Why Do the Religious Reject Science While Embracing the Impossible?

[Atla]

While I aim to engage thoughtfully and productively in discussions, there are limits to what is worth pursuing. My ignore list consists of individuals who repeatedly show they are uninterested in engaging with ideas constructively or are more focused on derailing the conversation than on advancing understanding.

My ignore list currently consists of these individuals:

1. Age
2. Alexis Jacobi
3. Atla
4. attofishi
5. FlashDangerpants
6. godelian
7. henry quirk
8. seeds
9. Skepdick

What external factor made you reply to some people who you have on ignore?

Then why do you respond to his posts if you know you are on 'ignore'? That's just bad manners and deliberate baiting. You have that in common with Age. You do realise this still creates a big red intrusive blob on someone's page that's impossible to ignore don't you? Of course you do, dearie.

Thank you miss moral policewoman, knowing you your deep concern is entirely believable. Don't worry though, I won't do it 1000 times like Age, and this one doen't even know why he put me on ignore.

[BigMike]

That's actually pretty good, but some clarification is needed about what it means to change a possibility, and also some of the other words.

It seems rather clear, actually.

If we define "genuine choice" in that manner, then determinism and "genuine choice" are clearly incompatible. However, as I pointed out repeatedly, the normal definition of choice (I assume such a "choice is "genuine") is "an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities." We humans can be "faced with" choices even if the one we will pick is determined. That's because we don't know what the outcome will be until it occurs, just as the gambler doesn't know which card is on the top of the deck until it is dealt.

The problem with using words in an idiosyncratic manner is that they are useful only if we accept the shared meaning.

Imagine a river with an intricate delta—a vast network of branching streams and tributaries. Each drop of water flows through this network, but its path is determined entirely by the topology of the delta, the angle of the terrain, and the volume of water pushing behind it. At every fork, the water doesn't "choose" where to go; it simply follows the path dictated by gravity, pressure, and the physical constraints of the branching channels.

Now, imagine the nervous system as a similar branching network. Signals, like the water, flow through this neural delta, guided by the connections between neurons, the strength of synaptic pathways, and the electrochemical conditions present at the moment. The "choices" you think you make are not decisions but the inevitable result of how the signals travel through the predefined structure of your neural pathways.

Just as the river cannot pause at a fork and decide to flow left or right, your nervous system doesn't evaluate "choices" independently—it operates based on input and its preexisting architecture. The outcome is as inevitable as the river's path through the delta, revealing that what we perceive as "free will" is simply the unfolding of predetermined processes within the brain. The illusion of free choice stems from our inability to consciously observe the forces shaping the flow.

[attofishpi]

It seems rather clear, actually.

If we define "genuine choice" in that manner, then determinism and "genuine choice" are clearly incompatible. However, as I pointed out repeatedly, the normal definition of choice (I assume such a "choice is "genuine") is "an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities." We humans can be "faced with" choices even if the one we will pick is determined. That's because we don't know what the outcome will be until it occurs, just as the gambler doesn't know which card is on the top of the deck until it is dealt.

The problem with using words in an idiosyncratic manner is that they are useful only if we accept the shared meaning.

Imagine a river with an intricate delta—a vast network of branching streams and tributaries. Each drop of water flows through this network, but its path is determined entirely by the topology of the delta, the angle of the terrain, and the volume of water pushing behind it. At every fork, the water doesn't "choose" where to go; it simply follows the path dictated by gravity, pressure, and the physical constraints of the branching channels.

..ooo.

So.

Mike, if everything is determinable then there must be a mathematical equation for it

[Alexiev]

It seems rather clear, actually.

If we define "genuine choice" in that manner, then determinism and "genuine choice" are clearly incompatible. However, as I pointed out repeatedly, the normal definition of choice (I assume such a "choice is "genuine") is "an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities." We humans can be "faced with" choices even if the one we will pick is determined. That's because we don't know what the outcome will be until it occurs, just as the gambler doesn't know which card is on the top of the deck until it is dealt.

The problem with using words in an idiosyncratic manner is that they are useful only if we accept the shared meaning.

Imagine a river with an intricate delta—a vast network of branching streams and tributaries. Each drop of water flows through this network, but its path is determined entirely by the topology of the delta, the angle of the terrain, and the volume of water pushing behind it. At every fork, the water doesn't "choose" where to go; it simply follows the path dictated by gravity, pressure, and the physical constraints of the branching channels.

