Philosophy Now Forum

Determinism doesn’t erode trust...

I admit that when I read this I thought it said “Determinism doesn’t erode toast...”

This debate is messing with my head …

Does it upset you when people are mutually respectful while disagreeing? And should it trouble you?

The causal chain that evokes my reaction in feeble attempts at “humor” is looooonnnggg indeed, and I cannot be blamed for it, if we accept BM’s analysis …

If we accept yours, suffice to say that even though it appears that I am “acting like an asshole”, that the action is consciously willed, and it is as if I am playing a role, but I really have no investment in the role.

It’s odd though: there are a few areas that you have never touched on over the months and years but which are latent topics even in this on-going debate. One actually does have to do with how you envision “supernatural agency” as operating in our world, and the other (distantly related?) is how you see and describe the Satanic component in the theology you hold to.

The rehearsed aspect and the daintiness through which this BM-IC debate is occurring is, in my view, necessarily false since all the real and operative terms are not actually out there on the table.

You may well be destined for the ignore chamber, Brother Immanuel! Don’t go submissively into that darkness … but go as a Raging Lion!

My own “sin” and that which cast me into the Outer Darkness is, I think, because I project further from the base-set of ideas presented into what is implied by the held-to ideology.

Really, there has to be that point where an immaterial soul communicates with the biological structure. However, and even since that axial 17th century, it has not been “found” (if that is the right word).

But that idea (an immaterial soul directing biological structures) is one of the pillars upon which your system of belief (interpretive model) rests. Without it, it collapses into something else.

That ideological falling down is really part of the larger debate and social conflict.

At the same time the demoniac or the Satanic aspect has to operate in the ideation of an acute physicalist. Ultimately, the type of argument BM is wedded to, because dangerously illusory, is one rooted in “satanic deception”.

In this sense the two of you are mortal enemies of each other. And you each emblematize for each other the very root of misapprehension, misunderstanding and error.

You never seem able to really translate the real spiritual differences that exist today, and are playing out, into a genuine broaching of the nature of those crucial and consequential differences. You prefer a polite philosophical game.

Let a more genuine philosophical evisceration begin!

“Keep up your bright swords, for the dew will rust them” needs be corrected by the fact that in our modernity we now have stainless steel! Science has brought advances!

Alexis Jacobi wrote: ↑Sat Nov 30, 2024 11:34 pm Further comment directed to Atla:

There is a prose poem quoted in WB Yeats Ideas of Good and Evil, this is the ending sentence:

“You have taken the east from me, you have taken the west from me, you have taken what is before me and what is behind me; you have taken the moon, you have taken the sun from me, and my fear is great that you have taken God from me.”

Thanks Jacobi, going to read dat..

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/32884/3 ... 2884-h.htm

In case you miss it, Mike...

viewtopic.php?t=43169&sid=a4a3a64fe37e5 ... 728d6255a9

Oh, I forgot: I'm in Mike's penalty box, so he won't read this (yeah, right).

Mebbe some kind soul he currently favors will point out the link, and article, to him.

BigMike wrote: ↑Sun Dec 01, 2024 8:07 am Immanuel, your argument for volition as a "cause" independent of physical laws...

Physical laws, by definition, govern physical things. The vexed question here is whether or not there are things that are real, but which are not merely physical...things like morality, self, reason, science, consciousness, belief and volition, which you're dismissing as mere epiphenomena, as mere shadows of physical phenomena.

But you're really alone in that assertion. And I don't believe it's a belief that even you hold...because you do not behave consistently with it. You're still trying to change minds, which according to your theory, would be utterly impossible to do.

You argue that volition operates in a realm distinct from physics, forming intentions before translating them into physical action. This separation of intention from physical causality creates a dualism that is irreconcilable with the conservation of energy.

There you go: you just begged the whole question again. "Energy"? What gives you the belief that volition is physical energy?

...energy must enter the system at some point, and without a prior physical cause, this energy would have to emerge from nothing.

Not at all. The "energy" comes from the physical body, it's true; but the action of the physical body is not decided by prior physical circumstances, but by volition -- which is, in itself, a thing. But you tried to dismiss it by way of the criticism that it's not sufficiently physical for your tastes; whereas, the truth is that physical things are not the only kind of causal initiator in the universe.

What's your evidence that volition isn't a real thing?

You also suggest that volition's complexity makes it immune to deterministic explanation...

I never said any such thing. Your word was the word "complexity." In point of fact, volition is, in a particular sense "simple," in that it is not divisible into bits, like physical stuff is. So I'm afraid you've made that allegation up.

