compatibilism

[Iwannaplato]

What is the difference between determinism and the law of causality?

For determinism the effect can be predetermined, at least in theory.
While for indeterminism the effect cannot be predetermined, not even in theory.

This sounds like determinism and indeterminism. Before it seemed like you were contrasting the law of causality and determinism. I am also not sure what you mean by 'can not be predetermined'. Would it be 'is not predetermined'?

But both are under the law of cause and effect.
Both have nothing to do with randomness.

I think there are indeterminisms that have a random element. It's not required for indeterminism, just one of the possible indeterminisms.

Is the cause that I am an effect or not?

If we separate the cause from its still being an effect, what are we saying?

Well, what I responded to was something like 'whether I am just an effect or not.' I can't see a reason to say, for example, humans are in a world of causes and effects, but they are just effects.

[bobmax]

What is the difference between determinism and the law of causality?

For determinism the effect can be predetermined, at least in theory.
While for indeterminism the effect cannot be predetermined, not even in theory.

This sounds like determinism and indeterminism. Before it seemed like you were contrasting the law of causality and determinism. I am also not sure what you mean by 'can not be predetermined'. Would it be 'is not predetermined'?

Determinism is within the law of causation.
In which there is also indeterminism.

I was wrong to write predetermined (ambiguous term) I meant that it is possible to determine the event before it happens.

But both are under the law of cause and effect.
Both have nothing to do with randomness.

I think there are indeterminisms that have a random element. It's not required for indeterminism, just one of the possible indeterminisms.

In my opinion, the meaning of a truly random event is generally not well understood.
Because randomness is, and is only, the negation of necessity.
His whole raison d'etre is in this same negation.

The really random event is unthinkable in itself.
Because it is the eruption of Chaos into the Cosmos.

Our every possibility of understanding would vanish in the face of a truly random event.
Therefore randomness is expelled from our thinking.
Although never quite.
Either because it is the negation of necessity, and because maybe we are not here by chance?

Is the cause that I am an effect or not?

If we separate the cause from its still being an effect, what are we saying?

Well, what I responded to was something like 'whether I am just an effect or not.' I can't see a reason to say, for example, humans are in a world of causes and effects, but they are just effects.

Of course we are also causes.

But are we causes only because we are effects?

Or are we causes apart from our being effects?

That is, are we at least somewhat an unconditional origin of events or are we conditioned anyway?

[Iwannaplato]

In my opinion, the meaning of a truly random event is generally not well understood.
Because randomness is, and is only, the negation of necessity.
His whole raison d'etre is in this same negation.

His? Who is he?

The really random event is unthinkable in itself.
Because it is the eruption of Chaos into the Cosmos.

I don't know if random is possible or not.

Our every possibility of understanding would vanish in the face of a truly random event.
Therefore randomness is expelled from our thinking.
Although never quite.
Either because it is the negation of necessity, and because maybe we are not here by chance?

Perhaps occasionally something random happens. What do I know?
If qm is already probablistic - though there isn't full consensus on this - I don't see how one can rule out full indeterminism.

Of course we are also causes.

But are we causes only because we are effects?

Or are we causes apart from our being effects?

That is, are we at least somewhat an unconditional origin of events or are we conditioned anyway?

I'm agnostic on that issue.

[iambiguous]

Okay, here's the challenge:

Experientially and experimentally, come up with hard evidence that you freely came up with hard evidence in order to demonstrate that iambiguous freely presented his version or was never able to not present his version.

I'm discussing what you are doing and not whether you are doing it freely or not.

Okay, but I'm discussing your failure [so far] to, experientially and experimentally, come up with hard evidence that you freely came up with hard evidence in order demonstrate that you opted freely to discuss it...or discussed it only as you were ever able to discuss it.

The part where we are all stuck. What I am doing right now is typyng these words. Am I doing this freely? Okay, Mr. Scientist, okay Mr. Philosopher, okay Mr. Theologian, pin that down for us.

Right, like those who restrain him were not in turn never able not to restrain him. Again, back to this...

"A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants." Schopenhauer.

The killer wants to kill
You want to restrain him

Missing the point.

