Philosophy Now Forum

I hope to publish the below essay “Bridging the Gap between Philosophy and the Science of Morality” about an approach to the mutual miscommunication problem between evolutionists studying morality and moral philosophers which one author calls a “travesty”. My approach explores the sources and possible cures of these misunderstandings using carefully chosen stipulated positions for an evolutionist and a moral philosopher (a rule utilitarian).

I am particularly interested in any comments regarding the accuracy and fairness with which I represent the rule utilitarian’s position and in the plausibility of her hypothetical response to the evolutionist’s answers to four questions about the subject he is studying. I have represented her accurately and fairly to the best of my ability, but recognize I have only a “scientistic” variety understanding of moral philosophy and thus seek your advice.

Bridging the Gap between Philosophy and the Science of Morality
By Mark Sloan 1-4-2015

“Evolutionary biology is young and excited, and would like to take over morality. Philosophy is old and experienced, and knows that this is a pipe dream and, even more to the point, that evolutionary biology should be ashamed of itself for thinking that way. … Moral philosophy, for its part, is a Johnny-come-lately attempt to intellectualize— to organize and explain, and usually to rationalize— a human experience that had long been a functional part of what it meant to be human. Long before there was any formal moral philosophizing, morality was rooted in the human journey both genetic and cultural. … Moral philosophy has for millennia been examining morality from every conceivable standpoint, and has developed and refined a strong analytical method. However, it is empirically impoverished, starving for data, lacking direction for its creativity, wandering through every conceivable cranny of thought space just to stay alive. It needs something more from the natural world than the vague intuitions of the proverbial man on the street and a set of historical views of how the human mind operates. In this context, the current dysfunctional relationship between moral philosophy and evolutionary biology is a travesty.” (Lahti 2014)

In this vein, David Lahti entertainingly and evenhandedly reveals the sometimes extreme mutual misunderstandings and resulting mutual disdain between evolutionists studying morality as natural phenomena and moral philosopher’s reacting to that work. This mutual misunderstanding has harmful real world effects. Moral philosophy is denied any substantial science based grounding in the natural world. Science is denied the collaborator it needs to make its rapidly expanding understanding of morality culturally useful. And the world is denied something it sometimes appears to desperately need, a robustly constructed secular morality grounded in the best science and moral philosophy have to offer.

The highly intelligent and well intentioned academics in both disciplines would have solved this miscommunication problem long ago if this was not the thorny, deep rooted, tangled mess it is.

How might we start hacking away at this mess in the near term?

Perhaps a carefully chosen simplified example could be useful. Rather than attempting to deal with the entire diverse spectrum of evolutionist’s and philosopher’s possible positions and misunderstandings all at once, we might more easily comprehend the problem by focusing on only one science of morality position and one relevant philosophical position. Understanding how miscommunication arises between these two specifically stipulated positions, and how they might be overcome, could shed much needed light on these disciplines’ larger miscommunication problem.

The stipulated evolutionist’s position:

“Morality in the evolutionary sense is a product of biological and cultural evolution. Both the biology that motivates moral behavior and cultural norms that advocate moral behavior share a common primary selection force, the benefits of cooperation. To be considered part of science, this hypothesis must show its explanatory power for 1) the set of emotions triggered by our moral sense, 2) the circumstances (harm, fairness, loyalty, impurity, etc.) that trigger a moral judgment from our moral sense, and 3) past and present cultural moral norms (norms whose violation deserve punishment). Science is silent on what the ultimate goal of moral behavior ought to be.”

The stipulated philosopher’s position:

“Morality deals with the good or right, ideal conceptions that are not components of the empirical world as it appears to scientists. The ultimate goal of moral behavior is to increase overall well-being. We can maximize well-being only by setting up a moral code that contains rules (rule utilitarianism). The correct moral rules are those whose inclusion in our moral code will produce more overall well-being than other possible rules. Determining what those rules are is an ongoing project in rule utilitarianism. If science has a role in morality, it could be in informing us about what moral norms will best engage our moral sense’s motivation for pro-social behavior and are hence most likely to maximize overall well-being. Science will never explain the full significance and meaning of moral goodness or justify any particular view of it.”