What I ams saying is that point volitional causality is a different category from physical causality, though related to it sequentially. And using physical-causal criteria to evaluate it is therefore a case of category error, not of reasonable critique.

Finally, your argument that physical causation undermines trust in cognition is self-defeating. If we can’t trust cognition because it is shaped by deterministic forces, why should we trust cognition under volitional causality?

I don't even see the problem you're hoping you're indicating. You'll have to explain why us being robots driven by physical forces allows our cognitions to be important, whereas not being a robot, and having one's own mind, as you allege, doesn't. That doesn't come close to being obvious.

Your framework doesn’t offer a coherent alternative

Volition. Nothing could be more coherent, or more natural for us to live by, actually. You're doing it right now, because you're trying to argue. You want to win, and you're therefore printing pixels out in the physical world, in order to actualize your volition. That's a demonstration of the phenomenon right there. It's certainly not Determinism.

Like psychokinesis...

That's a rhetorical flourish, only. It's an attempt at reductio. But the analogy is clearly false. Psychokinesis is a mythical concept; volition is one you're using right now. And if you weren't, you wouldn't even "want" to win your point, or to be able to do so, even if you could want to. Remember: Determinism says all this is preset by prior forces of some sort. There's no way to change a mind. Neither the appearance of change from one belief to another, nor mind itself, is anything but an epiphenomenon, it says.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Dec 01, 2024 8:32 pm

Immanuel, let’s break down your claim that volition is a "different category" from physical causality and see how it works with a simple example: picking up a pen. To pick up a pen, your brain must send signals to your arm and hand muscles. These signals travel through neurons, which fire action potentials to communicate instructions. The question becomes: how does your "volition"—which you claim operates outside physical causality—cause these neurons to fire?

Neurons don't just fire spontaneously. Each neuron has an internal voltage, and for it to fire, this voltage must reach a critical threshold. This threshold is exceeded when other neurons release neurotransmitters, chemicals that cross the synapses (the gaps between neurons) and excite the neuron. This cascade of activity is what generates the nerve signals that travel to your muscles.

Here’s the key: if volition is separate from physical causation, how does it excite a neuron? Neurons respond to physical inputs—electrochemical signals—not to abstract intentions. To say that your will excites neurons without any physical mechanism is to suggest that your intention somehow injects energy or causes voltage changes in the neuron. But how does that work? If your "volition" operates without physical interaction, it faces the same challenge as psychokinesis—the claim that the mind can move or influence objects without transferring energy. Both require violating the conservation laws of energy and momentum.

For the neuron to fire, some physical input must alter its state. If volition exists in a "different category," it would have to interface with the physical realm in a measurable way to excite those neurons. But this interaction is never observed in neuroscience. Every neural action can be traced back to prior physical causes—signals from other neurons, stimuli from the environment, or internal bodily states. There is no mysterious, non-physical "spark" that initiates these signals.

In your framework, volition acts like an invisible hand, somehow altering neural activity without any physical trace or mechanism. This is as problematic as claiming telekinesis or psychokinesis is real because it demands an unobserved and untestable interaction between the immaterial and the material. If volition were truly independent, we’d expect to see evidence of neurons firing without any physical cause, but this isn’t the case. Every action potential, every movement of your hand toward the pen, can be explained by physical processes governed by known laws of biology and physics.

Your argument, while rhetorically engaging, provides no answer to the critical question: how does non-physical volition interface with the physical brain to produce action? Without a clear mechanism, it remains indistinguishable from the fantastical claims of psychokinesis, relying on faith in an unseen process rather than observable reality.

Your mind doesn't push atoms around; atoms push your mind around. You cannot do what you will; you will what you do.

BigMike wrote: ↑Sun Dec 01, 2024 9:45 pm Your mind doesn't push atoms around; atoms push your mind around. You cannot do what you will; you will what you do.

Classic example of falling off the other side of the horse

It's the real world which creates the virtual, that being our prerogative in the sense of adding value to the most fundamental source all existence which doesn't have any. We wear our values like clothes. They become the variables of fashion. Free will, in effect, defaults to a virtual reality, the one which creates our complex of ever changing values.

BigMike wrote: ↑Sun Dec 01, 2024 9:45 pm

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Dec 01, 2024 8:32 pm

Immanuel, let’s break down your claim that volition is a "different category" from physical causality and see how it works with a simple example: picking up a pen. To pick up a pen, your brain must send signals to your arm and hand muscles. These signals travel through neurons, which fire action potentials to communicate instructions. The question becomes: how does your "volition"—which you claim operates outside physical causality—cause these neurons to fire?

