Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Aug 25, 2020 11:24 am
By way of valediction, here’s a summary of my argument against moral objectivism, including, where relevant, explanation of the theory of truth and theory of language I use to make the argument. And I apologise for the repetition.
I’m also posting this at my other OP,
Is morality objective or subjective?, for anyone following one discussion but not the other.
1 Signs such as words can mean only what we use them to mean, and there is no other court of appeal. So what we call truth, facts and objectivity are what we say they are. For example, when we talk about factual assertions being true, that is what constitutes what we call truth. And what we mean when we say we know things is what constitutes what we call knowledge.
The idea that what we call such things as truth and knowledge may not be what we say they are comes from a metaphysical delusion. Unlike nouns such as
dog and
tree, abstract nouns, such as
truth and
knowledge, are not names of things of some kind that can be described, in the way we can describe dogs and trees.
Pending evidence for the existence of so-called abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational. But the myth of abstract things is ancient and pervasive.
(
I agree it is effective to made repetitions)
No other courts of appeal??
Words as sign to represent truth, fact and objectivity is very crude.
This is a very serious issue and philosophically you need to approach it with more rigor and precision.
What is truth, fact and objectivity is
justified empirically and philosophical reasoning within specific Framework and System of knowledge.
The resultant truths, facts and objectivity need not be presented in words but more precise in mathematical symbols and images, videos, etc.
Whatever fact you talk of must be conditioned upon a FSK, and the most credible is the Scientific FSK not on your mere talks of signs, words and what they mean.
Thus the grounding of your argument based on words is toothless and therefore to the conclusions you made depended on the above groundless premises.
2 What we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts. So, in this context, that there are facts is a given. And to ask if morality is objective is really to ask if there are moral facts.
Again objectivity is based on what is
justified empirically and philosophical reasoning within specific Framework and System of knowledge.
What is objective in relation to Morality is grounded and structured upon 3 main and 7 sub-dimensions.
- The ontological dimensions of ethical objectivity explored in this book are
- mind-independence,
determinate correctness,
uniform applicability, and
invariance;
the epistemic dimensions are
- transindividual concurrence and
impartiality; and
the semantic dimension is
I am reading the book on this at present.
3 We use the word fact in two radically different ways, to mean either a feature of reality (a state-of-affairs) that is or was the case, or a description of such a feature of reality. And only the second kind of fact - typically a linguistic expression – has a truth-value: (classically) true or false.
Most features of reality just are or were, neither true not false, because reality is not linguistic. The only features of reality that can have truth-value are factual assertions.
Your grounding of what is fact of reality is toothless.
Thus your 3 is pointless.
4 I define a factual assertion as an assertion that claims something about reality that may or may not be or have been the case. So a factual assertion has a truth-value: true or false. And we call a true factual assertion a fact.
A factual assertion is always contextual and involves a conventional use of signs. And as there are many ways to describe features of reality, there are many facts about any feature of reality, each true in its descriptive context. But though we invented different ways to talk about reality, we did not invent the reality that we talk about. A description is not the described.
Your grounding of what is fact of reality is toothless.
Thus your 4 is pointless.
5 A putative moral fact is either a moral feature of reality that is or was the case, or a description of such a feature of reality. And only the second kind of putative moral fact – typically a linguistic expression – has a truth-value: true or false.
Your grounding of what is fact of reality is toothless.
Thus your 5 is pointless.
6 Moral realists and objectivists claim that there are moral features of reality – moral rightness and wrongness – that are or were the case, so that there can be factual assertions about them that have truth-value.
Moral realist and moral objectivists [cognitivists] made the following claims;
Moral Sentence and moral judgments;
1. Are propositions
2. Is True or False – Truth Apt
3. Is Objective – mind independent via its FSK
4. Reducible to non-moral properties
The above are justified via a Moral Framework and System and Moral Cognitivists [different groups] has given their respective supports for their claims.
7 To my knowledge, moral realists and objectivists have failed to prove that moral features of reality exist. And while that may not mean they do not exist, it does mean that to believe they do exist is irrational.
This is because you have never bothered to read widely on the various claims made by the cognitivists.
In addition I have presented my of my justifications on the existence of moral facts, but because of your dogmatism you are naturally blinded and be open to alternative views.
8 Given this, a moral assertion, such as ‘slavery is morally wrong’ is non-factual, does not claim something about reality that may or may not be or have been the case, and therefore does not have a truth-value.
Instead, the function of a moral assertion is to express a moral value-judgement about a feature of reality, such as genocide, slavery, rape, abortion, capital punishment, eating animals – and so on.
I have already provided the justifications.
In addition there are loads of books and articles by cognitivists who provided their own basis of justification for moral facts.
9 Our moral values and judgements matter deeply to us. And we think of them as universal – applicable everywhere and for all time. For example, if we think slavery is morally wrong, we think it always was and will be morally wrong. To think otherwise would be morally inconsistent.
For these reasons, it is easy to think there are moral facts, so that morality is objective. It is an understandable misunderstanding.
The misunderstanding is due to your ignorance and dogmatism in sticking to some archaic doctrines inherited from the bastardized philosophies of the logical positivists, note Ayer's Emotivism for example.
You should try to counter the
Frege-Geach Problem that had sunk the non-Cognitivists ideology.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30150
I believe this is beyond your grasp?
This Frege-Geach Problem undermines all your claims above and those nonCognitivists' stances I listed below.
You must counter to keep your claims above water after being sunk.
Your above counter against Moral Objectivism is too flimsy, note the more complete stance taken by nonCognitivists like yourself are;
- Moral Sentences - moral judgments
1. Cannot be Propositions
2. Cannot be True nor False
3. Not truth apt
4. Not fact, not state-of-affairs
4i Are opinions and 'beliefs'
5. Not objectively true
6. Prescriptive not descriptive
7. Non-Declarative Speech Acts
8. Meaningless - Boo,
9. Moral knowledge impossible
10. Not state of mind of Beliefs
11. Express desires, emotions, dis/approval
12. Do not predicate properties of subjects
13. Are Queer - mythical -woo woo
14. Mind Dependent
But the nonCognitivists claims are full of big holes, i.e. fallacious.
Therefore you should get your own house in order before you critique others.