Now, imagine the nervous system as a similar branching network. Signals, like the water, flow through this neural delta, guided by the connections between neurons, the strength of synaptic pathways, and the electrochemical conditions present at the moment. The "choices" you think you make are not decisions but the inevitable result of how the signals travel through the predefined structure of your neural pathways.

Just as the river cannot pause at a fork and decide to flow left or right, your nervous system doesn't evaluate "choices" independently—it operates based on input and its preexisting architecture. The outcome is as inevitable as the river's path through the delta, revealing that what we perceive as "free will" is simply the unfolding of predetermined processes within the brain. The illusion of free choice stems from our inability to consciously observe the forces shaping the flow.

This is irrelevant to my point. I have no idea whether our thoughts, choices, and everything else are "determined". Nor do I care. Nor does it affect whether we make "choices", as I have explained repeatedly.

The word "choice" describes a process which occurs in a deterministic or undeterministic universe. Simply repeating yourself while ignoring that definition avoids the issue.

[BigMike]

If we define "genuine choice" in that manner, then determinism and "genuine choice" are clearly incompatible. However, as I pointed out repeatedly, the normal definition of choice (I assume such a "choice is "genuine") is "an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities." We humans can be "faced with" choices even if the one we will pick is determined. That's because we don't know what the outcome will be until it occurs, just as the gambler doesn't know which card is on the top of the deck until it is dealt.

The problem with using words in an idiosyncratic manner is that they are useful only if we accept the shared meaning.

Imagine a river with an intricate delta—a vast network of branching streams and tributaries. Each drop of water flows through this network, but its path is determined entirely by the topology of the delta, the angle of the terrain, and the volume of water pushing behind it. At every fork, the water doesn't "choose" where to go; it simply follows the path dictated by gravity, pressure, and the physical constraints of the branching channels.

Now, imagine the nervous system as a similar branching network. Signals, like the water, flow through this neural delta, guided by the connections between neurons, the strength of synaptic pathways, and the electrochemical conditions present at the moment. The "choices" you think you make are not decisions but the inevitable result of how the signals travel through the predefined structure of your neural pathways.

Just as the river cannot pause at a fork and decide to flow left or right, your nervous system doesn't evaluate "choices" independently—it operates based on input and its preexisting architecture. The outcome is as inevitable as the river's path through the delta, revealing that what we perceive as "free will" is simply the unfolding of predetermined processes within the brain. The illusion of free choice stems from our inability to consciously observe the forces shaping the flow.

This is irrelevant to my point. I have no idea whether our thoughts, choices, and everything else are "determined". Nor do I care. Nor does it affect whether we make "choices", as I have explained repeatedly.

The word "choice" describes a process which occurs in a deterministic or undeterministic universe. Simply repeating yourself while ignoring that definition avoids the issue.

The analogy isn't intended to deny that "choices" happen; it's to clarify what underlies the phenomenon of choice. Let me address your point directly.

You define "choice" as the act of selecting among possibilities. That's fine as a functional description, but whether that process is deterministic or not radically alters its nature. If our actions are determined—like the river navigating a delta—the apparent "choice" is not a selection among real alternatives but an outcome of prior causes, which includes your environment, biology, and neural structure.

The key difference lies in the perception of agency. In a deterministic framework, "choices" are not genuinely open-ended. They are outcomes of processes unfolding according to fixed laws, even if you are unaware of the determining factors. That unawareness gives the illusion of "choosing freely," but the reality is that the decision could not have been otherwise.

Your definition doesn't address this deeper philosophical issue: whether the "choice" is a process of genuine selection among alternatives or just the deterministic unfolding of causes. The analogy is relevant because it illustrates this distinction—not to deny that "choices" occur in the ordinary sense, but to question their assumed freedom.

[henry quirk]

your nervous system doesn't evaluate "choices" independently

Of course not. I do that, not my nervous system.

[Alexiev]

The analogy isn't intended to deny that "choices" happen; it's to clarify what underlies the phenomenon of choice. Let me address your point directly.

