Philosophy Now Forum

David Benatar in “Better never to have been” says that every life is not worth starting, because human lives are so ridden with harm, even the best ones, that is preferable not to be over coming into existence in a world of suffering.

He then maintains that it is preferable not to procreate anyone, and, if a woman happens to get pregnant, we should take on a “pro-death” stance, which means that we should defend the right not to abort, abortion (or means that prevent conception) being the preferable, “normal” case. This somehow reverses the view of pro-choice activists, who in the end support life while advocating women’s right not to carry a child to term.

He says that after he (in my view successfully) demonstrated that even the happiest lives are in fact very bad, and life is full of suffering. However, what strikes me as contradictory is that he says that coming to existence is also very bad because you cannot avoid death and one cannot live as long as one desires.

Now, since human life – and the conscious lives of any other animals for that matter – is equalled to a harm, how could it be that death qualifies as a harm, as it can be defined as the (irreversible) cessation of a harm? I cannot see how the two stances hold together: either life is an unmitigated harm or death is. If death occurs to end something which is defined as a harm, now that’s a good.

Death and suicide are bad things, that’s for sure, but in my view that is true not because they shorten life – which I believe is a harm, as Benatar maintains –, but because they cause pain to our surviving loved ones. They’re not bad in themselves, then, but only relative to their consequences for the people (friends, spouse/partner, relatives, etc.) that have to go through the experience our demise.

If you see Life as mostly suffering, then Death is a release. Those left behind suffer further for the loss of a loved one. My grandparents died and though I was sad, I also felt relieved that their suffering was over. Your conception of Life determines your conception of Death, and vice versa.

I totally agree. It seems that the value of a life is partly determined by your age and the likelihood to survive for a long period of time. People generally regret the death of a ninety-year old less than that of a fifteen-year old. That is true in spite of the fact that life is indeed something bad for both of them.

Logically speaking, Professor Benatar’s argument is less sound than it could be, if he says that death is a harm as well as life. If he advocates abortion (even reversing the common liberal pro-choice view into a pro-death view) and euthanasia (implicitly, by saying that there could be instances in which death is preferable over continuing to live), and states that life is so bad that no human lives are even worth starting, how could he say that death is something bad at large?

Yes, I'm not familiar with the guy you mention, he seems to hold a very pessimistic position though. Life is bad and death too. His position reminds me of Schopenhauer, who was then countered by Nietzsche. I wonder what the professor's point is, if life is bad and death too, what can those who are here now do about it? And then it comes back to making the best of your own life whichever way you can.

Yes, his position is reminiscent of that of Schopenhauer’s. He also takes pain over countering Epicurus’ view of death (“death is nothing to us”), a view that I thought was a logical consequence of such a pessimistic opinion on life.

Life, Death, & Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions
by David Benatar
p. 164
Not all share this view of death. One opposing perspective would see death as equivalent to pre-conception non-existence. Those who have this outlook will deny that death is a harm. They may even seek to suggest that my view suffers contradiction in that I think non-existence is preferable to existence, but then see the cessation of existence as a harm. If coming into existence is a harm, how can going out of existence also be a harm? The answer is this. Whereas pre-conception non-existence or the non-existence if possible people who never become actual is not something which happens to anybody, death (the cessation of existence) is something that happens to somebody. It happens to the person who dies. Whereas Epicurus is correct that where death is, I am not and where I am, death is not, it does not follow that I have no reason to regard my death as a harm. It is, after all, the termination of me and the prospect is something that I can regret intensely.

(Btw, I am a Benatarian)

Encolpio wrote:David Benatar in “Better never to have been” says that every life is not worth starting, because human lives are so ridden with harm, even the best ones, that is preferable not to be over coming into existence in a world of suffering.

He then maintains that it is preferable not to procreate anyone, and, if a woman happens to get pregnant, we should take on a “pro-death” stance, which means that we should defend the right not to abort, abortion (or means that prevent conception) being the preferable, “normal” case. This somehow reverses the view of pro-choice activists, who in the end support life while advocating women’s right not to carry a child to term.

He says that after he (in my view successfully) demonstrated that even the happiest lives are in fact very bad, and life is full of suffering. However, what strikes me as contradictory is that he says that coming to existence is also very bad because you cannot avoid death and one cannot live as long as one desires.

Now, since human life – and the conscious lives of any other animals for that matter – is equalled to a harm, how could it be that death qualifies as a harm, as it can be defined as the (irreversible) cessation of a harm? I cannot see how the two stances hold together: either life is an unmitigated harm or death is. If death occurs to end something which is defined as a harm, now that’s a good.

Death and suicide are bad things, that’s for sure, but in my view that is true not because they shorten life – which I believe is a harm, as Benatar maintains –, but because they cause pain to our surviving loved ones. They’re not bad in themselves, then, but only relative to their consequences for the people (friends, spouse/partner, relatives, etc.) that have to go through the experience our demise.

Death is a harm for the existent. With our overdeveloped consciousness, we are the only living things that get to dwell on our impending doom for the lengths of our lives, and then experience the dying in all its painful glory. That is why it's a harm, but again, only to the existent. After which, it becomes a benefit. But the harm could have been avoided in the first place by simply not procreating.

I'm very happy to see people who have actually read Benatar. Refreshing change.

Not for the good man, not for the good man.

Jaded Sage wrote:Not for the good man, not for the good man.

For every existent being who can dwell on it, until consciousness passes, then nothing.

i think that whether death is harm or not, it's still better than this "life", regardless.

Dalek Prime wrote:

Jaded Sage wrote:Not for the good man, not for the good man.

For every existent being who can dwell on it, until consciousness passes, then nothing.

Pain, not harm.

Jaded Sage wrote:

Dalek Prime wrote:

Jaded Sage wrote:Not for the good man, not for the good man.

For every existent being who can dwell on it, until consciousness passes, then nothing.

Pain, not harm.

pain is harm.

Benatar may be right...doesn't change the fact that, for example, I'm 'here' and prefer 'here' to 'nowhere'. 'Here'' is preferable cuz I can exercise some control over 'here', can work to better a circumstance I find discomforting. I suppose if I were paralyzed from the neck down, I might have a different view on the matter, but, I'm not paralyzed or stupid (in a crippling way), so living is a good thing (miseries included).

Joy is temporary; so is misery, so why wallow constantly in the latter when the former is possible (at least once in a while)?

I've had major surgeries on legs and head, several years of painful recovery; the loss of friends dear to me; the slow erosions of privation; betrayals by family; the wholly natural reminders that I'm finite and will not 'be' forever, and on and on. I'm 53 and fully expect more miseries of all kinds in the future, and I still want to be 'here', still believe the exercise of myself, in service to myself and those I (imperfectly, grudgingly) love, is better than 'not here'.

I get that some find living impossible...I can only offer (useless) sympathy cuz I won't walk down their road...I simply can't.

alpha wrote: pain is harm.

No it's not. If I reset a dislocated shoulder, I'm hurting you, but I'm healing you, not harming you.

Jaded Sage wrote:

alpha wrote: pain is harm.

No it's not. If I reset a dislocated shoulder, I'm hurting you, but I'm healing you, not harming you.

you might not be harming me, but i am being harmed by the pain (of both the dislocated shoulder, and its readjustment).