Philosophy Now Forum

Hello all,

I'm new to philosophy so I'm sorry if the question is very basic. I just started reading Spinosa's "The Ethics" and I'm already stuck on the 5th Prop. It reads:

PROP. V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

Proof.—If several distinct substances be granted, they must be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications (Prop. iv.). If only by the difference of their attributes, it will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an identical attribute. If by the difference of their modifications-as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (Prop. i.),—it follows that setting the modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another,—that is (by Prop. iv.), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only. Q.E.D.

What I don't get is that he jumps from saying that they must be differentiated my their attributes (plural) to saying that two substances couldn't have the same attribute ((singular!). Why couldn't two separate substances be differentiated by having different attributes but share one in common? Such as two twins that share a lot in common but are differentiated by the style of there hair.

"Two or more substances having the same nature or attribute"? It leaves a lot open to interpretation. On the periodic table, for example, whilst clearly not the same elements, they are grouped according to attrbutes eg. halogens, all inert gases.

Both corn syrup and oil are viscous carbon-based substances.

they may have similar shapes but they don't exist in the same space...

-Imp

and if I recall correctly, Baruch finally claims that everything that exists is nothing but a part of god... all is one

-Imp

Read Leibniz on his Principle of the Indiscernibles. He makes much the same point as Spinoza, from whom he probably stole it, but he focuses more on the pre-Socratic idea that an "object" is only definable in the language of its changes. No object can be physically identical to any other because no object can even be physically identical to itself from one moment to the next. Metaphysics is an exploration into the nature of Being and anything which can be said to exist in a state of Being is also necessarily defined as existing in a state of Becoming something else. In other words Leibniz defined physical reality as a PROCESS.

To be fair to myself, I was trying to point out the lack of definitive clarity in Spinoza's words, and am agreeing with the question posed by the OP author regarding shared attributes and such.

I found the text by Spinoza as quoted above, completely incomprehensible.

Latter posts did not tackle the text; they compared it to texts of others.

So maybe the OP and I are not alone in not seeing any sense in the text, we just handle our inability differently from how others handle theirs. We say "it does not make sense to me," others say, "the question at hand is handled by other philosophers, X.Y. and M.N., in this way: [description of handling]."

From reading the entire thread, it seems to me that these great minds, the quoted and alluded-to thinkers, have discovered the String Theory, or discovered some of the essential elements of String Theory, but they could not put the concepts they discovered into words as succinctly and convincingly and clearly as later philosophers, our own compatriots.