Philosophy Now Forum

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Tue Nov 12, 2024 2:55 am

CIN wrote: ↑Mon Nov 11, 2024 9:57 pm I might make one further point. There is another respect in which you and VA are similar. You have told me that you think objectivism is pernicious. VA has said that subjectivists must necessarily be tolerant of certain evils (I think he may have mentioned rape and torture). Both of you are making the same mistake, which is to attribute particular normative attitudes to people on the basis of their views on meta-ethics. This is impossible, because meta-ethical theories are normatively neutral.

At times PH's response is irritating [nevertheless a gentleman] but I am not too overly concern with PH's responses because regardless of whatever, I have benefitted from the exchange for my self interest in the expansion of my knowledge on Ethics.

Re my point re Moral Relativism [not so much moral subjectivism], there is an obligation to tolerate the 'moral' views of others.

You seem to be ignorant of this:

Descriptive moral relativism holds that people do, in fact, disagree fundamentally about what is moral, without passing any evaluative or normative judgments about this disagreement.
Meta-ethical moral relativism holds that moral judgments contain an (implicit or explicit) indexical such that, to the extent they are truth-apt, their truth-value changes with context of use.[1][2]
Normative moral relativism holds that everyone ought to tolerate the behavior of others even when large disagreements about morality exist.[3]
Though often intertwined, these are distinct positions. Each can be held independently of the others.[4]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_relativism

From the above, it is not philosophical merely to confine Moral Relativism to Meta-Ethics only.

If anyone were strictly to restrict Ethics to merely Meta-Ethics exclusively, I won't be interested in discussing. If you had specified that term earlier, I would have not bothered to respond to your posts.

You didn't understand what CIN wrote. Which is a shame because you kind of need to.

CIN wrote: ↑Mon Nov 11, 2024 9:57 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Nov 08, 2024 6:47 pm

CIN wrote: ↑Fri Nov 08, 2024 5:30 pm VA actually behaves a lot like Peter Holmes. The difference is that VA is 100% sure that he's right, and Peter is 100% sure that you're wrong.

Clarification, please. Which 'you' do you think I'm 100% sure is wrong? IWP? You (CIN)? Or just everyone else?

Me, certainly. That was clear from your attitude when we discussed my naturalist/hedonist/objectivist theory. You displayed total subjective certainty in almost all of your replies.

I hope I addressed your argument properly, by pointing out that non-moral premises - for example, from nature, such as that pleasure is 'preferable' to pain - can't entail moral conclusions, so that morality can't be objective. (I assume you accept the premise.) And I apologise if I didn't. But I'm afraid I can't remember.

If you'd be kind enough to set out your naturalist/hedonist/objectivist moral theory again, in its simplest and briefest form - preferably syllogistically - I and others could consider it again. But I completely understand if you don't want to!

And objectivists generally. Do you deny that you have many times stated as a fact that objectivism is wrong?

No, I don't deny it. My OP amounted to a rejection of moral objectivism. I'm 100% convinced that moral objectivism is incorrect.

Yet as far as I know, you have never provided either argument or evidence to support this view.

This is extraordinary. I've been providing both for years.

(I hope you understand that however many individual objectivist theoríes you successfully refute, this will never amount to a refutation of objectivism per se.)

1 If I've refuted every objectivist theory so far, that'll suffice for me.
2 I think I've refuted moral objectivism per se. There can be no moral facts. The expression 'moral fact' is incoherent. There can only ever be moral opinions. And the impossibility of ever establishing the factual truth or falsehood of a moral assertion is the evidence.

You could perhaps take a leaf out of Flash's book. He clearly doesn't agree with me, but he gives my theory a fair hearing. I'm sorry, but I don't think you ever really have. The reason I pulled out of our debate last year was that I found myself typing 'strawman' so often that I was forced to the conclusion that, for whatever reason, you were incapable of reading my posts as written.

I thought I gave your theory a fair hearing. But if I didn't, I apologise.

