Philosophy Now Forum

Julien Beillard argues that it makes no sense to say that morality is relatively true.

http://philosophynow.org/issues/97/Mora ... telligible

A classic case of confusing Moral with Mores . . .

If any thing is moral or immoral, it is so at all times and
places. On the other hand mores differ from time to time and
from place to place.

moral: Of or concerned with the judgment of the goodness or
badness of human action and character

mores: The accepted traditional customs and usages of a
particular social group

No, actually. I thought that at first glance too, and then I saw what he was really saying.

There are two types of relativism: 1) epistemological, and 2) moral. Epistemological relativism is easy to defeat, because it's self-contradictory. If there exists no such thing as Truth, then the statement that says so is not True either. So that's silly.

But type 2) is trickier, because, as you suggest, 1) is a matter of fact and 2) is a matter of value. We could say that morals are like aesthetic judgments...just matters of taste.

But what Beillard has got here is actually quite a good response to that. First, he points out that the observation that people disagree is a non sequitur with the conclusion "therefore there's no right answer." And he's clearly right about that. At one time, everyone in the world thought the world was flat. That didn't stop it being round.

So much for epistemological relativism. But moral relativism...hmmm.

He's forcing us to consider what would count as *evidence or proof* of moral relativism. It can't be simply that we observe people disagreeing...that's just a non-sequitur, like "People believe the earth is flat." He accepts that we could guess from this that NO moral codes are true, or that there IS some objective moral code. But he points out that the one thing we could never deduce from this sort of "evidence" is that morality is SOMETIMES true; because in that case, the word "true" loses any intelligible referent. All it could really be saying is "Sometimes people think one thing, and sometimes another," which, as he points out, is trivial and warrants no moral obligation at all.

Now on the other hand, he acknowledges that we can indeed deny the existence of ANY morality, but if we do we could not find grounds thereafter to insist on SOME morality -- which is the description of what the moral relativist tries to do. He's just saying, "Be a moral objectivist or be a moral nihilist: the one thing you can't do is be a relativist, i.e. someone who says there are *some* ("non-objective") moral obligations, because that hangs up in the middle, in no place we can make intelligible."

I think he's got a case...at least if we understand "relativism" not as a synonym for nihilism, but as a position which wants there to be *some* morality but not *objective* morality. I can't make that intelligible either.

Moral nihilism can not be the case, as everyone, everywhere has their own version of what moral truth is, as to one subject or another.

Moral truth can only ever be relative, when one, only ever, applies it to themselves.

Moral truth can only ever be objective, when one, only ever, applies it to anyone other than themselves.

The examples in the article, to demonstrate to the majority of readers, the immorality of certain moral codes, were of one choosing another's moral code for them. In this case, as I've said, it can only ever be objective. One may wonder where this objective view comes from, a valid question. In all circumstances, one must swap themselves for the person in question, that they attempt to project moral code upon. If then in fact, they see it as unquestionable moral truth, then it 'should probably' be considered objective, but to test it to the fullest extent, one would have to seek the council of the majority of people of all cultures, under the same circumstances, where they placed themselves as the one that experienced the ramifications of the moral truth. This then should be the objective moral truth amongst humans. Still, I see that as to the actual application of moral truth, upon someone other than oneself, it should actually be left entirely, to the relative moral truth of that individual, as they are the only one that is to experience the ramifications of that particular moral judgement. Of course, sound mind is prerequisite, to any judgement.

As to life and death judgements, I also appeal to the fact that each of us has been given life, by no choice of our own, and that death shall surely take us, through no choice of our own, or so the majority would certainly agree. This objective truth is that of star stuff, that of the universe, and/or that of a god, and as such can only be seen as absolute, an objective point of view, of the origin of life, what ever it's specifics. This then, is the proper platform to try and realize objective perspective, common to all beings.

This seems to me a nonsensical reply. If moral truth is relative, it cannot be morally obligatory for anyone to recognize it. For in that case, no one has a duty to anyone else, least of all to "project" themselves into the place of the Other.