You define "choice" as the act of selecting among possibilities. That's fine as a functional description, but whether that process is deterministic or not radically alters its nature. If our actions are determined—like the river navigating a delta—the apparent "choice" is not a selection among real alternatives but an outcome of prior causes, which includes your environment, biology, and neural structure.

The key difference lies in the perception of agency. In a deterministic framework, "choices" are not genuinely open-ended. They are outcomes of processes unfolding according to fixed laws, even if you are unaware of the determining factors. That unawareness gives the illusion of "choosing freely," but the reality is that the decision could not have been otherwise.

Your definition doesn't address this deeper philosophical issue: whether the "choice" is a process of genuine selection among alternatives or just the deterministic unfolding of causes. The analogy is relevant because it illustrates this distinction—not to deny that "choices" occur in the ordinary sense, but to question their assumed freedom.

"Freedom" is another word with which you are playing fast and loose. Nobody thinks "freedom" suggests the ability to flout the laws of physics. Few people would think a man who cannot fly by flapping his arms lacks freedom.

Nor can we think anything we don't think, or choose anything we don't choose. Everyone knows our thoughts and choices are created in our brains. Everyone knows we have "reasons" for choosing as we do. These reasons may involve neurons (which explains nothing to us, given our current state of understanding). Or they may be the standard reasons we DO understand: we eat when we're hungry, we look before crossing the street because we don't want to get run over, and we raise when holding a straight flush because we want more money. The notion that our brains follow the laws of physics (didn't we invent those laws?) is all well and good, but it explains nothing, fails to improve our understanding of human behavior, and.encourages us to settle for this lack of understanding by couching itself in scientific jargon.

If, on the other hand, we see people making choices as the result of perceived benefits and costs, that often DOES help us predict and explain human behavior. Hmmm. Which is more "scientific"?

[BigMike]

The analogy isn't intended to deny that "choices" happen; it's to clarify what underlies the phenomenon of choice. Let me address your point directly.

You define "choice" as the act of selecting among possibilities. That's fine as a functional description, but whether that process is deterministic or not radically alters its nature. If our actions are determined—like the river navigating a delta—the apparent "choice" is not a selection among real alternatives but an outcome of prior causes, which includes your environment, biology, and neural structure.

The key difference lies in the perception of agency. In a deterministic framework, "choices" are not genuinely open-ended. They are outcomes of processes unfolding according to fixed laws, even if you are unaware of the determining factors. That unawareness gives the illusion of "choosing freely," but the reality is that the decision could not have been otherwise.

Your definition doesn't address this deeper philosophical issue: whether the "choice" is a process of genuine selection among alternatives or just the deterministic unfolding of causes. The analogy is relevant because it illustrates this distinction—not to deny that "choices" occur in the ordinary sense, but to question their assumed freedom.

"Freedom" is another word with which you are playing fast and loose. Nobody thinks "freedom" suggests the ability to flout the laws of physics. Few people would think a man who cannot fly by flapping his arms lacks freedom.

Nor can we think anything we don't think, or choose anything we don't choose. Everyone knows our thoughts and choices are created in our brains. Everyone knows we have "reasons" for choosing as we do. These reasons may involve neurons (which explains nothing to us, given our current state of understanding). Or they may be the standard reasons we DO understand: we eat when we're hungry, we look before crossing the street because we don't want to get run over, and we raise when holding a straight flush because we want more money. The notion that our brains follow the laws of physics (didn't we invent those laws?) is all well and good, but it explains nothing, fails to improve our understanding of human behavior, and.encourages us to settle for this lack of understanding by couching itself in scientific jargon.

If, on the other hand, we see people making choices as the result of perceived benefits and costs, that often DOES help us predict and explain human behavior. Hmmm. Which is more "scientific"?

Alexiev, you're burying the core issue under semantic distractions. It's frustrating because this discussion isn’t about redefining words like “choice” or “freedom” into comfortable abstractions that bypass the philosophical implications of determinism. The point is to explore what underlies these phenomena—not to deny they occur, but to question whether they mean what we assume they mean. You're sidestepping that by focusing on superficial definitions while dismissing the explanatory power of a deterministic framework.

