What could make morality objective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Elsewhere, VA has referred to pragmatism, associating it with his approach to objectivism.

But like all so-called philosophical theories, a theory of truth is nothing more than a description of how we do or could use the abstract noun truth, its cognates, and related words, such as falsehood.

And that's why it's so easy to falsify claims made in any theory of truth, such as correspondence, coherence, consensus, redundancy - and pragmatism. All such theories propose to describe a 'thing' - 'truth' - and fail, because there is no such 'thing'.

VA commends pragmatism, because it supposedly doesn't 'hold a mirror up to nature' - which means it doesn't rest on a correspondence theory of truth. But neither does realism, necessarily, though VA straw-mannishly insists it does.

Strawman and babbling.

Where I mentioned 'pragmatism' with the "ISM" that is not my intent.
I am not into 'pragmatism' per se, i.e. no focus on the "ism" for me.
What I am into is actually being pragmatic and optimal to the well being of the individual and that of humanity.

Philosophical Realism as in your case implies a mirroring of reality, i.e. the description of that feature of reality, i.e. just-is with that-which-is-just-is, that real feature of reality.
You many deny you are involved with any essence, essential, ideals or forms, BUT your 'just-is' is still something that your are mirroring with in matching to the description of it.

Here again, your "Philosophical realism"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

• 1. Philosophical realism is .... about a certain kind of thing (like numbers or morality) is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind-independent existence, [mind = human conditions] i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.[1][2][3]
  
  2. This includes a number of positions within epistemology and metaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently of knowledge, thought, or understanding. [the description is not the-described]
  
  3. This can apply to items such as the physical world, the past and future, other minds, and the self, though may also apply less directly to things such as universals, mathematical truths, moral truths, and thought itself.
  
  4. Realism can also be a view about the properties of reality in general, holding that reality exists independent of the mind, as opposed to non-realist views (like some forms of skepticism and solipsism) which question the certainty of anything beyond one's own mind.
  
  4. Philosophers who profess realism often claim that truth consists in a correspondence between cognitive representations and reality.[7]
  
  5. Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.

While you deny 'correspondence truth' you are still corresponding between between cognitive representations [knowing and describing] and reality [the described, just is]
Show me where your 'realism' differs from the above 1-5 points?

A falsehood that works is nonetheless a falsehood. And our ancestors have survived and even thrived on working falsehoods for millennia - such as the assertion 'our god is real'. An adherent of pragmatism theory has to accept that that assertion is or used to be true. And it likely ain't and never was. Bummer.

As I had stated, I am not into pragmatism-proper, i.e. strictly that of James, Dewey or Rorty.

However pragmatism-proper is that absolutely stupid as you imply above.
Pragmatism-proper also falls back on the scientific-FSK to avoid the possibility of 'falsehoods' with certain limits for usefulness alone, e.g. James concession for a belief in God.

William James's version of the pragmatic theory is often summarized by his statement that "the 'true' is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the 'right' is only the expedient in our way of behaving."[2]

By this, James meant that truth is a quality the value of which is confirmed by its effectiveness when applying concepts to actual practice (thus, "pragmatic").

James's pragmatic theory is a synthesis of correspondence theory of truth and coherence theory of truth, with an added dimension.
Truth is verifiable to the extent that thoughts and statements correspond with actual things, as well as "hangs together," or coheres, fits as pieces of a puzzle might fit together, and these are in turn verified by the observed results of the application of an idea to actual practice.
James said that "all true processes must lead to the face of directly verifying sensible experiences somewhere."[7]: 83 

The majority of the pragmatists will not agree with James on this;

He also extended his pragmatic theory well beyond the scope of scientific verifiability, and even into the realm of the mystical: "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, then it is 'true.' "
Wiki

I agree, the idea that "God is real" to a theist is very pragmatic relative to the theists' psychological state, but its objectivity and truth would be insignificant.

[Peter Holmes]

Here is VA's supposedly 'anti-realist' moral objectivism.

VA: 'My what is fact is not 'mind-independent existence' but entangled [inter-dependent, intertwined with ] with the human conditions.'

The usual contrast is between mind-independence and mind-dependence. But instead, VA contrasts mind-dependence with 'entanglement with the human conditions' - an undefined state or condition - one which could mean many different things, and which anyway is not a coherent alternative to mind-dependence.

