An Argument About Free Will

[lancek4]

What exactly do you mean by "they turn out to be equivalent to the phenomena we describe as "persons""? I just want to be clear to avoid misunderstanding.

Equivalent as in identical to. If event A is the combination of events B and C and if B and C cause consequence D then we can say that event A causes event D. An example of such identity would be lightning. Lightning is the discharge of electricity and can be reduced to the activity of electrons. We would not say that this activity causes lightning, it is the lightning.

The cause of lightning would be whatever causes the electron activity ( the build up of opposing negative and positive electrostatic states between the ground and the atmosphere ). We would also say that if lightning struck a tree and caused it to ignite, the lightning was the cause of the tree getting burnt. We can reduce the lightning to electron activitity, but this is not the same thing as explaining lightning in terms of a temporally preceding cause.

But this is where the idea of causality gets tricky. The tree is also the cause of the event. Where the tree not there reaching for the sky there would not be sufficient charge for the lightning to happen. The water in the tree enables the event. Causality is not always one dimensional. The humidity of the air is also a casual factor; thickness of atmosphere; amount of iron in the earth; constitution of the atmosphere ad infinitem

A furhter comment on ultimate responsibility:

If events B and C are random and we want to trace the ultimate cause of consequence D, that ultimate cause will be events B and C plus the chain of causes that producued the events that were the immediate preconditions for events B and C / A.

This is why there is no such thing as an ultimate cause.


Now let's assume that the immediate conditions for event A allowed two possibilities - A and Z where Z has the consequence Y. If we asked what was the cause of D we should cite A plus its preceding events. However, if we ask what was the cause of D rather than Z, the only cause is A. We could then say that A was ultimately responsible for D, but only in the qualified sense that it caused D rather than Y.

What about the rest of the alphabet, and all the other causes and conditions that pertained before A?

So might we say that causality is a particular limiting of phenomena to a local event? What is this local event?

[MGL]

.... if events B and C are randomly caused, such as in your example of atomic decay, and they lead to consequence D then I'm saying that ultimately we can't pin responsibility for consequence D on anyone's choices as we can't say that they deliberately decided to chose to do whatever event B or C are.

Perhaps if if we break the events down a bit.
1) Preceding events create a state of affairs such that there are two possible metaphysical consequences. Either the sub-atomic events B & C occur or some other combination of events can occur.
2) Events B & C occur.
3) B & C = event A
4) Event A = the choosing of an action D
5) Event A deterministically causes action D. That, is, no other consequence is possible from event A.


Nobody is deciding to do events B & C, therefore nobody is deciding to do event A. Event A is the event of deliberately deciding to do action D - thereby causing the event D. The choices of what actions being considered are occuring at step 1 in the preceding events. At this stage the subject is considering two courses of action - either action A or some other action, say Z. (Apologies for the appalling inconsistencies in my labelling) . Now if at step 2 B&C did not occur, other events equivalent to event Z would occur, which woudl result in the alternative action Y instead of action D.

Responisbility for consequence D as opposed to consequence Y can therefore be attributed to action\event A. As event A is equivalent to the choosing of action D, we can say that the choosing of D was responsible for the consequence D.

I have effectively broken the action into two sub-events A & D, so that it might make the distinction between the choosing of an action and the action itself. Hopefully, this demonstrates the meaningless of questioning how someone comes to choose the action of choosing an action as you could go on for ever in an infinite regress. From what I can gather from yourself and other comments, a key objection seems to be against equating a random process with a decision to choose some action. But if you are a physicalist about the mind like myself, then the only other option is to equate a non random process with a decision. I do not know why the latter should be any less confusing than the former.

[MGL]

Equivalent as in identical to. If event A is the combination of events B and C and if B and C cause consequence D then we can say that event A causes event D. An example of such identity would be lightning. Lightning is the discharge of electricity and can be reduced to the activity of electrons. We would not say that this activity causes lightning, it is the lightning.

The cause of lightning would be whatever causes the electron activity ( the build up of opposing negative and positive electrostatic states between the ground and the atmosphere ). We would also say that if lightning struck a tree and caused it to ignite, the lightning was the cause of the tree getting burnt. We can reduce the lightning to electron activitity, but this is not the same thing as explaining lightning in terms of a temporally preceding cause.