If morality has any force of duty, and if we're under any obligation to recognize morality, there must be a universal principle that says so. But from where do we get that? You need to clear that up for me.

And how do you get the idea that morality is something the individual makes up for himself? Surely there are many problems with such a proposal, such as:
1) morality concerns others...in a universe with only one person in it, there would be no moral quandaries at all, no reason to ask, "Is it okay if I do X."
2) it fails to distinguish between what we desire and what we should morally do.
3) morality would never be an issue if desire and action were always the same thing. It's only when desire is one thing, and duty to act is another that morality appears; so what the individual happens to desire is not a useful datum in defining morality.
4) as Beillard suggests, moral "truth" (which by your remarks you seem to think exists) can only be in any sense "true" if it applies objectively. Otherwise the epithet "true" has no force.

In other words, the kind of relativistic "morality" you're describing seems clearly to be no kind of morality at all; it's merely slapping the moral stamp on whatever an individual happens to desire. But let us try to defend your case: even to prove that the desires of the individual have some sort of moral standing, such that we "should" honour them, requires reference to a universal judgment. So where do you get the universal principle that "individuals must be allowed to generate their own (sic) morality"?

Now, as for "the universe" or "star stuff," neither clearly has any opinion on morality; and if, as impersonal matter, they could be said to hold an opinion (surely a bizarre idea), then we would still have to explain why we were obligated to honour the universe's "preferences," as opposed, say, to seeking our own freedom. And in this discussion, "common" needs to be shown to have some kind of deontological force, if you want to use it to say that we have to realize "common" moral precepts.

I'm not at all convinced. You seem to me to be bluffing. If you're not, then explain how you get obligation to come from any of the things you mention.

Soren wrote:This seems to me a nonsensical reply. If moral truth is relative, it cannot be morally obligatory for anyone to recognize it. For in that case, no one has a duty to anyone else, least of all to "project" themselves into the place of the Other.

That's the old canard from Aristotle. It is not factual, not logical, and not lifelike.

There are many kinds of relativism. All of them are sound. From there, the problem is to also find the logics to make our models of it valid. Relativism does not respect Aristotelian logic, and furthermore, it is not bound to its dichotomy nor its exclusivity. The world is all gray, some lighter, some darker. It is in constant change. Our perspectives and the aspects of the world we see can also change from moment to moment.

Morals can be personal, social, cultural, or universal. The problem is pragmatic one. What does such Protagorianism imply? Is it OK to kill the enemy in war? Can that be answered with a simple, objective yes or no?

Actually, the Law of Non-Contradiction is not necessary to get at this, but yes, it works for that purpose; but I didn't use it. All I said was that I was agreeing with Beillard's observation that it's not possible to make a coherent account of it. If you think otherwise, feel free to show how it can be done. Oh, and if you really think the LONC is a "canard," I can only recommend a first year course in basic logic. You'll soon see it isn't.

Actually, you're also incorrect when you say there are "many" types of relativism, there are only really two (epistemological, moral). I think you're trying to say something like "relativists don't agree with each other often, which is probably true. But if you want to show that EITHER of the two main types is (what you call) "sound," you'll have to prove that. "Sound" (as your impending course in logic will one day tell you) means "conforming to logic." So if, as you say, "relativism is sound," let's see the logic to which you are referring. Spell out your syllogism. (That means, "Show me how you get that").

When you say, "relativism does not respect Aristotelian logic"...do you mean that relativists don't *understand* logic, or that they *refuse* logic? If that's what you mean, I heartily agree...but it hardly constitutes any defense of your point. I would rather think it a bit of an embarrassment to Relativists.

Your "perspective" argument is also a simple non-sequitur (there's that annoying beast, logic again)... the fact that there are "multiple perspectives" proves nothing about relativism. There are multiple perspectives on the answer to 2+2: but it just so happens that every last one of them but 4 is wrong. So what's the point in stating that "there are many perspectives"? That's the very fallacy Beillard just debunked.

