Harbal wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2023 9:35 pm
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2023 5:50 pm
Harbal wrote: ↑Tue Dec 19, 2023 5:07 pm
Duty is a feeling, or sensation, but if we think there is something that it refers to outside of our own minds, then yes, maybe you could say it's an illusion. I don't think it's accurate to say we just make it up if we want to, or ignore it, if we don't. It doesn't seem to work like that, where we only feel a sense of duty according to whether or not we want to.
I agree...we do feel duties "whether or not we want to." And that's a surprising fact, if there's nothing objective behind that impression.
I don't find it surprising; most animals have mental processes that influence their behaviour, it would be surprising if we didn't have them.
They have instinct. But very often, our moral sense goes quite contrary to instinct.
But if that impression is no more than "a feeling or a sensation," maybe we ought to shake it off the way we shake off a tingling the leg or a sudden twinge of irrational guilt. Maybe it's just a thing to get over, not to be indulged.
How would we know which it was?
Well I wouldn't recommend that we shake it off. I suspect we would find the world a far more unpleasant and dangerous place if we did.
I think that's probably true. But given that Evolutionism has to tell us that it only exists by accident, we don't know whether or not to trust it. And the same would be true for things like our intellect: if out intellect is not actually geared to telling us the truth, and if it only exists as a "twinge" put in us accidentally by time and chance, then why should be believe in our own rationality? Why should we trust science, if the brain that processes the concepts is actually indexed to survival, but not to truth?
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:Whether belief in something unreal is a problem or not depends on what consequences come out of it.
That's interesting. So you think it would be okay for people to believe untruths that made them feel happy?
That's not for me to say; I can only speak for myself. I would always opt for the truth, even when it may not be what I want to hear. It's like when you try to paint a rosy picture of a world with God in it, and a bleak one of the world without God. It's like saying it isn't about truth, it's about which sounds nicer; well I don't agree with that.
That's not at all what I'm saying. I'm saying it IS about truth. Where we are currently disagreeing is merely on what the truth is, obviously.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:But I wouldn't be imagining things, or deluding myself. If I feel admiration, then that feeling actually exists for me.
Only in the sense that the feeling "exists." Not in the sense that the admiration itself finds any basis or warrant in objective reality.
I can't imagine, even hypothetically, what such a basis might be.
That's the problem. In the Evolutionary worldview, there's no entity included that could possibly account for admiration that turns out to be objectively warranted. One doesn't owe anybody to "admire" any accidental products of time-plus-chance.
IC wrote:If in the course of our evolution we have installed in us a sense of right and wrong, which we appear to have, then we will experience things in terms of right and wrong, and it is difficult to override that function just by means of rational analysis.
That may be true; and maybe it was hard for some monkeys to get rid of the vestigial tail, the Evolutionist might suppose; but that doesn't at all indicate that the monkeys shouldn't have lost the tail, or that we should not simply shake off that odd thing we can't "override by means of rational analysis." Maybe exactly what we DO need is to be more rational about it...

But that's the point, not being able to override it means we can't just shake it off.
But of course, we CAN override it. It takes a little effort, true; but it's actually not terribly hard to do. We have plenty of experiments, from Milgram to the studies done on torturers and Holocaust participants, that ordinary people can be quickly induced to overcome the twinges of conscience, and even to perform acts of hideous evil, with very, very little provocation.
So why shouldn't we override it? If it's only a subjective feeling anyway, and unrelated to the objective status of anything, we can do so very easily.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:I know Nietzsche is regarded as a genius by some people, but he just comes across as a crackpot and misfit to me, so I can't really go along with you here.
What's your problem with Nietzsche?
I don't have a problem with Nietzsche; I'm completely disinterested in the man. My problem is that you keep bringing him up, as if I should care about anything he said.
Just because I think, for an Atheist anyway, he's somebody everybody
should know. He is, after all, one of their great "saints," if I can abuse that word.
