There is no 'Matter of Fact' [Analytic].

[Skepdick]

It's just a brute fact about how the world works.

So then, what is your objection?

Are you in a world in which A obtains, or B obtains?

A: You ought to pay your taxes.
B: You ought not pay your taxes.

Some things don't obtain, but they could have, because nothing prohibited them from obtaining prior to whatever obtained.

What prohibited them from obtaining was you being in a universe where one obtains and not the other.

[Skepdick]

It doesn't hinge on my conceptualization. What is your suggestion where there would be empirical evidence for it?

Your own damn desires are empirical evidence.

Prior to you boxing them in the box called "opinions"

[Terrapin Station]

Are you in a world in which A obtains, or B obtains?

A: You ought to pay your taxes.
B: You ought not pay your taxes.

Neither. It depends on what one desires.

What prohibited them from obtaining was you being in a universe where one obtains and not the other.

No, contingent facts do not prohibit earlier possibilities from obtaining. Only necessary facts would.

[Terrapin Station]

It doesn't hinge on my conceptualization. What is your suggestion where there would be empirical evidence for it?

Your own damn desires are empirical evidence.

Again, you understand that no one is denying that they have desires, that they have moral stances, etc., right?

[Skepdick]

Neither. It depends on what one desires.

In Universe A you desire to pay your taxes.
in Universe B you desire to not pay your taxes.

Which universe are you in?

No, contingent facts do not prohibit earlier possibilities from obtaining. Only necessary facts would.

That's a normative view.

[Skepdick]

Again, you understand that no one is denying that they have desires, that they have moral stances, etc., right?

You understand that I understand that, yes?

Given our mutual understanding of that, I want you to explain to me what an "ought" is and how it's different from an "is".

[Terrapin Station]

Again, you understand that no one is denying that they have desires, that they have moral stances, etc., right?

You understand that I understand that, yes?

Given our mutual understanding of that, I want you to explain to me what an "ought" is and how it's different from an "is".

Okay, but wait. You're supposed to be presenting a conceptualization that would allow us to test for moral normatives. Since we both agree that everyone has desires, moral stances, etc., but we disagree on whether there are moral normatives (aside from calling someone saying "I ought to x" a normative), then presenting a conceptualization where we have desires and moral stances won't do the trick, right?

[Skepdick]

Okay, but wait. You're supposed to be presenting a conceptualization that would allow us to test for moral normatives.

No. YOU are supposed to present that.

My conceptualisation of moral normatives already allows for testing and I am using it to that effect to assert that morality is objective.

Yours doesn't.

Since we both agree that everyone has desires, moral stances, etc., but we disagree on whether there are moral normatives (aside from calling someone saying "I ought to x" a normative), then presenting a conceptualization where we have desires and moral stances won't do the trick, right?

Then fix your conception.

There's a universe in which there are moral normatives.
There's a universe in which there are no moral normatives.

How do you tell which universe you are in?

[Terrapin Station]

Then fix your conception.

There's a universe in which there are moral normatives.
There's a universe in which there are no moral normatives.

How do you tell which universe you are in?

You suggested you would have a different conception that would allow us to test this and get a different answer, no? I asked you to present it. The first thing you came up with is the fact that we have desires and moral stances. That's not a different conception, so that doesn't work.

So do you have a different conception that might suggest a different answer or not?

[Skepdick]

You suggested you would have a different conception that would allow us to test this and get a different answer, no?

Not a DIFFERENT answer. ANY answer.

The answers are just possibilities.

I asked you to present it. The first thing you came up with is the fact that we have desires and moral stances. That's not a different conception, so that doesn't work.

What normative notion of "it working" do you have in mind?

So do you have a different conception that might suggest a different answer or not?

Sure. The negation of your conception produces the opposite answer.

[Terrapin Station]

What normative notion of "it working" do you have in mind?

In this case, (a) being a different notion, (b) being intelligible/making sense, (c) being testable.

[Skepdick]

In this case, (a) being a different notion, (b) being intelligible/making sense, (c) being testable.

So why isn't your conception of an "ought" testable?

Your current conception is anything BUT intelligible/making sense.

[Terrapin Station]

In this case, (a) being a different notion, (b) being intelligible/making sense, (c) being testable.

So why isn't your conception of an "ought" testable?

Your current conception is anything BUT intelligible/making sense.

It is testable, and the test resulted in: there aren't any extramental/objective oughts.

[Skepdick]

It is testable, and the test resulted in: there aren't any extramental/objective oughts.

But if reality is all there is, why are you selective about your search?

[Terrapin Station]

It is testable, and the test resulted in: there aren't any extramental/objective oughts.

But if reality is all there is, why are you selective about your search?

Selective as in?