Is all consciousness the same
Posted: Sat Sep 07, 2013 7:13 pm
So the question I'm asking is what is fundamentally different about two peoples self awareness. It may seem like there are obvious answers to this question, but I'm not referring to things such as experience, personality, appearance or spatial position, because these things are all qualities that can be shared.
What I'm trying to determine can be seen more clearly when we consider a baby in the womb, when it is fully developed but yet to be born, it is aware but relatively unconditioned by experience, and most of its experiences are sensations that are shared by all unborn babies, warmth, heartbeat and the common sounds of life around it. So at this stage, if it were possible to become each baby in turn, would there be an experienced difference in being each entity, or would it feel identical in each. I believe it must be the latter, which suggests that being conscious in an entity that has little or no individual distinctness, is in fact the same experience, and that the sensation of being a distinct individual is an illusion created only by a matter of perspective.
I believe it is this type of reasoning that is behind the Buddhist philosophy of a collective consciousness, or the oneness of everything. There is, and can only be, one way to be conscious, and what we experience as a personal self is all a matter of perspective, so it's just like a body with many windows, and the acknowledging agent within looks out on reality through many perspectives simultaneously, and thus building a truer understanding of reality as a whole.
So I believe there is a single state that is what we call conscious awareness, and that any example of its realisation is essentially the identification of a single agent, and what creates the illusion of individual existence is only the development of distinct perspectives.
There is also the question of communication between distinct entity's. If something is classed as individual, it is by virtue of either substance or quality. So if we try distinguishing an object in reference to its parts firstly it proves to be impossible in reality, and secondly if it were possible, that object would have no means by which it could communicate its presence, or react to its environment. It also isn't applicable to consciousness as this is not a quantity of substance, but a quality which seems only to apply to an event, rather than the substance taking part in an event, so the actual substance, or body, is not what we call consciousness, it's actually the event that can be classed as conscious. So if we allow that consciousness is a quality that is applicable to an event, then it would seem sensible to say that wherever that class of event occurs, the quality is indistinguishable in each.
What I'm trying to determine can be seen more clearly when we consider a baby in the womb, when it is fully developed but yet to be born, it is aware but relatively unconditioned by experience, and most of its experiences are sensations that are shared by all unborn babies, warmth, heartbeat and the common sounds of life around it. So at this stage, if it were possible to become each baby in turn, would there be an experienced difference in being each entity, or would it feel identical in each. I believe it must be the latter, which suggests that being conscious in an entity that has little or no individual distinctness, is in fact the same experience, and that the sensation of being a distinct individual is an illusion created only by a matter of perspective.
I believe it is this type of reasoning that is behind the Buddhist philosophy of a collective consciousness, or the oneness of everything. There is, and can only be, one way to be conscious, and what we experience as a personal self is all a matter of perspective, so it's just like a body with many windows, and the acknowledging agent within looks out on reality through many perspectives simultaneously, and thus building a truer understanding of reality as a whole.
So I believe there is a single state that is what we call conscious awareness, and that any example of its realisation is essentially the identification of a single agent, and what creates the illusion of individual existence is only the development of distinct perspectives.
There is also the question of communication between distinct entity's. If something is classed as individual, it is by virtue of either substance or quality. So if we try distinguishing an object in reference to its parts firstly it proves to be impossible in reality, and secondly if it were possible, that object would have no means by which it could communicate its presence, or react to its environment. It also isn't applicable to consciousness as this is not a quantity of substance, but a quality which seems only to apply to an event, rather than the substance taking part in an event, so the actual substance, or body, is not what we call consciousness, it's actually the event that can be classed as conscious. So if we allow that consciousness is a quality that is applicable to an event, then it would seem sensible to say that wherever that class of event occurs, the quality is indistinguishable in each.