Philosophy Now Forum

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:30 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:29 pm

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:25 pm

Brains have extension, position, mass, however, if you crack open someone's brain, where would you find their experience of say, the color "blue"? For one thing, no matter where you look among the neurons and grey matter, I doubt anything there would remotely appear blue in the way it is perceived by the brain? So how do you know where the experience of "blue" is? It isn't a particle. It isn't a single neuron. Presumably, it's something occurring somewhere among a nebulous of neurons firing. Does that experience of blue have a definite position?

Are you seriously completely unfamiliar with imaging mental content? We've been doing it for a long time now.

OK. Show me a picture of blue in a brain? Where is it?

You're not asking so that the picture "looks like" the first person experience of it, are you?

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:31 pm

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:30 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:29 pm

Are you seriously completely unfamiliar with imaging mental content? We've been doing it for a long time now.

OK. Show me a picture of blue in a brain? Where is it?

You're not asking so that the picture "looks like" the first person experience of it, are you?

I am indeed. If you can't see what I'm seeing in my brain, then where is what I'm seeing?

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:33 pm I am indeed.

Then you either didn't understand or you're simply ignoring something I've explained multiple times already:

Not just for brains/consciousness, but in general, for everything, PROPERTIES ARE DIFFERENT FROM DIFFERENT SPATIOTEMPORAL REFERENCE POINTS. Hopefully you'll notice that this time. Don't ignore it. If you don't get it, ask for clarification about it.

So this means that a third-person spatiotemporal reference point is NOT going to have the same properties as a first-person spatiotemporal reference point of the same thing.

The reason for this, by the way, is that properties are IDENTICAL to qualitative characteristics of dynamic relations of matter, and every dynamic relation of matter is unique/with unique properties. So different spatiotemporal reference points amount to different dynamic relations of matter.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:35 pm

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:33 pm I am indeed.

Then you either didn't understand or you're simply ignoring something I've explained multiple times already:

Not just for brains/consciousness, but in general, for everything, PROPERTIES ARE DIFFERENT FROM DIFFERENT SPATIOTEMPORAL REFERENCE POINTS. Hopefully you'll notice that this time. Don't ignore it. If you don't get it, ask for clarification about it.

So this means that a third-person spatiotemporal reference point is NOT going to have the same properties as a first-person spatiotemporal reference point of the same thing.

So how is my mental image "physical"? right now I see a computer screen in front of me with typing on it. Where is that computer screen right now? Where is the computer screen 2 seconds later when I think about it after seeing it? These are real problems with the physicalist view of mind.

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:39 pm So how is my mental image "physical"?

It's the properties of a subset of brain states from the spatiotemporal reference point of your brain.

Keep in mind, by the way, that I'm not of the view that we're ONLY seeing mental content and not literally seeing the computer screen (or rather lightwaves emitted from/reflected off of the computer screen) when we look at a computer screen. On philosophy of perception, I'm a direct or "naive" realist.

right now I see a computer screen in front of me with typing on it. Where is that computer screen right now?

The computer screen itself is on your desk or whatever, of course. Your perception of the computer screen is located at a complex of your eyes, optic nerves and brain.

Where is the computer screen 2 seconds later when I think about it after seeing it?

Remembering/Imagining your computer screen is a set of properties of your brain (again, from the spatiotemporal reference point of being identical to your brain).

These are real problems with the physicalist view of mind.

None of that was any problem at all.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 12:08 am

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:39 pm So how is my mental image "physical"?

It's the properties of a subset of brain states from the spatiotemporal reference point of your brain.

Keep in mind, by the way, that I'm not of the view that we're ONLY seeing mental content and not literally seeing the computer screen (or rather lightwaves emitted from/reflected off of the computer screen) when we look at a computer screen. On philosophy of perception, I'm a direct or "naive" realist.

right now I see a computer screen in front of me with typing on it. Where is that computer screen right now?

The computer screen itself is on your desk or whatever, of course. Your perception of the computer screen is located at a complex of your eyes, optic nerves and brain.

Where is the computer screen 2 seconds later when I think about it after seeing it?

Remembering/Imagining your computer screen is a set of properties of your brain (again, from the spatiotemporal reference point of being identical to your brain).

These are real problems with the physicalist view of mind.

None of that was any problem at all.