Free-will or determinism, people are going to have to deal with the killer's actions.

Call it moral responsibility or call it something else.

Call it punishment or call it reeducation.

Click.

Again, I am more than willing to admit that you are making an important point here that, if I grasp it, it will clarify the determinism/free will/compatibilism conundrum that has stymied both science and philosophy now for thousands of years.

But [compelled or not] I don't. The point is that if I am missing the point in the manner in which I and others have come to understand a wholly determined universe, I was destined/fated to miss it. I could never have not missed it.

And if people deal with the behavior of others only because [as they do in dreams] they were commanded by their brains chemically and neurologically to do so in the only possible reality in the only possible world, that seems profoundly different than because they were of their own volition able to judge more or less rationally how to deal with it.

[bobmax]

In my opinion, the meaning of a truly random event is generally not well understood.
Because randomness is, and is only, the negation of necessity.
His whole raison d'etre is in this same negation.

His? Who is he?

Typo...

The really random event is unthinkable in itself.
Because it is the eruption of Chaos into the Cosmos.

I don't know if random is possible or not.

Our every possibility of understanding would vanish in the face of a truly random event.
Therefore randomness is expelled from our thinking.
Although never quite.
Either because it is the negation of necessity, and because maybe we are not here by chance?

Perhaps occasionally something random happens. What do I know?
If qm is already probablistic - though there isn't full consensus on this - I don't see how one can rule out full indeterminism.

Probability has nothing to do with true randomness.
Because probability is only a means of managing what we cannot uniquely determine.
But that's not why it's really random...

Let's say that an event happened by chance, but that's just a saying.
Not because we believe it is truly random!

Just imagining it should we be overwhelmed with horror.

Yet, in that horror, the Truth can be hidden.

[Iwannaplato]

Probability has nothing to do with true randomness.
Because probability is only a means of managing what we cannot uniquely determine.
But that's not why it's really random...

There are two types of probability. One is, we can't know all the factors down to the atomic level and below, so from our limited perspective we dish out probabilities. But there are physicists who think probability is ontologically the case. Not that we can't figure it out, but that at quantum levels it is probabilities that rule. And since the qm level can affect larger levels this would have implications even for us. Once a cause does not necessarily lead to an effect, once several futures, for example are possible, I think it is harder to rule out random. So, I disagree.

Let's say that an event happened by chance, but that's just a saying.
Not because we believe it is truly random!

Oh, but some do.

Just imagining it should we be overwhelmed with horror.

Yet, in that horror, the Truth can be hidden.

I don't know what everything being random would mean, but if some things were random I don't think that would have to be terrifying. Essentially we already live in a universe that seems to include random events. We experience things that way sometimes. So, if it turned out that sometimes certain events WERE random ontologically, not just epistemologically for us, our experience would not necessarily be that different.

[phyllo]

Okay, but I'm discussing your failure [so far] to, experientially and experimentally, come up with hard evidence that you freely came up with hard evidence in order demonstrate that you opted freely to discuss it...or discussed it only as you were ever able to discuss it.

The part where we are all stuck. What I am doing right now is typyng these words. Am I doing this freely? Okay, Mr. Scientist, okay Mr. Philosopher, okay Mr. Theologian, pin that down for us.

Okay, so that's your only interest.

It's not everyone's interest.

And if people deal with the behavior of others only because [as they do in dreams] they were commanded by their brains chemically and neurologically to do so in the only possible reality in the only possible world, that seems profoundly different than because they were of their own volition able to judge more or less rationally how to deal with it.

Yeah, you keep saying it's "profoundly different" but you can't seem to show any differences in a context or example when you are asked to do so.

It's always Determined Mary has to abort and Free-will Mary doesn't have to abort but that's as far as you take it. There's no actual reasoning why those are the two cases that play out in the determined and free world.

[iambiguous]

Okay, but I'm discussing your failure [so far] to, experientially and experimentally, come up with hard evidence that you freely came up with hard evidence in order demonstrate that you opted freely to discuss it...or discussed it only as you were ever able to discuss it.

