What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

Strawman again.

PH: You use ought to and ought not to all the time in your moral 'theory'
Nope I never used the above modal [auxillary] verbs specifically.

Rather, I used 'ought-not-ness to kill humans' or 'oughtness to do ..."

These are nouns representing potentiality.
Example, the "oughtness-to-breathe" is a potential and driving force within all humans.
The "ought-not-ness to kill humans" is a potential and a noun that is inherent in all humans, but unfolding and active in a range of degrees in humans.

Get it?

Ah. That clarifies your claim: the noun oughtness-not-to-kill has nothing to do with the ways we use the verb ought.

So, please can you explain what exactly is the 'potential' you call 'oughtness-to-breathe'. We certainly have to or must breathe or (usually) we die. Perhaps the potential 'haveness-to-breathe' or 'mustness-to-breathe' are better terms. Then perhaps it'd be okay to use cognates: we have to/must breathe.

But if you think there's a difference between 'oughtness-to-breathe' and 'mustness-to-breathe', please explain what the difference is. I obviously need to learn.

First the 'oughtness-to-breathe' is an imperative [not in the command sense] that is absolute within human nature.
The term 'oughtness' is very relevant to describe that potential and imperative to breathe and more so when applied to morality within human nature. This is why the term 'ought' is generally associated with morality.

I believe context is critical.
The terms 'have to' 'should', 'must', does not jive well with features of human nature and its imperativeness especially in the context of morality.

Sorry, but you're not explaining why oughtness is different from mustness with regard to breathing. So your idea that humans are programmed with oughtness-to-breathe doesn't make sense. It's just a physiological fact that if humans don't breathe, they die. (No need to bang on about the physiology fsk, blah, blah.)

And you don't explain why oughtness is particularly relevant to morality, when you reject the idea that morality is about the rightness and wrongness of behaviour. What is it that the noun 'oughtness-not-to-kill' names? Just saying it's a potential in human neurology doesn't explain anything.

[Peter Holmes]

I suggested there's a different way of thinking about talk of minds and mental things and event - in response to VA's fixation with mind-dependence, mind-independence, and 'not-mind-independence'. I think VA's basic idea is that reality isn't and can't be not-mind-independent. So what the mind is seems to be an important issue.

Several contributors have argued - with evidence - that the mind is, as it were, spread throughout the body - perhaps because, or in the way that, neurons spread out through all soft tissue. And the same must be true of the hamster mind. The hamster mind is not confined to the hamster brain. It's also in its tail.

Okay. Suppose what we call the mind is, in some way, coterminus with the body. (And I'm reminded of Wittgenstein's remark: the human body is the best picture of the human soul.) And suppose claims about substance - monism and dualism - are, as IWP argues, undecided - and perhaps undecidable. So we can't conclude or assume that the mind is 'the same as' or 'different from' the body. We have to keep an open...mind.

Given all this - back to VA's claim that reality isn't and can't be 'not-mind-independent'. Can anyone explain what that means? We seem to have hit the buffers.

The question I'm getting at is this. If we (I think rightly) 'embody' the mind - or 're-embody' it after millennia of religiously based separation - what price any talk of the mind-body relationship - such as reality being 'not-mind-independent'?

PS. And if, with IWP, we conclude that we don't know what body is anyway - there's no game of soldiers at all.

PPS. It would be of comfort to a mouse to know that the cat isn't not-mouse-mind-independent.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Ah. That clarifies your claim: the noun oughtness-not-to-kill has nothing to do with the ways we use the verb ought.

So, please can you explain what exactly is the 'potential' you call 'oughtness-to-breathe'. We certainly have to or must breathe or (usually) we die. Perhaps the potential 'haveness-to-breathe' or 'mustness-to-breathe' are better terms. Then perhaps it'd be okay to use cognates: we have to/must breathe.

But if you think there's a difference between 'oughtness-to-breathe' and 'mustness-to-breathe', please explain what the difference is. I obviously need to learn.

First the 'oughtness-to-breathe' is an imperative [not in the command sense] that is absolute within human nature.
The term 'oughtness' is very relevant to describe that potential and imperative to breathe and more so when applied to morality within human nature. This is why the term 'ought' is generally associated with morality.

