Philosophy Now Forum

A NEW PROOF OF GOD

1) Because the set of all that is actualized must either eventually cease to be actualized or not cease to be actualized, then the set of all that is actualized must exist in either a state of eternality or a state of finality.

2) A state of finality must consist of the set of all that is actualized ceasing to be actualized in a state of True Nothingness where ABSOLUTELY NOTHING IS ACTUALIZED, including a Void because a Void is actualized by being a place where something could be put.

3) Because a state of True Nothingness must either exist or not exist, then a dichotomy with True Nothingness contains the two correct possible states of existence.

4) True Everythingness is a state of ABSOLUTELY ALL THAT IS LOGICALLY POSSIBLE IS ACTUALIZED, which exhausts all possibilities for actualization.

5) True Everythingness and True Nothingness are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaust all possibilities for the correct possible states of existence where existence means not requiring a cause to be real. Somethingness is not the exact opposite of nothingness, because Everything contains Something, but Something does not contain everything. Because the impossible by definition can never be actualized or be a true state of existence, the dichotomy does not have to account for the impossible and hence the impossible lies outside the dichotomy without the capacity to prove the dichotomy untrue.

6) True Nothingness cannot be caused, because anything actualized that could cause True Nothingness would itself also have to be caused otherwise it would exist in a state of eternality that would not allow the state of finality necessary to cause True Nothingness.

7) Because a state of finality must be caused, and because the only state of existence possible that could exist prior to a state of finality in order to cause it would be true nothingness, and because true nothingness is incapable of causing anything because nothing comes from nothing, then true nothingness cannot be caused.

Because True Nothingness cannot be caused, and because a state of finality would cause True Nothingness, then the state of finality cannot be correct.

9) Because the state of eternality must be correct because we are actualized, then True Everythingess is the correct state of existence.

10) Because True Nothingness does not require a cause and True Nothingness forms a dichotomy with True Everythingness, then True Everythingness also does not require a cause, and hence, True Everythingness was not created and is in a state of eternality.

11) Because neither True Everythingness nor True Nothingness can be caused, neither can be actualized.

12) More than one True Everythingness cannot exists, because each such True Everythingness could not contain the others, and hence none of them would be a True Everythingness.

13) More than one True Nothingness cannot be the correct state of existence, because then there would be something in the form of the existence of two or more True Nothingnesses and True Nothingness cannot contain something.

14) Because we know in our reality that the possible can become actualized, then True Everythingness must contain both the possible and the actualized.

15) A Constraint means power to limit or restrict what True Everythingness would otherwise actualize giving the Constraint the power to decide what is and what is not actualized by True Everythingness.

16) A Constraint on True Everythingness is LOGICALLY POSSIBLE, because True Everythingness must contain the possible and only a Constraint is capable of containing the possible in a state of True Everythingness.

17) Because ABSOLUTELY ALL THAT IS LOGICALLY POSSIBLE IS ACTUALIZED, then a Constraint on True Everythingness is actualized.

18) Because a mind is capable of containing the possible in the form of thought, then it is LOGICALLY POSSIBLE that the Constraint contains a mind.

19) Because ABSOLUTELY ALL THAT IS LOGICALLY POSSIBLE is actualized, but there can be only one Constraint containing the possible, then the Constraint’s one container for the possible must be the container that comes closest to being LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE.

20) Because a mind comes closest to being LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE, and because ABSOLUTELY ALL THAT IS LOGICALLY POSSIBLE is actualized, then the Constraint’s one container for the possible must be an actualized mind.

21) Because the Constraint determines what is actualized and what is not actualized having power to control True Everythingness, then the mind of the Constraint containing the possible must be capable of exercising the power of the Constraint in order to decide what is actualized from what is possible.

22) Because the mind is capable of a will, then it is LOGICALLY POSSIBLE for the mind of the Constraint to be capable of will.

23) Because ABSOLUTELY ALL THAT IS LOGICALLLY POSSIBLE is actualized, then the will of the mind of the Constraint is actualized.

24) Because the mind of the Constraint must be capable of exercising the power of the Constraint in order to decide what is actualized from what is possible, and because the will of the mind of the Constraint is actualized, then it is LOGICALLY POSSIBLE for the mind of the Constraint to will the possible into actuality.

25) Because ABSOLUTELY ALL THAT IS LOGICALLY POSSIBLE is actualized, then the ability of the mind of the Constraint to will the possible into actuality Reality must be actualized.

26) Because the actualized comes from True Everythingness and not the Constraint which only controls True Everythingness, the actualized although brought on by the will of the mind of the Constraint is not itself simply a thought, but rather an actual creation of True Everythingness allowed to be actualized through the mind of the Constraint.

27) Because a mind requires time in order to be actualized, then it is LOGICALLY POSSIBLE that the Constraint contains immaterial time.