As I was saying earlier, there's a huge number of phenomena, such as transitional forms, or triadic symbosis, or the human psyche, that just do not lend themselves to that sort of simplistic explanation. In fact, in many cases, survival-of-the-fittest would be the best way to argue that those phenomena should not even be possible to exist.
No offence, but I think you are dabbling in something above your pay grade here; as would I be if I attempted to address your comments.
I actually know very well what I'm saying, and it's not remotely above either my "pay grade," or, I assure you, your ability to understand the reasoning, if you were interested.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:Why on earth should I let myself be forced into that position just because I am a rational human being who does not happen to believe in God?
Precisely to the extent that you are a "rational person" (to say nothng of the fact that we also aspire to be moral agents, as well). A rational person wants his beliefs to be rational. And when one's Atheist deals one a particular hand, rationally speaking, is it not the duty of a rational person to face it squarely? If he does not, then what do we even mean by calling him "rational"?
But morality is an emotional issue, one of sentiment, not rationality.
I don't believe that at all. And if you do, then essentially, all you're saying is that morality has the same status as any feeling, from feeling like one is being watched, to resenting one's neighbour, to throwing a hissy fit. They're all just "emotional issues." If that's all morality is, then nobody needs to take it seriously at all.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:I want to behave morally, and such behaviour is generally approved of, so it does make sense.
Well, what that means is that it is "convenient." Whether it "makes sense" is a question of rationality.
No, what it means is, my behaviour is guided by my own preferences, rather than by what does or does not make sense to you.
Then morality just means solipsism. I'm not sure that's a definition that anyone else is going to embrace.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:Their own, those of their society, their religion...
But those conflict. How does one choose among them?
I suppose one reaches for the bible if he has no confidence in his own moral judgement.
It's not about "no confidence." If I'm right, it's about checking your mere solipsisitic impulses against a few objective moral facts.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:The one that conforms most closely to my own moral sense, I suppose.
Intuitionism? How come other people's "intuitions" about morality conflict so radically with our own, sometimes? How can Islamists pursue Sharia, for example, when intuitively, to us, the very thought makes your skin and mine crawl?
Because our morality is entirely subjective. Did I not mention that before?
That still doesn't explain why what is moral to one person can be utterly morally reprehensible to another. It would just mean that both were confused. But when you and I object to Sharia, I don't think we are confused; and when we check our sense of that against the moral code of Scripture, we find out we're right.
IC wrote:Harbal wrote:What else should I take as given, other than what I've got?
Well one of the first achievements of our moral growing-up is to discover that what we take for granted isn't always right. And what we consider moral isn't what is always moral or fair to other people.
Other people like gays, or reluctant soon-to-be mothers?
No, I mean that we come to understand that other people have to be taken into our account when we think morally. I don't at all mean that what others think has to be right merely because they think it. I just mean realizing that I'm not the only person in the world who counts in the moral equation.
So we start to question our own "givens": and some we may keep and some we may modify, but it's that process of NOT taking our our moral presuppositions simply as unexamined "givens" that is basic to our moral maturation. I just suggest that's what we should keep doing: not taking the versions of morality handed to us by others for granted, and continually asking what is genuinely moral about this or that.
And you are obviously assuming that I never question or modify my moral views,
I'm not assuming that. But I am pointing out that your choice of your sole self as moral touchstone wouldn't be what moral developmentalists would call a "highly developed" concept of morality.
Because that's exactly what we do, if we don't think our moral judgments are objectively right.
Unless you are claiming that your moral behaviour, and that of all those who believe in God's moral authority, is impeccable, I don't see your point.
[/quote]My point is that if morality is no more than a subjective twinge that only one person has (just me, that is), then nobody has a duty to care or respect me if I live up to it, or if I don't. I don't even have an explanation for myself as to why I'm "better" for having honoured that principle instead of merely disregarding it.
And if solipsistic subjectivism is the whole story of morality, it isn't clear at all why we can even call that "moral." After all, it doesn't rise above the level of a mere subjective twinge. Why a person would think he was "moral" for merely responding to his or her own twinges is certainly not obvious.