No one is denying that humans act, think, or weigh perceived benefits and costs. But you're glossing over the fact that these actions and perceptions are themselves determined by prior causes. Saying, “we make choices because of reasons” doesn't answer the deeper question of where those reasons originate or whether they could have been otherwise. It's not “scientific” to stop at observable behavior and ignore the mechanisms driving it—especially when those mechanisms dismantle the illusion of genuine freedom you're defending.

Determinism isn’t a lack of understanding or an appeal to ignorance. It’s the recognition that every decision, every “reason,” arises from an unbroken chain of causality. You’re arguing for a more palatable explanation, but that explanation is fundamentally incomplete if it ignores the deterministic processes shaping everything we think, perceive, or do. Let’s not mistake superficial predictability for true explanatory depth. It’s disappointing to see you champion simplicity while ignoring the larger implications.

[henry quirk]

No one is denying that humans...weigh perceived benefits and costs.

You do. How can a person weigh perceived benefits and costs when he has no control over his thoughts?

To assess sumthin' (to weigh it) one must be capable of directing one's self, one's attention, one's thinking. One must be capable of forming intent.

You say, over and over, a person cannot direct himself or his attention or his thinking. You say a person is incapable of forming intent.

So, yes, you, over and over, deny humans weigh perceived benefits and costs.

[Age]

No one is denying that humans...weigh perceived benefits and costs.

You do. How can a person weigh perceived benefits and costs when he has no control over his thoughts?

LOL
LOL
LOL

This one is, AGAIN, OBVIOUSLY, ABSOLUTELY OBLIVIOUS to the ABSOLUTE CONTRADICTION, here.

To assess sumthin' (to weigh it) one must be capable of directing one's self, one's attention, one's thinking. One must be capable of forming intent.

You say, over and over, a person cannot direct himself or his attention or his thinking. You say a person is incapable of forming intent.

So, yes, you, over and over, deny humans weigh perceived benefits and costs.

Talk about ANOTHER PRIME EXAMPLE of one BAMBOOZLING "itself" when 'trying to' find words that it hopes will back up and support its 'current' BELIEF/S.

[Alexiev]

Alexiev, you're burying the core issue under semantic distractions. It's frustrating because this discussion isn’t about redefining words like “choice” or “freedom” into comfortable abstractions that bypass the philosophical implications of determinism. The point is to explore what underlies these phenomena—not to deny they occur, but to question whether they mean what we assume they mean. You're sidestepping that by focusing on superficial definitions while dismissing the explanatory power of a deterministic framework.

No one is denying that humans act, think, or weigh perceived benefits and costs. But you're glossing over the fact that these actions and perceptions are themselves determined by prior causes. Saying, “we make choices because of reasons” doesn't answer the deeper question of where those reasons originate or whether they could have been otherwise. It's not “scientific” to stop at observable behavior and ignore the mechanisms driving it—especially when those mechanisms dismantle the illusion of genuine freedom you're defending.

Determinism isn’t a lack of understanding or an appeal to ignorance. It’s the recognition that every decision, every “reason,” arises from an unbroken chain of causality. You’re arguing for a more palatable explanation, but that explanation is fundamentally incomplete if it ignores the deterministic processes shaping everything we think, perceive, or do. Let’s not mistake superficial predictability for true explanatory depth. It’s disappointing to see you champion simplicity while ignoring the larger implications.

The semantic discussions expose the weaknesses of your contentions. If the "unbroken chain of causality" determines all human behaviors, so what? Why should anyone care? After the shuffle, the order in which the cards will be dealt is clearly 100% determined. But that's irrelevant to the gambler, because he doesn’t know the order of the deck.

That's the same with us poor blokes. We trot merrily along our life's journey, blissfully making free choices whether or not they have been destined since the big bang. Thinking they have been so destined makes no difference to our behavior or our understanding. It doesn't help us predict; it doesn't help us to understand. Perhaps, as you assert, such quasi-religious faith prevents us from blaming moral transgressions. But that may or may not be a good thing. Guilt, shame, ethical beliefs etc.are all part of the river delta, flowing in accordance with the laws of phyics. There is no reason to assume that abandoning them in favor of blameless determinism will make the world a better, kinder place. Indeed, I'd guess it would have the opposite effect.

So where does this religious faith in materialistic determinism get us? Nowhere, or to walls so high their tops cannot be seen. As Gertrude Stein might say, "There's no there there."