28) Because ABSOLUTELY ALL THAT IS LOGICALLY POSSIBLE is actualized, then immaterial time is actualized.

29) Due to the actualization of the CONSTRAINT, the CONSTRAINT then determines what is actualized and what is not actualized, except that CONSTRAINT cannot determine that the CONSTRAINT itself is not actualized, the Constraint cannot make more than one CONSTRAINT actualized, the CONSTRAINT cannot create anything that would be considered IMPOSSIBLE and outside the dichotomy itself, nor can the CONSTRAINT make true nothingness the correct state of existence, nor can the CONSTRAINT create true everythingness because true everythingness cannot be caused.

30) Because time is a property of materiality actuality in the form of space-time, the Constraint also creates our material time.

31) Because the Constraint creates our material time, the Constraint is not subject to our material time.

32) Because the Constraint is not subject to our material time, then the mind of the Constraint is not subject to our material time.

33) Because more than one Constraint could constrain each other’s work, then only a single Constraint is actualized, otherwise it is not a Constraint on all that is logically possible being actualized because it cannot constrain another Constraint.

34) True everythingness cannot contain itself, because true everythingness first cannot be caused and second cannot contain more than one Constraint which would be impossible and outside the dichotomy.

35) The actualization of two logically possible but contradictory states would also be impossible thus lying outside the dichotomy, because two logically possible but contradictory states both being actualized would deny the actualization of the Constraint, because true everythingness must contain both the actualized and the possible which can only be correct if the Constraint is actualized to contain the possible, and the actualization of two logically possible but contradictory states would mean there is no Constraint and no such thing as the possible.

36) Because we know from the actualization of our own minds that knowledge is actualized, then it is LOGICALLY POSSIBLE for the mind of the Constraint to have complete knowledge of True Everythingness.

37) Because it is LOGICALLY POSSIBLE to have complete knowledge of True Everythingness, then the mind of the Constraint must have complete knowledge of True Everythingness.

38) Because the mind of the Constraint must have complete knowledge of True Everythingness, then the mind of the Constraint must be Omniscient.

39) Because the mind of the Constraint has power over true Everythingness in order to constrain True Everythingness, the mind of the Constraint must be Omnipotent.

40) Because the mind of the Constraint must have complete presence in True Everythingness in order to constrain True Everythingness, the mind of the Constraint must be Omnipresent.

41) The immaterial mind of the Constraint shares the characteristics of God the Father.

42) The omnipresence of the mind of the Constraint in material reality shares the characteristics of God the Holy Spirt.

43) The actualization of the mind of a man to perfectly reflect the immaterial mind of the Constraint to the fullest extent possible given the limited capacity of the human mind share the characteristics of God the Son.

44) Omniscience, omnipresence and omnipotence are the same characteristics of God.

45) The evidence that Jesus was the Son of God goes like this: One can hear a great masterpiece of music and infer that a Master composer must have been actualized in order for the masterpiece of music to be actualized. The Words of Jesus contained in The Gospels are a masterpiece of supergenius, and from them one can infer that the Master supergenius, Jesus, must have been actualized. Such a supergenius is exactly what one should expect from the Son of God.

46) Hence, a single being is actualized who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent and we call this being God.

Hegel said this better...or worse, I can't tell.

Hegel never said this.


The closest to it is Plato's and Aristotle's Plenitude.

1) Because the set of all that is actualized must either eventually cease to be actualized or not cease to be actualized, then the set of all that is actualized must exist in either a state of eternality or a state of finality.

The 'set of all that is actualized' = A
So you are saying that A must either eventually cease to be actualized or not.
You then draw the implication, A 'must exist in either a state of eternality of a state of finality.

Are you really speaking of the members of A, rather than A itself, when you say these things?

And what is a 'state of finality' - I've never heard of that before and it doesn't make sense, especially as contrasted with a 'state of eternality.'

@Wyman.

I am speaking of A - not the individual members of A.

A state of finality simply means A must at some point cease to be actualized.

John J. Bannan wrote:@Wyman.

I am speaking of A - not the individual members of A.

A state of finality simply means A must at some point cease to be actualized.

Well then, since I assume that your conclusion will be that God is actualized, I would need a better definition of 'actualized' before accepting your axiom or starting assumption - since the conclusion of a valid argument is only as true as it's axioms.

This is where I see the problem from the start: you are assuming that 'sets' are capable of being 'actualized' from the get-go. You are assuming that 'sets' have the same attributes as their members, so that a set is capable of existence like a physical object. That is by no means an axiom that everyone would agree to.

In fact, many people would say that 'sets' are a type of abstract concept or universal and that concepts are not 'actualized.' Further, they would say that God is but a concept created by humans and similarly not 'actualized.' So I believe your argument is circular.

@Wyman

Actualized means to make be.

A=all the jelly beans in my jar.

Either all my jelly beans must eventually all be eaten, or not be eaten.

