Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Jun 24, 2022 8:41 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Jun 24, 2022 2:05 am
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Wed Jun 22, 2022 1:10 pm
1 Objective morality - the existence of moral facts - isn't even a very remote possibility.
You have not countered this?
There are Objective Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=35002
You have repeated your view "objective morality is impossible"
ad nauseam but have not provided any sound argument with credible references and groundings.
You are merely continuing with the bastardized views and farts of the logical positivists on their stance towards ethics as nonsense.
- The influential wrongness of AJ Ayer
Ayer’s work tells us important things about the shortcomings of Anglophone philosophy
Ayer was catapulted to fame by Language, Truth and Logic, a book published at the philosophically precocious age of 26. Inspired by a year in Austria in the company of the Vienna Circle, he had returned to proselytise his version of the group’s creed.
The members of the Vienna Circle—which included Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and Kurt Gödel—did not all agree in detail but they shared a conviction that all philosophical metaphysics and most ethics to date was not so much wrong as meaningless nonsense.
I know. Let's do it again.
1 A non-moral premise or premises can't entail a moral conclusion, because a deductive conclusion can't contain information not present in the premise or premises of an argument. If it does, then the argument is a non sequitur fallacy.
Your thinking above is too narrow, shallow and dogmatic.
Deduction is merely a useful guide subject to its limitations, but it can also generate shit conclusions, note GIGO, i.e. garbage in garbage out.
Induction is a more effective tool to generate more realistic conclusions.
Note the first premise is always not deductive but always empirical and inductive.
I ask you,
how it is that a
non-scientific common sense observation of an apple falling, and the likes be concluded as an
objective scientific fact?
how it is that the
non-legal evidence of someone -X stabbing into the heart of another human -Y be concluded as a
legal fact, i.e. X is the murderer of Y?
The same apply to other situations where,
a non-X evidence can lead to a X-factual conclusion via induction.
You ignore my counter above?
There are Objective Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=35002
2 If the ought in an assertion is non-moral - if it doesn't refer to the moral rightness or wrongness, propriety or impropriety, of behaviour - then it isn't a moral assertion, so it can't assert a so-called moral fact.
You ignore my counter above?
There are Objective Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=35002
What is critical is we must define, what is fact, what is morality, what is objectivity, and other relevant terms. That is the most effective way to do philosophy.
3 The logical positivists were wrong to say that non-factual, non-empirical assertions are meaningless nonsense. I am not now, nor have I ever been, a logical positivist.
I have never stated "you are a logical positivist" rather you are influenced and has adopted their views partially with reference to moral facts.
Yours is one of the broken spoke of a 120 years long tradition of analytic philosophy [analyticism] which is facing its death at present.
Suggestion. Instead of talking about foundations and grounding, why not actually address and try to refute 1 and 2 above? Claims and arguments are what matter - not who made or makes them.
There is no way we can get through your 1 and 2 without any reference to foundations and grounding.
I have given you a clue, your grounding is traceable to Hume's "no ought from is" which is with reference to very common religious oughts from an illusory God which obviously is nonsensical.
Because the majority of people are theists, that moral oughts that are raised in whatever ways is traceable to God's commands.
Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his book, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739):
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs;
when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.
For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it's necessary that it should be observed and explained;
and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.
But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.[3][4]
Wiki
Hume did not deny moral sentiments and he intuitively claimed they arise from sympathy [empathy]. He could not dig deeper than this speculation because there was no neuroscience during his time.
Now I am not referring to religious moral oughts nor arbitrary moral opinions and beliefs but rather is tracing the moral potentiality [moral oughtness] as moral fact as matter-of-fact in terms of physical neurons in the brain.
You cannot follow on this because your thinking is too archaic and not open to new knowledge.