You say "morals can be personal, social, cultural or universal." I really have no idea what you mean by "morals," then. If they're "universal," then by definition they're not merely social or personal. "Universal" means "always applying in every (relevant) case." That means "not merely personal or social."

Or do you simply mean to observe that individuals, societies, cultures and the human race have a habit of making up arbitrary rules and calling them "morals"? That's all I can suppose; but if that's what you mean then it's a bland observation that doesn't go to the point at all; the real problem is how to show that ANY of these levels of morals-making is justified. As Beillard says, you can be a Nihilist if you want to; but there's no such thing as a *rational* relativist. To be a *relativist* one has to perform the sort of self-deceptions that require the dropping of logic altogether...just as you advocate at the beginning of your message. But if you do that, then you've cut off the very branch on which you yourself are trying to sit -- because you are arguing with me, trying to use reasons to convince me. If you then deny the efficacy of reason, you're denying that ANY argument a person can offer, including your own, ought to convince anyone of anything.

As for the "war" question, it can indeed be answered...but it has to be answered in keeping with two things: 1) logic, and 2) the existence or non-existence a definite meaning, purpose or teleology for the universe. However, relativists are notoriously opposed to teleology, and you have already declared your mistrust of logic, so you don't have either of the two essential elements necessary to get any answer.

Bottom line: relativism has no rational defense. You certainly haven't offered one here, and you've told me you don't even believe in logic. So if Beillard is wrong, don't just say so -- prove it. Oh, right...you say you don't believe in proofs (logic again). How inconvenient. Well, where shall we go from here?

You sound convinced that your various positions are correct. Not good. It would be much better for you if instead, you mirrored Socrates' conviction that he did not know anything.

Where to start ... where to start ... It would be easier to quote Aristotle and show that his key arguments demonstrate fallacies of his own classical logic, nowadays all well documented: false dichotomies, strawman, circular reasoning, false analogy, ad hominem. He could get away with these because other people were less smart and more ignorant. And today, he's dogma, a demiurge of modern philosophy. Well, maybe later, if you are still interested.

Perhaps a fundamental understanding of relativism is more important, because there, I have more to offer.

A good place to start is with Plato. He was indeed a student of Cratylos prior to Socrates, as Aristotle snidely remarked. However, Plato, who was head and shoulders above Aristotle as a philosopher (perhaps more on this later), soaked up Heraclitean relativism, rather than ridiculing or ignoring it. Plato's entire work of 28 books, more or less depending on which expert one asks, consists of reconciling, or synthesizing Heraclitean relativism with Parmenidean binary logic (the one called Aristotelian today), in an attempt to establish certain, objective, universal knowledge of moral and more general Ideas. Did Plato succeed? Absolutely yes, in a manner of speaking. But only if you can accept his Idealism. Without his Ideas, all knowledge is relative!

In Plato, the best place to find a vague, yet incisive understanding of relativism is in the final monologue of the Cratylus, and in portions of the Theaetetus. In the Theaetetus, there is a lengthy discussion of Protagorean relativism and a short interlude of a 'secret doctrine' of Heracliteanism. These are the two relativisms that Plato and Aristotle were concerned. The others, metaphysical, ontological, epistemic, cultural, methodological, theoretic, contextual, linguistic, and so on, I will skip.

What I term as 'Heraclitean' relativism, is the consequence of incessant flux, and the dynamic interplay of all being, within, between, and with the environment. While it is possible to talk about 'things' that are objectively suspended in time and perspective (as Plato does), in general, all things evolve, including the cosmos. No thing is ever fixed, therefore universal truths about fixed things are impossible. (Please do not not give me that inane fallacy that my statements are circular. My statements are only semantic, not ontological things.)

The best modern example of Heraclitean relativism is Galilean relativism. All motion is relative depending on the observer. The ship is both moving and not moving at the same time, depending whether the sailor is on deck or on shore. The Earth is both moving and not moving. So is everything else. QED

There are many levels of Protagorean relativism. My coffee is too hot, our summer is too hot, we live in an affluent society. Each of these depend on the speaker or speakers.