Hence, either A is in a state of eternality or a state of finality.

John J. Bannan wrote:Hegel never said this.

I can't make any sense of this or of Hegel. It's all unintelligible.

John J. Bannan wrote:@Wyman

Actualized means to make be.

A=all the jelly beans in my jar.

Either all my jelly beans must eventually all be eaten, or not be eaten.

Hence, either A is in a state of eternality or a state of finality.

Well, I'm somewhat suspicious as to why we need to talk of a group of jellybeans rather than a jellybean. But so be it. So a group of things is either eternal or not eternal. I suppose so, but only in a trivial sense (see my post re: tautologies). Moving on.

A state of finality must consist of the set of all that is actualized ceasing to be actualized in a state of True Nothingness

No, a state of finality, being 'not eternal' by definition, does not have to degrade into a state of nothingness. It could be a state of change. No?

@Wyman

A change is not a ceasing to be. An ice cube may melt, but the water is still there. The water may evaporate, but the water is still there. The water vapor may come down as rain, but the water is still there. The rain may be collected and turned back into ice cubes, but the water is still there.

So, no, change is not ceasing to be.

John J. Bannan wrote:@Wyman

A change is not a ceasing to be. An ice cube may melt, but the water is still there. The water may evaporate, but the water is still there. The water vapor may come down as rain, but the water is still there. The rain may be collected and turned back into ice cubes, but the water is still there.

So, no, change is not ceasing to be.

Yep. It's all recycled.

@Melchior and Wyman.

I know it's not a state of finality. Notice that I said:

"9) Because the state of eternality must be correct because we are actualized, then True Everythingess is the correct state of existence."

I only used the state of finality to prove that a state of true nothingness is a proper and reality based question, thus leading to the conclusion that the dichotomy was a reality based truth. I was not at all suggesting that the state of finality was correct.

Notice where I go on to state that:


"10) Because True Nothingness does not require a cause and True Nothingness forms a dichotomy with True Everythingness, then True Everythingness also does not require a cause, and hence, True Everythingness was not created and is in a state of eternality. "

But then notice that I said:

"17) Because ABSOLUTELY ALL THAT IS LOGICALLY POSSIBLE IS ACTUALIZED, then a Constraint on True Everythingness is actualized."

And then notice that I said:

"29) Due to the actualization of the CONSTRAINT, the CONSTRAINT then determines what is actualized and what is not actualized, except that CONSTRAINT cannot determine that the CONSTRAINT itself is not actualized, the Constraint cannot make more than one CONSTRAINT actualized, the CONSTRAINT cannot create anything that would be considered IMPOSSIBLE and outside the dichotomy itself, nor can the CONSTRAINT make true nothingness the correct state of existence, nor can the CONSTRAINT create true everythingness because true everythingness cannot be caused."

Thus, I am indeed proving that the CONSTRAINT must be actualized in a state of eternality. Hence, the CONSTRAINT can never cease to be.

Where you and I differ is that I am saying that the CONSTRAINT is responsible for the creation of matter through True Everythingness, but as the CONSTRAINT and TE cannot cease to be, we do in fact live in a state of eternality.

Your recycling theory has a fundamental flaw. You cannot explain why stuff should be actualized to begin with. TE can explain why stuff should be actualized to being with. Your theory fails because there is nothing in Math or the laws of physics that explains why Math or the laws of physics should be actualized. Hence, you are forced to accept the actualization of an immaterial reality to account for the actualization of stuff.

In other words, just saying that stuff has always existed and recycles is an inadequate explanation because it does nothing to explain why that stuff is actualized, nor does it explain why there isn't more or even less stuff. TE answers those questions. You can't answer them.

OP is pure nonsense and babble, incoherent ramblings that only madmen can dish out in such elaborate ways!

John J. Bannan wrote:@Wyman

A change is not a ceasing to be. An ice cube may melt, but the water is still there. The water may evaporate, but the water is still there. The water vapor may come down as rain, but the water is still there. The rain may be collected and turned back into ice cubes, but the water is still there.

So, no, change is not ceasing to be.

Well, that was my point. You said that there are only two possibilities: eternality and ceasing to be. I thought you were putting change in the group of 'ceasing to be' which doesn't make sense. Are you therefore putting change in the category of 'eternality?'

If A is a group of 10 jellybeans and I eat one, then has A changed (but still exists), or has A ceased to be, replaced by A1, which is the (new) set of nine jellybeans?

@Wyman.

We both agree that change does not necessarily result in something ceasing to be.

Look at it this way. If at the end of the universe there is this lonely photon out in the utter emptiness of space with no friends and no chance of meeting new friends, what happens to the lonely photon? Does the photon continue to existence for eternity? Does the photon eventually become so lonely it simply ceases to exist? The former is a state of eternality. The latter is a state of finality. Get it?