This conceptual incoherence could be the result of VA's embarrassment over having to claim that facts are mind-dependent - given its substance-dualist assumption. The amorphous 'entangled with the human conditions' is sufficiently ill-defined to cover many possibilities. It could mean mind-dependent or mind-independent.

I have explained clearly, and many times, that, pending evidence for the existence of minds - or any other so-called abstract or non-physical things - belief in their existence is irrational - and so talk of mind-dependence and -independence is incoherent. But VA ignores this point.

VA: 'In this case, what-is-fact is always conditioned to a human-based-FSK [science being the most credible and reliable], thus highest degree of Objectivity.'

VA's conceptual malaise deepens. The useless 'entangled with the human conditions' now morphs into 'conditioned to a human-based-framework-and-system-of-knowledge'. Exactly what this so-called 'conditioning' involves is as undefined as 'entanglement' - but these have become religiously intoned mantras for VA, so that just repeating them is comforting. Asking for rational, critical thinking is pointless.

But - once again. What makes a descriptive context - such as a natural science - credible - is evidence for the truth of its premises and conclusions. And VA knows this damn well. But, in order to justify the false claim that there are moral facts, just as there are physical facts, VA has to pretend that it's the descriptive context itself that produces facts - not that it's the existence of those facts that makes the description credible. Hence the following -

VA: 'What is a moral fact is conditioned upon a human-based-moral-FSK which has near equivalence in objectivity to the scientific FSK.
Therefore, "Morality is Objective" as conditioned upon the moral FSK.'

Here's the fallacy:

Facts exist within a descriptive context; therefore, any description can produce facts.

The premise is false, because what we call facts are features of reality that are or were the case - and those features of reality have nothing to do with knowledge or language - they just are or were the case. And the conclusion is embarrassingly absurd.

'What I agree with is Moral Empirical Realism which is conditioned upon a human-based-empirical-moral-FSK which is credible, reliable and has a high degree of objectivity.'

I and others have explained 'a million times' why this is nonsense.

[Skepdick]

I have explained clearly, and many times, that, pending evidence for the existence of minds - or any other so-called abstract or non-physical things - belief in their existence is irrational - and so talk of mind-dependence and -independence is incoherent. But VA ignores this point.

Surely Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes is consistent in his principles?

Surely then pending evidence for the existende of "features" (of reality) - belief in their existence is irrational?
And so talk of "features of reality" is incoherent.

But Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes ignores this point.

[Peter Holmes]

VA, elsewhere: 'The FSK began with the Big Bang [BB].'

So now there's a giant, all-encompassing 'FSK', which is nothing less than the universe.

And it's all 'entangled with the human conditions'.

And, therefore, there are moral facts, and so morality is objective.

Perhaps this is an Easter Revelation.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is VA's supposedly 'anti-realist' moral objectivism.

VA: 'My what is fact is not 'mind-independent existence' but entangled [inter-dependent, intertwined with ] with the human conditions.'

The usual contrast is between mind-independence and mind-dependence. But instead, VA contrasts mind-dependence with 'entanglement with the human conditions' - an undefined state or condition - one which could mean many different things, and which anyway is not a coherent alternative to mind-dependence.

This conceptual incoherence could be the result of VA's embarrassment over having to claim that facts are mind-dependent - given its substance-dualist assumption. The amorphous 'entangled with the human conditions' is sufficiently ill-defined to cover many possibilities. It could mean mind-dependent or mind-independent.

I asked again, which point do you deny in the list below representing Philosophical Realism?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

• 1. Philosophical realism is .... about a certain kind of thing (like numbers or morality) is the thesis that this kind of thing has mind-independent existence, [mind = human conditions] i.e. that it is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.[1][2][3]
  
  2. This includes a number of positions within epistemology and metaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently of knowledge, thought, or understanding. [the description is not the-described]
  
  3. This can apply to items such as the physical world, the past and future, other minds, and the self, though may also apply less directly to things such as universals, mathematical truths, moral truths, and thought itself.
  
  4. Realism can also be a view about the properties of reality in general, holding that reality exists independent of the mind, as opposed to non-realist views (like some forms of skepticism and solipsism) which question the certainty of anything beyond one's own mind.
  
  4. Philosophers who profess realism often claim that truth consists in a correspondence between cognitive representations and reality.[7]
  
  5. Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.

