Philosophy Now Forum

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 1:46 pm...it is disengenuous to use this thought to suggest that philosphy and science are no different in all or even most aspects.

Here's the opening paragraph of another article I wrote*:

With which of these three propositions do you most agree? A scientific theory must be:
(1) A logically coherent explanation.
(2) Supported by evidence.
(3) Useful.
If you are firmly of the opinion that one of these is the defining feature of science, then in philosophical terms you are either (1) a rationalist, (2) an empiricist, or (3) a pragmatist. Moreover, if you happen to be a scientist, then it is likely that your main interest is (1) Theoretical, (2) Experimental, or (3) Instrumental. More generally, you might just like to (1) Have an idea about how something works, (2) Find out how it works, or (3) Just make it work.
When philosophers of science are doing what they are paid for, one of the key things they consider is what blend of the above elements makes an activity a science. On the face of it, it shouldn’t be all that difficult to work out. There are only three variables; how hard can it be?[/quote]
And then there's another 4000 words that make a case that while all of those propositions are features of science, the one that distinguishes science is the usefulness; basically, science has to work at some practical level. A logically coherent explanation is useful, in the sense that it is often easier and quicker to explore than a mathematical model, but it is a philosophical model. It is not essential to science, and actually makes no difference whether it is right or wrong.

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 1:46 pmPhilosophy can entertain competing even contradictory paradigms, whilst science can only do so temporarily.

We've lived with special relativity, general relativity and quantum mechanics for roughly a century. They are each based on different logical/philosophical models, and while it is impossible to say how we might have fared with different ideas, there has been a lot of science in the last hundred years.

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 1:46 pmPardigms only exist at the peripheries. Despite changes in paradigm, core science is unchanged. Knowledge happens and results are replicated; none of this may be said of non-natural philosophy.

If by "core science" you mean something like observation, measurement and prediction based on mathematical models, then yes. But the logical models can be anything.

*https://philosophynow.org/issues/133/Ph ... _Millennia

uwot wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 5:19 pm

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 1:46 pm...it is disengenuous to use this thought to suggest that philosphy and science are no different in all or even most aspects.

Here's the opening paragraph of another article I wrote*:

With which of these three propositions do you most agree? A scientific theory must be:
(1) A logically coherent explanation.
(2) Supported by evidence.
(3) Useful.
If you are firmly of the opinion that one of these is the defining feature of science, then in philosophical terms you are either (1) a rationalist, (2) an empiricist, or (3) a pragmatist.

Your thinking is somewhat one dimensional.

Moreover, if you happen to be a scientist, then it is likely that your main interest is (1) Theoretical, (2) Experimental, or (3) Instrumental. More generally, you might just like to (1) Have an idea about how something works, (2) Find out how it works, or (3) Just make it work.
When philosophers of science are doing what they are paid for, one of the key things they consider is what blend of the above elements makes an activity a science. On the face of it, it shouldn’t be all that difficult to work out. There are only three variables; how hard can it be?

Philosophers of science are not paid to do something specific. That's not really how it works. Not in the same way scientists are paid to do a specific job. Philosophers bang on about things they like, they teach it at collage, write books. There is little in the way of tangible results. They are like the journalists of science; just a bit more critical.
Science progresses by tanglible results.

And then there's another 4000 words that make a case that while all of those propositions are features of science, the one that distinguishes science is the usefulness; basically, science has to work at some practical level. A logically coherent explanation is useful, in the sense that it is often easier and quicker to explore than a mathematical model, but it is a philosophical model. It is not essential to science, and actually makes no difference whether it is right or wrong.

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 1:46 pmPhilosophy can entertain competing even contradictory paradigms, whilst science can only do so temporarily.

We've lived with special relativity, general relativity and quantum mechanics for roughly a century.

Science demands a resolution. one of the them shall win, in the same way Alchemy, astrology, geocentricism, humeral theory, all had to give way to chemistry, astronomy and germ theory.
Relativity and QM are at the periphery, as I said.
Cosmology is currently in the dark. Whilst it has established great knoweldge and evidence, it's foray into origins has led it down a dark path. The Bog Bange damands stuff they they cannot see; hence dark matter and energy. Again: peripheral science.
But core science does not admit to error, or contradiction. You cannot go to the moon with Pholgistan, crystal spheres, geocentricity, or in a plenum.

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 1:46 pmPardigms only exist at the peripheries. Despite changes in paradigm, core science is unchanged. Knowledge happens and results are replicated; none of this may be said of non-natural philosophy.

If by "core science" you mean something like observation, measurement and prediction based on mathematical models, then yes. But the logical models can be anything.