I believe context is critical.
The terms 'have to' 'should', 'must', does not jive well with features of human nature and its imperativeness especially in the context of morality.

Sorry, but you're not explaining why oughtness is different from mustness with regard to breathing. So your idea that humans are programmed with oughtness-to-breathe doesn't make sense. It's just a physiological fact that if humans don't breathe, they die. (No need to bang on about the physiology fsk, blah, blah.)

There is a difference between 'oughtness' and 'mustness' in different context with regard to breathing.
Within the science-biological FSK and its language-game, it would be more appropriate to use 'mustness' i.e. all air breathing organism MUST breathe else they die.

It is only when I want to relate 'must breathe' as an analogy to moral elements that it would be relevant to use the term 'oughtness-to-breathe' because the term 'ought' is more common with the morality language game.

And you don't explain why oughtness is particularly relevant to morality, when you reject the idea that morality is about the rightness and wrongness of behaviour. What is it that the noun 'oughtness-not-to-kill' names? Just saying it's a potential in human neurology doesn't explain anything.

To deal the emergence & realization of what is real, we need its specific FSK which will then facilitate its conscious experience, perception, appearance, knowing and description.
Note this complex series of processes, mechanisms and the variables involved. As usual you will be blind to this complex issue.
Reality: Emergence & Realization Prior to Perceiving, Knowing & Describing
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=40145


As such we deal with the emergence & realization of what is real morality-proper, it is imperative we need a human-based moral FSK.
The 'oughtness-not-to-kill-human' is a neural potential within the brain which when dealt within the human-based moral FSK is a moral element and an objective moral fact as explained in these threads.

There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587

Two Senses of Reality
viewtopic.php?t=40265

What is Philosophical Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31416

Two Senses of 'Objective'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39326

Scientific Objectivity
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39286 Jan 13, 2023

What is Moral Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30707

There are Objective Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=35002

Also the more than 250 threads [many with relevant references] I opened in the Ethical Theory Sections are relevant to support the justification why there are objective moral facts and that morality is objective.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I suggested there's a different way of thinking about talk of minds and mental things and event - in response to VA's fixation with mind-dependence, mind-independence, and 'not-mind-independence'. I think VA's basic idea is that reality isn't and can't be not-mind-independent. So what the mind is seems to be an important issue.

Several contributors have argued - with evidence - that the mind is, as it were, spread throughout the body - perhaps because, or in the way that, neurons spread out through all soft tissue. And the same must be true of the hamster mind. The hamster mind is not confined to the hamster brain. It's also in its tail.

Okay. Suppose what we call the mind is, in some way, coterminus with the body. (And I'm reminded of Wittgenstein's remark: the human body is the best picture of the human soul.) And suppose claims about substance - monism and dualism - are, as IWP argues, undecided - and perhaps undecidable. So we can't conclude or assume that the mind is 'the same as' or 'different from' the body. We have to keep an open...mind.

Given all this - back to VA's claim that reality isn't and can't be 'not-mind-independent'. Can anyone explain what that means? We seem to have hit the buffers.

The question I'm getting at is this. If we (I think rightly) 'embody' the mind - or 're-embody' it after millennia of religiously based separation - what price any talk of the mind-body relationship - such as reality being 'not-mind-independent'?

PS. And if, with IWP, we conclude that we don't know what body is anyway - there's no game of soldiers at all.

PPS. It would be of comfort to a mouse to know that the cat isn't not-mouse-mind-independent.

As I had stated many times you are very ignorant when it comes to more complex issues that need critical reflective thinking to dig below the surface of crude appearances.

Are you familiar with Kuhn's Paradigm Shift [there are criticisms but not critical for this point];
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradigm_shift
which is obvious from the contrasting shift in theories from Newtonian to Einsteinian and to Quantum Physics.
On the surface of it, there is a paradigm shift from mind-independent [Newtonian & Einstein] to non-mind-independent [QM] in terms of anti-scientific_realism.
Ultimately they as conditioned within the respective FSK are all non-mind-independent.