Before I skip Aristotle, just one point. Aristotelian metaphysics is entirely subsumed under Heraclitean metaphysics! It is a subclass of fixed objects in a greater world of moving beings. A special case of a fixed slice through a world in motion.

This relation is analogous to a flat Euclidean geometry defined within a curved geometry. Similarly, it is logically impossible to demonstrate, starting with Aristotelian metaphysics, that Heraclitean metaphysics is wrong.

YehYeh wrote:...
Where to start ... where to start ... It would be easier to quote Aristotle and show that his key arguments demonstrate fallacies of his own classical logic, nowadays all well documented: false dichotomies, strawman, circular reasoning, false analogy, ad hominem. He could get away with these because other people were less smart and more ignorant. And today, he's dogma, a demiurge of modern philosophy. Well, maybe later, if you are still interested. ...

I look forward to it as I'll be surprised if this can be applied to his formal treatment of logic?

... However, Plato, who was head and shoulders above Aristotle as a philosopher ...

Depends what type of philosopher you are talking about I think. As Aristotle produced one of the earliest formalisms of logic, what did Plato do that was as good?

... Parmenidean binary logic (the one called Aristotelian today), ...

Is this right? As Aristotles was a formalization of logic and this approach is still with us today.

Not saying you're not right as the Greeks are not my forte but I've had to read a chunk of them so I'd be interested in your thoughts about what you claim.

Yes. Aristotle is an iconic figure of Western civilization, and foundational in the theology of the major religions. To even suggest that he may have been mistaken even on a single point is practically criminal. Perhaps it will take another 50 years of spectacular scholarly research to at least level the field.

Soren wrote:This seems to me a nonsensical reply. If moral truth is relative, it cannot be morally obligatory for anyone to recognize it. For in that case, no one has a duty to anyone else, least of all to "project" themselves into the place of the Other.

If morality has any force of duty, and if we're under any obligation to recognize morality, there must be a universal principle that says so. But from where do we get that? You need to clear that up for me.

And how do you get the idea that morality is something the individual makes up for himself? Surely there are many problems with such a proposal, such as:
1) morality concerns others...in a universe with only one person in it, there would be no moral quandaries at all, no reason to ask, "Is it okay if I do X."
2) it fails to distinguish between what we desire and what we should morally do.
3) morality would never be an issue if desire and action were always the same thing. It's only when desire is one thing, and duty to act is another that morality appears; so what the individual happens to desire is not a useful datum in defining morality.
4) as Beillard suggests, moral "truth" (which by your remarks you seem to think exists) can only be in any sense "true" if it applies objectively. Otherwise the epithet "true" has no force.

In other words, the kind of relativistic "morality" you're describing seems clearly to be no kind of morality at all; it's merely slapping the moral stamp on whatever an individual happens to desire. But let us try to defend your case: even to prove that the desires of the individual have some sort of moral standing, such that we "should" honour them, requires reference to a universal judgment. So where do you get the universal principle that "individuals must be allowed to generate their own (sic) morality"?

Now, as for "the universe" or "star stuff," neither clearly has any opinion on morality; and if, as impersonal matter, they could be said to hold an opinion (surely a bizarre idea), then we would still have to explain why we were obligated to honour the universe's "preferences," as opposed, say, to seeking our own freedom. And in this discussion, "common" needs to be shown to have some kind of deontological force, if you want to use it to say that we have to realize "common" moral precepts.

I'm not at all convinced. You seem to me to be bluffing. If you're not, then explain how you get obligation to come from any of the things you mention.

This is what I said:
1) Moral truth can only ever be relative, when one, only ever, applies it to themselves.

2) Moral truth can only ever be objective, when one, only ever, applies it to anyone other than themselves.

What I'm basically saying it that, as to the question of morals, the answer is contained in the golden rule.

In the article he spoke of an Aztec priest, sacrificing a human life, not his own, and someone raping a child. He used these two because almost everyone today, a majority, would agree that the priest and rapist's acts were immoral, but to the priest and the rapist they were moral, which is where the idea of relative morals comes from, where different people disagree on what's moral or immoral, especially in the case of a group of people, such as the Aztecs or some tribe of headhunters or cannibals.