No - that is just method. Even Ptolemy used obseration, measurement and prediction. It just took a long time to get the right theory to explain what it all meant. That meant changing paradigms thoroughly. Aristotle's perfect circles had to go; superlunary science had to go, and many other pardigmatic assumptions.
The point being that Ptolemy's system was still much better than Copurnicus's and Aristarchus. It was not until Kepler that it all made sense. People actually lost their liberty, even their lives to change the paradigm.
Core science: Germs exist. So do viruses. Colds are not caused by weather, or too much blood bile or phlegm.

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 9:13 pmEven Ptolemy used obseration, measurement and prediction. It just took a long time to get the right theory to explain what it all meant...It was not until Kepler that it all made sense.

Is it more important that science makes sense, or that it works?

uwot wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 10:52 pm

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 9:13 pmEven Ptolemy used obseration, measurement and prediction. It just took a long time to get the right theory to explain what it all meant...It was not until Kepler that it all made sense.

Is it more important that science makes sense, or that it works?

A dichotomy that it is impossible to untangle. Depends what you think is "important", depends on the case, and on the particular science.
It tends to make sense when it works.

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 12:10 am

uwot wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 10:52 pmIs it more important that science makes sense, or that it works?

A dichotomy that it is impossible to untangle. Depends what you think is "important", depends on the case, and on the particular science.

Well yes, 'important' is a loaded term, and it is true that one of the problems with defining science is that there are so many fields of study whose practitioners claim to be scientists. I broadly agree with Feyerabend that defining and restricting 'science' to certain topics is counterproductive. Here's the concluding paragraph.
Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) was one of four people personally thanked by Kuhn in the Preface to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Feyerabend had turned down an offer to be Popper’s research assistant. Having started his academic career as a physicist he was well qualified to make that judgement. As the history of gravity shows, explanation, demonstration, and usefulness have all played a critical role in science; and Feyerabend was concerned that any reductive scientific method, such as Popper was advocating, would have ruled out some part of that history. No one likes being told what to think or do, and scientists are no exception. Rather, Feyerabend thought that the only prescription for science that could accommodate every stumble and leap is methodological anarchy, or as Feyerabend put it, anything goes. He took the view that by far the most important criterion is that a theory should be useful – it didn’t matter to who, or what for. Feyerabend gave this insight: “Having listened to one of my anarchistic sermons, Professor Wigner exclaimed: ‘But surely, you do not read all the manuscripts which people send you, you must throw most of them into the wastepaper basket.’ I most certainly do. ‘Anything goes’ does not mean that I shall read every single paper that has been written – God forbid! – it means that I make my selection in a highly individual and idiosyncratic way, partly because I can’t be bothered to read what doesn’t interest me – and my interests change from week to week and day to day – partly because I am convinced that humanity and even science will profit from everyone doing their own thing” (Against Method, 1975). Whatever anyone thinks should or shouldn’t qualify as science, the fact is that science is done by people. Some of those people are rationalists, some are empiricists, and some are pragmatists; and no matter what rules are imposed, people break them.

I also think that Karl Popper highlighted an important point: that being wrong is just part of the natural progression; Conjectures and Refutations as a title of a book describes a fact about the history of science, and his criterion of falsifiability is reasonable rule of thumb for what I call a science. It can, in my view, be wrong and still be science, so I don't agree with this:

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 9:13 pmBut core science does not admit to error, or contradiction. You cannot go to the moon with Pholgistan, crystal spheres, geocentricity, or in a plenum.

You can go to the moon with Newtonian mechanics. If going to the moon is some sort of standard of core scientific achievement, then science can be done with theories which are good enough, even if they are known to result in error where greater precision is required.

uwot wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 9:43 am

Sculptor wrote: ↑Fri May 21, 2021 11:00 amPhilosophy as a method of enquiry is where it is at its best. As soon as it starts making dogmatic statements is where the whole thing falls down.

One of the main points Kuhn made in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is that the same is true of science.

For example like when, so called, "scientists" make claims like the Universe began, and is expanding, those dogmatic statements also FALL DOWN.

uwot wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 9:43 am

Sculptor wrote: ↑Fri May 21, 2021 11:00 amAside from that My instinct would be to reject believe in all its forms and persue knowledge.

That's what all the Truth Seekers and Prophets think they are doing.

How do you know this, and, do you believe this is actually true.

And, it could be said, that pursuing knowledge is what all the rest believe they are doing, especially all "scientists". But as some of us ALREADY KNOW these type of ALL statements are just obviously and clearly, Wrong, False, and Incorrect. Or, are they?

Do all "scientists" believe some things and believe that they are pursuing knowledge?

uwot wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 7:38 am

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 12:10 am

uwot wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 10:52 pmIs it more important that science makes sense, or that it works?

A dichotomy that it is impossible to untangle. Depends what you think is "important", depends on the case, and on the particular science.

