Problem with Aquinas' Third Way?
Posted: Wed Aug 31, 2016 8:17 pm
Here is another "issue" of mine with Thomism.
In his Third Way of proving God’s existence (ST 1a Q. 2 Art. 3), Aquinas appeals to our experience that some things can exist or not exist, since things are found to be generated and pass away. But when a thing passes away, on Aristotelian assumptions, its matter just no longer is organized by the “old” form; the matter receives one or more “new” forms, and something different arises. In Aristotle there is no pure disappearance of a thing into nothingness, and pure matter never is found separate from form. So Aquinas is only entitled to conclude that if all things are able not to be, then at some time they would all undergo corruption at once. He is not entitled to conclude that at some time there would have been nothing at all. So he is not entitled to his ensuing deduction from contingent things’ existence now that there must be an uncaused cause.
Maybe at various points all things do undergo corruption at once, as in ancient notions of the universe's ending in fire to be replaced by a new one. That's different from imagining some point in infinite time past when all contingent things suddenly would have become nothingness.
Am I missing something about the Third Way?
In his Third Way of proving God’s existence (ST 1a Q. 2 Art. 3), Aquinas appeals to our experience that some things can exist or not exist, since things are found to be generated and pass away. But when a thing passes away, on Aristotelian assumptions, its matter just no longer is organized by the “old” form; the matter receives one or more “new” forms, and something different arises. In Aristotle there is no pure disappearance of a thing into nothingness, and pure matter never is found separate from form. So Aquinas is only entitled to conclude that if all things are able not to be, then at some time they would all undergo corruption at once. He is not entitled to conclude that at some time there would have been nothing at all. So he is not entitled to his ensuing deduction from contingent things’ existence now that there must be an uncaused cause.
Maybe at various points all things do undergo corruption at once, as in ancient notions of the universe's ending in fire to be replaced by a new one. That's different from imagining some point in infinite time past when all contingent things suddenly would have become nothingness.
Am I missing something about the Third Way?
