God, gods, or none of the above?

[Greylorn Ell]

Next there is the issue of free-will. If there exists a God who truly knows everything, then he knows not only when and where every one of the trillions of termites on earth will fart, but also how often and where they farted in the past, plus where and when each of those bugs will fart in the future. He will know the chemical composition of each emission, and must also know the complete history of every carbon atom in the emitted methane-- beginning with when and where and in what star it was manufactured, through its travels to planet earth, and any biological organisms that might have incorporated it into their bodies as they lived and died. That's a lot of knowledge. It is inconceivable to me that, given such an unlimited God, any termite will ever have a choice about leaving a fart.

Why? I confess I've never been able to understand the leap from God's omniscience to determinism. Why must knowing what will happen mean it is determined? Knowing the outcome of a coin flip is not the same as determining it, no?

Knowing, with absolute certainty, the outcome of a coin flip means that the outcome has been determined.

Greylorn

[Hobbes' Choice]

Next there is the issue of free-will. If there exists a God who truly knows everything, then he knows not only when and where every one of the trillions of termites on earth will fart, but also how often and where they farted in the past, plus where and when each of those bugs will fart in the future. He will know the chemical composition of each emission, and must also know the complete history of every carbon atom in the emitted methane-- beginning with when and where and in what star it was manufactured, through its travels to planet earth, and any biological organisms that might have incorporated it into their bodies as they lived and died. That's a lot of knowledge. It is inconceivable to me that, given such an unlimited God, any termite will ever have a choice about leaving a fart.

Why? I confess I've never been able to understand the leap from God's omniscience to determinism. Why must knowing what will happen mean it is determined? Knowing the outcome of a coin flip is not the same as determining it, no?

Knowing, with absolute certainty, the outcome of a coin flip means that the outcome has been determined.

Greylorn

It's not about knowing.
As soon as the coin leaves the cup its path is determined. The coin does not care whether or you you know it or are ignorant of it; it is still determined.
Only god knows. But then he is determined to, as is the universe. I can't see how it could be otherwise.
Each word I type is caused by my intention, experience, learning, genetics.. and a million other causal factors.
But if you were to turn back the clock and reset the universe exactly as it was, the outcome would not be difference - how could it be?

[Immanuel Can]

It's not about knowing.

Hobbes is correct. The statements, "I knew you would say that," and "I made you say that" are not at all equivalent. They are two distinct issues entirely.

Each word I type is caused by my intention, experience, learning, genetics.. and a million other causal factors.

Be careful thinking through this idea, Hobbes. Think again: to say "natural laws caused," and "Hobbes's will caused" are two quite different statements as well. Natural Laws have no intentions...they just do what they do; but whether that is true of human will or not is the vexed question -- it is not one we can simply bypass in this way, as it needs to be shown that the strong intuition we all have that our wills actually "do" stuff has to be fully discredited by convincing means, or doubt remains and the point won't stand.

One cannot simply expect us to concede that your list contains only equivalent terms there.

But if you were to turn back the clock and reset the universe exactly as it was, the outcome would not be difference - how could it be?

That may be true, or it may not be: we have absolutely no way of checking. Unless we believe already in determinism, we would have no reason to believe that was true. But the problem for both of us will be your "if": for hypothetical situations cannot be checked. So this isn't really an argument useful to proving determinism, nor is it a problem the non-determinist is obliged to resolve.

[thedoc]

One of the problems for those who are either trying to prove or disprove the existence of God, is the practice of defining God according to human reason and understanding. There are those who claim that God was created by man, therefore understandable by man. However there is no reason to expect that God, (or the Universe) will act according to human understanding. A previous statement that resetting the Universe to exactly the same condition of a previous time will result in the same conditions now is only true if the Universe behaves according to human expectations, but the Universe is not bound to behave according to human understanding, so if it were reset, there is no real expectation that it will turn out exactly the same. Likewise any definition of God devised by man is bound to be limited to mans reason and understanding and there is no reason to believe that God exists within those limits. God is likely to be much greater than anything humans can imagine and would not be bound by human logic and understanding, thus the claim that what God has done in the Bible is not logical, is meaningless and does not prove anything.