My experience of blue may well depend upon a brain state, however, it's not identical with a brain state. If it's not identical with a brain state then it's not identical with a brain state. if you crack my brain open, you're probably not going to find blue anywhere in it. You're going to find an area of the brain that is stimulated when I see blue. However, for all you know, my mental state could be one of seeing red when you see blue. Mental states are not physical, cannot be transmitted nor understood physically. If you can't understand something physically, then it's certainly questionable as to whether it's something that is physical in nature.

The experience of blue and the physical phenomena that produce it seem to be two different things. What comes into my retina are physical phenomena. What happens in my brain is an experience of blueness. That blueness is arguably not in the computer screen as it is independently of my observation. If I must be here in order to see the blue then where is the blue? It must be in my brain somewhere. But where? And how do you know it's blue and not your experience of red? You possibly don't.

So you have no idea what I'm seeing/experiencing just by opening up my brain and looking, yet you seem to maintain the assumption that it is identical to a physical state.

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 4:16 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 12:08 am

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Tue Apr 13, 2021 11:39 pm So how is my mental image "physical"?

It's the properties of a subset of brain states from the spatiotemporal reference point of your brain.

Keep in mind, by the way, that I'm not of the view that we're ONLY seeing mental content and not literally seeing the computer screen (or rather lightwaves emitted from/reflected off of the computer screen) when we look at a computer screen. On philosophy of perception, I'm a direct or "naive" realist.

right now I see a computer screen in front of me with typing on it. Where is that computer screen right now?

The computer screen itself is on your desk or whatever, of course. Your perception of the computer screen is located at a complex of your eyes, optic nerves and brain.

Where is the computer screen 2 seconds later when I think about it after seeing it?

Remembering/Imagining your computer screen is a set of properties of your brain (again, from the spatiotemporal reference point of being identical to your brain).

These are real problems with the physicalist view of mind.

None of that was any problem at all.

My experience of blue may well depend upon a brain state, however, it's not identical with a brain state. If it's not identical with a brain state then it's not identical with a brain state. if you crack my brain open, you're probably not going to find blue anywhere in it. You're going to find an area of the brain that is stimulated when I see blue. However, for all you know, my mental state could be one of seeing red when you see blue. Mental states are not physical, cannot be transmitted nor understood physically. If you can't understand something physically, then it's certainly questionable as to whether it's something that is physical in nature.

The experience of blue and the physical phenomena that produce it seem to be two different things. What comes into my retina are physical phenomena. What happens in my brain is an experience of blueness. That blueness is arguably not in the computer screen as it is independently of my observation. If I must be here in order to see the blue then where is the blue? It must be in my brain somewhere. But where? And how do you know it's blue and not your experience of red? You possibly don't.

So you have no idea what I'm seeing/experiencing just by opening up my brain and looking, yet you seem to maintain the assumption that it is identical to a physical state.

First, there's no doubt that your experience of blue isn't identical to my experience of blue. How do we know that? Because your experience is your experience, and my experience is my experience. They're two different experiences. They're numerically distinct. They're spatiotemporally distinct. They also occur in brains that are not identical in terms of structure and function even if we were to pretend somehow that they're not spatiotemporally distinct. And not only are discernibles noncontroversially nonidentical (the identity of indiscernibles/the nonidentity of discernibles is a standard philosophical trope going back to Leibniz, at least), but properties are different at different spatiotemporal reference points. (Which frankly follows from the discernibility/identity trope).

In no way does this suggest that either of our experiences of blue are nonphysical.

We already know why when we look at someone else's brain it's not going to "look like" their visual experience . I've explained this over and over. Again, this doesn't suggest that their experience is nonphysical. It rather reflects a truism about physical properties. If that's a truism about physical properties it can't serve as a good reason to believe that experience isn't a physical phenomenon.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 11:00 am

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 4:16 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 12:08 am

It's the properties of a subset of brain states from the spatiotemporal reference point of your brain.

Keep in mind, by the way, that I'm not of the view that we're ONLY seeing mental content and not literally seeing the computer screen (or rather lightwaves emitted from/reflected off of the computer screen) when we look at a computer screen. On philosophy of perception, I'm a direct or "naive" realist.



The computer screen itself is on your desk or whatever, of course. Your perception of the computer screen is located at a complex of your eyes, optic nerves and brain.