Your above is also a strawman;
I do not deny 'mind-independent' totally.
I only deny 'mind-independent' in the absolute sense as philosophical realists like you are clinging to this illusory concept.

Absolute mind-independence vs Relative Mind-independence:
viewtopic.php?p=659125#p659125

I accept 'mind-independence' in the relative sense where I shifts and adopts Empirical Realism. In this case, the oncoming train on the track I am standing on, is independent of my mind, thus I will jump off the rail track ASAP.

Where it is necessary I will shift to a 'not-mind-independent' paradigm in the case of FSK-ed reality which CANNOT be mind-independent at all because a FSK is human-based and thus conditioned upon the human conditions [mind, brain & body].

PPS. It would be of comfort to a mouse to know that the cat isn't not-mouse-mind-independent.

This exposes your ignorant and dogmatism in being stuck with the evolution default of the ideology of philosophical realism.

In the above you are assuming the mouse-nature is the same as human-nature which is impossible.
A mouse will experience a cat within its specific mouse-nature as external to its body but without any concern for epistemology, ontology, morality, etc.
Your above example is totally irrelevant.

In the case of humans and human nature where morality is concern, the concept of mind-interdependence is critical as whichever stance one adopts it will have an impact on the moral progress of humanity in terms of efficiency to meet with impending threats.
In one sense, a mouse is not absolutely independent from a cat;
Cats and mice both evolved from a common ancestor, which was something similar to a shrew.
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/scie ... -and-mouse

Philosophical Realism is A Threat to Humanity
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=40094

because;
"Philosophical Realism" is an Evolutionary Default.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39975

and dogmatically clung by people like;
PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992

[Peter Holmes]

VA.

1 I've explained that a definition of what is evil and what is good is subjective.

2 I've explained that calling 'oughtness-not-to-kill-humans' good, and 'oughtness-to-kill-humans' evil is a choice, which is subjective.

3 I've explained that deciding to enhance 'oughtness-not-kill-humans', rather than 'oughtness-to-kill-humans' is a choice, which is subjective.

4 I've explained that the choice of premises in a moral code is subjective. (See 1.)

The only fact here is about human neurological programming. And your claim that all facts exists in, or are 'conditioned upon' a human-based framework and system of knowledge is irrelevant. Whatever facts are - wherever they come from - they can't entail moral conclusions.

So your theory of moral objectivity doesn't work.

But hey, keep repeating your false premises and fallacious conclusions. Keep ignoring all and every rebuttal and refutation. Let's get one million hits. That's an achievement.

[Wizard22]

It seems to me this question - which has emerged from discussion of my post 'Is morality objective or subjective?' - is the crux in the disagreement between objectivists and subjectivists.

An objection to moral subjectivism is that, if moral values and judgements are matters of opinion, we can't know if they're correct. For example, we can't know if slavery is right or wrong, and can't therefore morally condemn those who think slavery is justifiable. That's just their opinion, and we can't say which opinion is correct or true.

But this assumes that there is indeed something to be known: an object of some kind that verifies the assertion slavery is wrong and falsifies the assertion slavery is right - or, perhaps, vice versa. But what is the object that makes moral judgements objective - matters of fact - and therefore true or false?

It can't be slavery itself, because that would also be the object of the assertion slavery is right - so we're back to square one. And it can't be the wrongness of slavery. To say the assertion slavery is wrong is justified (shown to be true) by the objective wrongness of slavery is circular, and so no justification at all.

So what is it that moral objectivists claim about moral judgements that makes them objective - matters of fact, falsifiable and independent from judgement, belief or opinion?

Does any moral objectivist here have an answer that doesn't beg the question?

(The claim that objective moral values and judgements come from a god's commands or a god's nature begs the question: what makes a god's commands or a god's nature objectively morally good?)

Moral Objectivity requires an "Objective" mind, I would put it at 130+IQ, to understand.

Since most humans alive today are well below 130IQ, they will neither understand nor accept moral "objectivity" at face value. It won't make sense to most people.