The part where we are all stuck. What I am doing right now is typyng these words. Am I doing this freely? Okay, Mr. Scientist, okay Mr. Philosopher, okay Mr. Theologian, pin that down for us.

Okay, so that's your only interest.

It's not everyone's interest.

My interest on this thread revolves around understanding how compatibilists reconcile determinism with moral responsibility. But it clearly goes deeper than that. Even if compatibilists explain to me how they reconcile it, how, experientially and experimentally, do they go about coming up with hard evidence that they freely came up with hard evidence in order to demonstrate that they opted freely to explain it...or explained it only as they were ever able to explain it.

Ever and always going back to what we still don't know definitively: how mindless and lifeless matter evolved into living and mindful matter evolved into us "somehow" acquiring the capacity to think and feel and say and do things autonomously.

What could possibly be of more fundamental importance here than that?

Thus...

And if people deal with the behavior of others only because [as they do in dreams] they were commanded by their brains chemically and neurologically to do so in the only possible reality in the only possible world, that seems profoundly different than because they were of their own volition able to judge more or less rationally how to deal with it.

Yeah, you keep saying it's "profoundly different" but you can't seem to show any differences in a context or example when you are asked to do so.

Note to others:

Try to reconfigure his point here so that I might understand it more clearly. Do you see any difference between Mary aborting her fetus because she opted freely to do so and aborting it because she was never able not to abort it?

If, somehow, re philosophy or science or theology it could be unequivocally demonstrated that men and women here on planet Earth do in fact possess some measure of volition, autonomy, free will?

It just gets "metaphysically" tricky, because we would still have to pin down that the demonstration itself was not wholly determined by the laws of matter.

Which, of course, takes us back to the gap between what we think we know about the human condition and what re Donald Rumsfeld we don't even know that we don't even know about existence itself.

It's always Determined Mary has to abort and Free-will Mary doesn't have to abort but that's as far as you take it. There's no actual reasoning why those are the two cases that play out in the determined and free world.

Maybe because there is no way in hell that I could possibly come up with the reasoning needed to explain it.

Instead, I always come back to the objectivists among us that, even in regard to questions this mind-boggling, still insist that they are in possession of such reasoning.

[bobmax]

don't know what everything being random would mean, but if some things were random I don't think that would have to be terrifying. Essentially we already live in a universe that seems to include random events. We experience things that way sometimes. So, if it turned out that sometimes certain events WERE random ontologically, not just epistemologically for us, our experience would not necessarily be that different.

This is the crucial point!

Because it implicitly shows the widespread obvious way of seeing the world.
This modality, inherited from positivism, assumes that everything that exists is rational.
And if something escapes a little, well one day it will be understood and even if it won't be, it doesn't matter anyway.

We have lost the ability to feel the limit.
That is, we do not perceive the abyss on which existence itself is founded.

So we take for granted the possibility of the ontological realities of randomness.
Without realizing the tremendous implications that this would entail.

But this blindness, due to the goddess of rationality, is present in every direction we try to go.

Another example is infinity.
That it should be obvious that it isn't there, it just can't be!
Yet by now we have reduced even the infinite to "something".

VA explicitly shows where the forgetfulness of the limit can lead.

ASC experiences are above all occasions to rediscover the limit.
Because when we really perceive the limit we are immediately thrown back on ourselves.

To conclude, I would like to say that for me causality is real, in the sense that it is the only reality.
It is Chaos, which generates the Cosmos as an act of love.
But the Cosmos has no reality of its own.

[Iwannaplato]

don't know what everything being random would mean, but if some things were random I don't think that would have to be terrifying. Essentially we already live in a universe that seems to include random events. We experience things that way sometimes. So, if it turned out that sometimes certain events WERE random ontologically, not just epistemologically for us, our experience would not necessarily be that different.

This is the crucial point!

Because it implicitly shows the widespread obvious way of seeing the world.
This modality, inherited from positivism, assumes that everything that exists is rational.
And if something escapes a little, well one day it will be understood and even if it won't be, it doesn't matter anyway.

