What could make morality objective?

[Atla]

You'll have to get by with that for now, you can have new attention in September perhaps.

That's still on the generous side I'd say, he should be thankful.

[Skepdick]

That's still on the generous side I'd say, he should be thankful.

I'd be even more thankful if he ignored me permanently.

Alas, addicts... They keep coming back for that fix.

[Peter Holmes]

If I define morality as moderating and managing evil to enable its related goods, how can I ignore the evil elements within the human conditions [mind, brain and body] in my Moral FSK [Model].

Try to think very hard.

What makes an action evil or good?

If evil is 'to the net detriment of the individual and society', then why should we resist or oppose it?
If good is 'to the net benefit of the individual and society', then why should we promote it?

My point is that your answer to the second and third questions seems to be: well, it just is - it's obvious - it's common sense. And in turn, you think that indirectly answers the first question.

Your appeal to neurological 'elements within the human conditions' [sic] doesn't explain why we should enhance one element and not another.

And your appeal to a morality-proper framework and system of knowledge to provide the reason doesn't work, because its main premise is that we should oppose evil and enhance its related good. Back to my questions above.

You have no way out. You begin with a moral premise - which is fine: we should oppose evil and enhance goodness - suitably defined. But your theory doesn't explain why it's a fact that we should.

You got it wrong.
I never explicitly state 'I should' 'we should' 'you should' 'they should,' 'he should' xyz should, etc. from a third party perspective as a command or prescription.
This is what Hume 'No Ought From Is' "NOFI" is about, i.e. enforcing 'ought' from a third party to individual[s] as in theism or political laws.

No, you got it wrong - and this is deflection.

Modal should need not be understood as imperative - and, among others, that has important legal consequences. And even modal must and shall are grammatically declarative, rather than imperative.

The issue of imperative prescription - do this and don't do that - is separate from the issue of moral rightness and wrongness - or, as you prefer, good and evil. And you've repeatedly acknowledged this by saying that, though there are - you claim - moral facts, this does not entail compulsion of behaviour - with enforcement and punishment.

You use ought to and ought not to all the time in your moral 'theory' - which is very largely identical in meaning to should. So your claim that you don't mean should is false. 'Humans oughtn't to kill humans' means 'humans shouldn't kill humans'. And they express a moral opinion, which is subjective. No way out.
[/quote]

[Skepdick]

And even modal must and shall are grammatically declarative, rather than imperative.

So Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes believes that if the law says "You must bring your vehicle to a complete stop at red traffic lights" that's not prescriptive statement.

[Peter Holmes]

One could, of course, look up the grammatical difference between declarative and imperative clauses. And one could, of course be careful to distinguish between grammatical form and function.

Of one could just troll along being a fucking moron.

[Skepdick]

One could, of course, look up the grammatical difference between declarative and imperative clauses. And one could, of course be careful to distinguish between grammatical form and function.

Of one could just troll along being a fucking moron.

All grammar is prescriptive. Demonstrable fact.

Write like this I can. Want to I do.

? stop me can you

It's very cute how Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes keeps confusing the normative for the descriptive...

[Peter Holmes]

The functional distinction between descriptive and prescriptive declaratives can be useful.

But, for example, is the declarative 'murder is morally wrong' descriptive or prescriptive? Is it a description of the way things are, with a truth-value? Or is it prescription for the way things ought to be, with no truth-value?

Because it's a declarative, it certainly looks like a description. But then, if it's a description, can it also be a prescription?

[Skepdick]

The functional distinction between descriptive and prescriptive declaratives can be useful.

But, for example, is the declarative 'murder is morally wrong' descriptive or prescriptive? Is it a description of the way things are, with a truth-value? Or is it prescription for the way things ought to be, with no truth-value?

"This color is red." was prescriptive the first time it was used and descriptive the second time it was used.

It continues to be prescriptive on anybody who doesn't accept it to be true.

[Peter Holmes]

Here's a sweet little demonstration of moral objectivity.

First user of an expression: 'It ought to be the case that abortion is morally wrong.' (prescription, no truth-value)
Second user of this expression: 'It is the case that abortion is morally wrong. (description with a truth-value)
Dissenter: 'I reject the description 'abortion is morally wrong' as a prescription with no truth value.'

Dissenter: 'It ought to be the case that abortion is not morally wrong'.
Etc.

[Skepdick]

Here's a sweet little demonstration of moral objectivity.

First user of an expression: 'It ought to be the case that abortion is morally wrong.' (prescription, no truth-value)
Second user of this expression: 'It is the case that abortion is morally wrong. (description with a truth-value)
Dissenter: 'I reject the description 'abortion is morally wrong' as a prescription with no truth value.'

Dissenter: 'It ought to be the case that abortion is not morally wrong'.
Etc.

First user or an expression: This color is red.
Second user of an expression: Is it the case that this color is red? (a description with truth-value)
Dissenter: I reject the description of this color as red as prescription with no truth value.

Dissenter: It ought to be the case that this color is blue.

Q.E.D

Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes doesn't understand how objectivity works amongst humans...

Even worse - he doesn't understand how defining work.

[Peter Holmes]

See above: how to demolish your own argument. Lol.

And at least i can write an English sentence. (Prescription or description?)

[Skepdick]

See above: how to demolish your own argument. Lol.

That's ironic. The above is not my argument. It's your argument.

At least you admit your argument is demolished.

I guess you needed me to echo it back to you before you could see it objectively.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You got it wrong.
I never explicitly state 'I should' 'we should' 'you should' 'they should,' 'he should' xyz should, etc. from a third party perspective as a command or prescription.
This is what Hume 'No Ought From Is' "NOFI" is about, i.e. enforcing 'ought' from a third party to individual[s] as in theism or political laws.

