An Argument About Free Will

[MGL]

You mean CAUSED by QM?
Just goes to prove that indeterminism implies a deterministic universe.

Causation does not have to be deterministic.

That has to be the funniest thing this week.

It can be indetermined, but that implies that it is determined, just unknown.

If Schroedinger's cat dies because the random decay of an atom releases a vial of poisonous gas I would say that the the decay of the atom causes the cat's death.
I would not say that the cause was a deterministic one.

[chaz wyman]

Just goes to prove that indeterminism implies a deterministic universe.

Causation does not have to be deterministic.

That has to be the funniest thing this week.

It can be indetermined, but that implies that it is determined, just unknown.

If Schroedinger's cat dies because the random decay of an atom releases a vial of poisonous gas I would say that the the decay of the atom causes the cat's death.
I would not say that the cause was a deterministic one.[/quote]

But as we all know radioactive elements decay at absolute certain rates. You can even set your clocks by then and we do.

Schroedinger's cat is an affirmation of a deterministic Universe. The lesson we learn is that the existence of complexity does not always enable us to predict events, but all this implies is that we are not aware of all the information necessary to predict determined events.
This is does not mean randomness is a fact of the universe. It means that we can't measure everything, or know everything.

[lancek4]

I would agree with you that consciously TRYING to act randomly in a credible way is not easy, especially as we have no way of knowing wheter our choice was purely random or not. All I am saying is that when we do act in a spontaneous manner, when for instance we are thinking creatively, I see no good reason to suppose that we are not tapping into truly random resources.

This is hugely a speculative and almost metaphysical statement. How could I, a being of the universe, Not be always tapped in to this truly random source? How could I not be entirely tapped into the non-random, contigent and necissary source? What is this sourse?
It seems you argue one side and then the other. Earlier, you seem to asssert than there is no separation, that the things of oursleves that we come upon as 'effecting' us are really just us, then you state that somehow there is a separation, that we can spontaneously be creative upon a TRS..
How could it be possible for me to be separated from the universe of which I am a part?

Is not some truely random source merely another one of these concepts that I 'make' true or false depending uppon my whim (or maybe not my whim)?

I reject that there is some truely random sourse that we can come upon by any means.
To have an idea of some TRS merely reflects a type of human ethical construct: a bias.

If we are attempting to relate terms of this bias in such a way that humanity may have a 'better' way of living, then sure, maybe there is some creatively found TRS, much like a God. But it is only True within the universal.

But please tell me we can delve a little deeper into a question of faith than one of creatively expressing some TRS.

Random is a discursive orientation.

that fact that i may come to need to use the term 'indeterminism' is determined by the conditions which I find myself in a choice of that matter.

[MGL]

But as we all know radioactive elements decay at absolute certain rates. You can even set your clocks by then and we do.

Schroedinger's cat is an affirmation of a deterministic Universe. The lesson we learn is that the existence of complexity does not always enable us to predict events, but all this implies is that we are not aware of all the information necessary to predict determined events.
This is does not mean randomness is a fact of the universe. It means that we can't measure everything, or know everything.

1) Radioactive decay does not happen at absolute certain rates. Radioactive decay is a stochastic (i.e., random) process at the level of single atoms, in that, according to quantum theory, it is impossible to predict when a given atom will decay. However, the chance that a given atom will decay is constant over time, so that given a large number of identical atoms (nuclides), the decay rate for the collection is predictable to the extent allowed by the law of large numbers. http://www.iem-inc.com/prhlfr.html
2) We do not set our clocks by the radio-active decay of elements. I think you are thinking of atomic clocks which are based on the frequency of micro wave emissions of atoms when the energy level of their electrons changes. This is predictable and deterministic.
3) The Schrodinger's cat thought experiment was wondering what effect sub-atomic quantum events like radio-active decay had on macroscopic events like a cat's state of health. I have never read anything that suggests it affirms a deterministic universe. Can you refer me to to a book, article or web page that makes this claim?
4) I am not claiming that Quantum physics proves there is indeterminacy in the universe, but I am claiming that there is a mainstream interpretation of it by physicists that does. There are other interpretations which suggest there are hidden deterministic variables which we may never be able to uncover, but I am not aware that this is now the accepted view, or has been established
5) Causation does not have to be deterministic. You may be confused with the two senses of the word "determine". Once sense is simply synonimous with cause. The other sense is determine as in deterministic. A very good book on Causation is "Causation and Explanation" by Stahis Psillos.

[MGL]

If you think this is incompatible with free will, then you must consider the concept of free will as meaningless, not just an impossibility.

A thing that is impossible is meaningless. That doe snot stop you describing it.