I have explained clearly, and many times, that, pending evidence for the existence of minds - or any other so-called abstract or non-physical things - belief in their existence is irrational - and so talk of mind-dependence and -independence is incoherent. But VA ignores this point.

I have already dealt with the above.
I have agreed there is no 'mind' in the case of Descartes' dualism, i.e. the traditional view;

Mind or mentality is usually contrasted with body, matter or physicality. The issue of the nature of this contrast and specifically the relation between mind and brain is called the mind-body problem.[5]
Traditional viewpoints included dualism and idealism, which consider the mind to be non-physical.[5]

What I refer to mind is this;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind
Modern views often center around physicalism and functionalism, which hold that the mind is roughly identical with the brain or reducible to physical phenomena such as neuronal activity.

To avoid talking pass each other, can you confirm you get my point [the modern view] on the above, if not let me know why?

VA: 'In this case, what-is-fact is always conditioned to a human-based-FSK [science being the most credible and reliable], thus highest degree of Objectivity.'

VA's conceptual malaise deepens. The useless 'entangled with the human conditions' now morphs into 'conditioned to a human-based-framework-and-system-of-knowledge'. Exactly what this so-called 'conditioning' involves is as undefined as 'entanglement' - but these have become religiously intoned mantras for VA, so that just repeating them is comforting. Asking for rational, critical thinking is pointless.

I have asked you whether you understands Kant Copernican Revolution. If you do [not necessary agree] you will get an idea of what I meant by 'entanglement with the human conditions'.

My basis position is, reality is NOT mind*-independent as claimed by Philosophical Realist and your like. *mind = modern views, not traditional view.

But - once again. What makes a descriptive context - such as a natural science - credible - is evidence for the truth of its premises and conclusions. And VA knows this damn well. But, in order to justify the false claim that there are moral facts, just as there are physical facts, VA has to pretend that it's the descriptive context itself that produces facts - not that it's the existence of those facts that makes the description credible.

You are so ignorant.
What is a product [natural or otherwise] of the scientific FSK is not solely something of a descriptive context.
There is an emergence and realization elements before scientific facts are known and described.

Hence the following -

VA: 'What is a moral fact is conditioned upon a human-based-moral-FSK which has near equivalence in objectivity to the scientific FSK.
Therefore, "Morality is Objective" as conditioned upon the moral FSK.'

Here's the fallacy:

Facts exist within a descriptive context; therefore, any description can produce facts.

The premise is false, because what we call facts are features of reality that are or were the case - and those features of reality have nothing to do with knowledge or language - they just are or were the case. And the conclusion is embarrassingly absurd.

'What I agree with is Moral Empirical Realism which is conditioned upon a human-based-empirical-moral-FSK which is credible, reliable and has a high degree of objectivity.'

I and others have explained 'a million times' why this is nonsense.

Strawman again.
I have never claimed 'any description can produce facts'.
I'll repeat;
There is an emergence and realization elements of facts before scientific facts are known and described.

PH: because what we call facts are features of reality that are or were the case - and those features of reality have nothing to do with knowledge or language - they just are or were the case.

This is what I described as your 'Bottom up' approach.
You merely ASSUME the 'features of reality' or 'that are or were the case' are there and are real without verification and justification, then assume the description of them match them exactly.
This is begging the question.

On the other hand, my TOP-DOWN approach is based on first-person's experiences processed within a collective of subjects based on intersubjective consensus within a human-based FSK.
There is no need to speculate there are the 'features of reality' or 'that are or were the case' which are illusory.
Humans already have had the experiences a certain liquid inherited from LUCA, the first cell ancestors, which is subsequent realized via human-based FSKs and is realized as 'water is H20' via the scientific-chemistry FSK.

There is no mind-independent 'feature of reality' or 'that are or were the case' called 'water is H20' without any qualification to a FSK.

[Peter Holmes]

Here's the big fallacy.

Premise:
A description of a feature of reality - and therefore a truth-claim - and therefore what we call a fact - is always contextual and conventional - dependent on agreement on the use of signs in context.

Conclusions:
1 Therefore, there are no facts 'outside' descriptions - 'outside' agreement on the use of signs.
2 Therefore, any kind of description can 'produce' facts. (So there can be moral facts.)