[Immanuel Can]

thedoc:

If we think strictly from the human side, what you say might be quite reasonable. But the key question is, "Is that the only 'side' from which to view the situation?"

I think it's not. For the answer to the question, "Can human reason lead us to God," is only one question. And if the answer is "No," (I think it is), then a second question arises: "Can God speak to humankind?"

Now, assuming He's a Supreme Being, I can't see a rational reason why we would think He could not. Even supposing a certain amount of tone-deafness on the human side, how serious a problem could that be to a genuinely "supreme" being? Not likely very much, I'm thinking.

So if we recognize that there can be no objection to the idea that the Supreme Being could speak hypothetically, if He wished to, then the question becomes not simply "Can we understand God," but rather, "Has God spoken?" Has He chosen to make some part of Himself comprehensible to us? For surely if He has, we would not have any reason to think we shouldn't be able to understand.

And even if we further surmise that God is awfully big, and thus He would be impossible for us to know completely, why would we think it would be impossible to know Him at least in part? If not totally, why not progressively, growingly, increasingly? We know many big things only in part. We know the Atlantic Ocean that way, as a matter of fact; and it's the only way any of us does know it. Why is knowing-in-part to be rejected if knowing-in-total is rejected? I see no reason.

So God may indeed be big, wondrous and transcend the dimensions of our poor human abilities; yet nothing in all this seems to suggest that God must remain forever unknowable. Rather, if we could never know Him despite His wish that we should know Him, could we speak of Him as God or a Supreme Being at all? It seems very nearly analytic in the idea of "God" that He can speak.

[thedoc]

thedoc:

If we think strictly from the human side, what you say might be quite reasonable. But the key question is, "Is that the only 'side' from which to view the situation?"

I think it's not. For the answer to the question, "Can human reason lead us to God," is only one question. And if the answer is "No," (I think it is), then a second question arises: "Can God speak to humankind?"

Now, assuming He's a Supreme Being, I can't see a rational reason why we would think He could not. Even supposing a certain amount of tone-deafness on the human side, how serious a problem could that be to a genuinely "supreme" being? Not likely very much, I'm thinking.

So if we recognize that there can be no objection to the idea that the Supreme Being could speak hypothetically, if He wished to, then the question becomes not simply "Can we understand God," but rather, "Has God spoken?" Has He chosen to make some part of Himself comprehensible to us? For surely if He has, we would not have any reason to think we shouldn't be able to understand.

And even if we further surmise that God is awfully big, and thus He would be impossible for us to know completely, why would we think it would be impossible to know Him at least in part? If not totally, why not progressively, growingly, increasingly? We know many big things only in part. We know the Atlantic Ocean that way, as a matter of fact; and it's the only way any of us does know it. Why is knowing-in-part to be rejected if knowing-in-total is rejected? I see no reason.

So God may indeed be big, wondrous and transcend the dimensions of our poor human abilities; yet nothing in all this seems to suggest that God must remain forever unknowable. Rather, if we could never know Him despite His wish that we should know Him, could we speak of Him as God or a Supreme Being at all? It seems very nearly analytic in the idea of "God" that He can speak.

IC, I agree with what you have said here, FTR, I accept that God is bigger than anything I can imagine, and I believe that God can speak to humans in a way that humans can understand. FYI, sometimes I play "devils advocate" and state a position that is not my own, but state it to illustrate some other point of view that I am aware of but is not being otherwise stated by others, or not stated to my satisfaction.

[thedoc]

It's not about knowing.

Hobbes is correct. The statements, "I knew you would say that," and "I made you say that" are not at all equivalent. They are two distinct issues entirely.

It's interesting how these ideas show up in the game of chess. Many times the opponents moves are anticipated, and other times the moves are forced due to the position of the pieces on the board. The ideal situation is to be able to force all your opponents moves so as to get into the most desirable position from your point of view, checkmate.

[Immanuel Can]

FYI, sometimes I play "devils advocate"

I understand, and well I believe it: for the advocatus diaboli position is an old and time-worn technique for pursuing the best in arguments. It's a useful way to contribute.

