skakos wrote:. . . Could it be that our senses obscure our view of the world? Could it be that what we see with our eyes makes it difficult to see with the eyes of our mind? . . .
A degree of misrepresentation or dupery is tooted to be the case when the immediate world of sensation is compared to the experimentally inferred one depicted by science or scientific realism.
Bertrand Russell wrote: Physics assures us that the occurrences which we call "perceiving" objects, are not likely to resemble the objects except, at best, in certain very abstract ways. We all start from "naive realism," i. e., the doctrine that things are what they seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow are not the greenness, hardness, and coldness that we know in our experience, but something very different. The observer, when he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the effects of the stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be at war with itself: when it most means to be objective, it finds itself plunged into subjectivity against its will. Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false. Therefore naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false. [An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth]
John Gregg wrote:I have argued that things are abstractions. We create all things, we infer unity and mid-level individuation in the world. Seen in this light, consciousness has a much bigger job than just painting the apple red. It must create reality much more broadly, including the apple itself. Just as there are no red photons, there are no rocks, cars, dogs, or numbers. Nature presents us with a wash of particles, a continuous flux of quantum stuff, and we overlay this flux with stories about cars and rocks. [Realism: To what extent is the world out there the way it seems?]
Challenge-wise, the brain is after all deciphering the existence of a reality from status reports which originally concerned events happening to the body (stimulated, specialized tissues open to receiving these disturbances and converting / outputting them to transmissions in a nervous system). But both commonsense and scientific representations are still different takes on the same extrospective environment (i.e., both conform to the characteristics and rules of consciousness and intellect).
Immanuel Kant wrote:The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this formula: "All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is truth." The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism, is on the contrary: "All cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in experience is there truth." [PTAFM]
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No doubt I, as represented by the internal sense in time, and objects in space outside me, are two specifically different [categories of] phenomena, but they are not therefore conceived as different things [substances]. The transcendental object, which forms the foundation of external phenomena [outer sense], and the other, which forms the foundation of our internal intuition [inner sense], is therefore neither matter, nor a thinking being by itself, but simply an unknown cause of phenomena which supply to us the empirical concept of both. [CPR]
As to the above transcendent version of an "outer world" which the ancient rationalists favored... Whether that references general forms or things in themselves, such might be more the cause of a phenomenal world and its concrete particulars than the latter literally trying to represent it. Thereby the amount of deception or the faithfulness of the simulation in respect to the provenance doesn't even become applicable. No more than a dream is trying to represent neural structure or operation (its creator).
In a materialist view of human death, absence of everything follows the eradication of sensation and reflective thought. Which seems analogous to transcendent affairs (by definition) stripped of our spatiotemporal and qualitative, quantitative, etc properties. Noumena and things in themselves might best be viewed as nomological potencies that regulate the sensible world rather than being a repeat of more "stuff existing in a place". Plus, Kant made the ancient Greeks' intelligible world somewhat redundant by placing much of those universal, regulating forms in the mind [or distributed to most minds like Windows OS to most computers].