But this is where the idea of causality gets tricky. The tree is also the cause of the event. Where the tree not there reaching for the sky there would not be sufficient charge for the lightning to happen. The water in the tree enables the event. Causality is not always one dimensional. The humidity of the air is also a casual factor; thickness of atmosphere; amount of iron in the earth; constitution of the atmosphere ad infinitem

You are absolutely right, and I perhaps should have chosen a better example, but I was only using the example of lightning to illustrate the difference and essentuial distinction between an explanation of a phenomena in terms of reducing it to more basic phenomena and that of an explanation of a phenomena in terms of what caused it. I apologise for over-simplifying things, but I am trying to highlight my points by abstracting only what I think are the essential ingredients.

[MGL]

A furhter comment on ultimate responsibility:

If events B and C are random and we want to trace the ultimate cause of consequence D, that ultimate cause will be events B and C plus the chain of causes that producued the events that were the immediate preconditions for events B and C / A.

This is why there is no such thing as an ultimate cause.

What about the big bang?

[MGL]

Now let's assume that the immediate conditions for event A allowed two possibilities - A and Z where Z has the consequence Y. If we asked what was the cause of D we should cite A plus its preceding events. However, if we ask what was the cause of D rather than Z, the only cause is A. We could then say that A was ultimately responsible for D, but only in the qualified sense that it caused D rather than Y.

What about the rest of the alphabet, and all the other causes and conditions that pertained before A?

When I said "A plus its preceding events" I meant all the other causes and conditions that pertained before A. Sorry if this was not clear.

At the point in time preceding A, neither A nor D are guaranteed, because the conditions allow two immediate possibilities - A or Z. D only happens because A happens. It is in this limited sense that we can attribute the cause of D to A.

I noticed I made an error in my previous statement. When I said "...if we ask what was the cause of D rather than Z..." I meant to say "...if we ask what was the cause of D rather than Y...".

Apologies if this confused you.

So might we say that causality is a particular limiting of phenomena to a local event? What is this local event?

Sorry, not sure what you are asking here.

[MGL]

As M says: (paraphrase) A did not cause B; A is B.
and then true to her essay's move: she argues in the mode of A causes B.
"...the phenomenon coming into existence through the concept..."

No sure if you are referring to me here. If you are, could you let me know where I say A did not cause B, A is B, but then go on to say A causes B.

[chaz wyman]

A furhter comment on ultimate responsibility:

If events B and C are random and we want to trace the ultimate cause of consequence D, that ultimate cause will be events B and C plus the chain of causes that producued the events that were the immediate preconditions for events B and C / A.

This is why there is no such thing as an ultimate cause.

It is not know what preceded that, it is not know if it was a event in an existing space with things in it.



What about the big bang?

[John]

From what I can gather from yourself and other comments, a key objection seems to be against equating a random process with a decision to choose some action.

The only point I was attempting to make, perhaps clumsily, is that whether random processes or deterministic processes are at play neither allows us to attribute ultimate responsibility to actions in a moral sense.

[MGL]

From what I can gather from yourself and other comments, a key objection seems to be against equating a random process with a decision to choose some action.

The only point I was attempting to make, perhaps clumsily, is that whether random processes or deterministic processes are at play neither allows us to attribute ultimate responsibility to actions in a moral sense.

I may agree with you that free will does not imply moral responsibility, but that is only because to do so requires adding further premises.
I agree that something simply being a cause of something harmful to others rather than something good does not in itself make that cause morally responsible. It only makes it responsible. To make it morally responsible we have to embed it in some moral system that applies values to the events to change the concept of responsibility into that of culpability.
Now I think you may be right that whatever assumptions you add to my concept of free will, they may not result in a rational concept of moral responsibility. I would assume for instance, that any action that harms others somehow incurs some sort of inherent liability to suffer for the perpetrator. That is, if you do something wrong by choice, you deserve to suffer for it. Although this is something we all might instinctively feel, I can’t think what should justify this from a rational point of view. Of course we can justify punishment on grounds of deterrence etc which I agree require no recourse to free will, but this doesn’t explain my sense of justice, which I can only assume is grounded on nothing more than some primitive instinct.