It gives me no pleasure to say any of this, because you strike me as a thoroughly decent guy whose normative ethics are very similar to my own. However, I think your entire attitude to objectivism rests on nothing but a kind of irrational prejudice, and as far as I can tell this is something you have not only failed to notice in yourself, but are quite possibly incapable of noticing. There is, of course, a simple way in which you can refute this charge, and that is by presenting a sound argument that refutes objectivism per se. You have no idea how earnestly I wish you would do this.

'Nothing but an irrational kind of prejudice' strikes me as grossly unfair. I think I've backed up every one of my claims and arguments rationally. Please give an example.

I'm sorry if all of this angers you, but you asked me for clarification, and I have done my best to give it.

I might make one further point. There is another respect in which you and VA are similar. You have told me that you think objectivism is pernicious. VA has said that subjectivists must necessarily be tolerant of certain evils (I think he may have mentioned rape and torture). Both of you are making the same mistake, which is to attribute particular normative attitudes to people on the basis of their views on meta-ethics. This is impossible, because meta-ethical theories are normatively neutral.

Perhaps I was unclear. I think moral objectivism is pernicious precisely because it is a meta-ethical position. Here's a definition.

'Meta-ethics is a branch of philosophy that investigates fundamental questions about the nature of moral judgments, moral properties, and moral facts123. It examines the metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic issues surrounding our moral beliefs and practices3. Rather than addressing questions about what practices are right and wrong, metaethics asks what morality actually is4.'

The very assumption that there are moral properties and moral facts - so that metaphysics and epistemology come into it - begs the 'objectivity' question. 'What morality actually is' is a classically deluded philosophical formulation.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Nov 13, 2024 8:47 pm The very assumption that there are moral properties and moral facts - so that metaphysics and epistemology come into it - begs the 'objectivity' question. 'What morality actually is' is a classically deluded philosophical formulation.

Your objection i.e. "morality cannot be objective" is with reference to Theistic Morality [re moral facts from God], Platonic Morality [real moral ideas] and the like.
I agree the theistic and platonic moral models are not objective nor tenable because their degree of credibility and objective are not sufficiently realistic.

Your objection against the theistic and platonic moral model is based on your definition of 'what is fact'.
But your 'what is fact' is grounded on an illusion, just as the theistic and platonic moral models are also grounded on an illusion based on the ideology of philosophical realism.

PH's ‘What is Fact’ is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

Since your objection is grounded on an illusion, i.e. delusion, you don't have any credibility to denounce morality is not objective.

I claim "morality is objective" but it is not on the grounds like those of the theistic and platonic moral model but rather on the following;

There are Two Senses of 'Objectivity' [philosophical], i.e.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39326
1. The realistic sense of a FSERC-based objectivity
2. The unrealistic philosophical realism's absolute mind independence objectivity which is delusion.

My argument [presented elsewhere] that Morality is Objective is based on the sense of objectivity as in 1 above.

I am just expressing and refreshing my views above, I don't want you to respond to it since you have ran out of counter arguments to my realistic claims.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Nov 13, 2024 8:47 pm

CIN wrote: ↑Mon Nov 11, 2024 9:57 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Nov 08, 2024 6:47 pm
Clarification, please. Which 'you' do you think I'm 100% sure is wrong? IWP? You (CIN)? Or just everyone else?

Me, certainly. That was clear from your attitude when we discussed my naturalist/hedonist/objectivist theory. You displayed total subjective certainty in almost all of your replies.

I hope I addressed your argument properly, by pointing out that non-moral premises - for example, from nature, such as that pleasure is 'preferable' to pain - can't entail moral conclusions, so that morality can't be objective. (I assume you accept the premise.)

No, I don't accept it, because it begs the very question at issue. And you are not entitled to 'point out' that non-moral premises can't entail moral conclusions, you have to support this claim with argument and/or evidence. Merely supplying a single failed entailment does not suffice.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Nov 13, 2024 8:47 pm If you'd be kind enough to set out your naturalist/hedonist/objectivist moral theory again, in its simplest and briefest form - preferably syllogistically - I and others could consider it again. But I completely understand if you don't want to!