So what is it that "doesn't make sense" exactly? You need to imagine Slavery from the perspective of the Master, and the Slave. You cannot presume the primacy of one, before the other. Therefore, you need to imagine what life is like for both the Master and the Slave, separately, distinctly, accurately, and viscerally real. This is something most Humans either *cannot* do, or those that can, *will not* do.

Objectivity implies that you need to imagine life, experience, and existence in the mind of an Inferior. Or, if it were possible to imagine as such in the mind of a Superior. Can people imagine what is above them? Certainly not! So Objectivity requires the Superior mindset. This is the fundamental rejection of "Objectivity" because Objectivity implies a type of mental, intellectual, and also, moral superiority over others.

See "iambiguous" many dissertations of moral objectivism, for this to make sense...


But things need not go that far, to understand Moral Objectivity. All you need to do, first and foremost, is imagine all perspectives involved, which the majority of humans will refuse to do from the get go. So it's a Non-starter, as they say. And this is why most people willingly handover their moral autonomy and authority to priestly and religious Representatives, to be dictated in matters of Moral Objectivity.

Because that's not in the realm of average people, average persons, to dictate, decide, or determine.

It's "Up to God".

[Peter Holmes]

It seems to me this question - which has emerged from discussion of my post 'Is morality objective or subjective?' - is the crux in the disagreement between objectivists and subjectivists.

An objection to moral subjectivism is that, if moral values and judgements are matters of opinion, we can't know if they're correct. For example, we can't know if slavery is right or wrong, and can't therefore morally condemn those who think slavery is justifiable. That's just their opinion, and we can't say which opinion is correct or true.

But this assumes that there is indeed something to be known: an object of some kind that verifies the assertion slavery is wrong and falsifies the assertion slavery is right - or, perhaps, vice versa. But what is the object that makes moral judgements objective - matters of fact - and therefore true or false?

It can't be slavery itself, because that would also be the object of the assertion slavery is right - so we're back to square one. And it can't be the wrongness of slavery. To say the assertion slavery is wrong is justified (shown to be true) by the objective wrongness of slavery is circular, and so no justification at all.

So what is it that moral objectivists claim about moral judgements that makes them objective - matters of fact, falsifiable and independent from judgement, belief or opinion?

Does any moral objectivist here have an answer that doesn't beg the question?

(The claim that objective moral values and judgements come from a god's commands or a god's nature begs the question: what makes a god's commands or a god's nature objectively morally good?)

Moral Objectivity requires an "Objective" mind, I would put it at 130+IQ, to understand.

Since most humans alive today are well below 130IQ, they will neither understand nor accept moral "objectivity" at face value. It won't make sense to most people.

So what is it that "doesn't make sense" exactly? You need to imagine Slavery from the perspective of the Master, and the Slave. You cannot presume the primacy of one, before the other. Therefore, you need to imagine what life is like for both the Master and the Slave, separately, distinctly, accurately, and viscerally real. This is something most Humans either *cannot* do, or those that can, *will not* do.

Objectivity implies that you need to imagine life, experience, and existence in the mind of an Inferior. Or, if it were possible to imagine as such in the mind of a Superior. Can people imagine what is above them? Certainly not! So Objectivity requires the Superior mindset. This is the fundamental rejection of "Objectivity" because Objectivity implies a type of mental, intellectual, and also, moral superiority over others.

See "iambiguous" many dissertations of moral objectivism, for this to make sense...


But things need not go that far, to understand Moral Objectivity. All you need to do, first and foremost, is imagine all perspectives involved, which the majority of humans will refuse to do from the get go. So it's a Non-starter, as they say. And this is why most people willingly handover their moral autonomy and authority to priestly and religious Representatives, to be dictated in matters of Moral Objectivity.

Because that's not in the realm of average people, average persons, to dictate, decide, or determine.

It's "Up to God".

Thanks, but I disagree with nearly all of this.

What we call objectivity is reliance on facts, rather than opinions. And what we call facts are features of reality that are or were the case, regardless of opinion. So moral objectivism is the belief or claim that there are moral facts - moral things or properties - that are or were the case, regardless of opinion. So a claim such as 'abortion is morally wrong' is supposed to be a factual assertion with a truth-value: classically, true or false.