Just to end on a note of irony if not a paradox. If determinists are right, and we are all slaves to forces beyond our control, then it would seem unfair to punish people for anything. But then what criteria are we using to judge fairness?

[John]

If determinists are right, and we are all slaves to forces beyond our control, then it would seem unfair to punish people for anything. But then what criteria are we using to judge fairness?

It may be unfair but the punishment, or the threat of punishment, becomes another determining factor on future behaviour so even if it's unfair a claim can still be made that it's necessary or socially beneficial.

[chaz wyman]

Those who promote free will tend do point out the problem with personal responsibility and accountability. As if a problem means you have to ignore the argument and pretend it does not exist. It is much like Kant saying there ahs to be a God because I can't imagine a world without one. Well just because you don't like it does not strengthen the argument.
My view of Determinism does not present any kind of problem.
So let's assume that we are all determined. What role does punishment have, and what can we take from determinism to make the penal system better and more attuned to stop recidivism.
With the old system where the illusion of free will holds court, each individual is punished for what he does because it is assumed that he or she has the absolute god given choice to have done otherwise; that he knows that difference between right and wrong and his crime is a wilful neglect of his duty as a human being. This does not even have to assume that the criminal has ever had any access to moral teaching, education, an internal moral compass- none of that matters because his crime is an act of will and he is deserving of punishment. Free will does not even indicate any remedial treatment, as all that is empty if he can go out again a wilfully commit a crime. Prison is a means by which the criminal is protected from society. In this system the person is punished as the person he has chosen to be. Any suggestion that there were causal factors is not on the table.

If, on the other hand we accept determinism; that each person for each act is a culmination of a multitude of factors that lead inevitably to the commission of a crime - factors include genetics, environment , social position, poverty, wealth, culture, and so on.., what lesson can we learn to adjust punishment for the betterment of the individual and his role in society? I see not problem with promoting a penal system which recognises that an adjustment in attitude can be made; provision of a job skill to avoid the poverty that led the person to a crime; punishment to deter; and incarceration more as a punishment and less about keeping them off the streets. But whilst each one is there do something so that they will be a changed person. With determinism we are forced to consider the causes. We are forced to consider the causes of crime and the causes that might lead the person away from crime, rather than just let them rot.

We all know that prison is not working in any sense. Recidivism rates are on the increase and all we seem to do by incarcerating criminals is to make them better criminals. I think it is no coincidence that the Western country which is most Christian and holds onto the idea of a god given free-will has by far the most massive per capita prison population on earth, and the greatest death row in the Western world. Whilst the people rage for vengeance the prison population swells and crime seem to be on the increase.

Why not provide correction, rather than punishment. Why not change the person, rather than punish them? Educate rather than blame them for their ignorance?

Determinism rules okay!

[John]

Well said. This is pretty much how I see things as well.

[lancek4]

sorry, I misquoted you M:

1) Random events B and C do not lead to event A, they ARE event A
2) If Event A IS the event of someone choosing\deliberately deciding an action then that person's choice is responsible for the consequences of A. Of course if you keep separating the random event from the person making choices you are always going to find a difficulty, but that is just misrepresenting my point rather than criticising it.

It seems you are drawing upon Sartre, (paraphrase) choice is a 'midpoint' of necessary past and future. Random events are reduced to nothing in human existence.

if the past is random and the furture random, then we have a real, 'liberal', of libertarian, choice.
your postulate (1) contradicts itself: B & C not equal to A; B & C = A.

And this points to Sartre's explanation.

the conflation of inner and outer, as in your essay, would remove the definitions we have for 'random' and 'causality' and 'choice' from their meaning we typically know.

[lancek4]

Those who promote free will tend do point out the problem with personal responsibility and accountability. As if a problem means you have to ignore the argument and pretend it does not exist. It is much like Kant saying there ahs to be a God because I can't imagine a world without one. Well just because you don't like it does not strengthen the argument.
My view of Determinism does not present any kind of problem.

your determinism is interestingly determined here (by you)...