[Alexis Jacobi]

One aspect, result or by-product of BM’s dogmatic philosophy is interesting to consider. Because it reduces everything human and conceptual to mere physicalism, it means that the only real sort of thinking that is valid and grounded is thought of the sort in his “water flowing in a delta” picture. It is all, therefore, reduced to mechanical, physical processes. By “it” I mean ourselves and the human world in nearly all aspects.

So, let me mention again the idea of “our metaphysical dream of the world”. If all conception is reduced to atomic or molecular events, any “conception”, and “imagination”, any metaphysical picture that expresses meaning and value is voided. These are epiphenomenal and, to employ a term used in this school of thought, unreal, i.e. invented.

The true mode of thought is, according to BM, the mode of thought he has invested himself in. And that mode quashes all other conceptual models. Or to put it differently it punctures them, deflating them. The only real thing is the determined flow of atoms and molecules which were set in motion when time (existence, manifestation) began.

Thus it (“it”, i.e. this metaphysical picture which is described as reality reduced to its absolute state of realness) actually undermines the human.

The aspect of BM’s dogma that is most dominant because it is inevitable is a form of mechanistic anthropology that must necessarily take shape through mechanistic models superimposed on man — at an internal level — and the structure of social and cultural forms. Perhaps I jump paranoiacally here but I cannot see how advanced computer systems and artificial intelligence will be made to direct and control man (ourselves) and systems. The ultimate machine takes over and establishes proper order.

If you don’t see things in his way (is it a “mind virus” operating in our late modernity?) you must be reconditioned. This is inevitable. Error must be corrected. Because you “deny science” which is presented as the ultimate truth possibility, your mind must be put in proper order.

While it is true that we definitely live and have our being in a conditioned world, and we are parts-and-parcels of material flows, if we choose to deny some level of choice available to us, we cannot be else but mechanisms in a world ultimately reducible to mere mechanical process.

The interesting thing is that we have access to the concept of an absolutely unconditioned reality which only comes to us through conceptual imagination. But as such it must exist outside of all material events.

It cannot exist (according to BM’s reductive philosophy) and yet it does exist. But according to BM’s science application it is a thoroughly false notion. A claim that has no basis in “reality”.

[BigMike]

Alexiev, you're burying the core issue under semantic distractions. It's frustrating because this discussion isn’t about redefining words like “choice” or “freedom” into comfortable abstractions that bypass the philosophical implications of determinism. The point is to explore what underlies these phenomena—not to deny they occur, but to question whether they mean what we assume they mean. You're sidestepping that by focusing on superficial definitions while dismissing the explanatory power of a deterministic framework.

No one is denying that humans act, think, or weigh perceived benefits and costs. But you're glossing over the fact that these actions and perceptions are themselves determined by prior causes. Saying, “we make choices because of reasons” doesn't answer the deeper question of where those reasons originate or whether they could have been otherwise. It's not “scientific” to stop at observable behavior and ignore the mechanisms driving it—especially when those mechanisms dismantle the illusion of genuine freedom you're defending.

Determinism isn’t a lack of understanding or an appeal to ignorance. It’s the recognition that every decision, every “reason,” arises from an unbroken chain of causality. You’re arguing for a more palatable explanation, but that explanation is fundamentally incomplete if it ignores the deterministic processes shaping everything we think, perceive, or do. Let’s not mistake superficial predictability for true explanatory depth. It’s disappointing to see you champion simplicity while ignoring the larger implications.

The semantic discussions expose the weaknesses of your contentions. If the "unbroken chain of causality" determines all human behaviors, so what? Why should anyone care? After the shuffle, the order in which the cards will be dealt is clearly 100% determined. But that's irrelevant to the gambler, because he doesn’t know the order of the deck.

That's the same with us poor blokes. We trot merrily along our life's journey, blissfully making free choices whether or not they have been destined since the big bang. Thinking they have been so destined makes no difference to our behavior or our understanding. It doesn't help us predict; it doesn't help us to understand. Perhaps, as you assert, such quasi-religious faith prevents us from blaming moral transgressions. But that may or may not be a good thing. Guilt, shame, ethical beliefs etc.are all part of the river delta, flowing in accordance with the laws of phyics. There is no reason to assume that abandoning them in favor of blameless determinism will make the world a better, kinder place. Indeed, I'd guess it would have the opposite effect.