And this has nothing to do with intelligence (IQ), or the ability to imagine the lives of others, 'inferior' or 'superior' - 'all perspectives involved' - though such attributes may inform our moral opinions.

[Wizard22]

Thanks, but I disagree with nearly all of this.

What we call objectivity is reliance on facts, rather than opinions. And what we call facts are features of reality that are or were the case, regardless of opinion.

"Regardless of opinion" requires awareness of all opinions, all perspectives.

It requires detachment from personal opinion, detachment from your own subjectivity.

So moral objectivism is the belief or claim that there are moral facts - moral things or properties - that are or were the case, regardless of opinion. So a claim such as 'abortion is morally wrong' is supposed to be a factual assertion with a truth-value: classically, true or false.

And this has nothing to do with intelligence (IQ), or the ability to imagine the lives of others, 'inferior' or 'superior' - 'all perspectives involved' - though such attributes may inform our moral opinions.

It has everything to do with intelligence, or more specifically, self-consciousness.

Humans who are not self-conscious, cannot be or become "objective". They cannot detach their 'self' from their opinions.

[Wizard22]

Furthermore,

What is an opinion???

It is an emotional reaction to a belief or range of beliefs. Because this is so, people are by default and automatically 'attached' to their beliefs. This is Pathology: Empathy, Sympathy, Antipathy, Apathy, Psychopathy, Sociopathy, Etc. Humanity doesn't have "one mode" of opinionated-beliefs. There are a lot of variations. There are a lot of different reactions. There are a lot of different personalities involved. People who are depressive, will react one way. People who are aggressive, will react another way.

Few people can "step-back", "outside" yourself, and understand your personality as different and distinct from others'. This means, again, few people are Self-conscious. Few people have this intellectual ability. Why? Because self-consciousness is a sophisticated and advanced form of consciousness, that requires a mix of abilities that most people don't have. It requires the ability to Disassociate self, in abstract, complex, and nuanced ways. It requires creativity. It requires imagination. It requires an Ethical obligation to "realism". It requires scientific standards. It requires specific awareness of who believes what and why and when and how. Lower intelligences literally, physically, mentally, cannot track such a wide range of variables in motion. This is expressed in IQ-testing, but more obviously and immediately, through online debate on a philosophy forum. All you need do is—start typing. Start demonstrating your own beliefs, how they're the same as others, how many others, and how they're different, and you'll begin to see the difference of 'opinion' and their emotional manifestations.

Shall we go on...?

[Wizard22]

Examine the lifestyle of a Master, and his or her Slave.

What is wrong about it? What is wrong about being Superior, Lording over an Inferior? Do humans have moral quandaries of a human housing and owning a domesticated Canine or Feline? Do you have a problem with being Master over a dog or cat? How about children? Is a parent, not a Master over his or her own children? So what's the difference, of the Master-Slave dynamic, than or compared to, owning a pet or "having" a child? Let's begin with the obvious, there is a difference of status and reputation. A Slave is a Servant. The Servant is supposed to put the Master's desires and needs, before his/her own.

And I think this is where the real 'moral' dilemma begins.

Because Slavery is inherently Unequal, Inequal. And Slavery cannot mesh with the Western Post-enlightenment notion of Liberalism. Liberalism is predicated on human "Equality". And so, if all Westerners are forced to believe that everybody is "Equal" with each-other, then it makes sense that Liberalism would attack and nullify Slavery as "the most evilest immorality in existence". Therefore, from the point-of-view of Liberals, Slavery is the worst human behavior possible.

But Liberals cannot 'detach' their (subjective) moral framework "outside" of Liberalism. They are too heavily propagated. Therefore, they will reject prima facie any moral system that hints toward, or supports, human Inequality.

That...for example, there should be Winners and Losers in life. That in a sports competition, the Winner is victorious, deserves honor, respect, accolades, while the Losers do not.