It's interesting how these ideas show up in the game of chess. Many times the opponents moves are anticipated, and other times the moves are forced due to the position of the pieces on the board. The ideal situation is to be able to force all your opponents moves so as to get into the most desirable position from your point of view, checkmate.

Nice analogy. Thank you.

Yes, some things are forced upon us, for sure -- I cannot pick my family, my athleticism level, my eye-colour, my intelligence, etc. But other things look very much elective -- what career I choose, whom I marry, or if I marry, which scoop of ice cream I want on a given day, and so on. Any good defense of determinism would have to rule out the latter entirely, and do so on compelling rational grounds.

Though I have in times past seen many leading analogies and florid rhetoric on both sides, I have not so far seen such an argument, either here or elsewhere.

[Hobbes' Choice]

That may be true, or it may not be: we have absolutely no way of checking. Unless we believe already in determinism, we would have no reason to believe that was true. But the problem for both of us will be your "if": for hypothetical situations cannot be checked. So this isn't really an argument useful to proving determinism, nor is it a problem the non-determinist is obliged to resolve.

Well consider the two outcomes.
1) things are different
2) things turned out the same.

What sense could we make of the world were 1) the case? perhaps you would like to tell me what you think?

If 2) then determinism is true, and compatible with whatever we might mean by will or "free-will". In other words to whatever degree our intentionality as a cause of events can succeed in bringing about those events is bound by antecedent conditions; and, of course limited by those same conditions.

I see no case for a free will in spite of in contradiction of a deterministic world. Setting the clock back, if only as a thought experiment, establishes compatibilism. Free-will, as normally expressed, is illusory.

[Immanuel Can]

Well consider the two outcomes.
1) things are different
2) things turned out the same.

What sense could we make of the world were 1) the case? perhaps you would like to tell me what you think?

I think I'm missing the intended thrust of your question. Can you clarify?

Whether we believe in determinism or voluntarism, it seems obvious to me that we are never positioned to be able to speak about "what would have happened if..." No such condition can be measured, evaluated or assessed, because no such condition does, in fact exist. Once a decision has been actualized, all previous possibilities may not be incoherent to think about, or even to speculate about; but they're certainly beyond empirical reach.

This would be especially the case if determinism were true, since things literally could not have been otherwise than they were. That's why no "if" case can be made for determinism.

[thedoc]

Well consider the two outcomes.
1) things are different
2) things turned out the same.

Why only 2, it seems like 1. things are totally different, and 2. things totally the same, would be the extremes on a spectrum of possibilities. Reality could be anything in between, I would suggest that 2 possibilities would be the fallacy of the excluded middle.

[Greylorn Ell]

Knowing, with absolute certainty, the outcome of a coin flip means that the outcome has been determined.

Greylorn

It's not about knowing.
As soon as the coin leaves the cup its path is determined. The coin does not care whether or you you know it or are ignorant of it; it is still determined.
Only god knows. But then he is determined to, as is the universe. I can't see how it could be otherwise.
Each word I type is caused by my intention, experience, learning, genetics.. and a million other causal factors.
But if you were to turn back the clock and reset the universe exactly as it was, the outcome would not be difference - how could it be?

H.C.
According to my best understanding of your views, you are an atheist or a Christian. If the latter, you should be a Calvinist. From those belief systems, your opinions may well be inevitable. However, if you perused my brief description of basic Beon Theory (Page 6, Sun 4/5 4:54a) you'd know that it offers an unique explanation of the beginnings of things, one that is not constrained by conventional opinions and beliefs, and is therefore paradox free.

According to B.T. free will is inevitable. It's description of the human mind is derived from Cartesian dualism, with exceptions. Put simply, the human body and brain are engineered mechanisms, and themselves subject to the deterministic laws of physics and principles of microbiology. Beon is an independent entity deliberately interfaced to the brain via a bi-directional connection, and capable of controlling the brain (mainly the cortex, but apparently with yoga practice some beons can also control the hypothalamus).

