Philosophy Now Forum

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Mar 31, 2023 3:25 am

Sculptor wrote: ↑Thu Mar 30, 2023 6:39 pm

Skepdick wrote: ↑Thu Mar 30, 2023 4:57 pm

It's really puzzling as to why you even care. As a moral subjectivist up or down, it's all relative. Right?

nuclear weapons.png

No "IT'S" not all subjectivist in any sense. Wever the fuck "IT" is in this context.

Tell me again how your diagram advances and argument towards moral objectivism!
Are you saying that we were more moral in 1944, than now and a bit more moral when nukes were at their height.?

Really? What the fuck is on your mind?

Is more or less more or less moral?
And if so WHY?

The above confirms your knowledge re morality is too shallow, narrow and dogmatic, no wonder you like images with a very thick skull.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Mar 31, 2023 3:25 am

Sculptor wrote: ↑Thu Mar 30, 2023 6:39 pm

Skepdick wrote: ↑Thu Mar 30, 2023 4:57 pm

It's really puzzling as to why you even care. As a moral subjectivist up or down, it's all relative. Right?

nuclear weapons.png

No "IT'S" not all subjectivist in any sense. Wever the fuck "IT" is in this context.

Tell me again how your diagram advances and argument towards moral objectivism!
Are you saying that we were more moral in 1944, than now and a bit more moral when nukes were at their height.?

Really? What the fuck is on your mind?

Is more or less more or less moral?
And if so WHY?

The above confirms your knowledge re morality is too shallow, narrow and dogmatic, no wonder you like images with a very thick skull.
As usual you will cry 'F/Off' every time you are cornered without any substance to counter.
I don't give a damn with your infantile crying, I'll response whenever there is an opportunity for me to refresh my knowledge on the relevant subject.

The first thing we need to define 'what is morality'.
Morality is the eliminating of 'evil' to enable its corresponding 'good'.
What is evil is net-negative to the well being of the individual[s] and that of humanity.
What are evil [immoral] acts and thoughts are exhaustive with no ambiguities and exceptions.
One immoral element is dying prematurely and not naturally.
Therefore the trend of increasing life span is a moral progress.

Increasing the average life-span could lead to increase in population which is moral but if there is overpopulation, then it many be detrimental to the well being of humanity, thus in this case it would be immoral.
In this case, humanity must take the moral steps to ensure there is no over-population as a matter of moral principles. [in the future, not now].

Slavery is net-negative to the well being of the individual[s] and there is a trend of reduction [statistics] is Chattel Slavery to the extent that it is banned legally [politics] in all countries. Whilst it is political move, overall it due to the inherent moral impulse within all humans.
Thus there is moral progress [statistically] with Chattel Slavery.
There are other forms of slavery at present, but because there is an inherent moral function with all humans [active in different degrees] [statistics -normal curve], there is pressure from individuals and NGOs urging politicians to deal with this problem.
That there are pressure to deal with all forms of slavery as opposed in indifference as in the past is a sign of moral progress.

Generally, all humans are embedded in their DNA with a moral function as adapted from evolution.
As with evolution, the moral function within all humans are unfolding and being activated very slowly at present. This is why the majority of humans at present are more aligned with 'evil' tendencies than moral tendencies.

This is why there is a need to recognize this inherent moral functions as existing objectively so that humanity can understand its mechanisms more precisely and expedite its activity to facilitate a greater speed of moral progress on average [statistics].

What I propose, especially for the morally tortured utilitarian, is a solution to this dilemma. Before doing so, let me make a few adjustments to the scenario. Forget the trolley, the bridge, and the fat man for now. This time you are not out for an afternoon stroll, but you are instead the Director of a large hospital. You have been made aware of a situation involving five patients, all of whom are suffering unique forms of fatal organ failure. There are no donors available...

...but you also know a healthy patient was admitted that morning for a sprained ankle. The ankle has been bandaged, and they will soon release him. It occurs to you that if you were to harvest this patient’s organs, you could save the lives of the five. Would it be right to do so?