Liberals attack this too. They want to give Losers "participation trophies". They see "nothing wrong" with Transexuals in women's sports. And they ignore any and all hypocrisy when it comes to racial quotas in the NBA. Why? Because Liberalism requires many Lies to stand up and perpetuate itself. It must therefore, attack "Racism" as any who addresses its own double-standards.


So much for "moral objectivity"...

[Peter Holmes]

Wizard22.

I think it's ironic that you obviously lack the intelligence and self-awareness that you proclaim are necessary for an elite access to moral objectivity. I have no interest in your maunderings about liberalism. In my opinion, you don't know what you're talking about, and I don't want to continue this conversation. But thanks, anyway.

[Peter Holmes]

VA charges me (and 'the gang' (?)) with holding to philosophical realism. And Atla points out that VA's argument is actually against naive or direct realism - belief that we can perceive reality as it really is. And this is supposed to be impossible, because of the 'causal chains of perception' from the perceived into our brains - and the way our brains have to interpret the data they receive from our senses, which could be interpreted differently.

VA, (arguably) recycling Kant, says there's no such thing as reality-as-it-really-is anyway - there is no 'noumenon' - so that any kind of realism - direct or indirect - is a mistake. And he calls this a form of philosophical antirealism, to contrast with the philosophical realism he castigates.

In response, I have a nagging question: how can we perceive the 'causal chains of perception' - because they must also be 'objects' - features of reality?. Why are they, as it were, really 'real'? In other words, how does indirect realism get off the hook that naive realism is supposed to be hanging on?

PS I think VA is wrong, because there's no reason to think that what we call reality doesn't exist 'as-it-is' - as do our brains, sense organs, and neurological electrochemical processes. But I think the label 'naive realism' is a question-begging slur.

PPS. I think the silliness of empiricist skepticism is at the bottom of all this confusion. It's what Kant tried to overcome, or at least reconcile with rationalism - with disastrous consequences for modern philosophy.

[Veritas Aequitas]

VA.

1 I've explained that a definition of what is evil and what is good is subjective.

2 I've explained that calling 'oughtness-not-to-kill-humans' good, and 'oughtness-to-kill-humans' evil is a choice, which is subjective.

3 I've explained that deciding to enhance 'oughtness-not-kill-humans', rather than 'oughtness-to-kill-humans' is a choice, which is subjective.

4 I've explained that the choice of premises in a moral code is subjective. (See 1.)

I have explained your above basis is grounded on the mind-independence of philosophical realism which is illusory.
Thus it follows, whatever your explanations in 1, 2, 3 are grounded on an illusion, thus they are all false.

You are relying on your 'what is fact' that 1, 2, 3 are not facts thus are only opinions, beliefs and judgments, so are subjective.
I have countered argued in the links above why your grounding to the above is illusory.
viewtopic.php?p=659965#p659965
However you have not countered them specifically.
I have repeated the above a 'million' times.

The only fact here is about human neurological programming.
And your claim that all facts exists in, or are 'conditioned upon' a human-based framework and system of knowledge is irrelevant. Whatever facts are - wherever they come from - they can't entail moral conclusions.

Yes, human neurological programs are facts, i.e. scientific-biological-neuroscientific facts which are conditioned upon human-based science-biology-neuroscience framework and system of knowledge [FSK].
If these facts are conditioned upon a FSK, then all facts must be conditioned upon a human-based FSK of which the science FSK is the most credible and objective.
In this case, a human based moral FSK is possible, thus we have moral facts.
Since my proposed moral FSK's majority of its input from the scientific FSK, it will have near equivalent credibility and objectivity to the scientific FSK.
So, facts from the scientific FSK can become moral facts when processed within a human-based moral FSK.

Again, I have explained the above a 'million' times.
You have not countered my arguments but merely blabbered and handwave them

So your theory of moral objectivity doesn't work.

There are already crude models of my type in existence.
I have tested my model in theory and it works.
The next task is its implementation.

But hey, keep repeating your false premises and fallacious conclusions. Keep ignoring all and every rebuttal and refutation. Let's get one million hits. That's an achievement.

Show me where in my argument that it is fallacious, i.e. not valid?
You may not agree with the truth of the premises but that is because you are grounding your argument based on an illusion, i.e. that of philosophical realism.