Well yes, 'important' is a loaded term, and it is true that one of the problems with defining science is that there are so many fields of study whose practitioners claim to be scientists. I broadly agree with Feyerabend that defining and restricting 'science' to certain topics is counterproductive. Here's the concluding paragraph.
Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) was one of four people personally thanked by Kuhn in the Preface to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Feyerabend had turned down an offer to be Popper’s research assistant. Having started his academic career as a physicist he was well qualified to make that judgement. As the history of gravity shows, explanation, demonstration, and usefulness have all played a critical role in science; and Feyerabend was concerned that any reductive scientific method, such as Popper was advocating, would have ruled out some part of that history. No one likes being told what to think or do, and scientists are no exception. Rather, Feyerabend thought that the only prescription for science that could accommodate every stumble and leap is methodological anarchy, or as Feyerabend put it, anything goes. He took the view that by far the most important criterion is that a theory should be useful – it didn’t matter to who, or what for. Feyerabend gave this insight: “Having listened to one of my anarchistic sermons, Professor Wigner exclaimed: ‘But surely, you do not read all the manuscripts which people send you, you must throw most of them into the wastepaper basket.’ I most certainly do. ‘Anything goes’ does not mean that I shall read every single paper that has been written – God forbid! – it means that I make my selection in a highly individual and idiosyncratic way, partly because I can’t be bothered to read what doesn’t interest me – and my interests change from week to week and day to day – partly because I am convinced that humanity and even science will profit from everyone doing their own thing” (Against Method, 1975). Whatever anyone thinks should or shouldn’t qualify as science, the fact is that science is done by people. Some of those people are rationalists, some are empiricists, and some are pragmatists; and no matter what rules are imposed, people break them.

I also think that Karl Popper highlighted an important point: that being wrong is just part of the natural progression; Conjectures and Refutations as a title of a book describes a fact about the history of science, and his criterion of falsifiability is reasonable rule of thumb for what I call a science. It can, in my view, be wrong and still be science, so I don't agree with this:

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sat May 22, 2021 9:13 pmBut core science does not admit to error, or contradiction. You cannot go to the moon with Pholgistan, crystal spheres, geocentricity, or in a plenum.

You can go to the moon with Newtonian mechanics. If going to the moon is some sort of standard of core scientific achievement, then science can be done with theories which are good enough, even if they are known to result in error where greater precision is required.

Being wrong is fine, until you are shown a better way. That is essentially what a paradigm shift is all about. And the examples are legion. Take a look at Claud Levi-Strauss' Pensee Sauvage, where he talks about how the "primitive" mind's rendancy to systematizations and observation can lead to "effective" knowledge of natural remedies from nature, that work more of less well despite the developed underlying theory being tragically and risibly wrong. The systematisation feeds back so that when treatements seem to be effective they are repeated when the ailment arises again. Ancient Greek medicine of Hyocrates and Galen worked though the underlying ideas were wrong. You can benefit from knoweldge only so far. If you think that the heart makes blood, rather than it being a pump you are going to fail down the road ,and the old paradigm has to be utterly rejected until something better comes along. Rome had pumps but no one had figured out the metaphor until Harvey. Harvey was right and circulation changed from a system of irrigation of newly made blood, which was "burned up" somewhere, to a circulation and transport system. And so we have a revolution. Such things are far too numberous to mention.
Newtonian Mechaniscs is not a denial of relativity, nor relativity a denial of Newtonain mechanics. Relarivistic maths is just a refinement. It's only when you want to get your DeltaX down to the metre that it is important. So you need ti for GPS, but not to sail into Portsmouth from Dieppe.Realtivity was Einstein standing on the shoulders of Newton.

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 11:55 amBeing wrong is fine, until you are shown a better way.

How do you define a 'better way'?

uwot wrote: ↑Mon May 24, 2021 7:51 pm

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 11:55 amBeing wrong is fine, until you are shown a better way.

How do you define a 'better way'?

When it works better and is consonant with other theories.
That is the progress of science.

Sculptor wrote: ↑Mon May 24, 2021 8:02 pm

uwot wrote: ↑Mon May 24, 2021 7:51 pm

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 11:55 amBeing wrong is fine, until you are shown a better way.

How do you define a 'better way'?

When it works better and is consonant with other theories.
That is the progress of science.

And that is the progress of philosophy.

Sculptor wrote: ↑Mon May 24, 2021 8:02 pm

uwot wrote: ↑Mon May 24, 2021 7:51 pm

Sculptor wrote: ↑Sun May 23, 2021 11:55 amBeing wrong is fine, until you are shown a better way.

How do you define a 'better way'?

When it works better and is consonant with other theories.
That is the progress of science.