Many evolutionists and philosophers disagree with at least parts of the above positions and would argue others are more likely ‘true’ or more representative. But these stipulations were not selected due to them being ‘true’ or representative, but because they are useful for shedding light on how the profound level of miscommunications between the two disciplines arose and might be reduced. The evolutionist stipulates that science reveals morality’s function but is silent regarding its ultimate end. The philosopher stipulates that science might usefully inform us as to what moral norms are most likely to actually maximize overall well-being, morality’s ultimate ‘end’. If they could just communicate this to each other, at least this evolutionist and philosopher might find a way forward as allies.

The table below compares the stipulated evolutionist’s and philosopher’s understandings of key elements of their own category of morality. Common cultural views of morality are included for comparison. The key elements of interest are 1) how each defines morality, 2) if they believe that definition is consistent with the stipulated philosophical position, 3) what aspects of their morality are universal, and 4) reasons their claims about morality are true.
(I apologise about this tables low readability - its at the forum software size limit. A much easier to read version is at http://moralitysrandomwalk.com/sloan-1- ... -morality/ just click on the table there.)

So what might this stipulated evolutionist make of this stipulated philosopher’s claims? He would likely wonder what justifies the claim that so broad a concept as overall well-being usefully defines a moral code. For example, pursuit of beauty (such as art) and inner peace might increase well-being but does that justify calling norms advocating these behaviors moral norms – perhaps they are better defined as just cultural norms? By this evolutionist’s understanding of cultural and evolutionary morality, all moral norms share the necessary characteristic that violators deserve punishment (of at least social disapproval). He observes that ‘moral’ norms whose violation does not deserve punishment are about a different subject than either cultural or evolutionary morality. (Social disapproval is a form of punishment due to our concern for reputation. Social disapproval can cause the physiological pain of shame.)

Besides, what is “well-being” anyway? Even the philosophers have reached no conclusion and some of them say the question is unanswerable. However, the evolutionists could be getting a glimmer of an idea about why this philosopher might ask what are to him incoherent questions such as “What makes this definition of evolutionarily moral correspond to what maximizes good?”

Now look at the table from the philosopher’s perspective. First, she might be surprised that the evolutionist fully understands and has no concern at all that some behaviors that are evolutionarily moral will not maximize overall well-being (such as behaviors that increase cooperation in an in-group by in some way exploiting out-groups which are commonly judged immoral in the modern world.) Second, the philosopher might be pleased to see that at least this evolutionist’s claims about morality are firmly grounded in both personal (our moral sense) and cultural concepts of morality. Finally, this evolutionist claims he tests his hypothesis’ explanatory power against all past and present culture norms, no matter how diverse, contradictory, and bizarre. Explaining all that, as well as our moral sense, and contradicting no known facts, may appear, even to the stipulated philosopher, to provide credible support for the hypothesis being scientifically ‘true’.

But is there anything more here than some science about how and why people became the remarkably cooperative species we are and past and present moral codes were what they were and are? Is there anything of relevance here for moral philosophy?

Our philosopher may begin to wonder if the evolutionist’s universally moral subset of evolutionarily moral behaviors is a candidate for the basis of the moral code that is most likely to achieve overall well-being. She also may begin to wonder if ‘moral’ norms whose violation does not deserve punishment, such as advocacy to pursue inner peace or beauty in the arts, are most usefully defined as part of a moral code or just as cultural norms that increase overall well-being.

The stipulated philosopher’s and stipulated evolutionist’s positions here were chosen to make them ultimately compatible provided they came to understand what the other refers to when they talk about what is evolutionarily moral or philosophically moral. Reduced miscommunication appears be a readily obtainable goal for these two once they accept that the other is now, and for the foreseeable future will be, not ‘wrong’, just talking about different, partially overlapping categories of behavior. As people can today easily simultaneously discuss what is philosophically moral and what is culturally moral, in the future what is evolutionarily moral may be included in the conversation and confuse no one.


Notes:
1. Cooperation strategies (and their elements) that are independent of the existence of separate groups are universally moral – moral in all cultures - according to the stipulated evolutionist. These are cooperation strategies that work even if everyone you meet is in your circle of moral concern. Universally moral elements include compassion, fairness, and indignation at exploitation of compassion and generosity.
2. Cooperation strategies are not universally moral if they are dependent on exploiting outgroups as threats (such as homosexuals or simply strangers, as with xenophobia), outgroups as not worthy of full moral consideration (such as women, other tribes, and other races), or are dependent on using markers of membership and commitment to a subgroup (such as circumcision and not trimming beards or eating pigs). Cooperation strategy elements can be “evolutionarily moral” while culturally, and philosophically, immoral.
3. The data sets for this evolutionist’s hypothesis explanatory power are as listed above in the evolutionist’s stipulated position.