Remembering/Imagining your computer screen is a set of properties of your brain (again, from the spatiotemporal reference point of being identical to your brain).



None of that was any problem at all.

My experience of blue may well depend upon a brain state, however, it's not identical with a brain state. If it's not identical with a brain state then it's not identical with a brain state. if you crack my brain open, you're probably not going to find blue anywhere in it. You're going to find an area of the brain that is stimulated when I see blue. However, for all you know, my mental state could be one of seeing red when you see blue. Mental states are not physical, cannot be transmitted nor understood physically. If you can't understand something physically, then it's certainly questionable as to whether it's something that is physical in nature.

The experience of blue and the physical phenomena that produce it seem to be two different things. What comes into my retina are physical phenomena. What happens in my brain is an experience of blueness. That blueness is arguably not in the computer screen as it is independently of my observation. If I must be here in order to see the blue then where is the blue? It must be in my brain somewhere. But where? And how do you know it's blue and not your experience of red? You possibly don't.

So you have no idea what I'm seeing/experiencing just by opening up my brain and looking, yet you seem to maintain the assumption that it is identical to a physical state.

First, there's no doubt that your experience of blue isn't identical to my experience of blue. How do we know that? Because your experience is your experience, and my experience is my experience. They're two different experiences. They're numerically distinct. They're spatiotemporally distinct. They also occur in brains that are not identical in terms of structure and function even if we were to pretend somehow that they're not spatiotemporally distinct. And not only are discernibles noncontroversially nonidentical (the identity of indiscernibles/the nonidentity of discernibles is a standard philosophical trope going back to Leibniz, at least), but properties are different at different spatiotemporal reference points. (Which frankly follows from the discernibility/identity trope).

In no way does this suggest that either of our experiences of blue are nonphysical.

We already know why when we look at someone else's brain it's not going to "look like" their visual experience . I've explained this over and over. Again, this doesn't suggest that their experience is nonphysical. It rather reflects a truism about physical properties. If that's a truism about physical properties it can't serve as a good reason to believe that experience isn't a physical phenomenon.

Not sure what a "trope" is and how it relates to logic, however, many very astute philosophers seem to take arguments like those put forth by Frank Jackson and Thomas Nagel quite seriously.

So your beleif is that mental states are material/physical states? Is that an accurate assessment of your position?

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 12:44 pm So your beleif is that mental states are material states? Is that an accurate assessment of your position?

(Dynamic relations of) material(s) states, yes. That's all states, all that exists, including mental states.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 12:50 pm

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 12:44 pm So your beleif is that mental states are material states? Is that an accurate assessment of your position?

(Dynamic relations of) material(s) states, yes. That's all states, all that exists, including mental states.

What is your definition of "material"? What sorts of qualities does a material thing have?

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 12:55 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 12:50 pm

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 12:44 pm So your beleif is that mental states are material states? Is that an accurate assessment of your position?

(Dynamic relations of) material(s) states, yes. That's all states, all that exists, including mental states.

What is your definition of "material"? What sorts of qualities does a material thing have?

Matter. "Chunks of stuff." Elementary particles of various types at root. In isolation elementary particles have properties like mass, charge, extension, etc. In dynamic relations with other particles, which is what's the case (there are no particles in complete isolation from other particles), they have every quality we can think of, depending on the dynamic relation. That's what qualities (properties) are--the characteristics of different dynamic relations of matter.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 1:00 pm

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 12:55 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 12:50 pm
(Dynamic relations of) material(s) states, yes. That's all states, all that exists, including mental states.

What is your definition of "material"? What sorts of qualities does a material thing have?

Matter. "Chunks of stuff." Elementary particles of various types at root. In isolation elementary particles have properties like mass, charge, extension, etc. In dynamic relations with other particles, which is what's the case (there are no particles in complete isolation from other particles), they have every quality we can think of, depending on the dynamic relation. That's what qualities (properties) are--the characteristics of different dynamic relations of matter.

So everything is "chunks of stuff?" Is the sensation of blueness a particle? It seems to me that my mental experiences are not "particles" of anything. I assume you can't produce them in a particle accelerator. Heck, even particles don't behave like particles in quantum physics. How do things communicate with each other when quantum entanglement happens, for example? quantum entanglement can apparently work as information being instantly transmitted over extreme distances. My view is that the universe is a very strange place at the most fundamental levels and the old-fashioned view of materialism as everything being "chunks of stuff" just doesn't hold up anymore. I take it that you disagree?