I could make this decision a little easier. I could alter this scenario [above] so the unsuspecting potential donor patient is elderly and on life support. All you’d have to do is pull the plug – similar to throwing the train switch. But I’ll instead go straight to the difficult dilemma. If you wish to save the lives of the five terminal patients, you must sacrifice a healthy patient.

You can stop worrying about it. I will make this decision for you. You should do what you can, everything medically possible, to save the five and the one (even though he only has a sprained ankle, so good for him). The same goes for the unfortunate fat man on the bridge. You may enlist him to try to help you warn the five doomed men; but you should not push him to his death.

Why? Let me answer this with another question. Could you live in a society in which your life could be arbitrarily sacrificed at any moment to save the lives of a thousand, or a hundred, or even two people? Of course not.

As a social structure consisting of organisms that have survived for millions of generations, our morality has evolved with us. Some may argue that true altruism does not exist since (as their argument goes) all our actions have selfish motivations driving them. But either way, a society that would allow, or even condone, the sacrifice of one life for the many as an integral component of its value system would not survive for long.

Utilitarianism aside, unless you’re a sociopath you will feel the horror that accompanies the thought of pushing a man to his death.

Introduction

Kant's example of lying to the murderer at the door has been a cherished source of scorn for thinkers with little sympathy for Kant's philosophy and a source of deep puzzlement for those more favorably inclined. The problem is that Kant seems to say that it is always wrong to lie—even to a murderer asking for the whereabouts of his victim.

If this is correct, then Kant's account seems not only to require us to respect the murderer more than the victim, but also that somehow we can be responsible for the consequences of another's wrongdoing.

After World War II our spontaneous, negative reaction to this apparently absurd line of argument is made even starker by replacing the murderer at the door with a Nazi officer looking for Jews hidden in people's homes. Does Kant really mean to say that people hiding Jews in their homes should have told the truth to the Nazis, and that if they did lie, they became co-responsible for the heinous acts committed against those Jews who, like Anne Frank, were caught anyway?

Because this is clearly what Kant argues, the critics continue, his discussion of lying to the murderer brings out the true, dark side not only of Kant's universalistic moral theory but also of Kant himself. We get the gloomy picture of a stubborn, old academic who refuses to see the inhumane consequences of his theory, and instead grotesquely defends the inhumane by turning it into an a priori, moral command.

The Murderer at the Door

Kant's short essay “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy” (hereafter “Supposed Right to Lie”) is a response to a challenge raised by Benjamin Constant in 1797. Kant begins by quoting Constant's challenges to him. Constant argues:

The moral principle, “it is a duty to tell the truth” would, if taken unconditionally and singly, make any society impossible. We have proof of this in the very direct consequences drawn from this principle by a German philosopher [Kant], who goes so far as to maintain that it would be a crime to lie to a murderer who asked us whether a friend of ours whom he is pursuing has taken refuge in our house. . . . It is a duty to tell the truth. The concept of duty is inseparable from the concept of right. A duty is that on the part of one being which corresponds to the rights of another. Where there are no rights, there are no duties. To tell the truth is therefore a duty, but only to one who has a right to the truth. But no one has a right to a truth that harms others.

Constant here argues against Kant that if it is always wrong to lie, then society is impossible, by which, I believe, Constant means that it would be practically impossible to protect oneself against violent aggressors.

In addition, Constant maintains, whether or not lying is wrong depends on the circumstances, that is, to whom we are lying. Murderers do not have a right to the truth and hence no one has the corresponding duty to tell them the truth. Constant therefore concludes—allegedly against Kant—that lying to murderers should not be considered a crime.

According to the traditional reading, we should view Kant's responses to Constant through the lenses provided by, for example, his account of the moral law in Groundwork. In this work, we learn that all moral actions must be based on a maxim that can be universalized and that we must do the right thing because it is the right thing to do—or from duty.