I don't think positivism gave us the idea of chance/randomness. I also think that the assumption that everything that exists is rational, or, I would say, follows a law, is problematic in practice. People don't want to notice and take seriously anomolies.

We have lost the ability to feel the limit.
That is, we do not perceive the abyss on which existence itself is founded.

Or, I would say, people generally don't want to feel cognitive dissonence.

So we take for granted the possibility of the ontological realities of randomness.
Without realizing the tremendous implications that this would entail.

I would say people also ignore the possibilitiy, that much at least seems to speak for it. Or they accept it without looking at the implications. Denial at both ends.

VA explicitly shows where the forgetfulness of the limit can lead.

ASC experiences are above all occasions to rediscover the limit.

I am not sure that fits my experience of ASCs at all.

[Iwannaplato]

... you could have opted to do something other ...

If you wanted to do something else, then you would have done it. That's what you wanted at the time.

And in case you're tempted to post ... "A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants." - Arthur Schopenhauer

A person with free-will also has wants. Where do his/her wants come from?

Again, my argument here is always that we seemingly have no way -- scientifically, philosophically, theologically etc. -- to pin down definitively whether I could have opted to do something other than to type these words any more than we can pin down definitively whether you could have opted to do something other than to read them.

Why?

Because "somehow" lifeless, mindless matter configured into living, mindful matter configured into us.

And, to the best of my own current knowledge, no one here can actually explain how that happened or why that happened...ontologically? teleologically?

Oh yeah. Having an explanation would change everything.

Wait. No. Cause everything would still work as it does now. An explanation would not be useful for anything.

I think this is where you came into the thread.
And you react to some degree, I think, similarly to how i react to the OP. In the OP it says...

Yep, that is basically my own reaction to compatibilism. We have "conceptual"/"theoretical" freedom, but, for all practical purposes, we have no control over what we do because "internal" and "external" are seamlessly intertwined re the laws of matter.

This is correct, in a way, but it is also confused and becomes an argument for hopelessness, passivity. Why do I say that?
The person saying this is not involved in either external nor the internal forces. There are these internal forces - desires, say - and external forces. I have no freedom. There are just internal and external forces What is this entity who is speaking?

The conclusion may well be ultimately correct at an ontological level, but the way the issue is framed it is as if 'we', read 'he or she', is an empty observer. There are internal and external forces making him or her do things. As if he or she is not a participant part of the univerves.

My guess is that someone with this position will focus on the ultimate ontological level and avoid noticing that they are a part of things with desires, wants, needs, drives.

While....
Here we are and we are this person with these drives affected by external conditions -challenges and influences - trying to make the day/world/relations how we would like or - to varying degrees - arguing that there is no point and based on a disidentification. I am a hollow victim of forces.

So on the surface we have an intellectual discussion and embedded in it there is another kind of argument. An argument that we should feel a certain way. It is like this so there is no hope, no point, no meaning. Logically or really 'logically' arguing that one ought to view life as meaningless and pointless.

I could be wrong but it seems like you are pushing on a similar point. To separate out the intellectual exploration from the attitudinal argument embedded in it. That one should feel X in relation to the possibilitity/liklihood of determinism and what it entails. One should feel X. In a deterministic universe such arguments might cause some people to feel X, but would also not cause others to. The argument does not have a logical conclusion, just effects.

I see this also in your reaction to the idea that an explanation would suddenly make things better.

and perhaps even here:

Missing the point.

Free-will or determinism, people are going to have to deal with the killer's actions.

Call it moral responsibility or call it something else.

Call it punishment or call it reeducation.

and especially here...
viewtopic.php?p=577852#p577852

Two things are happening at the same time, often, in these discussions:
One is a discussion of ontology. Is free will possible? Is everything determined? Can these somehow be compatible?
Two is the emotional reaction to these options, generally to determinism, which becomes an implicit argument about meaningless, nothing here for me, I am compelled...arms go up in the air.
To which you respond in part...

As if there is a 'you' which is somehow separate from the universe, separate from the laws of matter.

Who is this 'you'?

It seems that you are an integral part of the universe. You are manifesting the laws of nature as much as everything and everyone else.