By impossible, I meant physically impossible, like it is impossible to jump off a cliff and stay in the air without any help. This does not imply that it cannot be imagined coherently. I did not mean logically impossible, which would imply something is meaningless. Certainly one could attempt to describe a square circle, but I don't think any description of it would make any sense.

[MGL]

Can you provide a meaningful definition of free will that does not imply randomness?

There is no free-will. The will is determined by that which preceded it.

You misunderstand the concept of free-will as given us by Christian ideology. It assumes that we are able to choose regardless of our experience. That our soul is able to have a 'god's eye' view' of our condition and is able to make the 'right' choice, regardless of the determining factors of our lives. It is as if everyone has the open and free choice to open the door to Jesus; to choose good over evil; to do what god thinks is right etc. This is banal as it is impossible.
I can't see where random choice has any role to play in this.

I agree that this concept of free-will does not say much about random choice, but it is not a concept of free will I would subscribe to, even if we take the religious element out. As I have tried to point out I do not advocate the idea that we are completely free to do as we like, regardless of other factors. Our choices are always going to be constrained by goals and beliefs which are perhaps mostly formed by deterministic forces. However, there will always be occasions when there are competing goals and competing means of acheiving them that are undecidable by any process of reasoning from our given beliefs. It is on these occasions that we are forced to decide arbitrarily. Now of course these arbitrary decisions could be caused by deterministic unconscious forces at work, but there is no fundamental reason to suppose they have to be. By just saying that they are deterministic is not an argument and offers me no reason to doubt my feeling that I can act in a genuinely arbitrary way. I am free to choose between equally compelling goals or actions.

[MGL]

I would not describe a single random sub-atomic occurence as being controlled by anything. Neither would I describe a collection of random sub-atomic occurences as being controlled by anything. Just because the macroscopic phenomena that emerges is ultimately reducable to the collection of sub-atomic occurences, I do not see this as a case of something being controlled by something else.

So if we're slaves to determinism we can't be held ultimately responsible for our actions (probably the most common objection to arguments against free will but based on the fact that it makes people uncomfortable rather than because it's wrong) and if we do things because of random sub-atomic occurrences we still can't be held ultimately responsible for our actions.

My biggest problem with many of the arguments for free will is that its advocates don't seem to be able to define it in any meaningful way or to define it in a way that leads to more of the personal responsibility that they so desire.

Do you have a more meaningful definition of free will, or do you think it is a meaningless term?
Do you think random sub-atomic occurrences are responsible for their consequences, if not personally responsible?
If they are responsible and they turn out to be equivalent to the phenomena we describe as "persons" would this phenomena not be personally responsible for its actions? If not, what do you mean by personally responsible?

I don't remember mentioning anything about using free will to hold ourselves ultimately responsible for our actions. Certainly I would say that we are responsible for the consequences of our actions, but only in the limited sense that our arbitrary decisions contribute to the cause of those consequences. Our ultimate responsibility for the consequence is going to be a matter of degree while the whole responsibility will be shared with the other forces that constrain our options.

[John]

I would not describe a single random sub-atomic occurence as being controlled by anything. Neither would I describe a collection of random sub-atomic occurences as being controlled by anything. Just because the macroscopic phenomena that emerges is ultimately reducable to the collection of sub-atomic occurences, I do not see this as a case of something being controlled by something else.

So if we're slaves to determinism we can't be held ultimately responsible for our actions (probably the most common objection to arguments against free will but based on the fact that it makes people uncomfortable rather than because it's wrong) and if we do things because of random sub-atomic occurrences we still can't be held ultimately responsible for our actions.

My biggest problem with many of the arguments for free will is that its advocates don't seem to be able to define it in any meaningful way or to define it in a way that leads to more of the personal responsibility that they so desire.

Do you have a more meaningful definition of free will, or do you think it is a meaningless term?

I think the term is largely meaningless in the way it is typically debated because it is usually associated with responsibility for actions and if nothing causes actions then there can be no responsibility for them. To put it another way, nothing hinges on either definition of the term as the implications of every action being predetermined are the same as they are actions have no causes.

Do you think random sub-atomic occurrences are responsible for their consequences, if not personally responsible?
If they are responsible and they turn out to be equivalent to the phenomena we describe as "persons" would this phenomena not be personally responsible for its actions? If not, what do you mean by personally responsible?

What exactly do you mean by "they turn out to be equivalent to the phenomena we describe as "persons""? I just want to be clear to avoid misunderstanding.

