Philosophy Now Forum

raw_thought wrote:One can define "physicalist" as a person whose belief that everything is physical contradicts itself. However, the physicalist is unaware of the contradiction.

You claim that there are "concepts" such as "materialism", but where and how are these concepts maintained? How and where to they exist? In what form or shape or essence? What is the nature of a 'concept'?
If you want to deny materialism, in what way are you able to sustain such a position? And what is the "you" that is making the point?

raw_thought wrote:How can you identify a particular instance of a universal if there are no universals?

Because of the difference between saying there is no such thing as a universal, and saying that universals are eronious when it comes a physical explanation of particular things.

raw_thought wrote: If there are no such things as unicorns how can I point out a particular unicorn?

We can't, because there is no such thing as unicorns.

raw_thought wrote: If there are no universals there is no description of what you are looking for.

I am sure it can be done without the need for universals such as brownness and dogness. Consider the following description of a particular dog:

I am looking for a particular Jack Russell Terrier. He is a short haired brown dog with a white patch over his left eye. He answers to the name of "Charlie"

raw_thought wrote:One can define "physicalist" as a person whose belief that everything is physical contradicts itself. However, the physicalist is unaware of the contradiction.

It is only a contradiction if we are prepared to accept that universals are a prerequisite when it comes to physical descriptions. Physicalists and materialists reject this on the basis that universal concepts cannot be applied to particular objects across time and space. They would say that any such an attempt results in a category error. For example, all brown dogs share the quality of brownness, so "brownness itself" must be a necessary part of description.

If what you are saying is true then any science that deals in descriptions is promoting a self-contradiction.

Only if they venture into philosophy. Scientists are great at science. However they are horrible at philosophy. For example, I have great respect for Hawking. However, he is quoted as saying that as a logical positivist he does not care if his theories match reality. He only cares about the ability to make experimental predictions.
Not all scientists adopt such a silly philosophy. Some are not materialists.
PS: Hawking takes that position because for him concepts are meaningless (materialism's position) and so therefore cannot refer to anything. All knowledge to him has nothing to do with reality. Knowledge is simply a tool. For example, "the cat is on the mat" for him does not refer to a reality. It is a tool to help someone avoid stepping on the cat!
Logical positicism is famous for being self refuting.
Logical positivism's fundamental tenet is that either a truth is analytical or empirical or it is nonsense.
Is the statement " truth is analytical or empirical " analytical or empirical. It is neither. Therefore according to logical positivism, logical positivism is nonsense!

raw_thought wrote:Only if they venture into philosophy. Scientists are great at science. However they are horrible at philosophy. For example, I have great respect for Hawking. However, he is quoted as saying that as a logical positivist he does not care if his theories match reality. He only cares about the ability to make experimental predictions.
Not all scientists adopt such a silly philosophy. Some are not materialists.
PS: Hawking takes that position because for him concepts are meaningless (materialism's position) and so therefore cannot refer to anything. All knowledge to him has nothing to do with reality. Knowledge is simply a tool. For example, "the cat is on the mat" for him does not refer to a reality. It is a tool to help someone avoid stepping on the cat!
Logical positicism is famous for being self refuting.
Logical positivism's fundamental tenet is that either a truth is analytical or empirical or it is nonsense.
Is the statement " truth is analytical or empirical " analytical or empirical. It is neither. Therefore according to logical positivism, logical positivism is nonsense!

Outside of philosophy of mind I don't think there are any scientists that are materialists in this day and age. As far as science is concerned materialism has been superseded by physicalism. I would say this is also true when it comes to neuroscience.

The physical according to modern physics has more mind like properties than what is commonly understood as physicalism.
Note, I am not saying that the physical is mental. I am saying that the physical (according to modern physics ) has more mind like properties. For example, non-locality etc.
Modern physics declares that the physical's fundamental nature is information not substance.

raw_thought wrote:The physical according to modern physics has more mind like properties than what is commonly understood as physicalism.
Note, I am not saying that the physical is mental. I am saying that the physical (according to modern physics ) has more mind like properties. For example, non-locality etc.

edit

Note again that I am not saying that matter=mind. I am saying that it has more in common with mind then our common sense understanding of matter.
The mind is non-local. Concepts (universals) have no position in spacetime.

raw_thought wrote:Note again that I am not saying that matter=mind. I am saying that it has more in common with mind then our common sense understanding of matter.
The mind is non-local. Concepts (universals) have no position in spacetime.

Quantum non-locality has nothing to do with universals. Non-locality is consistent with time and space, otherwise there would no way to conduct a measurement problem.

P.S.

I just realized what you are probably talking about. You might have in mind the collapse of the wave function by way of observation.

Note again that I am not saying that matter=mind. I am saying that it has more in common with mind then our common sense understanding of matter.

Which is a great reason to suppose that physics will one day be able to explain qualia and consciousness without resorting to mysticism or dualism.

Sure if they co-opt psychology terms and make physics out of psychology.

“You claim that there are "concepts" such as "materialism", but where and how are these concepts maintained? How and where to they exist? In what form or shape or essence? What is the nature of a 'concept'?”
Wyman
So you agree with me that concepts are not physical! They have no form, shape etc!!!!

“If there are no such things as unicorns how can I point out a particular unicorn?”
ME
We can't, because there is no such thing as unicorns.
Ginko
I think you missed my point. I was not arguing for the existence of unicorns. I was drawing an analogy. One cannot believe in concepts if one does not believe in particular concepts.

raw_thought wrote:“If there are no such things as unicorns how can I point out a particular unicorn?”
ME
We can't, because there is no such thing as unicorns.
Ginko
I think you missed my point. I was not arguing for the existence of unicorns. I was drawing an analogy. One cannot believe in concepts if one does not believe in particular concepts.

I think I see what you are getting at now. The universal concept of dog, man and unicorn is the same as the particular concepts of dog, men and unicorns. Is this correct?

Ginkgo wrote:

raw_thought wrote:“If there are no such things as unicorns how can I point out a particular unicorn?”
ME
We can't, because there is no such thing as unicorns.
Ginko
I think you missed my point. I was not arguing for the existence of unicorns. I was drawing an analogy. One cannot believe in concepts if one does not believe in particular concepts.

I think I see what you are getting at now. The universal concept of dog, man and unicorn is the same as the particular concepts of dog, men and unicorns. Is this correct?

No, I think he is just being circular again. He says 'If you speak of a dog, then you are speaking of a particular instance of a universal. You can't speak of particular instances of universals without believing in universals just like you cannot believe in universals and not believe in particular instances of them' But the very first premise assumes everything, as I'd say 'it is not true that if you speak of a dog then you are speaking of a particular instance of a universal, since universals do not exist.'
He can't fathom that anyone would disagree with the truth of his conclusion, which is that universals exist, so he states it as an 'obvious' premise. It is like saying 'I will prove to you that 'Gingkoness' really exists: If you speak of a person named 'Gingko' then you are speaking of a particular instance of something that all instances of Gingkos have in common (even if there is only one) - 'Gingkoness.' You can't speak of 'Gingko' without believing in 'Gingkoness.'

And yet, I'll bet it's never crossed anyone's mind to think of something called 'Gingkoness' until now.