Reference:
Lahti, David C., (2014). On the Partnership between Natural and Moral Philosophy. In Understanding Moral Sentiments: Darwinian Perspectives? Putnam, Hilary, Neiman, Susan, and Schloss, Jeffrey P., editors. Transaction Publishers

...veeeryyyy looooong talkative post, shorten it by half.

Hex, if you want shorter:

There are almost universally extreme mutual misunderstandings and resulting mutual disdain between evolutionists studying morality as natural phenomena and moral philosopher’s reacting to that work. This mutual misunderstanding has harmful real world effects. Moral philosophy is denied any substantial science based grounding in the natural world. Science is denied the collaborator it needs to make its rapidly expanding understanding of morality culturally useful. And the world is denied something it sometimes appears to desperately need, a robustly constructed secular morality grounded in the best science and moral philosophy have to offer.

This miscommunication can be overcome by the recognition by both evolutionists studying morality and moral philosophers that the other is now, and for the foreseeable future will be, not ‘wrong’, just talking about different, partially overlapping categories of behavior.

The three major categories of moral behavior are what is philosophically moral, culturally moral, and evolutionarily moral. They are different categories of behaviors. It should be expected that the three categories of behaviors should have different origins, functions, and ultimate goals (or no ultimate goal in the case of what is evolutionarily moral).

Of the three categories, the newest on the block is what is philosophically moral; an intellectual construct with no necessary connection with what is evolutionarily or culturally moral.

Moral philosophy is a Johnny-come-lately attempt to intellectualize a human experience that is at the core of what it means to be human. Evolutionary morality, and its child cultural morality, was all of the moral world for humans before Moral Philosophy emerged on the scene.

Evolutionists = Darwinists?

If yes, then how exactly are their morals conflicting? You need to give some examples.

In the above essay, I explore a hypothetical interaction between an evolutionist working on morality and a moral philosopher. Have I represented the philosopher's rule utilitarian position accurately and fairly?

The stipulated philosopher’s position:

“Morality deals with the good or right, ideal conceptions that are not components of the empirical world as it appears to scientists. The ultimate goal of moral behavior is to increase overall well-being. We can maximize well-being only by setting up a moral code that contains rules (rule utilitarianism). The correct moral rules are those whose inclusion in our moral code will produce more overall well-being than other possible rules. Determining what those rules are is an ongoing project in rule utilitarianism. If science has a role in morality, it could be in informing us about what moral norms will best engage our moral sense’s motivation for pro-social behavior and are hence most likely to maximize overall well-being. Science will never explain the full significance and meaning of moral goodness or justify any particular view of it.”

The stipulated evolutionist’s position:

“Morality in the evolutionary sense is a product of biological and cultural evolution. Both the biology that motivates moral behavior and cultural norms that advocate moral behavior share a common primary selection force, the benefits of cooperation. To be considered part of science, this hypothesis must show its explanatory power for 1) the set of emotions triggered by our moral sense, 2) the circumstances (harm, fairness, loyalty, impurity, etc.) that trigger a moral judgment from our moral sense, and 3) past and present cultural moral norms (norms whose violation deserve punishment). Science is silent on what the ultimate goal of moral behavior ought to be.”

Dude, what you have presented is purely nonsense and babble, no real arguments only some weird postulations that doesn't add up.

Perhaps being simpler would help.

By revealing the evolutionary function of our moral sense, increasing the benefits of cooperation, science has revealed the universal source (and function) of our moral intuitions. This knowledge about what ‘is’ reveals how to design moral codes that fit people “like a key in a well-oiled lock, because this key (the evolutionary function of morality) is what shaped this lock, our moral sense”. No crossing of the is/ought barrier is required. If societies, or moral philosophers, can decide on an ultimate goal for enforcing moral codes, science is ready to provide the same category of knowledge it always does, instrumentally useful knowledge.

I agree with Lahti’s assertion that “(Moral philosophy) is empirically impoverished, starving for data, lacking direction for its creativity, wandering through every conceivable cranny of thought space just to stay alive. It needs something more from the natural world than the vague intuitions of the proverbial man on the street and a set of historical views of how the human mind operates”

As well as “… the current dysfunctional relationship between moral philosophy and evolutionary biology is a travesty”.

