. But it does have legislative force when deciding what policies to priorities, whether the justice system should deter, punish, or rehabilitate, etc. But that is another issue entirely.

And I do not exactly see how Utilitarianism would, in practical terms, prescribe what you have listed, but maybe I misunderstood it.

Anywho, it seems you still use intuition when looking at a situation in which an ethical choice can be made, and use that to argue against Utilitarianism. This is what my question was more concerned with; whether this meta-ethical justification for the goal of maximising utility could trump this?

SCP wrote: ↑Sat Mar 10, 2018 2:24 pm If so, then from there, no argument based on reactionary intuition to a certain Utilitarian judgement is an argument against the meta-ethical claim. No action, no matter how repulsed we are by it, is wrong because it seems wrong, as long as it maximises Utility.

I don't see the need or value in any of that meta-ethics you propose when ultimately your advice boils down to the simple matter of biting the bullet.

When presented with the complaint that under some fanciful circumstance many people could be made happy by the secret torture of an innocent child, have always been presented with a dilemma. Namely to accept that under those weird circumstances then torturing the child is indeed the mortally correct action, or to limit their ambitions with some morals as imperatives style deontology. They already have a reason to grasp the nettle, I'm not sure that a second reason makes any difference, and I certainly don't see how it makes them more right than they were before if they do.

This rule of "least possible intuition" - that may be widely used but I've never head of it before - only muddies a fairly simple choice. And my intuition tells me that it isn't a very strongly grounded principle, I suspect it is largely founded itself on intuition.

The value I see in it is giving one a reason to bite the bullet.

The rule of using the least intuition possible is not something I came across, I made it up because I found it odd/inconsistent how people who accept that they ultimately want happiness, just throw that away when maximising utility in some situations seems distasteful. By 'widely used' I meant in maths, logic, etc. We don't re-evaluate our methods when a situation seems counter-intuitive. But yes, it is founded on intuition, but like '1+1=2', it is a little, unavoidable amount of intuition that works consistently (at least in maths, physics, biology...).