In #1 above, I'm saying that if one wants to decide for themselves, what is either moral or immoral, they can, no matter what any other person or group says, as long as the ramifications of such morality or immorality only affects themselves. So a relative moral can only ever affect the one that believes it. In this case neither could the Priest sacrifice anyone but himself, likewise with the rapist. In this case the moral truth, would be purely subjective.

In #2 above, I'm saying that if one wants to decide for someone other than themselves, what is either moral or immoral, they cannot, if the ramifications of such morality or immorality is to only affect someone other than themselves where those that it shall affect disagree, especially where the affect is seen as negative. So to get to the objective perspective, seems to be the problem.

But I see it as this: It is contained in the majority of the entire peoples of the earth, where their belief is not tainted through possible retribution, and by that of the cosmos, especially when it comes to dealing death or harm, in a so called civilized world, where we are 'all' in fact, children of the universe. As Carl Sagan said: "The Cosmos is also within us, we're made of star stuff, we are a way for the cosmos to know itself.". We are the Cosmos, and the Cosmos is us. And as we are it's children, so we have children. The fact that the cosmos bore life, is in fact where the objective resides, for any consciousness that is capable of eventually finding all the answers to all it's questions, as to it's origins.

The objective truth of things, whether it be moral or otherwise, can only ever be found in the biggest picture of them all, encompassing everything, or everyone!

What's interesting to me is that you are using logic to try to "debunk" logic. That is, of course, self-defeating. If, as you insist, logic is not "sound" as a practice, then you can't turn around and practice it without thereby denying your own premise. That's why Aristotle's Laws are not "tastes" one can opt out of, like choosing chocolate instead of vanilla -- they're the basic building blocks of ANY logic or reasoning. For a good treatment of the state of this issue, can I recommend this month's Philosophy Now, pages 25-28?

A philosopher who doesn't believe in logic is like a physicist who disbelieves in gravity.

Empirically speaking the Golden Rule isn't a universal moral axiom, because many cultures deny it, and several (e.g. Nietzscheans, for example) have an axiom that is dead against it. If you think it is universal in spite of their disagreement with it, you need to justify your conclusion. Why should we, for example, not follow the road of the Social Darwinists and say that "devil take the hindmost" is the basic axiom of morality? I don't agree with the SD's and Nietzscheans, but you owe them a refutation if you're going to say the GR is the root of morality.

You write,
"In the article he spoke of an Aztec priest, sacrificing a human life, not his own, and someone raping a child. He used these two because almost everyone today, a majority, would agree that the priest and rapist's acts were immoral, but to the priest and the rapist they were moral, which is where the idea of relative morals comes from, where different people disagree on what's moral or immoral, especially in the case of a group of people, such as the Aztecs or some tribe of headhunters or cannibals."

Again, the disagreement of ANY number of people does not warrant the conclusion "therefore there is no answer," which the Relativist needs from it. The number of ways we can disagree with 2+2=4 is infinite. But one answer is still right, and the others are simply wrong. If Aztecs and cannibals think something is "right," that does not make it either objectively right or permanently indeterminate; and it can't tell us if it's wrong either. All it tells us is that Aztecs and cannibals perform certain actions. That's an "Is" statement with no "Ought." It's a complete non-sequitur. Surely that point is clear to you.

Incidentally, your approval of Socrates and rejection of Aristotle is, on every base you offer for it, simply ad hominem. That means you're rejecting the person, not defeating or proving his idea. You need to do is not to pile personal insults on Aristotle or personal praise on Socrates; what you really need to do here is to do what I suggested, and show the "proof" you use to convince yourself that "logic does not apply." )But again, if you use logic to do so, you've lost the point immediately by showing you have to resort to the thing you condemn.) So go ahead...let's see you do it. I'll watch particularly for that proof in your next message, so don't forget, now...