Is there anyone here who thinks either or both assertions are false?

markus7 wrote:Perhaps being simpler would help.

...evolutionary function of our moral sense, increasing the benefits of cooperation... useful knowledge.

I agree “(Moral philosophy) is empirically impoverished,... needs something more ... than ... vague intuitions ... and ... historical views...”l

Being simpler yet would help even more:

Biological science studies (among other things such as genetics and the varieties of life forms) how the human species evolved and adapted to its habitat. It discovered that by cooperating and collaborating humans managed to evolve to the present time rather than becoming extinct. Over time the human brain developed nerve connections that remind us to cooperate; we speak of this as our 'moral sense.' Now we are pre-wired to have a moral sense, otherwise known as the conscience.

If we listen to it we will cooperate more, and thus we will get more benefits. Science explains all this to us. One branch of moral philosophy is known as Ethics. It teaches us that our ultimate purpose is to provide well-being for all members of the species. This both facilitates cooperation and cooperation helps us achieve a quality life for one and all. Hence we find that there is no conflict between Ethics and science.

In fact, historically philosophy has been "the mother of science" giving birth to new sciences. For when the vague, ambiguous, words of philosophy are sufficiently sharpened up, when they become more exact, they become terms in a network of related concepts which serve to explain and order the relevant empirical data. The data gets organized by the scientific system. This can occur in Ethics. It can evolve in clarity until it itself constitutes a new scientific theory. This will happen when its key terms are well-defined and are all related to each other. Good philosophy eventually ushers in good science.
Alchemy became Chemistry. Natural Philosophy became Physical Science. Philosophy of Mind helped give birth to Psychology (the Science of Behavior.) Etc.

Some of the data of Ethics are acts of altruism, of kindness, of compassion, of reverence and respect. Instances of appreciation, rescue, rehabilitation, heroism, empathy, moral courage, whistle-blowing, authenticity, fairness, justice, peace-making, etc. are also empirical data relevant to Ethics. These need to be ordered and explained; a new paradigm, a good frame of reference can do it.

Let us get to work and accomplish this. Then we will see new ethical technologies resulting - such as, for example, a proliferation of workers cooperatives - which will make our lives morally better.

Isn't a quality life what we really want?

Prof, thanks for commenting.

First, I assure you that, aside from a few outliers such as Sam Harris (who actually does not do science of morality work), the position in the field is “Knowledge about morality from science has no inherent binding power. That knowledge about morality, like all knowledge from science, is only instrumentally useful to achieve human goals.”

So have no concern about science ‘proving’ that the ultimate goal for enforcing moral codes ‘ought’ to be something or another. That is impossible; it would be a logical error (assuming the ought from is barrier still stands).

If a society chooses, as an ultimate goal for enforcing moral norms, quality life for all its members, or for all its member plus all conscious creatures, or whatever, science is becoming ready to inform us what moral norms will be most likely to actually achieve that goal. For example, science can inform us as to which moral norms are most likely to engage our moral emotions that motivate pro-social behaviors.

But the present state of mutual incomprehension and even disdain between philosophers and scientists make such collaboration almost impossible. Thus the world is denied a robust secular morality based on the best science and moral philosophy have to offer.

My essay is an attempt at beginning to reduce this mutual incomprehension.

But back to my question:

“(Moral philosophy) is empirically impoverished, starving for data, lacking direction for its creativity, wandering through every conceivable cranny of thought space just to stay alive. It needs something more from the natural world than the vague intuitions of the proverbial man on the street and a set of historical views of how the human mind operates”

and “… the current dysfunctional relationship between moral philosophy and evolutionary biology is a travesty”.

Do you think either or both assertions are false?

And do you have any suggestions for making the stipulated position of the rule utilitarian more accurate or more fair?

“Morality deals with the good or right, ideal conceptions that are not components of the empirical world as it appears to scientists. The ultimate goal of moral behavior is to increase overall well-being. We can maximize well-being only by setting up a moral code that contains rules (rule utilitarianism). The correct moral rules are those whose inclusion in our moral code will produce more overall well-being than other possible rules. Determining what those rules are is an ongoing project in rule utilitarianism. If science has a role in morality, it could be in informing us about what moral norms will best engage our moral sense’s motivation for pro-social behavior and are hence most likely to maximize overall well-being. Science will never explain the full significance and meaning of moral goodness or justify any particular view of it.”

