Models versus Reality...
Posted: Sat Aug 01, 2015 1:48 pm
I've had this discussion with a few people here with regards to science where there seems to be a confusion on whether some people mistaken the models for reality. I open this thread because I think it is imperative that we recognize how models, as 'ideas', are both very real and can manifest what is real even with no mind to perceive these ideas.
Why do I raise this question and propose what I do?
When we think of the question of those proposing "God" as a source of all things at least in a Deistic way, many have argued Anselm's Ontological Argument as a justification on the basis that since we can conceive of the idea of a collective whole, this represents a certainty about reality itself. While I thought the argument interesting, when I first read it, I realized that the error lay in the fact that he simply begged this idea to be labeled as "God", like a variable or model to stand for this absolute 'whole'. Then he hoped that the readers would transfer this meaning to the religious interpretation of what "God" meant to most.
This transference is the problem, not the argument in itself. But this points to how or why most today do not accept using abstract ideas to represent something 'true' about reality itself. It is what Obvious Leo here on this site as well as others would see as "mistaking the map for the territory".
Anselm was not the first to try to use ideas as real things. The "forms" of Plato referred to the same idea with much better clarity. I believe, however, this topic has always been repeated through time likely from our initial origins of communication. The differences in the discussions on these are usually just renewed using different terms. In more recent times, this was what the fuss was about with Logical Positivists among other philosophers attempted to do by finding a means to demonstrate that logic itself could provide justification for all things real. At least, if we could find something substantially real about math/logic, when we use it in things like science, we can be more trustworthy of at least using logic and math to determine truth about the Cosmos.
Gödel'sIncompleteness Theorem was intended to end this topic once and for all by showing how there is no complete and consistent set of axioms for all of mathematics, including logic. This extends to ideas themselves. Yet I began to question whether we cannot ourselves question whether reality requires completeness or consistency with respect to the whole. And within logic itself, what seemed to be the problem came from how we create the rules of contradiction. That is, when we accept contradiction as an end to dismantle an argument, does not the very contradiction serve to motivate one to do something to find resolution by finding a place in totality for which these things can coexist?
This does not mean that we require accepting contradictions of people's arguments as mapping reality to anyone's wild opinions. Rather, it allows us to default to presuming any possibility as 'true' about totality as a whole with the aim of classifying things which operate contingently in our world as opposed to other ones. It aims to determine which descriptions of reality correspond to a one-to-one relationship between the ideas (models) and the real world.
I raised a comparison of the original problem using computer programming and architecture. I will reintroduce this here to show what I mean.
Human consciousness is akin to a computer program where the architecture represents our brain or the physical reality that defines how we are conscious. If we think of each experience we have as involving both processes and states, we can try to make sense of this as follows:
In all computer programming, the assembly or machine language predetermines the reality of the ability of a program to succeed. It is the hardware that initially precedes a priori the capacity of any program to behave. In the computer, the function of contingent reality comes from either memory or ports (which are indistinguishable from memory as data sources). To a computer, each of these may either hold a one or a zero for each bit memory or port possibility. As such, each of these act as variables.
The analogue for human consciousness is that the state of all information we experience uniquely (qualia) are as to the possible ones or zeros from memory or ports that get used to create the infinite variables. These may come from either our senses OR from our memories. Those from our senses are akin to the ports whereas those we internally reflect are our memories.
There are also many ways the electronics can be designed to create the architecture of the computer. This is just the same with respect the complexity of our brain to evolve in different ways. Like a computer program, our consciousness does not know nor care about the architecture as it defines how the computer programs or consciousness must 'obey' to some functional rules beyond their absolute control.
So how does a human infer whether the information and processes they are defined by are real or not? Is there a kind of test we can use to at least determine that something in us exists that is true a priori to our experiences? Using a computer analogue, one way for a program to do this is by assigning a variable label that maps onto a memory location. Even though the label only creates a symbol for the programmer to refer to, the hardware actually arbitrarily assigns a spot in physical memory that uses the label as a link to it. Now here when I say "arbitrary", this doesn't mean that the computer randomly does this. It can just do it by assigning any new defined variable name to consecutive memory units beginning from some designated starting memory. If this is the '0th' location, then each new variable places it in the next available memory, the '1st' location. But this starting point can be assigned by the hardware at any beginning location.
Similarly, we don't have to worry about how or where our experiences are placed in respect to particular spaces within the brain. But we just assign each experience as a variable from the domain of possible elemental experiences, referred to as 'qualia' by some (I assume this is a derived word to describe an elemental experience as a quality like a specific interpretation of what 'redness' means for sight data, or a particular pitch is heard as sound data.)