I may try to explain how this works more precisely later in this thread. It is explained in detail, along with the basic physics needed to make sense of it, in my book. Some on my website.

Greylorn

[Greylorn Ell]

...some things are forced upon us, for sure -- I cannot pick my family, my athleticism level, my eye-colour, my intelligence, etc. But other things look very much elective -- what career I choose, whom I marry, or if I marry, which scoop of ice cream I want on a given day, and so on. Any good defense of determinism would have to rule out the latter entirely, and do so on compelling rational grounds.

Though I have in times past seen many leading analogies and florid rhetoric on both sides, I have not so far seen such an argument, either here or elsewhere.[/color]

I.C.
I believe that your initial premises are badly mistaken.

I went from a weakling wimp in elementary school and early H.S. to someone with whom few cared to fight. All it took was my commitment to buying a 100 lb. barbell/dumbell set and working out six nights weekly, one hour minimum. My skills at sports improved accordingly. This was a mental choice.

Moreover, I have reasons to believe that my enhanced physical development was subsequently passed on to my offspring.

You might want to evaluate MENSA's published research re: the development of intelligence. By avoiding the customary emotional reactions to the positioning of children in the family pecking order (adopting the principles of Beon Theory), my offspring did rather well. The smartest of them had to work to pay for her education, but the two stupid ones obtained full-ride scholarships to different major universities.

It is impressive what a mind can do in the absence of perceived or programmed limitations.

One of my objections to almost all religious beliefs is their acceptance of mental determinism, stemming from the belief that God created the mind, and that's the way it is.

Obviously I think that determinism really sucks. I believe in the absolute free will and unlimited development potential of the beon component of mind.

Greylorn

[Hobbes' Choice]

Knowing, with absolute certainty, the outcome of a coin flip means that the outcome has been determined.

Greylorn

It's not about knowing.
As soon as the coin leaves the cup its path is determined. The coin does not care whether or you you know it or are ignorant of it; it is still determined.
Only god knows. But then he is determined to, as is the universe. I can't see how it could be otherwise.
Each word I type is caused by my intention, experience, learning, genetics.. and a million other causal factors.
But if you were to turn back the clock and reset the universe exactly as it was, the outcome would not be difference - how could it be?

H.C.
According to my best understanding of your views, you are an atheist or a Christian. If the latter, you should be a Calvinist. From those belief systems, your opinions may well be inevitable. However, if you perused my brief description of basic Beon Theory (Page 6, Sun 4/5 4:54a) you'd know that it offers an unique explanation of the beginnings of things, one that is not constrained by conventional opinions and beliefs, and is therefore paradox free.

According to B.T. free will is inevitable. It's description of the human mind is derived from Cartesian dualism, with exceptions. Put simply, the human body and brain are engineered mechanisms, and themselves subject to the deterministic laws of physics and principles of microbiology. Beon is an independent entity deliberately interfaced to the brain via a bi-directional connection, and capable of controlling the brain (mainly the cortex, but apparently with yoga practice some beons can also control the hypothalamus).

I may try to explain how this works more precisely later in this thread. It is explained in detail, along with the basic physics needed to make sense of it, in my book. Some on my website.

Greylorn

There is more to determinism that Calvinism, I could be several other species of Protestantism and be a Christian. I could even be a Christian and an Atheist at the same time. Labels conceal more than they reveal.
Free-will is meaningless, not inevitable. If it is not compatible with the laws of cause and effect it simply does not make any sense at all.
From this Calvin was right about one thing. If there is a God (typical pan-omni being), then he has to have known from the beginning of time who will be and who will not be saved. Calvin was thus, one of the "chosen". Pity Servetus had not figured on Calvin's arrogance, when he was lured to his murder at the hands of the Cavinist acolytes.

So you will forgive me for considering it an insult to be called a "Calvinist"!

[Greylorn Ell]

The revised formats are just too stupid to even try to deal with. Not worth the frustration. The one useful thing that they might have changed was the style of "smilies," but no such luck.

Sorry to abandon my conversation, but I'm out of here.

Greylorn