You are only interested in the numbers game but not to expand your knowledge base, which suits me fine.
I hope you will never agree to my arguments so that I can leverage on that to refresh and increase [self-research] my database of knowledge on Morality & Ethics.

[Veritas Aequitas]

VA charges me (and 'the gang' (?)) with holding to philosophical realism.

The fundamental principle of Philosophical Realism as in here.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

And Atla points out that VA's argument is actually against naive or direct realism - belief that we can perceive reality as it really is. And this is supposed to be impossible, because of the 'causal chains of perception' from the perceived into our brains - and the way our brains have to interpret the data they receive from our senses, which could be interpreted differently.

Atla created a strawman.
Kant's and mine is against Philosophical Realism [ANTI-Philosophical Realis] where naive realism is one of its many forms.

VA, (arguably) recycling Kant, says there's no such thing as reality-as-it-really-is anyway - there is no 'noumenon' - so that any kind of realism - direct or indirect - is a mistake. And he calls this a form of philosophical antirealism, to contrast with the philosophical realism he castigates.

That is a strawman.
Kant argued, the noumenon can be thought as merely a thought-object, i.e. in the negative sense BUT not in the positive sense like an apple that can be verified and justified as real scientifically.
see: Kant on Phenomena vs Noumena viewtopic.php?t=40170

In response, I have a nagging question: how can we perceive the 'causal chains of perception' - because they must also be 'objects' - features of reality?. Why are they, as it were, really 'real'? In other words, how does indirect realism get off the hook that naive realism is supposed to be hanging on?

Both naive and indirect realism are within fundamentally Philosophical Realism umbrella.

Note this point which mentioned 'Conceptual Framework' which is the basis for my more detailed human-based FSK.

• Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.[3]
  Furthermore, indirect realism is a core tenet of the cognitivism paradigm in psychology and cognitive science. While there is superficial overlap, the indirect model is unlike the standpoint of idealism, which holds that only ideas are real, but there are no mind-independent objects. WIKI

In my case, I cover 'emergence & realization' prior to perception and description.

PS I think VA is wrong, because there's no reason to think that what we call reality doesn't exist 'as-it-is' - as do our brains, sense organs, and neurological electrochemical processes. But I think the label 'naive realism' is a question-begging slur.

Prove reality "as it is" exists as absolutely mind-independent re philosophical realism?
PH, Is Your Philosophy-of Mind-Independence, Mind-Independent?
viewtopic.php?t=40585

PPS. I think the silliness of empiricist skepticism is at the bottom of all this confusion. It's what Kant tried to overcome, or at least reconcile with rationalism - with disastrous consequences for modern philosophy.

?? disastrous consequences for modern philosophy??
Where and how is that?

Kant is claimed to be one of the greatest philosopher of all times, the most influential philosophy in modern times.
and a godfather of cognitive science.

• Through nineteenth-century intermediaries, the model of the mind developed by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) has had an enormous influence on contemporary cognitive research. Indeed, Kant could be viewed as the intellectual godfather of cognitive science. Link

Kant's ANTI-philosophical_realism is in alignment with QM as opposed to Einstein's philosophical realism.

[Peter Holmes]

• Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.[3]
  WIKI

Notice how high flow the uncritical metaphorical tides. What is 'the external world', and to what is it external? The expression assumes there is an 'internal world' - but what exactly is an internal world, and why is it a 'world'? This crap has passed intellectual muster for so long that we're numb to it. It's a residual faith, left over from religious belief in the soul.

The subject/object dichotomy itself is simply a way of talking in certain contexts. Yet Kant constructed a whole convoluted philosophy on 'reversing the polarity' of the invented metaphysical distinction - recycling the myth.

And wtf is a conceptual framework, that's also a lens? Why does it mean we can't experience the external world as it really is? Why say the external world must be different from what we experience? Who knows what the external world is really like? Do a dog and a hamster have conceptual frameworks through the lenses of which they also can't experience the external world as it really is? And so on.

Just poke in a pin, and the whole farrago pops.