So let's assume that we are all determined. What role does punishment have, and what can we take from determinism to make the penal system better and more attuned to stop recidivism.
With the old system where the illusion of free will holds court, each individual is punished for what he does because it is assumed that he or she has the absolute god given choice to have done otherwise; that he knows that difference between right and wrong and his crime is a wilful neglect of his duty as a human being. This does not even have to assume that the criminal has ever had any access to moral teaching, education, an internal moral compass- none of that matters because his crime is an act of will and he is deserving of punishment. Free will does not even indicate any remedial treatment, as all that is empty if he can go out again a wilfully commit a crime. Prison is a means by which the criminal is protected from society. In this system the person is punished as the person he has chosen to be. Any suggestion that there were causal factors is not on the table.

If, on the other hand we accept determinism; that each person for each act is a culmination of a multitude of factors that lead inevitably to the commission of a crime - factors include genetics, environment , social position, poverty, wealth, culture, and so on.., what lesson can we learn to adjust punishment for the betterment of the individual and his role in society? I see not problem with promoting a penal system which recognises that an adjustment in attitude can be made; provision of a job skill to avoid the poverty that led the person to a crime; punishment to deter; and incarceration more as a punishment and less about keeping them off the streets. But whilst each one is there do something so that they will be a changed person. With determinism we are forced to consider the causes. We are forced to consider the causes of crime and the causes that might lead the person away from crime, rather than just let them rot.

We all know that prison is not working in any sense. Recidivism rates are on the increase and all we seem to do by incarcerating criminals is to make them better criminals. I think it is no coincidence that the Western country which is most Christian and holds onto the idea of a god given free-will has by far the most massive per capita prison population on earth, and the greatest death row in the Western world. Whilst the people rage for vengeance the prison population swells and crime seem to be on the increase.

Why not provide correction, rather than punishment. Why not change the person, rather than punish them? Educate rather than blame them for their ignorance?

Determinism rules okay!

It seems you are using Determinism as a label for how to interpret the past while leaving out the present. (Again, I do nn disagree with your proposal, only that it promotes a type of ethical activity (a technology if you will ).
Indeed, the general system of law we have limits its scop of what reality may be for the purpose of managing society. Law overtly, consciously, argues no existential position, only in its activity does it argue free will and social responsibility.

If we take determinism as a valid position, we cannot leave out the present, as if all of a sudden we become free (god given). Our present decisions must likewise be determined if our past was. If not then determinism is empty of meaning and has 'no content'; that is, unless we have a basic duality.

how do we say that our choices were determined in the past, but in the present we have responsibility. Subatomic activity would have to have some sort of 'random', but more properly, 'separate force-element' in order to bring about a free choice in one moment and determined choice in the next. Indeed, to have any type of absolute free choice, there must be an effective element that is beyond our knowable universe.
In fact, i am changing my position to advocating Free Choice, for I choses freely to absolutly deny that this sentence I am writing has been determined. Determinism is a necessary condition of my having a free choice. there could be no determinate reality without my first free choice.

(Uh --I wish to admit that I am a dork. I had read this article and another one recently and was mixing them up on this thread. Yes, now that I am am a dork,I can now make relevant comments to this thread.

[MGL]

sorry, I misquoted you M:

1) Random events B and C do not lead to event A, they ARE event A
2) If Event A IS the event of someone choosing\deliberately deciding an action then that person's choice is responsible for the consequences of A. Of course if you keep separating the random event from the person making choices you are always going to find a difficulty, but that is just misrepresenting my point rather than criticising it.

It seems you are drawing upon Sartre, (paraphrase) choice is a 'midpoint' of necessary past and future. Random events are reduced to nothing in human existence.

if the past is random and the furture random, then we have a real, 'liberal', of libertarian, choice.
your postulate (1) contradicts itself: B & C not equal to A; B & C = A.

And this points to Sartre's explanation.

the conflation of inner and outer, as in your essay, would remove the definitions we have for 'random' and 'causality' and 'choice' from their meaning we typically know.

I am not sure why you think the phrase "leads to" is equivalent to the phrase "are". The former suggests something causing something, the latter is a statement of identity. An act of throwing a brick at a window may lead to the window shattering, but they are hardly the same thing.

Also, what essay of mine are you talking about and why do think I am a woman? Are you confusing me with the lady who co-wrote the article we are debating who was arguing against free will?