Now, in the last bit of your message, you actually verge on a truth. Not the part where you quote Sagan, because that's just a non-sequitur again. The Cosmos cannot "know itself" if it is strictly a product of material forces, any more than a rock or a dead stick can "know itself." Secondly, if this thing you call Cosmos wanted to "know itself," then you'd need to show why we are morally obliged to help it do that. But in point of fact, the only way your argument can make any sense at all is if the Cosmos is, itself, sentient -- i.e. that is, if you mean God. But then your theory would be that God doesn't know Himself, and is looking to us to help Him do it -- a strange and very religious view. and surely one that would benefit from some evidence.

So the Cosmos is "the biggest picture of them all"...so what? What property of "bigness" insures that it is the locus of meaning or morals? You'd better spell that one out too. But if you mean God, who would be a sentient entity, then you might have something on that point...can you elaborate?

Soren wrote:What's interesting to me is that you are using logic to try to "debunk" logic. That is, of course, self-defeating. If, as you insist, logic is not "sound" as a practice, then you can't turn around and practice it without thereby denying your own premise. That's why Aristotle's Laws are not "tastes" one can opt out of, like choosing chocolate instead of vanilla -- they're the basic building blocks of ANY logic or reasoning. For a good treatment of the state of this issue, can I recommend this month's Philosophy Now, pages 25-28?

A philosopher who doesn't believe in logic is like a physicist who disbelieves in gravity.

Empirically speaking the Golden Rule isn't a universal moral axiom, because many cultures deny it, and several (e.g. Nietzscheans, for example) have an axiom that is dead against it. If you think it is universal in spite of their disagreement with it, you need to justify your conclusion. Why should we, for example, not follow the road of the Social Darwinists and say that "devil take the hindmost" is the basic axiom of morality? I don't agree with the SD's and Nietzscheans, but you owe them a refutation if you're going to say the GR is the root of morality.

You write,
"In the article he spoke of an Aztec priest, sacrificing a human life, not his own, and someone raping a child. He used these two because almost everyone today, a majority, would agree that the priest and rapist's acts were immoral, but to the priest and the rapist they were moral, which is where the idea of relative morals comes from, where different people disagree on what's moral or immoral, especially in the case of a group of people, such as the Aztecs or some tribe of headhunters or cannibals."

Again, the disagreement of ANY number of people does not warrant the conclusion "therefore there is no answer," which the Relativist needs from it. The number of ways we can disagree with 2+2=4 is infinite. But one answer is still right, and the others are simply wrong. If Aztecs and cannibals think something is "right," that does not make it either objectively right or permanently indeterminate; and it can't tell us if it's wrong either. All it tells us is that Aztecs and cannibals perform certain actions. That's an "Is" statement with no "Ought." It's a complete non-sequitur. Surely that point is clear to you.

Incidentally, your approval of Socrates and rejection of Aristotle is, on every base you offer for it, simply ad hominem. That means you're rejecting the person, not defeating or proving his idea. You need to do is not to pile personal insults on Aristotle or personal praise on Socrates; what you really need to do here is to do what I suggested, and show the "proof" you use to convince yourself that "logic does not apply." )But again, if you use logic to do so, you've lost the point immediately by showing you have to resort to the thing you condemn.) So go ahead...let's see you do it. I'll watch particularly for that proof in your next message, so don't forget, now...

Now, in the last bit of your message, you actually verge on a truth. Not the part where you quote Sagan, because that's just a non-sequitur again. The Cosmos cannot "know itself" if it is strictly a product of material forces, any more than a rock or a dead stick can "know itself." Secondly, if this thing you call Cosmos wanted to "know itself," then you'd need to show why we are morally obliged to help it do that. But in point of fact, the only way your argument can make any sense at all is if the Cosmos is, itself, sentient -- i.e. that is, if you mean God. But then your theory would be that God doesn't know Himself, and is looking to us to help Him do it -- a strange and very religious view. and surely one that would benefit from some evidence.

So the Cosmos is "the biggest picture of them all"...so what? What property of "bigness" insures that it is the locus of meaning or morals? You'd better spell that one out too. But if you mean God, who would be a sentient entity, then you might have something on that point...can you elaborate?