After assigning a variable label, a computer program may 'test' it by trying to see what value it holds. By default, this is usually zero since it represents no charge in the hardware. But upon this initial test, if it should return a zero, there is no way to be certain that any memory unit actually corresponds to this variable label. If it tries to check what is in some memory location that doesn't exist, it would obviously have nothing to 'return' and so would be interpreted as a zero anyways.
So what is needed is to then assign a value, like '1' to the variable label. Then test it again to see if it returns a '1'. If it still returns a zero ('0'), then this variable actually does not exist and so even the label we assign to it has no real link to anywhere. However, if it returns a '1', then the program has evidence that this variable location exists, even if it doesn't know where or why. To be certain it remains variable, the program can reassign this variable to become '0' again and then retest. This is how you can find a means to test whether there is some substantial meaning to an a priori existence beneath or beyond the program. And in a similar way, we can and do test this with respect to our experiences in kind.
For instance, on this site, click the "Post Reply" on the bottom or top of this thread. Without doing anything, you should observe a work space that is empty. If you wanted to determine whether it is functional or useful as a 'real' operating space (or function), you can't simply just see that it exists empty. Now place anything you want in it by typing something intentionally there. As soon as you confirm that what you intended to type appears on the screen, this proves that you can assign something to that space and get a 'return' that confirms your experience.
This proves that the editing space is a real 'variable', meaning that you can vary it with anything from your domain (the letters you can type) in that space. The "label" of the generic variable is "Post Reply" where the potential title you can place in the "subect" line is a more specific label you can opt to assign to your unique post. Even though you can also 'vary' the names of the labels, you don't get confused by assuming that the label IS the post. The "ideas" are actually the contingent data you type in the edit area. While you can imagine an infinite possible such ideas can be printed there, the data that you post is still a reality. The labels we used to reference them, such as the post subject name or number of position in the thread, etc, represent arbitrary labels as variable places to refer to. It is NOT important what you label these things as, they themselves do not act as the reality but rather act as pointers to the reality.
Therefore, this proves that "ideas" themselves are real, even if they don't necessarily require mapping to any real eventual posting. But where they are proposed, they exist at least in 'some' real form. This is what the Platonic Forms were intended to suggest.
I'll leave it at this for now to see if and how others respond to this so far as this is already long for an intro to this thread.
Why do I raise this question and propose what I do?
When we think of the question of those proposing "God" as a source of all things at least in a Deistic way, many have argued Anselm's Ontological Argument as a justification on the basis that since we can conceive of the idea of a collective whole, this represents a certainty about reality itself. While I thought the argument interesting, when I first read it, I realized that the error lay in the fact that he simply begged this idea to be labeled as "God", like a variable or model to stand for this absolute 'whole'. Then he hoped that the readers would transfer this meaning to the religious interpretation of what "God" meant to most.
This transference is the problem, not the argument in itself. But this points to how or why most today do not accept using abstract ideas to represent something 'true' about reality itself. It is what Obvious Leo here on this site as well as others would see as "mistaking the map for the territory".
Anselm was not the first to try to use ideas as real things. The "forms" of Plato referred to the same idea with much better clarity. I believe, however, this topic has always been repeated through time likely from our initial origins of communication. The differences in the discussions on these are usually just renewed using different terms. In more recent times, this was what the fuss was about with Logical Positivists among other philosophers attempted to do by finding a means to demonstrate that logic itself could provide justification for all things real. At least, if we could find something substantially real about math/logic, when we use it in things like science, we can be more trustworthy of at least using logic and math to determine truth about the Cosmos.
Gödel'sIncompleteness Theorem was intended to end this topic once and for all by showing how there is no complete and consistent set of axioms for all of mathematics, including logic. This extends to ideas themselves. Yet I began to question whether we cannot ourselves question whether reality requires completeness or consistency with respect to the whole. And within logic itself, what seemed to be the problem came from how we create the rules of contradiction. That is, when we accept contradiction as an end to dismantle an argument, does not the very contradiction serve to motivate one to do something to find resolution by finding a place in totality for which these things can coexist?
This does not mean that we require accepting contradictions of people's arguments as mapping reality to anyone's wild opinions. Rather, it allows us to default to presuming any possibility as 'true' about totality as a whole with the aim of classifying things which operate contingently in our world as opposed to other ones. It aims to determine which descriptions of reality correspond to a one-to-one relationship between the ideas (models) and the real world.