The intellectual malaise that this fallacy demonstrates has been around for decades - and, arguably, for much longer. In my opinion, this mistaking what we know and say about things for the way things are is the source and sauce of philosophy. It's an ancient, potent and pervasive delusion.

'Ah - but there's no such thing as the way things are...'

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA says this:

'In the first place there is no ABSOLUTE objective reality that independent and awaiting organism to realize it at 100%. There is no such thing. This is the expectation of realists which is chasing an illusion.'

Realism does not entail essentialism. But VA has to insist it does, in order to promote 'anti-realism', which is really anti-essentialism. The rejection of essences or absolute reality is really the rejection of any claim to describe an essence or absolute nature - as though there could be such a thing which isn't really a straw windmill. 'You realists are wrong to insist there's an absolute, essential reality - a reality-in-itself'. But - we don't. You just want us to.

And if there are only brains and other physical things, the idea of 'entanglement with the human conditions' is moribund. In what way is a brain entangled with a rock?

(Unless, of course, what's being invoked is some quantum or string-theoretical 'entanglement' of all physical things.)

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here's the big fallacy.

Premise:
A description of a feature of reality - and therefore a truth-claim - and therefore what we call a fact - is always contextual and conventional - dependent on agreement on the use of signs in context.

Conclusions:
1 Therefore, there are no facts 'outside' descriptions - 'outside' agreement on the use of signs.
2 Therefore, any kind of description can 'produce' facts. (So there can be moral facts.)

The intellectual malaise that this fallacy demonstrates has been around for decades - and, arguably, for much longer. In my opinion, this mistaking what we know and say about things for the way things are is the source and sauce of philosophy. It's an ancient, potent and pervasive delusion.

'Ah - but there's no such thing as the way things are...'

Strawman!!!
The millionth time.
I have never claimed any kind of description can 'produce' facts.

What you termed as fact i.e. a feature of reality that is 'just-is' is a noumenon, illusory, empty, nothing, meaningless and nonsensical.
You have never been able to demonstrate how to realize your 'just is'.

Here is how I defined 'what is fact'.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486
which imperatively is conditioned to a specific FSK.

Before a fact is known [epistemologicall] and described [linguistically], that 'fact' [entangled with the human conditions] of reality must be realized within a specific human based FSK.

Here is a more detailed explanation
why I insist 'description cannot produce fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39925

Don't repeat that strawman again!!

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA finally admits that descriptions cannot produce facts. So facts exist even if they're not described. And it follows that facts exist before they're known - and would exist if they weren't known. For example, what we call water was what we call H2O before we turned up to know and describe it. Obviously.

But here's VA's peculiar spin.

'Before a 'fact' is known [epistemologicall] and described [linguistically], that 'fact' is already entangled with the human conditions of reality within a 4 billion years old of conditionings and dynamically emerging and must be realized within a specific human based FSK.' [sic]

Of course, what actually emerged over billions of years was life, the evolution of humans, and the growth of human knowledge about what constitutes reality - including what constitutes what we call water. The expression 'entanglement with the human conditions of reality' is meaningless claptrap.

To repeat: being known and described are not necessary conditions for being a fact.

And meanwhile. Just to point out. Since descriptions can't produce facts, moral discourse can't produce moral facts - just as chemistry discourse can't produce chemistry facts. So if there are moral facts, they exist outside and 'before' being known and described. Burden of proof time, lads and lasses and everyone else.

[Skepdick]

So facts exist even if they're not described. And it follows that facts exist before they're known - and would exist if they weren't known.

WHERE do undescribed/unknown facts exist? Show us one such fact already!

For example, what we call water was what we call H2O

That's a described fact. You are describing it as water/H2O.

Show us an undescribed fact!
Show us an undeescribed fact that was previously unknown that is now known.

Why can't you? Is it because you are lying about the existence of facts?
Is Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes is actually Peter "Dumb Lying Cunt" Holmes?

Only existents exist. It is impossible and incoherent to claim that facts exist also. Where do they exist? Alongside existents?!?

There are no facts about existents without fact-makers. Humans.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Elsewhere, VA says this:

'In the first place there is no ABSOLUTE objective reality that independent and awaiting organism to realize it at 100%. There is no such thing. This is the expectation of realists which is chasing an illusion.'