You skipped a step. The sequence begins, "You see a pen. You decide to pick it up. Then you remember that you have your own in your pocket, so you don't pick up the pen...."

And I might ask you, since nothing physical has been done at all, how is it that you have the overwhelming feeling of having decided something?

Here’s the key: if volition is separate from physical causation, how does it excite a neuron?

Nobody knows exactly what the relation between the physical stuff and the cognitions might be. We know there's some sort of relation, but it's fuzzy and not precise; because it's not what we would predict if it were 1:1.

Neurons respond to physical inputs—electrochemical signals—not to abstract intentions.

So back to my question: in the pen situation, exactly what happened? Nothing?

If volition exists in a "different category," it would have to interface with the physical realm in a measurable way to excite those neurons. But this interaction is never observed in neuroscience.

There you go. (Actually, it can be observed; what it can't be is predicted. Neuroscientists can see, for example, that SOME cognition is being fired through, but they can't precisely tell you what it will be.)

...how does non-physical volition interface with the physical brain to produce action?

Neuroscientists await your answer to that. They konw it's happening, but they can't say exactly how. And I'm happy to say I don't know the precise process involved anymore than you do.

Your mind doesn't push atoms around...

Apparently, it does. The first step to picking up the pen is DECIDING to pick up the pen. That, only a person, a consciousness, a mind, can do.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Dec 01, 2024 11:20 pm

BigMike wrote: ↑Sun Dec 01, 2024 9:45 pm

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Dec 01, 2024 8:32 pm

Immanuel, let’s break down your claim that volition is a "different category" from physical causality and see how it works with a simple example: picking up a pen. To pick up a pen, your brain must send signals to your arm and hand muscles. These signals travel through neurons, which fire action potentials to communicate instructions. The question becomes: how does your "volition"—which you claim operates outside physical causality—cause these neurons to fire?

You skipped a step. The sequence begins, "You see a pen. You decide to pick it up. Then you remember that you have your own in your pocket, so you don't pick up the pen...."

And I might ask you, since nothing physical has been done at all, how is it that you have the overwhelming feeling of having decided something?

Here’s the key: if volition is separate from physical causation, how does it excite a neuron?

Nobody knows exactly what the relation between the physical stuff and the cognitions might be. We know there's some sort of relation, but it's fuzzy and not precise; because it's not what we would predict if it were 1:1.

Neurons respond to physical inputs—electrochemical signals—not to abstract intentions.

So back to my question: in the pen situation, exactly what happened? Nothing?

If volition exists in a "different category," it would have to interface with the physical realm in a measurable way to excite those neurons. But this interaction is never observed in neuroscience.

There you go. (Actually, it can be observed; what it can't be is predicted. Neuroscientists can see, for example, that SOME cognition is being fired through, but they can't precisely tell you what it will be.)

...how does non-physical volition interface with the physical brain to produce action?

Neuroscientists await your answer to that. They konw it's happening, but they can't say exactly how. And I'm happy to say I don't know the precise process involved anymore than you do.

Your mind doesn't push atoms around...

Apparently, it does. The first step to picking up the pen is DECIDING to pick up the pen. That, only a person, a consciousness, a mind, can do.

Immanuel, the problem with your explanation is that it leaves a critical gap: how does the non-physical will interact with the physical brain to initiate action? In physics, all known interactions occur through the four fundamental forces: gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak nuclear forces. Every action in the physical world involves an exchange of energy, momentum, charge, etc., ensuring that nothing is created or destroyed—only transferred. This conservation is maintained because, for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.

If volition, as you claim, operates outside these physical principles, it must interface with the brain’s neurons in a way that introduces energy or momentum into the system. However, introducing such energy without a prior physical source would violate conservation laws. Neurons fire due to specific, measurable inputs, like electrical signals or chemical neurotransmitters—not abstractions like "decisions." Without a mechanism linking volition to neuronal excitation, your claim that the mind "pushes atoms around" is as unsupported as suggesting an invisible force moves objects without interaction—a modern form of mysticism.

You state that neuroscientists see "cognition being fired through" but can’t predict it. This doesn’t imply non-physical causation; it reflects the complexity of physical systems. Unpredictability doesn’t equal uncaused. Just as weather patterns are difficult to predict yet fully governed by physical laws, so is human cognition—a complex interplay of electrochemical interactions, not mysterious mind-to-matter transmissions.