I raised a comparison of the original problem using computer programming and architecture. I will reintroduce this here to show what I mean.
Human consciousness is akin to a computer program where the architecture represents our brain or the physical reality that defines how we are conscious. If we think of each experience we have as involving both processes and states, we can try to make sense of this as follows:
In all computer programming, the assembly or machine language predetermines the reality of the ability of a program to succeed. It is the hardware that initially precedes a priori the capacity of any program to behave. In the computer, the function of contingent reality comes from either memory or ports (which are indistinguishable from memory as data sources). To a computer, each of these may either hold a one or a zero for each bit memory or port possibility. As such, each of these act as variables.
The analogue for human consciousness is that the state of all information we experience uniquely (qualia) are as to the possible ones or zeros from memory or ports that get used to create the infinite variables. These may come from either our senses OR from our memories. Those from our senses are akin to the ports whereas those we internally reflect are our memories.
There are also many ways the electronics can be designed to create the architecture of the computer. This is just the same with respect the complexity of our brain to evolve in different ways. Like a computer program, our consciousness does not know nor care about the architecture as it defines how the computer programs or consciousness must 'obey' to some functional rules beyond their absolute control.
So how does a human infer whether the information and processes they are defined by are real or not? Is there a kind of test we can use to at least determine that something in us exists that is true a priori to our experiences? Using a computer analogue, one way for a program to do this is by assigning a variable label that maps onto a memory location. Even though the label only creates a symbol for the programmer to refer to, the hardware actually arbitrarily assigns a spot in physical memory that uses the label as a link to it. Now here when I say "arbitrary", this doesn't mean that the computer randomly does this. It can just do it by assigning any new defined variable name to consecutive memory units beginning from some designated starting memory. If this is the '0th' location, then each new variable places it in the next available memory, the '1st' location. But this starting point can be assigned by the hardware at any beginning location.
Similarly, we don't have to worry about how or where our experiences are placed in respect to particular spaces within the brain. But we just assign each experience as a variable from the domain of possible elemental experiences, referred to as 'qualia' by some (I assume this is a derived word to describe an elemental experience as a quality like a specific interpretation of what 'redness' means for sight data, or a particular pitch is heard as sound data.)
After assigning a variable label, a computer program may 'test' it by trying to see what value it holds. By default, this is usually zero since it represents no charge in the hardware. But upon this initial test, if it should return a zero, there is no way to be certain that any memory unit actually corresponds to this variable label. If it tries to check what is in some memory location that doesn't exist, it would obviously have nothing to 'return' and so would be interpreted as a zero anyways.
So what is needed is to then assign a value, like '1' to the variable label. Then test it again to see if it returns a '1'. If it still returns a zero ('0'), then this variable actually does not exist and so even the label we assign to it has no real link to anywhere. However, if it returns a '1', then the program has evidence that this variable location exists, even if it doesn't know where or why. To be certain it remains variable, the program can reassign this variable to become '0' again and then retest. This is how you can find a means to test whether there is some substantial meaning to an a priori existence beneath or beyond the program. And in a similar way, we can and do test this with respect to our experiences in kind.
For instance, on this site, click the "Post Reply" on the bottom or top of this thread. Without doing anything, you should observe a work space that is empty. If you wanted to determine whether it is functional or useful as a 'real' operating space (or function), you can't simply just see that it exists empty. Now place anything you want in it by typing something intentionally there. As soon as you confirm that what you intended to type appears on the screen, this proves that you can assign something to that space and get a 'return' that confirms your experience.
This proves that the editing space is a real 'variable', meaning that you can vary it with anything from your domain (the letters you can type) in that space. The "label" of the generic variable is "Post Reply" where the potential title you can place in the "subect" line is a more specific label you can opt to assign to your unique post. Even though you can also 'vary' the names of the labels, you don't get confused by assuming that the label IS the post. The "ideas" are actually the contingent data you type in the edit area. While you can imagine an infinite possible such ideas can be printed there, the data that you post is still a reality. The labels we used to reference them, such as the post subject name or number of position in the thread, etc, represent arbitrary labels as variable places to refer to. It is NOT important what you label these things as, they themselves do not act as the reality but rather act as pointers to the reality.
Therefore, this proves that "ideas" themselves are real, even if they don't necessarily require mapping to any real eventual posting. But where they are proposed, they exist at least in 'some' real form. This is what the Platonic Forms were intended to suggest.
I'll leave it at this for now to see if and how others respond to this so far as this is already long for an intro to this thread.