Realism does not entail essentialism. But VA has to insist it does, in order to promote 'anti-realism', which is really anti-essentialism. The rejection of essences or absolute reality is really the rejection of any claim to describe an essence or absolute nature - as though there could be such a thing which isn't really a straw windmill. 'You realists are wrong to insist there's an absolute, essential reality - a reality-in-itself'. But - we don't. You just want us to.

And if there are only brains and other physical things, the idea of 'entanglement with the human conditions' is moribund. In what way is a brain entangled with a rock?

(Unless, of course, what's being invoked is some quantum or string-theoretical 'entanglement' of all physical things.)

Strawman again.
Where have I insisted realism entail essentialism.

I stated;
'In the first place there is NO ABSOLUTE objective reality that [is] independent and awaiting organisms to realize it at 100%. There is no such thing. This is the expectation of realists which is chasing an illusion.'

The above is not about essentialism but it is an anti-Philosophical Realism [or Idealism {transcendental}] position.

'You realists are wrong to insist there's an absolute, essential reality - a reality-in-itself'. But - we don't. You just want us to.

Strawman again.
Where did I assert absolute, essential reality - a very dirty trick of yours.

I stated "ABSOLUTE objective reality".
ABSOLUTE objective reality is,

• absolute reality
  noun
  1 : ultimate reality as it is in itself unaffected by the perception or knowledge of any finite being.
  https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction ... %20reality#:

As often mentioned in philosophy, objective reality is that which exists independent of the human conditions[aka mind -modern view].
That is your definition of what is fact, i.e. a feature of reality which is just-is, and independent of human opinions, beliefs and judgment, thus objective, so objective reality.
This version of an absolute independent objective reality is the philosophical realism version.

Note I asked you [many times] how is Philosophical Realism as defined here
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
different from what you deemed as 'fact' independent of the human conditions.
Your answer here is critical for our discussion.

Don't strawman in 'essentialism' which is not "essential" in this case.
You cannot deny you as a philosophical realist accept the idea of an objective reality, which is a thing-in-itself and absolutely independent of the human conditions.

And if there are only brains and other physical things, the idea of 'entanglement with the human conditions' is moribund. In what way is a brain entangled with a rock?

(Unless, of course, what's being invoked is some quantum or string-theoretical 'entanglement' of all physical things.)

In a way, QM entanglement is involved but there is no need to go that far yet.

Read this thread!
All Human-Based FSKs are 4 Billion Years Old
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39918

At the beginning of the Big Bang there was no rock per se, but merely a primordial soup of particles with dynamic coalescence of cluster of denser and denser particles of various patterns.
The particles within these clusters of different densities inter-change between the clusters.
It was after 13 billion years of exchanges between the clusters of particles that some clusters [human beings] rely on the linguistic FSK to identify certain patterns of cluster as 'rocks'.

What is the reality i.e. in this case to state of affairs of what is rock is the combination of the 'human state of affair' in entanglement with that rock-state-of-affair at time t..
In the ultimate sense, there cannot be rock-state-of-affair independent of the human-state-of-affair.
What is a rock in reality is a unification [entanglement] of rock-state-of-affair [cluster of particles] independent of the human-state-of-affair [cluster of particles].

Get it? [not necessary agree with].
This is critical, else you will be keep creating and fighting your own strawmen.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Elsewhere, VA finally admits that descriptions cannot produce facts.
So facts exist even if they're not described. And it follows that facts exist before they're known - and would exist if they weren't known. For example, what we call water was what we call H2O before we turned up to know and describe it. Obviously.

But here's VA's peculiar spin.

'Before a 'fact' is known [epistemologicall] and described [linguistically], that 'fact' is already entangled with the human conditions of reality within a 4 billion years old of conditionings and dynamically emerging and must be realized within a specific human based FSK.' [sic]

Of course, what actually emerged over billions of years was life, the evolution of humans, and the growth of human knowledge about what constitutes reality - including what constitutes what we call water. The expression 'entanglement with the human conditions of reality' is meaningless claptrap.

To repeat: being known and described are not necessary conditions for being a fact.

And meanwhile. Just to point out. Since descriptions can't produce facts, moral discourse can't produce moral facts - just as chemistry discourse can't produce chemistry facts. So if there are moral facts, they exist outside and 'before' being known and described. Burden of proof time, lads and lasses and everyone else.

Strawman again!