When viewed this way the “Supposed Right to Lie,” including passages like the one quoted above, is seen as accomplishing two goals: it simply repeats how one ought never to lie as the maxim of lying cannot be universalized, and it cashes out the implications of this moral principle with regard to people's enforceable rights and duties against one another.

Because lying is not a universalizable maxim, Kant is seen as saying, lying to the murderer is a crime. And of course, it is continued, this must mean not only that one cannot lie to a run of the mill murderer at the door, but also not to the worst of murderers, such as the Nazis. Lying to Nazis is therefore also a crime. There are no exceptions to the rule—the truth must be told.

To make things even worse, in the above passage Kant can be seen as arguing that if you lie despite the immorality of doing so, you are also legally responsible for the bad consequences of the lie. So, for example, if the Jew hiding in your house sneaks out while you are lying to the Nazi, and hence as the Nazi walks away from your house she actually captures the fleeing Jew, then you are partially responsible for what happens to the Jew even if it was not foreseeable. But this analysis is clearly absurd and morally repugnant. If this is all Kant has to say about the issue, the critics reasonably conclude, then the theory's irreconcilability with any test of reason is demonstrated.

Taking Kant’s principle of duty to what seems to be a logical conclusion, it should always be wrong to lie. No maxim for lying seems capable of passing the universalization test, since upon the maxim’s universalization the person to whom one would lie can always be expected know she is being lied to. This implication seems to be confirmed by Kant himself, in the quotation above. But does his principle of duty really lead to the conclusion that no lie is ever morally permissible—regardless of the consequences?

Lying to the murderer at the door. The classic objection to Kant’s ethical theory as a whole is the case of the inquiring murderer. Knowing that someone is intent on killing your friend, you hide her upstairs; but then he knocks on your door and asks if she is in your house. Your maxim of lying, telling the murderer that your friend has left, seems contrary to the principle of duty; but your telling him the truth seems to make you complicit in your friend’s murder; if you say nothing at all, or if you say “I’d rather not answer that question,” these will be equivalent to telling the truth. That’s the trouble with an ethics like Kant’s that emphasizes exceptionless moral rules, it is said.

popeye1945 wrote: ↑Thu Apr 27, 2023 2:06 am Moral relativism is complex, involving geological location, climate, and the past history of a given country/local. The development of given mythologies through time, including those mythologies termed religions. Also, the historical animal/s of the given people's substance. The closeness or isolation of a given people/culture to others, and thus mixing of cultures and at times war and the threat of war.

Belinda wrote: ↑Thu Apr 27, 2023 10:30 am

popeye1945 wrote: ↑Thu Apr 27, 2023 2:06 am Moral relativism is complex, involving geological location, climate, and the past history of a given country/local. The development of given mythologies through time, including those mythologies termed religions. Also, the historical animal/s of the given people's substance. The closeness or isolation of a given people/culture to others, and thus mixing of cultures and at times war and the threat of war.

That's a proper analysis from the point of view of anthropology. However we can aspire to better and, as long as one principle is in place, better morality may be achievable.

The "one principle" is universalism is better than tribalism.
.

And another is the living individual matters more than any culture of belief or any corporation.

popeye1945 wrote: ↑Thu Apr 27, 2023 11:17 am

Belinda wrote: ↑Thu Apr 27, 2023 10:30 am

popeye1945 wrote: ↑Thu Apr 27, 2023 2:06 am Moral relativism is complex, involving geological location, climate, and the past history of a given country/local. The development of given mythologies through time, including those mythologies termed religions. Also, the historical animal/s of the given people's substance. The closeness or isolation of a given people/culture to others, and thus mixing of cultures and at times war and the threat of war.

That's a proper analysis from the point of view of anthropology. However we can aspire to better and, as long as one principle is in place, better morality may be achievable.

The "one principle" is universalism is better than tribalism.
.


And another is the living individual matters more than any culture of belief or any corporation.

I couldn't agree more, but perhaps utopian--sadly.