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Alan Chudnow asks if there are any natural rights which can be derived from reasoning.

http://philosophynow.org/issues/10/Natural_Rights

Philosophy Now wrote:Alan Chudnow asks if there are any natural rights which can be derived from reasoning.

http://philosophynow.org/issues/10/Natural_Rights

"Conclusion

If ‘natural’ implies ‘all’ or ‘common’ or is notmeaningful, perhaps the question should not be: “Are there any ‘natural’ rights which can be derived from reasoning?” but “Are there any rights which can be derived from reasoning?” Most natural law theorists that I have read consider 'natural' to refer to certain common aspects evident in man's nature, such as rationality. It is obvious that all human beings can reason, more or less.

I suspect that the author of this article has not read the magisterial Natural Law And Natural Rights by John Finnis.
http://www.amazon.com/Natural-Law-Right ... ral+rights

Finnis defines 'natural law' as "the set of principles of practical reasonablness in ordering human life and human community " p. 280

There are various approaches to reasoning out rights. One approach, pioneered by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau is to define rights in terms of a social contract. This is also what the contemporary philosopher John Rawls want to do:

“Rawls’ theory is based on a thought experiment in which people, separated by a ‘veil of ignorance’ from knowledge of their particular lot in life (wealth, social status, abilities,…) reflect upon the rules for social life that they would make in advance to bind themselves, whatever their position.” Brenda Almond in P. Singer A Companion to Ethics p.265

If the idea of ‘natural’ is not useful, then rights in the social contract are defined on egoistic, utilitarian, or theological grounds. A citizen will accept the social contract because it is good for him or her; or the greatest good for greatest number of people; or God’s way. Rights defined in strictly utilitarian terms are based on specific objectives and in this sense lack some of the authority of an idea of ‘natural’ rights. As a practical matter, this may leave utilitarian-based rights on shakier ground as the social objectives change. For example, in the US there is currently a debate about the right to bear arms, a right that I believe may have been useful 200 years ago but not today.
Regarding the author's statement, "a right that I believe..." above, natural law thinkers do not consider the utility of a right to be its sole justification. Nor would they ever consider their belief (preference) to be relevant.

This article is very misleading on the idea of natural law. Read Finnis instead.

In the US Declaration of Independence, the Founding Fathers wrote:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident … that all are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

As self-evident, these truths did not have to be defined by reason. Analogous to geometry, where axioms cannot be proved, rights are taken as social axioms.4 In these arguments, rights are not proven, but provide the basis for generating proofs of political and moral theories. But of course this still leaves us with the question of how self-evident any rights really are."
(Underlined emphasis added)

tbieter wrote:

Philosophy Now wrote:Alan Chudnow asks if there are any natural rights which can be derived from reasoning.

http://philosophynow.org/issues/10/Natural_Rights

"Conclusion

If ‘natural’ implies ‘all’ or ‘common’ or is notmeaningful, perhaps the question should not be: “Are there any ‘natural’ rights which can be derived from reasoning?” but “Are there any rights which can be derived from reasoning?” Most natural law theorists that I have read consider 'natural' to refer to certain common aspects evident in man's nature, such as rationality. It is obvious that all human beings can reason, more or less.

I suspect that the author of this article has not read the magisterial Natural Law And Natural Rights by John Finnis.
http://www.amazon.com/Natural-Law-Right ... ral+rights

Finnis defines 'natural law' as "the set of principles of practical reasonablness in ordering human life and human community " p. 280

There are various approaches to reasoning out rights. One approach, pioneered by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau is to define rights in terms of a social contract. This is also what the contemporary philosopher John Rawls want to do:

“Rawls’ theory is based on a thought experiment in which people, separated by a ‘veil of ignorance’ from knowledge of their particular lot in life (wealth, social status, abilities,…) reflect upon the rules for social life that they would make in advance to bind themselves, whatever their position.” Brenda Almond in P. Singer A Companion to Ethics p.265

If the idea of ‘natural’ is not useful, then rights in the social contract are defined on egoistic, utilitarian, or theological grounds. A citizen will accept the social contract because it is good for him or her; or the greatest good for greatest number of people; or God’s way. Rights defined in strictly utilitarian terms are based on specific objectives and in this sense lack some of the authority of an idea of ‘natural’ rights. As a practical matter, this may leave utilitarian-based rights on shakier ground as the social objectives change. For example, in the US there is currently a debate about the right to bear arms, a right that I believe may have been useful 200 years ago but not today.
Regarding the author's statement, "a right that I believe..." above, natural law thinkers do not consider the utility of a right to be its sole justification. Nor would they ever consider their belief (preference) to be relevant.

This article is very misleading on the idea of natural law. Read Finnis instead.

In the US Declaration of Independence, the Founding Fathers wrote:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident … that all are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

As self-evident, these truths did not have to be defined by reason. Analogous to geometry, where axioms cannot be proved, rights are taken as social axioms.4 In these arguments, rights are not proven, but provide the basis for generating proofs of political and moral theories. But of course this still leaves us with the question of how self-evident any rights really are."
(Underlined emphasis added)

I think you are right when you say that natural law thinkers do not consider utility as a sole justification for rights. However, the Founders, who were Enlightenment thinkers were faced with a dilemma. That dilemma being how to come up with a completely secular constitution based on human reason and science rather than faith, tradition and a fixed hierarchy of political authority.

The term, 'natural law' contains within a number of possibilities such as common law,divine law, human reason. Some definitions may even turn out to be contradictory. I see Locke in his, "Second Treatise on Civil Government" as attempting to overcome this problem introducing natural rights into the equation. For Locke some rights are the result of humans living in a state of nature before there was any organized society. In this way natural rights servers a similar purpose to natural law without the additional baggage. Many see natural law and natural rights as being one and the same, but Locke wants to talk about both.