Philosophy Now Forum

Rebecca Hanrahan says that just because you can imagine zombies doesn’t mean they’re possible, or that they can tell us anything about consciousness.

http://philosophynow.org/issues/67/The_ ... th_Zombies

Philosophy Now wrote:Rebecca Hanrahan says that just because you can imagine zombies doesn’t mean they’re possible, or that they can tell us anything about consciousness.

http://philosophynow.org/issues/67/The_ ... th_Zombies

I think Rebecca Hanrahan misunderstand Chalmers in a number of ways. This is especially true in relation to how Chalmers uses the word "possible".

It makes no difference if a philosophical zombie is a product of intuition. It also makes no difference if intuition leads to solipsism. Now, clearly p-zombies are impossible in any empirical sense because of their very nature; they are excluded from the physical world because they cannot operate in our world. However, just because something is impossible in the empirical sense doesn't mean that it is not possible in some other sense, e.g. "intuition".

Rebecca is right when she says that intuition cannot be a basis for knowledge. But this does not mean that it cannot be used as a basis for obtaining knowledge. I see this as an important distinction.