Thanks for any answers.

Greetings, markus7

You write as if you have not read my threads here (and I know you are not obliged to have done so.) Yet it seems to me that if one wants to be aware, one should be familiar with the literature and with the latest developments in one's field of interest. For instance, have you checked out these links?

Note the date this was written, [July 2012], and how it expresses so many of the concepts you are now putting forth: - viewtopic.php?f=8&t=9278

The issue of whether morality can be objective, is a part of nature, and thus open to scientific investigation and analysis is argued here: viewtopic.php?f=8&t=9503 - also (in the first section) here: viewtopic.php?f=8&t=13988 - and in greater depth here: viewtopic.php?f=8&t=12179 :follow the link it offers to the paper "Basic Ethics." After you study it, we will be in a better position to discuss Utilitarianism further, as well as the other ideas it sets forth. It will definitely stimulate thinking !!!

As to the claim you made that an ought cannot be derived from an is, that view is outdated. See the argument that demonstrates that here: viewtopic.php?f=8&t=9669


After you consider the merits of the new paradigm for Ethics, have read "The Case for Ethics" - viewtopic.php?f=8&t=13302 and its follow-up post,"What everyone should know about Ethics," I would love to hear your response, for I respect your intellect, your aims, and your sense of values. It is indeed important to reconcile Evolutionary Biology with Moral Psychology and with Ethics. Interdisciplinary cooperation is a high value ...and you and I appreciate that. More power to you in achieving your goals! I wish for you, and for the rest of us, a Quality Life.

.

Prof, I briefly skimmed over the links (thanks for providing them) and saw nothing to disagree with. I certainly agree that several people have claimed to have shown how to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, I was not aware that any such argument (even yours) had become generally accepted in moral philosophy. In any event, I would suggest to evolutionists studying morality as part of science that they leave such subtle work to moral philosophers.

However, I actually have little to no interest in arguing, for instance, what the ultimate goal of enforcing moral codes ought to be. What I know of moral philosophy leads me to believe the question is unanswerable. I am content to let philosophers work on that and methods for defining self-consistent moral codes.

My present primary interest is in how to reduce what I see as the current tragic level of miscommunication between evolutionary morality and moral philosophy.

From the post:
“This mutual misunderstanding has harmful real world effects. Moral philosophy is denied any substantial science based grounding in the natural world. Science is denied the collaborator it needs to make its rapidly expanding understanding of morality culturally useful. And the world is denied something it sometimes appears to desperately need, a robustly constructed secular morality grounded in the best science and moral philosophy have to offer.”

The approach I am proposing is that there are three usefully defined moral domains. What is philosophically moral, culturally moral, and evolutionarily moral. The table in the first post answers four relevant questions about each of these three domains.

To avoid the complications of some multiple positions among evolutionists and many more among moral philosophers I used stipulated positions for both.

“The stipulated philosopher’s and stipulated evolutionist’s positions here were chosen to make them ultimately compatible provided they came to understand what the other refers to when they talk about what is evolutionarily moral or philosophically moral. Reduced miscommunication appears be a readily obtainable goal for these two once they accept that the other is now, and for the foreseeable future will be, not ‘wrong’, just talking about different, partially overlapping categories of behavior. As people can today easily simultaneously discuss what is philosophically moral and what is culturally moral, in the future what is evolutionarily moral may be included in the conversation and confuse no one.”

Any chance you might comment on the rule –utilitarian’s stipulated position and the ‘fairness’ of that representation?

The stipulated philosopher’s position:

“Morality deals with the good or right, ideal conceptions that are not components of the empirical world as it appears to scientists. The ultimate goal of moral behavior is to increase overall well-being. We can maximize well-being only by setting up a moral code that contains rules (rule utilitarianism). The correct moral rules are those whose inclusion in our moral code will produce more overall well-being than other possible rules. Determining what those rules are is an ongoing project in rule utilitarianism. If science has a role in morality, it could be in informing us about what moral norms will best engage our moral sense’s motivation for pro-social behavior and are hence most likely to maximize overall well-being. Science will never explain the full significance and meaning of moral goodness or justify any particular view of it.”

In case you were wondering where I was hoping to publish, I just meant on a website, perhaps one in an informal blog format.