First, I'd like to apologize for leading you astray. When I refer to the Golden rule, I do so, that whom I'm talking to, is more likely to generally understand my point, as most are familiar with it, but in fact I'm actually referring to my "Fundamental Social Axiom," that is actually a revision of the Golden Rule, that takes into account the critique of various philosophers. I changed it's name because I don't see that the concept of wealth, as mankind uses it as a weapon of superiority, has any place in such an important civil/social statement. It is as follows:

"Treat others as you would have others treat you, to the extent that all parties knowingly agree at the time."

I think that it is in fact a fundamental axiom, that speaks of morality, where it seeks out objectivity, where no one could stack the deck, of course only where honesty is observed.

The rest I think you misunderstand, and would ask that you show specific contradictions, as you see them, as I'm sure they are not contained within my meaning, while it is possibly not being conveyed with the accuracy that your understanding requires.

Concerning your Golden Rule axiom, you state: It is as follows:

"Treat others as you would have others treat you, to the extent that all parties knowingly agree at the time."


A valiant effort, but that doesn't work, for a number of very easy reasons. One is that (as I pointed out) the reciprocity principle is denied by various moral systems, so stands in need of proof (which you've neglected to supply). Another is that "all parties" can't "knowingly agree" without being of equal intelligence. That would entail that children, the handicapped, and less intelligent or educated persons would be at a disadvantage -- they can't be expected to "agree" rationally, but are very likely to misrepresent their real wishes and interests. What you really need is a principle that proves that mental capacity is NOT necessary in the judgment of a human being's worth or rights, or you've lost the reciprocity principle immediately. So this is cotton fluff -- an attempt to rescue a relativism you cannot defend.

I also notice (and I promised you in my last message that I would be watching for this) that you haven't presented your syllogism showing that logic doesn't work. That would have been really interesting to see. But maybe you're still working on it...I can wait.

The problem is that you could no more do that than you could draw a square circle. The Laws of Logic are so intrinsic to debate that you cannot work without them. For example, Aristotle's Law of Non-Contradiction is what you trust when you send a message and know that the words "relativism is sound" will be understood by your readers as an advocacy of relativism and rather than a refutation of it. Or when you write the word "the" or "a," and you send it in confidence that it will not suddenly turn into "the" or "what", you are relying on ARistotle's Law of Identity. So you're absolutely dependent on the laws of reason, and yet the semantics of your premises say those same laws are "not true." Well, if they're "not true," as you have insisted, then you can make no intelligible argument at all...for all arguments depend on Aristotle's Laws.

The simplest evidence of contradiction is simply in the statement "Relativism is true." For, As Beillard points out, we cannot think of anything we could mean by "truth" except "objectively so, in the real world." But "relative" means, "only apparently correct from particular perspectives, not universally true." So the very statement "relativism is true" is as nonsensical as the statement "Bachelors are married," or "Circles are square.

But maybe I'm missing your real point. In my experience, people don't become Relativists because they have good reasons to do so, but because of certain perceived benefits that taking on the cloak of a Relativist appears to offer them.

The problem, though, is that none of the "goods" people suppose they will get from Relativism get delivered. I don't know you, so I won't even dare to suggest why you want to see yourself as a Relativist (though feel free to say, if you want to). The Relativists of my experience have their own reasons. They advocate it because...

a) it allows them not to have to go to the hard work of having to discern truth from falsehood, and so "lets them out" of debates they want to avoid, and

b) in well-intended folly, they sometimes mistake it for an expression of respect for others, when really it's a way of dismissing different views as indistinct, or

c) they think that if they deny there are any standards of judgment, then they cannot themselves be judged...so they think it will lead to their own ultimate moral freedom.