Which will likely trigger a 'prove to me you are free' response.
or
a repeat of the 'everything is external and internal forces' as if he or she is outside, looking in.

[iambiguous]

An Examination of Free Will and Buddhism
Barbara O'Brien

No Determinism, No Indeterminism, No Self

The question is, where does Buddhism stand on the question of free will? And the short answer is, it doesn't, exactly. But neither does it propose that we have nothing to say about the course of our lives.

No, the question [as always] is how do Buddhists demonstrate [even to themselves] that their stand on the question of free will is in fact a stand that they opted for of their own volition or "opted" for given the illusion of human volition. Or however the compatibilists encompass it "opting" to do things.

In an article in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, Author and Buddhist practitioner B. Alan Wallace said that the Buddha rejected both the indeterministic and deterministic theories of his day. Our lives are deeply conditioned by cause and effect, or karma, refuting indeterminism. And we are personally responsible for our lives and actions, refuting determinism.

Refuting it? Right. Like the Buddha wasn't just as all the rest of us here are. What if our lives were not "deeply conditioned" by cause and effect but wholly intertwined in it going back to however the laws of matter came into existence in the first place.

And he certainly wouldn't be the first [nor the last] to "think up" the conclusion that we are personally responsible for our lives. Why? Because "somehow", even though our lives are deeply conditioned by cause and effect, the human brain is considerably less conditioned than rocks and oceans and the atmosphere.

Then [of course] this part:

But the Buddha also rejected the idea that there is an independent, autonomous self either apart from or within the skandhas. Wallace wrote:

"Thus, the sense that each of us is an autonomous, non-physical subject who exercises ultimate control over the body and mind without being influenced by prior physical or psychological conditions is an illusion."

That pretty much refutes the western notion of free will.

Refutes again. Now all we need is a particular context in which Buddhists and non-Buddhists here go back and forth explaining what we do have "self-control" over and what we don't.

Taking into account both sides of grave of course.

[iambiguous]

From ILP:

How are we not "expressing our being" in the only manner in which our wholly in sync with the laws of matter brains compel us to express it?

Again, you're right. It'll all unfold as it was influenced. My word choice was poor, and you highlighted that. "Expressing our being" was intended to mean expressing the culmination of our will, ideals & beliefs - but it's true, our being is the messy / ordered bits alike. And a step further, the external environment is as much a part of us, as we are of it - perhaps moreso.

Then it seems the crucial part comes down to scientists, philosophers and theologians getting together and, given any particular human behavior, finally pinning down whether it's being influenced by the laws of matter, determined by the laws of matter or some place in between.

This part...

How is what we think we understand and is happening around us any different from what we care about here, if both emanate from a consciousness emanating from a mind emanating from a brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter?

It's possible to envision a scenario, where our interests/desire/will aren't realised - that the objective for that which we care, isn't attained/satisfied/completed. This scenario represents having an interpretation of what is happening, that is not in accord with our desire. It's common to actively seek for this not to be be the case, or remain the case.

While both the contents/events of reality and our cares are inseparably chained together, the image of what we think is happening (reality), and the image of what we want to be happening (objectives), often don't match. So there's reason to draw distinction between them.

It's also possible that what we envision we were never able not to envision.

But, again, this is all very abstract. Why don't you focus in on behaviors that you have chosen of late and note how your point here is applicable.

Acknowledging of course that this assumes that you are in possession of the free will necessary to make your description the actual embodiment of free will in the first place.

How mentally, emotionally and psychologically is anything that we think and feel not but an inherent manifestation of the only possible world?

Yes, you're right. But if the only possible world has led one to suffer in the present, ought one still not seek it's reduction in the future?

Here's the part that continues to baffle me. If the only possible world has led one to suffer, hasn't it also led one to either seek or not to seek its reduction?

Is this the compatibilist frame of mind? Yes, there's the only possible reality in the only possible world but "somehow" we can influence and change it?

What do I keep missing here?

This part:

So even if it's all determined, as I and others believe, we're still trying to act in a way that we anticipate may contribute to an outcome in reality which is preferable than other outcomes that aren't preferred. [...]