By "personally responsible" I mean in the sense that there is a genuine choice in actions meaning that it is possible to apportion blame or praise. If there is no genuine choice then we can't really blame or praise people for their actions. That said, I ascribe to the idea of ultimate responsibility and ordinary responsibility in that I may not be ultimately responsible for my actions (as chaz has already said: I can do as I will but I can't will what I will) but in the very ordinary sense of getting on with everyday existence the illusion of choice is important and either I can make no actual choices at all or I can make genuine choices but within a limited predetermined range of choices that are not within my control. I'm open to debate on this though but I tend to favour the "no real choice" option at the moment. However, that's not to say that we shouldn't punish people for making what only appear to be destructive choices because the punishment affects the choices of others and also their future choices.

I don't remember mentioning anything about using free will to hold ourselves ultimately responsible for our actions. Certainly I would say that we are responsible for the consequences of our actions, but only in the limited sense that our arbitrary decisions contribute to the cause of those consequences. Our ultimate responsibility for the consequence is going to be a matter of degree while the whole responsibility will be shared with the other forces that constrain our options.

No you're right and I didn't mean to imply that you did argue this, sorry if I gave that impression, but I just thought your point about randomness was interesting given that most of the arguments I've read in favour of free will are usually influenced by the issue of responsibility because they're often derived from a theistic point of view that depends on us having responsibility for our actions.

[chaz wyman]

Can you provide a meaningful definition of free will that does not imply randomness?

There is no free-will. The will is determined by that which preceded it.

You misunderstand the concept of free-will as given us by Christian ideology. It assumes that we are able to choose regardless of our experience. That our soul is able to have a 'god's eye' view' of our condition and is able to make the 'right' choice, regardless of the determining factors of our lives. It is as if everyone has the open and free choice to open the door to Jesus; to choose good over evil; to do what god thinks is right etc. This is banal as it is impossible.
I can't see where random choice has any role to play in this.

I agree that this concept of free-will does not say much about random choice, but it is not a concept of free will I would subscribe to, even if we take the religious element out. As I have tried to point out I do not advocate the idea that we are completely free to do as we like, regardless of other factors. Our choices are always going to be constrained by goals and beliefs which are perhaps mostly formed by deterministic forces. However, there will always be occasions when there are competing goals and competing means of acheiving them that are undecidable by any process of reasoning from our given beliefs. It is on these occasions that we are forced to decide arbitrarily. Now of course these arbitrary decisions could be caused by deterministic unconscious forces at work, but there is no fundamental reason to suppose they have to be. By just saying that they are deterministic is not an argument and offers me no reason to doubt my feeling that I can act in a genuinely arbitrary way. I am free to choose between equally compelling goals or actions.

I have a problem with the juxtaposition of free with will and random with choice. They sound like peaceful war, tough love, white blackness, dry water. There is no random choice; you throw a dice you do not choose the number it lands on. An act of will is an expression of personal determination.

[MGL]

What exactly do you mean by "they turn out to be equivalent to the phenomena we describe as "persons""? I just want to be clear to avoid misunderstanding.

Equivalent as in identical to. If event A is the combination of events B and C and if B and C cause consequence D then we can say that event A causes event D. An example of such identity would be lightning. Lightning is the discharge of electricity and can be reduced to the activity of electrons. We would not say that this activity causes lightning, it is the lightning.

The cause of lightning would be whatever causes the electron activity ( the build up of opposing negative and positive electrostatic states between the ground and the atmosphere ). We would also say that if lightning struck a tree and caused it to ignite, the lightning was the cause of the tree getting burnt. We can reduce the lightning to electron activitity, but this is not the same thing as explaining lightning in terms of a temporally preceding cause.

A furhter comment on ultimate responsibility:

If events B and C are random and we want to trace the ultimate cause of consequence D, that ultimate cause will be events B and C plus the chain of causes that producued the events that were the immediate preconditions for events B and C / A. Now let's assume that the immediate conditions for event A allowed two possibilities - A and Z where Z has the consequence Y. If we asked what was the cause of D we should cite A plus its preceding events. However, if we ask what was the cause of D rather than Z, the only cause is A. We could then say that A was ultimately responsible for D, but only in the qualified sense that it caused D rather than Y.

[John]

What exactly do you mean by "they turn out to be equivalent to the phenomena we describe as "persons""? I just want to be clear to avoid misunderstanding.

Equivalent as in identical to. If event A is the combination of events B and C and if B and C cause consequence D then we can say that event A causes event D. An example of such identity would be lightning. Lightning is the discharge of electricity and can be reduced to the activity of electrons. We would not say that this activity causes lightning, it is the lightning.

