Philosophy Now Forum

Obviously, a word like “red” does not have a redness quale, but only represents it. The only way to get the qualitative meaning from a word like “red” is to have a properly functioning interpreting mechanism. Sure, simulations based on representations like the word “red” can simulate anything you want about qualia, but the simulations are operating in a qualitative zombie way – no qualia present.

This all seems obvious to me, whether you are a functionalist, a materialists, or whatever. I just wondered if anyone disagrees that computers “simulating” qualitative consciousness are nothing more than zombies. Sure, they can “simulate” anything you want, but they are not qualitatively the same as when we experiences something like a redness quale.

a computer with the proper sensor device could distinguish between a shade of red that was 1/1000 brighter than another where the human eye couldn't...

zombie brains are good

-Imp

Impenitent wrote:a computer with the proper sensor device could distinguish between a shade of red that was 1/1000 brighter than another where the human eye couldn't...

zombie brains are good

-Imp

Which is MORE RED?
RED RED RED

The computer can "tell", but no matter how many times you ask it - it still does not give a shit about the answer.

All good comments. It appears to me that so far, everyone is in agreement, and my assumption that we have achieved a near unanimous expert consensus on this topic is sound.

Or is there anyone that still thinks differently, for any good reasons?

... computers “simulating” qualitative consciousness ... are not qualitatively the same as when we experiences something like a redness quale.

I don't see how we can know this is the case. What would be the observable difference between the computer behaviour and our human behaviour that differentiates their experiences from ours?

Brent.Allsop wrote:Obviously, a word like “red” does not have a redness quale, but only represents it. The only way to get the qualitative meaning from a word like “red” is to have a properly functioning interpreting mechanism. Sure, simulations based on representations like the word “red” can simulate anything you want about qualia, but the simulations are operating in a qualitative zombie way – no qualia present.

This all seems obvious to me, whether you are a functionalist, a materialists, or whatever. I just wondered if anyone disagrees that computers “simulating” qualitative consciousness are nothing more than zombies. Sure, they can “simulate” anything you want, but they are not qualitatively the same as when we experiences something like a redness quale.

You are very much behind in computer intellect, some super computers has simulated neurons and that way can grasp the concept of a cat, but it's knowledge through brute force, in coming years we'll have chips with neural network that easily can simulate human brain, and thereby comprehend human abstract intellect.

mickthinks wrote:... computers “simulating” qualitative consciousness ... are not qualitatively the same as when we experiences something like a redness quale.

I don't see how we can know this is the case. What would be the observable difference between the computer behaviour and our human behaviour that differentiates their experiences from ours?

Redness and Greenness qualities we can experience are obviously detect-ably different than sets of ones and zeros. Some people argue that redness can “arise” from the right “functional isomorph”. Even in this case, whatever this "functional isomorph" is that is responsible for a redness qualia will be detect-ably different from whatever is responsible for something different like a greenness experience - no matter how powerful the supper computer. Again, simple sets of ones and zeros can represent these “functional isomorphs”, but, by definition they do not have a redness and greenness quality, and you must know how to properly interpret them, and have a mechanism to do so, in order to get the redness quality meaning from them. In other words, the simple non functional isomorph ones and zeros must have a mapping mechanism back to whatever is the real functional isomorph. One is a zombie representation that must be properly interpreted, the functional isomorph is the real thing.

For more information about how to know this, and how to detect qualia, whatever is responsible for qualia, see this 15 minute video on detecting qualia: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHuqZKxtOf4 .

ones and zeros...

neurons fire and neurons don't...

zombie brains are good

-Imp

Impenitent wrote: Zombie brains are good

Hi Imp,

I didn’t reply to your first “zombie brains are good” post because I thought I agreed with you, that zombie brains are good because ones and zeros can be thought of as, and simulate qualia, even if they don’t have any qualia, as long as you interpret the ones and zeros correctly. But now that you have posted this again, I suspect I might be missing something. Perhaps you could clarify? Are you saying that either there is no such thing as qualia, or that ones and zeros are the same as qualia, and don’t require interpretation, or something like that?

Brent.Allsop wrote:

Impenitent wrote: Zombie brains are good

Hi Imp,

I didn’t reply to your first “zombie brains are good” post because I thought I agreed with you, that zombie brains are good because ones and zeros can be thought of as, and simulate qualia, even if they don’t have any qualia, as long as you interpret the ones and zeros correctly. But now that you have posted this again, I suspect I might be missing something. Perhaps you could clarify? Are you saying that either there is no such thing as qualia, or that ones and zeros are the same as qualia, and don’t require interpretation, or something like that?

computers and human brains are nothing but sequences of on and off switches... they are at base similar ...

interpretation comes from programming...

or habit

Zombie brains are good

-Imp

Impenitent wrote: computers and human brains are nothing but sequences of on and off switches... they are at base similar ...

interpretation comes from programming...

or habit

Zombie brains are good

• 
• RED

Everything you say is true, but you are still thinking in way that is qualia blind. One of the above has a redness quality that requires no interpretation, programming or habit. The word RED does require interpretation to know that it represents the other. My redness could be more like your greenness. You seem to be naively missing anything along those lines in your thinking. Can you tell me what "inverted qualia" could possibly be and how to prove whether or not my redness is more like your grenness?

Brent.Allsop wrote:

Impenitent wrote: computers and human brains are nothing but sequences of on and off switches... they are at base similar ...

interpretation comes from programming...

or habit

Zombie brains are good

• 
• RED

Everything you say is true, but you are still thinking in way that is qualia blind. One of the above has a redness quality that requires no interpretation, programming or habit. The word RED does require interpretation to know that it represents the other. My redness could be more like your greenness. You seem to be naively missing anything along those lines in your thinking. Can you tell me what "inverted qualia" could possibly be and how to prove whether or not my redness is more like your grenness?

one is called red out of habit

"your truth is not my truth" and I have yet to disagree with Lee

I remain a skeptic

-Imp

Hi Imp,

You remain a skeptic, OK, fair enough, we haven’t done our job adequately yet. So if you will, let’s go into a bit more detail.
You say: “my truth is not your truth” which means we both have knowledge that may be different. The specific example we are talking about is where your brain decides to represent your knowledge of this colored patch with something that has your redness quality, while my brain decides to use your greenness quality to represent my knowledge of the same patch. Out of habit, you call your “redness” red, while out of habit I call your greenness “red”.

Now a computer similarly can simulate all this. Instead of representing the knowledge of the colored patch with knowledge that has a redness quality, it represents the knowledge with something else that doesn’t matter what it is like, as long as it is being interpreted by hardware as if it was a “one”. Sure, my greenness can be interpreted, out of habit, to be the same as your redness, just as the “one” can also be interpreted as the same. All that is true, both the inverted qualia and the zombie qualia are good, in that they can both report that it is red. But the important thing to understanding consciousness, is knowing the qualitative differences between all of these types of knowledge.

Does that help at all?

that presupposes that the programmer is omniscient...

if you are saying that knowledge is subjective, I'd say that's at least part of it as one has no other perceptions ...

-Imp

Brent, you say the functional isomorph responsible for a redness quale is detectably different from the isomorph corresponding to a green quale. I can see how this must be so, a priori, for the isomorphs exhibited in a single brain, but I don't see why this must be the case when comparing, for example, an instance of the red isomorph in my brain with an instance of the green isomorph in your brain. And this doesn't look as if it answers my question above:

What would be the observable difference between the computer behaviour and our human behaviour that differentiates their experiences from ours?