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 1:36 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 1:00 pm

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 12:55 pm

What is your definition of "material"? What sorts of qualities does a material thing have?

Matter. "Chunks of stuff." Elementary particles of various types at root. In isolation elementary particles have properties like mass, charge, extension, etc. In dynamic relations with other particles, which is what's the case (there are no particles in complete isolation from other particles), they have every quality we can think of, depending on the dynamic relation. That's what qualities (properties) are--the characteristics of different dynamic relations of matter.

So everything is "chunks of stuff?"

Dynamic relations of chunks of stuff, yes.

Is the sensation of blueness a particle?

It's as if you're reading "dynamic relations of" but it's flying right out of your head or something. I can't simplify it more than it can be simplified just because it's too difficult to handle something more nuanced/complex.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 1:39 pm

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 1:36 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 1:00 pm

Matter. "Chunks of stuff." Elementary particles of various types at root. In isolation elementary particles have properties like mass, charge, extension, etc. In dynamic relations with other particles, which is what's the case (there are no particles in complete isolation from other particles), they have every quality we can think of, depending on the dynamic relation. That's what qualities (properties) are--the characteristics of different dynamic relations of matter.

So everything is "chunks of stuff?"

Dynamic relations of chunks of stuff, yes.

Is the sensation of blueness a particle?

It's as if you're reading "dynamic relations of" but it's flying right out of your head or something.

Is a "dynamic relation" a "chunk of stuff", though? Is a "relation" a physical entity? You say that matter is "chunks of stuff." If something is material, then it should be a chunk of stuff, then shouldn't it? Or is it the case that not all matter is a "chunk of stuff?" Or is it the case that not all things that can be talked about are material in nature? "Dynamic relation" sounds like a rather nebulous or non-descript term for "I don't know how it works but it must be material in nature."

Gary Childress wrote: ↑Wed Apr 14, 2021 1:45 pm Is a "dynamic relation" a "chunk of stuff", though? Is a "relation" a physical entity?

I explained this already, but I'll do so again in a bit more detail. Hopefully I won't have to explain it yet again.

By physical, what I'm referring to is
(1) matter
(2) relations of matter
(3) dynamic relations of matter

So in a way, three "different" things--they're at least conceptually separable. However, (2) is necessarily the case as soon as we have more than one particle in a universe, and (3) is at least contingently the case for everything in our universe--matter is in motion with respect to other matter.

These "three things" have ways that they happen to be--qualitative ways, or qualitative characteristics. They can't not have this. These qualitative characteristics are what properties are. And as I've stated many times, properties are different--because dynamic relations are different--at different spatiotemporal reference points.

There's nothing nebulous about those terms. They're actually rather simple. Relations are things like spatial and temporal situatedness with respect to other things. "This particle is to the left of that particle at time Tx from reference point 1," and so on. And "dynamic" just refers to the fact that things are in motion relative to each other. Properties are not just factors of matter. They're also factors of relations (or structures--structures are simply sets of relations) and processes (processes are simply motions, relatively changing positions and relationships).

You can think of it this way for illustrative purposes. Think about working automobile engines (and you can think about the properties of the same). In order to have a working automobile engine, you can't just have the parts laid out in any random arrangement. They have to be in a particular structure. They have to have specific relations to each other. And to be a working engine, they can't be in that structure and "just sit there," without motion. They need to be in motion with respect to each other, in that particular structure.

All physical entities are dynamic relations of matter--all physical entities have those three inseparable aspects, and those three inseparable aspects amount to properties. And re the above illustration, even the automobile parts--a single piston "all by its lonesome," say, is actually a set of dynamic relations of matter. Each particle that makes up the piston is in motion to other particles that comprise the piston, and they have to be in a particular structure, undergoing particular processes, in order to have the properties of a piston. That's the case for everything.

Or is it the case that not all matter is a "chunk of stuff?"

All matter is "chunks of stuff." As you see from the above, though, "physical" doesn't just refer to matter. It refers to three inseparable aspects of what exists, which also amount to properties.