I don't mind in principle, and I know you are more comfortable playing Whack-A-Mole with other people's theories than justifying your own position, but for the moment the latter is what I want you to do.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Nov 13, 2024 8:47 pm

CIN wrote: ↑Mon Nov 11, 2024 9:57 pm And objectivists generally. Do you deny that you have many times stated as a fact that objectivism is wrong?

No, I don't deny it. My OP amounted to a rejection of moral objectivism. I'm 100% convinced that moral objectivism is incorrect.

Yet as far as I know, you have never provided either argument or evidence to support this view.

This is extraordinary. I've been providing both for years.

I don't recall you providing either, though I do recall you merely stating your position many, many times. But the issue can very easily be settled if you will provide one or the other now.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Nov 13, 2024 8:47 pm

CIN wrote: ↑Mon Nov 11, 2024 9:57 pm (I hope you understand that however many individual objectivist theoríes you successfully refute, this will never amount to a refutation of objectivism per se.)

1 If I've refuted every objectivist theory so far, that'll suffice for me.

It shouldn't, because it's not rational. And this remark is hardly consistent with your immediately succeeding claim to have refuted objectivism per se: if refuting all theories so far did indeed suffice for you, why did you feel it necessary to make the further claim to have refuted objectivism per se? On a psychological level, never mind on a philosophical level, you seem to be confused.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Nov 13, 2024 8:47 pm 2 I think I've refuted moral objectivism per se. There can be no moral facts. The expression 'moral fact' is incoherent. There can only ever be moral opinions. And the impossibility of ever establishing the factual truth or falsehood of a moral assertion is the evidence.

You have provided no such evidence, because you have not shown that it is impossible to establish the factual truth or falsehood of a moral assertion. You are merely assuming that it is impossible.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Nov 13, 2024 8:47 pm

CIN wrote: ↑Mon Nov 11, 2024 9:57 pm I think your entire attitude to objectivism rests on nothing but a kind of irrational prejudice, and as far as I can tell this is something you have not only failed to notice in yourself, but are quite possibly incapable of noticing. There is, of course, a simple way in which you can refute this charge, and that is by presenting a sound argument that refutes objectivism per se. You have no idea how earnestly I wish you would do this.

'Nothing but an irrational kind of prejudice' strikes me as grossly unfair. I think I've backed up every one of my claims and arguments rationally. Please give an example.

The post of yours that I'm currently replying to contains two examples: you start by claiming that a non-moral premise cannot entail a moral conclusion, but you do not back up this claim with either evidence or argument, you state it as a premise and say nothing to support it; and you claim that it is impossible to establish the factual truth or falsehood of a moral assertion, again without saying anything to support this claim.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Nov 13, 2024 8:47 pm

CIN wrote: ↑Mon Nov 11, 2024 9:57 pm I might make one further point. There is another respect in which you and VA are similar. You have told me that you think objectivism is pernicious. VA has said that subjectivists must necessarily be tolerant of certain evils (I think he may have mentioned rape and torture). Both of you are making the same mistake, which is to attribute particular normative attitudes to people on the basis of their views on meta-ethics. This is impossible, because meta-ethical theories are normatively neutral.

Perhaps I was unclear. I think moral objectivism is pernicious precisely because it is a meta-ethical position. Here's a definition.

'Meta-ethics is a branch of philosophy that investigates fundamental questions about the nature of moral judgments, moral properties, and moral facts123. It examines the metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic issues surrounding our moral beliefs and practices3. Rather than addressing questions about what practices are right and wrong, metaethics asks what morality actually is4.'

The very assumption that there are moral properties and moral facts - so that metaphysics and epistemology come into it - begs the 'objectivity' question. 'What morality actually is' is a classically deluded philosophical formulation.

This, even if true, would not make meta-ethical positions pernicious, it would only make them false. And even if you reject moral properties and moral facts, there are still moral judgements, which certainly do exist. As for 'what morality actually is,' that doesn't presume the existence of moral properties or facts, because it could be held that morality is simply a type of human behaviour. The idea that the whole of meta-ethics can be thrown out in this way is absurd. Your own anti-objectivist position is the denial of a particular meta-ethical position, rather than a denial of meta-ethics per se, and is therefore itself a meta-ethical position.