Again, if it's all determined, we're not trying to act, we're acting in the only manner in which the laws of nature compel us to act. Our "contributions" are no less destined/fated.

Our expectations are very important here and I'd ask you to reread my statement quoted above.
Yes, we'll always act - but that's not what I was saying. I was specifically speaking about acting in a way that we predict, or anticipate will result in a preferred outcome as opposed to a non-preferred outcome.

Let's say I'm hungry and decide to resolve this. My solution: I plan to hit my arm with a hammer in hope it will put food in my stomach. Now, you as a neutral party, do you expect this to work? Do you anticipate my strategy to be effective? I assume not. In this scenario, I'm trying to attain a goal, but failing.

My point? That our acts, and the intent of our acts, are different. The trying, which I was referring to, was directly regarding trying to effectively achieve our objectives based on our plan of action - trying to act wisely. -- yes, we're always acting, but not always achieving the contents of our will.

My point? That in a wholly determined world as I understand it, our acts and our intentions to act are six of one, half a dozen of another to our brains. Nothing that we think, feel, say and do is exempt from the only possible reality in the only possible world. My intent to type these words, my typing these words, your intent to read them, your reading them...all seamlessly intertwined in the laws of matter.

Back to, Schopenhauer's, "A man can do as he wills, but not will as he wills."

But this is no less open to differing interpretations: https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/qu ... nt-what-he

Back to you telling this to someone in a dream. You wake up and realise it was entirely your brain creating the words you "spoke".

Even if it's all a dream, we're still living it. Our experiences are real, even if a terribly poor representation of objective reality. If you're in a dream, and don't know it, then the contents of your will, reasonably should be in concern to the contents of the dream.

But the living we do in the waking world is basically what some hard determinists insist is interchangeable with the living we are doing in the dream world.

Our "gut" tells us that is absurd. But what if our deep down intuitive, visceral thoughts and feelings in the waking world are no less a manifestation of our brains on automatic pilot?

[iambiguous]

An Examination of Free Will and Buddhism
Barbara O'Brien

The western "free will" perspective is that we humans have free, rational minds with which to make decisions. The Buddha taught that most of us are not free at all but are being perpetually jerked around -- by attractions and aversions; by our conditioned, conceptual thinking; and most of all by karma. But through the practice of the Eightfold Path, we may be freed of our backward thinking and be liberated from karmic effects.

Think of it like this: The Buddha's rendition of dasein. Only he "thinks up" a spiritual cure.

Anyone here practice the Eightfold Path? Okay, let's bring that down to Earth in regard to determinism and free will and Mary agonizing over an unwanted pregnancy. Or a context of your own choosing.

But this doesn't settle the basic question -- if there is no self, who is it that wills? Who is it that is personally responsible? This is not easily answered and may be the sort of doubt that requires enlightenment itself to clarify.

Any Buddhists here who deem themselves enlightened? Okay, let's bring your own clarification down to Earth. In particular in regard to the distinction I make between the clarity that prevails in the is/ought world and the confounding ambiguities that abound in the world of conflicting value judgments.

Wallace's answer is that although we may be empty of an autonomous self, we function in the phenomenal world as autonomous beings. And as long as that is so, we are responsible for what we do.

Got that? Then please explain it to me. How, given examples like a woman agonizing over an unwanted pregnancy, are we to make sense of this?

We are empty of an autonomous self in a world that is not phenomenal? But then "somehow" in the phenomenal world -- presto! -- we become responsible for what we do.

Is this a Buddhist thing such that for those of us who remain unenlightened are simply unable to figure it out?

Again, the whole thing seems profoundly "mystical" to me. Like something some are able to think themselves into believing because it soothes the soul not to think of the human condition as...I do?

[Belinda]

Iambiguous quoted:

Wallace's answer is that although we may be empty of an autonomous self, we function in the phenomenal world as autonomous beings. And as long as that is so, we are responsible for what we do.

Instead of an enduring self there are clusters of ephemeral memories glued together by causality.
The phenomenal world is a world of social reality and we have to protect that social reality by saddling ourselves with responsibility, as if we are permanent entities.