In point of fact, though, Relativism does not do any of the good things they hope it might, and does a whole lot of bad ones as byproducts. It deprives them of standards for praise or blame of their own behavior and that of others -- therefore, they can no longer (with any rational consistency) call themselves "good" people, or identify even raw psychopaths and child-molestors as "evil." It cripples justice and truth. They also forget that turning off one's brain on a particular question is not the same as having solved anything. They also fail to see that when they treat other cultures or ideologies as "relative" to their own, they're simultaneously saying to those cultures and ideologies, "You have nothing important or distinctive to offer me or anyone else. You're just a 'flavour,' not something important enough to challenge my worldview." And finally, and most tragically, they fail to realize is that denying standards and refusing truth does not prevent those standards from being applied. In a court, I didn't know there was a speed limit is not an acceptable defense; and if there is a God behind the objective moral standards (as your last message inadvertently suggested) then at the Great Judgment, "I'm a relativist" is not going to shelter anyone.

So the issue of moral standards will not go away simply because Relativists would like it to disappear.

But I'm still waiting for that proof...

Soren wrote:Concerning your Golden Rule axiom, you state: It is as follows:

"Treat others as you would have others treat you, to the extent that all parties knowingly agree at the time."


A valiant effort, but that doesn't work, for a number of very easy reasons. One is that (as I pointed out) the reciprocity principle is denied by various moral systems, so stands in need of proof (which you've neglected to supply). Another is that "all parties" can't "knowingly agree" without being of equal intelligence. That would entail that children, the handicapped, and less intelligent or educated persons would be at a disadvantage -- they can't be expected to "agree" rationally, but are very likely to misrepresent their real wishes and interests. What you really need is a principle that proves that mental capacity is NOT necessary in the judgment of a human being's worth or rights, or you've lost the reciprocity principle immediately. So this is cotton fluff -- an attempt to rescue a relativism you cannot defend.

SoB-->--SNIPPED-->--to be addressed later.

Your points beg questions, that through the axioms observance, lends to the answers.

"To the extent that all parties knowingly agree," does not say that everyone is equal going into negotiations, but rather that before negotiations end, they must be, or one should not proceed, which is the responsibility of all parties. To reiterate: it is incumbent on the one of, so called, higher intellect, to ensure compliance with the axiom, if the other party is initially incapable, they must be made to be otherwise, or one cannot proceed. I don't see that negotiations break the axiom, which someone had previously asserted.

And before you say that both may be incapable to decide with clarity, it's why I added, "at the time," as there is absolutely no accounting for truths yet to be revealed in the future, and neither party should be held accountable for those, they have yet to understand.

knowledge and intellect with "Time" is the only thing one could never account for. Knowledge and intellect, at the time, are easy to account for, as I've demonstrated, it's called teaching, unless of course one is unteachable. In which case one cannot proceed without independent, unbiased, popular opinion that seeks to be objective at all costs. Of course nothing in this world is perfect.

I'm not judging a human beings worth, and can't see how you could possibly say so. It's all about treating someone, not necessarily how a sadist might want to, but only ever how they want to, unless of course they agree with sadomasochistic behavior. Then I guess you have a perfect match. But not by my measure. And there's your relativity!

The thing is, is that it really all depends on what we're talking about. For instance ones "freedom" to conduct their own life how ever they see fit, where it only ever affects themselves or those that wish to participate, should never be relative, as everyone deserves the same mobility to build their own world. To account for morality, in the way someone 'should' lead their, one and only, life, is to say one knows 'why' we are all here, and no one does. Only one that could know this, would then know our purpose, if there in fact be one at all. Contained within the one true purpose, is the only place one can find the truth of morality. So then that leads to one of my other axioms: "The only thing that we 'absolutely' owe one another, is to leave one another alone!" And where you want to interact with another, you have to do so in such a way, that you respect their version, of why they believe they are here, and of course they have to respect yours. There's your reciprocity, and your relatively. And it's also where my FSA comes in.

So it's not cotton fluff, and I can defend it, as I just did!

As to justifying my FSA, so too, do those other moral systems.

I see that all that don't agree with my FSA do so, so as to dominate, be a dictator, so they can have more than another, so they can swindle, be a king or a queen, have slaves or more power than another, so they can fancy themselves better, to use a group as their foundation, etc, etc, etc!