No, you got it wrong - and this is deflection.

Modal should need not be understood as imperative - and, among others, that has important legal consequences. And even modal must and shall are grammatically declarative, rather than imperative.

The issue of imperative prescription - do this and don't do that - is separate from the issue of moral rightness and wrongness - or, as you prefer, good and evil. And you've repeatedly acknowledged this by saying that, though there are - you claim - moral facts, this does not entail compulsion of behaviour - with enforcement and punishment.

You use ought to and ought not to all the time in your moral 'theory' - which is very largely identical in meaning to should. So your claim that you don't mean should is false. 'Humans oughtn't to kill humans' means 'humans shouldn't kill humans'. And they express a moral opinion, which is subjective. No way out.

Strawman again.

PH: You use ought to and ought not to all the time in your moral 'theory'
Nope I never used the above modal [auxillary] verbs specifically.

Rather, I used 'ought-not-ness to kill humans' or 'oughtness to do ..."

These are nouns representing potentiality.
Example, the "oughtness-to-breathe" is a potential and driving force within all humans.
The "ought-not-ness to kill humans" is a potential and a noun that is inherent in all humans, but unfolding and active in a range of degrees in humans.

Get it?

[Peter Holmes]

You got it wrong.
I never explicitly state 'I should' 'we should' 'you should' 'they should,' 'he should' xyz should, etc. from a third party perspective as a command or prescription.
This is what Hume 'No Ought From Is' "NOFI" is about, i.e. enforcing 'ought' from a third party to individual[s] as in theism or political laws.

No, you got it wrong - and this is deflection.

Modal should need not be understood as imperative - and, among others, that has important legal consequences. And even modal must and shall are grammatically declarative, rather than imperative.

The issue of imperative prescription - do this and don't do that - is separate from the issue of moral rightness and wrongness - or, as you prefer, good and evil. And you've repeatedly acknowledged this by saying that, though there are - you claim - moral facts, this does not entail compulsion of behaviour - with enforcement and punishment.

You use ought to and ought not to all the time in your moral 'theory' - which is very largely identical in meaning to should. So your claim that you don't mean should is false. 'Humans oughtn't to kill humans' means 'humans shouldn't kill humans'. And they express a moral opinion, which is subjective. No way out.

Strawman again.

PH: You use ought to and ought not to all the time in your moral 'theory'
Nope I never used the above modal [auxillary] verbs specifically.

Rather, I used 'ought-not-ness to kill humans' or 'oughtness to do ..."

These are nouns representing potentiality.
Example, the "oughtness-to-breathe" is a potential and driving force within all humans.
The "ought-not-ness to kill humans" is a potential and a noun that is inherent in all humans, but unfolding and active in a range of degrees in humans.

Get it?

Ah. That clarifies your claim: the noun oughtness-not-to-kill has nothing to do with the ways we use the verb ought.

So, please can you explain what exactly is the 'potential' you call 'oughtness-to-breathe'. We certainly have to or must breathe or (usually) we die. Perhaps the potential 'haveness-to-breathe' or 'mustness-to-breathe' are better terms. Then perhaps it'd be okay to use cognates: we have to/must breathe.

But if you think there's a difference between 'oughtness-to-breathe' and 'mustness-to-breathe', please explain what the difference is. I obviously need to learn.

[Veritas Aequitas]

No, you got it wrong - and this is deflection.

Modal should need not be understood as imperative - and, among others, that has important legal consequences. And even modal must and shall are grammatically declarative, rather than imperative.

The issue of imperative prescription - do this and don't do that - is separate from the issue of moral rightness and wrongness - or, as you prefer, good and evil. And you've repeatedly acknowledged this by saying that, though there are - you claim - moral facts, this does not entail compulsion of behaviour - with enforcement and punishment.

You use ought to and ought not to all the time in your moral 'theory' - which is very largely identical in meaning to should. So your claim that you don't mean should is false. 'Humans oughtn't to kill humans' means 'humans shouldn't kill humans'. And they express a moral opinion, which is subjective. No way out.

Strawman again.

PH: You use ought to and ought not to all the time in your moral 'theory'
Nope I never used the above modal [auxillary] verbs specifically.

Rather, I used 'ought-not-ness to kill humans' or 'oughtness to do ..."

These are nouns representing potentiality.
Example, the "oughtness-to-breathe" is a potential and driving force within all humans.
The "ought-not-ness to kill humans" is a potential and a noun that is inherent in all humans, but unfolding and active in a range of degrees in humans.

Get it?

Ah. That clarifies your claim: the noun oughtness-not-to-kill has nothing to do with the ways we use the verb ought.

So, please can you explain what exactly is the 'potential' you call 'oughtness-to-breathe'. We certainly have to or must breathe or (usually) we die. Perhaps the potential 'haveness-to-breathe' or 'mustness-to-breathe' are better terms. Then perhaps it'd be okay to use cognates: we have to/must breathe.

But if you think there's a difference between 'oughtness-to-breathe' and 'mustness-to-breathe', please explain what the difference is. I obviously need to learn.

First the 'oughtness-to-breathe' is an imperative [not in the command sense] that is absolute within human nature.
The term 'oughtness' is very relevant to describe that potential and imperative to breathe and more so when applied to morality within human nature. This is why the term 'ought' is generally associated with morality.

I believe context is critical.
The terms 'have to' 'should', 'must', does not jive well with features of human nature and its imperativeness especially in the context of morality.