That's two of Kuhn's criteria for choosing between different paradigms. The complete list is in the article:
1. How accurately a theory agrees with the evidence.
2. It’s consistent within itself and with other accepted theories.
3. It should explain more than just the phenomenon it was designed to explain.
4. The simplest explanation is the best. (In other words, apply Occam’s Razor.)
5. It should make predictions that come true.
However, Kuhn had to concede that there is no objective way to establish which of those criteria is the most important, and so scientists would make their own mind up for subjective reasons. In choosing between competing theories, two scientists “fully committed to the same list of criteria for choice may nevertheless reach different conclusions.”
You make a good point bringing up La Pensée Sauvage, published in the same year as The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as it happens. Both writers make a similar point; call it a paradigm or a structure, in either case the idea is that people create a portrait of reality. They are two massively influential books, but the criticism they have faced in the last almost 60 years is that new paradigms do not inevitably replace older ones, because it is not just primitive minds that create structures. As Richard Feynman said "Every theoretical physicist that's any good knows six or seven theoretical representations for exactly the same physics."

A_Seagull wrote: ↑Tue May 25, 2021 12:19 am

Sculptor wrote: ↑Mon May 24, 2021 8:02 pm

uwot wrote: ↑Mon May 24, 2021 7:51 pm
How do you define a 'better way'?

When it works better and is consonant with other theories.
That is the progress of science.

And that is the progress of philosophy.

No. Philosophy does not progress. It is a system of and methods of asking questions. Once it concludes, it is dead.
When answers form you get one of two things; religion or science.
Progress in Natural Philosophy was contrary to the mainstream in this sense, and that is why it broke off and called itself science.
Religion is the antithesis of progress.

uwot wrote: ↑Tue May 25, 2021 4:26 am

Sculptor wrote: ↑Mon May 24, 2021 8:02 pm

uwot wrote: ↑Mon May 24, 2021 7:51 pm
How do you define a 'better way'?

When it works better and is consonant with other theories.
That is the progress of science.

That's two of Kuhn's criteria for choosing between different paradigms. The complete list is in the article:
1. How accurately a theory agrees with the evidence.
2. It’s consistent within itself and with other accepted theories.
3. It should explain more than just the phenomenon it was designed to explain.
4. The simplest explanation is the best. (In other words, apply Occam’s Razor.)
5. It should make predictions that come true.
However, Kuhn had to concede that there is no objective way to establish which of those criteria is the most important, and so scientists would make their own mind up for subjective reasons. In choosing between competing theories, two scientists “fully committed to the same list of criteria for choice may nevertheless reach different conclusions.”
You make a good point bringing up La Pensée Sauvage, published in the same year as The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as it happens. Both writers make a similar point; call it a paradigm or a structure, in either case the idea is that people create a portrait of reality. They are two massively influential books, but the criticism they have faced in the last almost 60 years is that new paradigms do not inevitably replace older ones, because it is not just primitive minds that create structures. As Richard Feynman said "Every theoretical physicist that's any good knows six or seven theoretical representations for exactly the same physics."

This is a sign of the post midern era. Anything goes. Feynman's comment is optimistic, as he knew pretty well that many of his collegues made a choice - a choice upon which their career was staked. Such people were held in great respect, such as Fred Hoyle and his Solid State Theory. That choice was made for subjective reasons. He coined the term "Big Bang" has a joke, he thought is was all a bit too creationist. His paradigm is DEAD. No one is going to revive it.
Feynman had his strings, despite being aware of many other ways of thinking, he argued for his pet theory.
When asked whether of not the French Revolution was a good idea, a famous person said "too Early to Tell", whether this was Chou En Lai, or not makes no difference.
I simply do not think you are in a position to say; "new paradigms do not inevitably replace older ones,", because there is so much evidence of paradigms being replaced in the longue durée of history, we may never speak of the "inevitable" until the end of history itself. Paradigms do assert themselves, despite there neing existing contrary theories. The big emerging one at the moment is "Climate Change"and it close cousin "Global Warmning". Denial of either is a career ending decision. Append "".. with reference to climate change" on your research proposal and you get special Brownie points as it opens up new avenues to more funding.

Sculptor wrote: ↑Tue May 25, 2021 9:45 am

A_Seagull wrote: ↑Tue May 25, 2021 12:19 am

Sculptor wrote: ↑Mon May 24, 2021 8:02 pm

When it works better and is consonant with other theories.
That is the progress of science.

And that is the progress of philosophy.

No. Philosophy does not progress. It is a system of and methods of asking questions. Once it concludes, it is dead.

Can you prove that? If not, have you considered the possibility that you might be operating from a less-than-optimum paradigm?

A_Seagull wrote: ↑Tue May 25, 2021 8:36 pm

Sculptor wrote: ↑Tue May 25, 2021 9:45 am

A_Seagull wrote: ↑Tue May 25, 2021 12:19 am

And that is the progress of philosophy.

No. Philosophy does not progress. It is a system of and methods of asking questions. Once it concludes, it is dead.

Can you prove that? If not, have you considered the possibility that you might be operating from a less-than-optimum paradigm?

haha