So where does this religious faith in materialistic determinism get us? Nowhere, or to walls so high their tops cannot be seen. As Gertrude Stein might say, "There's no there there."

Alexiev, the point is not that determinism is some grand solution that transforms our lives overnight—it’s that it changes how we understand the foundation of human behavior, morality, and society. Your analogy to a gambler not knowing the order of cards misses the mark because it equates ignorance of outcomes with the illusion of freedom. The gambler feels suspense because they lack knowledge, but that ignorance doesn’t mean the shuffle wasn't fully determined. Similarly, the fact that we don’t know what our choices will be until we “make” them doesn’t mean those choices aren’t the result of prior causes.

You say determinism doesn’t help us predict or understand, but that’s simply not true. A deterministic framework does away with mysticism and focuses on causality—understanding the "why" behind actions. If people commit moral transgressions, we can focus on addressing the causes instead of relying on archaic notions of blame and retribution. Your appeal to shame, guilt, and ethical beliefs as immutable aspects of the human experience ignores the fact that these, too, are products of deterministic forces—cultural, psychological, and neurological. They can evolve as our understanding deepens.

Blaming someone for their actions, while emotionally satisfying, is counterproductive if the goal is to create a kinder, better world. A deterministic worldview isn’t about excusing harmful behavior but about addressing its root causes. It opens the door to reformative justice, evidence-based policy, and a more compassionate society. To dismiss this as a “religious faith” is ironic, given how determinism demands rigorous empirical grounding while your argument rests on the inertia of traditional beliefs.

The claim that determinism offers “no there there” is a deflection. It’s not about arriving at a utopia but about dismantling harmful illusions that shape our systems of governance, morality, and justice. If you find the walls of determinism intimidating, it’s not because there’s nothing beyond them—it’s because they challenge the comforting simplicity of free will and all the assumptions built upon it. That discomfort doesn’t invalidate the perspective; it underscores its transformative potential.

[Alexis Jacobi]

BM writes: Blaming someone for their actions, while emotionally satisfying, is counterproductive if the goal is to create a kinder, better world. A deterministic worldview isn’t about excusing harmful behavior but about addressing its root causes. It opens the door to reformative justice, evidence-based policy, and a more compassionate society.

The other “interesting” thing is that BM’s philosophy is presented as something beneficial. As if ‘reasoned choices’ had been made by enlightened men who are cultural engineers. These men went to work on the conceptual order and restructured everything.

But all notions of benefit and goodness are derived ideas more proper to humanistic, progressive political models. But why, necessarily, should the natural flow of molecules have concerns of this sort? The water flowing in the river does not. It cannot. The “proper order” then would model nature (thoughtless, determined) and not idealism, which is ultra-metaphysical.

All notions of goodness (those typical to human conception) have always been grounded in metaphysics and not in a model of scientific determinism.

[Immanuel Can]

Imagine a river with an intricate delta—a vast network of branching streams and tributaries. Each drop of water flows through this network, but its path is determined entirely by the topology of the delta, the angle of the terrain, and the volume of water pushing behind it. At every fork, the water doesn't "choose" where to go; it simply follows the path dictated by gravity, pressure, and the physical constraints of the branching channels.

Now, imagine the nervous system as a similar branching network. Signals, like the water, flow through this neural delta, guided by the connections between neurons, the strength of synaptic pathways, and the electrochemical conditions present at the moment. The "choices" you think you make are not decisions but the inevitable result of how the signals travel through the predefined structure of your neural pathways.

Just as the river cannot pause at a fork and decide to flow left or right, your nervous system doesn't evaluate "choices" independently—it operates based on input and its preexisting architecture. The outcome is as inevitable as the river's path through the delta, revealing that what we perceive as "free will" is simply the unfolding of predetermined processes within the brain. The illusion of free choice stems from our inability to consciously observe the forces shaping the flow.

Cute story.

And, since it denies the reality of the cognitive faculties we require in order to know whether or not it was true, it leaves us with no way to know. We're not allowed to use our brains (because their revelations to us are allegedly just products of prior forces acting on us), so we can't criticize the story. Very convenient, that.

But neither have you the slightest reason to suppose it's true: so it's just as well you begin with the word "imagine." Imagining it is all that's possible to do...according to Determinism.