The cause of lightning would be whatever causes the electron activity ( the build up of opposing negative and positive electrostatic states between the ground and the atmosphere ). We would also say that if lightning struck a tree and caused it to ignite, the lightning was the cause of the tree getting burnt. We can reduce the lightning to electron activitity, but this is not the same thing as explaining lightning in terms of a temporally preceding cause.

If events B and C are randomly caused, such as in your example of atomic decay, and they lead to event A then I'm saying that ultimately we can't pin responsibility for event A on anyone's choices as we can't say that they deliberately decided to chose to do whatever event A is.

[MGL]

What exactly do you mean by "they turn out to be equivalent to the phenomena we describe as "persons""? I just want to be clear to avoid misunderstanding.

Equivalent as in identical to. If event A is the combination of events B and C and if B and C cause consequence D then we can say that event A causes event D. An example of such identity would be lightning. Lightning is the discharge of electricity and can be reduced to the activity of electrons. We would not say that this activity causes lightning, it is the lightning.

The cause of lightning would be whatever causes the electron activity ( the build up of opposing negative and positive electrostatic states between the ground and the atmosphere ). We would also say that if lightning struck a tree and caused it to ignite, the lightning was the cause of the tree getting burnt. We can reduce the lightning to electron activitity, but this is not the same thing as explaining lightning in terms of a temporally preceding cause.

If events B and C are randomly caused, such as in your example of atomic decay, and they lead to event A then I'm saying that ultimately we can't pin responsibility for event A on anyone's choices as we can't say that they deliberately decided to chose to do whatever event A is.

1) Random events B and C do not lead to event A, they ARE event A
2) If Event A IS the event of someone choosing\deliberately deciding an action then that person's choice is responsible for the consequences of A. Of course if you keep separating the random event from the person making choices you are always going to find a difficulty, but that is just misrepresenting my point rather than criticising it.

[John]

If events B and C are randomly caused, such as in your example of atomic decay, and they lead to event A then I'm saying that ultimately we can't pin responsibility for event A on anyone's choices as we can't say that they deliberately decided to chose to do whatever event A is.

1) Random events B and C do not lead to event A, they ARE event A

Sorry, I typed in haste and didn't read things back carefully enough so I should have written: if events B and C are randomly caused, such as in your example of atomic decay, and they lead to consequence D then I'm saying that ultimately we can't pin responsibility for consequence D on anyone's choices as we can't say that they deliberately decided to chose to do whatever event B or C are.

[chaz wyman]

What exactly do you mean by "they turn out to be equivalent to the phenomena we describe as "persons""? I just want to be clear to avoid misunderstanding.

Equivalent as in identical to. If event A is the combination of events B and C and if B and C cause consequence D then we can say that event A causes event D. An example of such identity would be lightning. Lightning is the discharge of electricity and can be reduced to the activity of electrons. We would not say that this activity causes lightning, it is the lightning.

The cause of lightning would be whatever causes the electron activity ( the build up of opposing negative and positive electrostatic states between the ground and the atmosphere ). We would also say that if lightning struck a tree and caused it to ignite, the lightning was the cause of the tree getting burnt. We can reduce the lightning to electron activitity, but this is not the same thing as explaining lightning in terms of a temporally preceding cause.

But this is where the idea of causality gets tricky. The tree is also the cause of the event. Where the tree not there reaching for the sky there would not be sufficient charge for the lightning to happen. The water in the tree enables the event. Causality is not always one dimensional. The humidity of the air is also a casual factor; thickness of atmosphere; amount of iron in the earth; constitution of the atmosphere ad infinitem

A furhter comment on ultimate responsibility:

If events B and C are random and we want to trace the ultimate cause of consequence D, that ultimate cause will be events B and C plus the chain of causes that producued the events that were the immediate preconditions for events B and C / A.

This is why there is no such thing as an ultimate cause.


Now let's assume that the immediate conditions for event A allowed two possibilities - A and Z where Z has the consequence Y. If we asked what was the cause of D we should cite A plus its preceding events. However, if we ask what was the cause of D rather than Z, the only cause is A. We could then say that A was ultimately responsible for D, but only in the qualified sense that it caused D rather than Y.

What about the rest of the alphabet, and all the other causes and conditions that pertained before A?

[lancek4]

Here is a couple definitions:

Free Will: that element of being human which derives its quality from a particular ethical scheme of truth.
Determinism: that element of being human which derives its quality from a particular ethical scheme of truth.
Choice: that element of being human which derives its quality from a particular ethical scheme of truth.

The probelm seems to me to be how we situate definitions. Is that what were working out here? I new scheme?

As M says: (paraphrase) A did not cause B; A is B.
and then true to her essay's move: she argues in the mode of A causes B.
"...the phenomenon coming into existence through the concept..."