If your argument rests on gaps in our knowledge, it mirrors pre-scientific explanations that invoked supernatural forces to explain lightning or illness. Suggesting volition acts outside physical laws without describing how it interfaces with neurons sidesteps the very conservation principles that govern every known interaction. Until such a mechanism is provided, your claim remains indistinguishable from invoking magic.

Damn. IC is guaranteed to turn ANY discussion into a coma-hazard...

BigMike wrote: ↑Sun Dec 01, 2024 11:50 pm Immanuel, the problem with your explanation is that it leaves a critical gap: how does the non-physical will interact with the physical brain to initiate action?

You don't know. I don't know. Neurologists don't know. But what we do know is that it does. Did you suppose that science is complete? The mind-brain relationship is one of the biggest mysteries of the universe.

In physics, all known interactions occur through the four fundamental forces...

That's one way you know that physics is not the right paradigm for investigating mind. It's strictly limited by the boundaries of the physical. It has no tools relevant to this question.

It's as if you're trying to investigate cosmology by way of worm farming. You're just in the wrong department, period.

You state that neuroscientists see "cognition being fired through" but can’t predict it. This doesn’t imply non-physical causation; it reflects the complexity of physical systems.

That's just a dodge. You're using the old eliminativist trick: promising to know something in the future that you have to admit you simply don't know now...and can't know whether or not you'll ever know.

Complexity isn't really the issue. We have lots of complex things we've unpacked in physics. The real problem is that physics seems utterly incapable of meaningful investigation in this area, and even the limited things it can reveal, like synapses and biochemistry, come off as extremely reductional and inadequate.

To say that the reason you love somebody, or hate somebody, or want to marry somebody or bury them is because of synapses and fluid is about the least informative kind of description one could possibly invent. It's the sort of thing that only somebody who knows nothing whatsoever about the related experience could imagine answers anything at all.

Unpredictability doesn’t equal uncaused.

You should be talking to somebody who said it did. That certainly wasn't me.

accelafine wrote: ↑Mon Dec 02, 2024 12:04 am Damn. IC is guaranteed to turn ANY discussion into a coma-hazard...

And yet...you don't have to be on this thread, and you are. You seem to show up everywhere I am.

I'm beginning to think you're in love with me.

Horrors.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Dec 02, 2024 3:27 am

accelafine wrote: ↑Mon Dec 02, 2024 12:04 am Damn. IC is guaranteed to turn ANY discussion into a coma-hazard...

And yet...you don't have to be on this thread, and you are. You seem to show up everywhere I am.

I'm beginning to think you're in love with me.

Horrors.

You should be so lucky.

Your 'arguments' are all the same. It doesn't matter what the topic is. ALL painfully transparent god-bothering.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Dec 02, 2024 3:24 am

Immanuel, your response acknowledges the mind-brain relationship as a mystery but sidesteps a critical point: while physics doesn’t claim to have all the answers, its principles—especially conservation laws—still constrain what can reasonably be claimed about causation. If you argue that volition operates outside physical causation, you need to explain how it interfaces with the physical world without violating those constraints. Simply saying “we don’t know” doesn’t address the inconsistency.

You critique physics as inadequate for investigating the mind, yet physical systems like the brain demonstrably obey the same fundamental laws governing all matter and energy. Neuroscience doesn’t claim that synapses and biochemistry alone capture the richness of human experience, but it does demonstrate that thoughts, emotions, and decisions correlate with measurable physical processes. These correlations aren’t reductionist—they’re explanatory. The claim that volition exists independently of physical causation doesn’t align with these observations and lacks any mechanism to substantiate it.

Your analogy comparing physics to “worm farming” in this context misrepresents the role of science. Physics doesn’t aim to explain the subjective texture of love or hate, but it does constrain the mechanics of how those feelings arise and translate into action. If volition is truly non-physical yet capable of interacting with neurons, it introduces a causal mechanism that no current evidence supports. Without a clear explanation of how non-physical volition adheres to or bypasses these principles, your argument doesn’t rise above speculation.

Physicists, as you say, don’t prove truths—they reject falsities. A non-physical volition influencing physical matter without violating conservation laws? That’s not proven false, but until it’s supported, it’s indistinguishable from claims outside the scope of rational inquiry.

Immanuel, do you have objections to any of the handful of conservation laws, such as energy or momentum conservation? If so, what are your reasons for dismissing them? Or do you avoid questioning their implications for volition because you hesitate to "sapere aude"—to dare to know?