Read my thread thoroughly:
VA: Descriptions CANNOT Produce Facts
viewtopic.php?p=634228#p634228

But note;

There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587


Your sense of what is fact is of the delusional kind. It is a noumenon, illusory, empty, nothing, meaningless and nonsensical.
So far you have not demonstrate how your 'what is fact' as feature of reality i.e. "just-is" is possible to be real.

My 'what is fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486
is the human-based FSK facts.
These facts are entangled, realized within a specific human-based FSK before they are known [epistemology] and described [linguistic FSK].

Strawman again.
I have never referred to "chemistry-discourse".
What I had been referring to is the science-chemistry FSK where humans are intricately part and parcel within reality as all-there-is and humans are in dynamic interactions [entangled] with all things.

Note this;
When you fart, it could cause a hurricane in China; the rain therefrom help vegetables to grow in China; these vegetables are subsequently exported to the UK; you bought these fibrous vegetable which caused to to fart and the cycle begin again, again, again ...
This is where you are a co-creator of the whole of reality you are part and parcel of.

[Peter Holmes]

VA agrees that descriptions cannot produce facts. But knowledge cannot produce facts either. For example, it wasn't and isn't our knowing that water is H2O that made or makes water H2O. That's a very strange idea.

And as for 'model-dependent realism' - to construct a model of reality is not to construct reality. If it were, then of what is the model a model? And if all we can know about reality is the models we construct, then how can we construct them in the first place?

[Veritas Aequitas]

VA agrees that descriptions cannot produce facts.
But knowledge cannot produce facts either. For example, it wasn't and isn't our knowing that water is H2O that made or makes water H2O. That's a very strange idea.

Strawman, I never assert that knowledge produce facts [FSK-facts] in your sense above.
I kept stating,
1. there is the entanglement, emergent and realization process conditioned up a 4. billion years of conditions within humans that enable FSK-facts.
2. then it is known [epistemology]
3. therefrom it is described [linguistic].

The emergence of 'water is H20' is imperative upon culmination of a 4 billion years of conditioning, plus the human FSK, the human-based physics-FSK, the chemistry FSK, the biological FSK, the linguistic FSK. There is no 'water-is-H20' without the above conditions.

Note;
1. The Big Bang [13 billion years ago] is conditioned upon the human-based Physics FSK.
2. Initially at the BB there were only particles, no H20.
3. Electrons and atoms emerged only after appx 500k years after the BB.
4. Water emerged after 1 million after the BB.
5. Water is H20 is confirmed 13 billion years after the BB.
6. Since the BB is conditioned upon a human-based FSK, all that followed from 2 to 3 is conditioned by the human conditions.

There is no way, you can take an independent God's-eyes-view there are facts independent of the human conditions.

And as for 'model-dependent realism' - to construct a model of reality is not to construct reality. If it were, then of what is the model a model? And if all we can know about reality is the models we construct, then how can we construct them in the first place?

That is the problem with your speculation of 'there must be a reality' even before you have verified and justify there is a reality.
You are putting the cart before the horse.
Why you must speculate there is something beyond the empirical possible is due to some existential psychology.

The model in this case is the specific FSK involved, not 'model' as in a car-model.
"Model-dependent realism" means what is really real is confined to the model involved with interaction with the human individuals, i.e. FSK conditioned reality.
In this case, the model [FSK] encompasses a 4 billion years of conditioning, plus the human FSK, and where necessary the human-based physics-FSK, the chemistry FSK, the biological FSK, the linguistic FSK.

In addition, the model relied upon has to be credible and reliable.
Example, QM itself via the QM-FSK is credible and reliable; where 'real-ISM' is concern, it is a philosophical issue.
As such model-dependent-realism of QM on the basis of anti-philosophical_realism is realistic, whereas if on the basis of Philosophical Realism as in your case is not realistic nor tenable.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA quotes a writer offering a speech act theory critique of what we call facts: they don't exist.

But why think that trying to 'distil an entity' from examination of uses of the word fact and its cognates is a good idea?

Could we 'distil an entity' from examination of use of the word dog? Is there anything canine about the word dog, or the word canine?

Nomenclaturism / representationalism / correspondence theory - they all mistake what language is and how it works. And speech act theory was no exception.

And anyway - to echo IWP - if there are no facts, then there are no moral facts. The end.