is/ought, final answer

[Skepdick]

Where in the universe can you point to an existence of an ought? The reason why you can't is because oughts are not an empirically observable object type. That much should be simple enough even for you to grasp, so what would be hte basis for that P2?

They are empirically observable. ALL my thoughts are empirically observable to me and by me. Right here - in my head. How else do you think I am reporting what I think?

You can't differentiate between private and public information so you jump to the idiotic conclusion that unobservable BY YOU means "non-existent".

That's an incurable case of the McNamara fallacy

The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This is OK as far as it goes. The second step is to disregard that which can't be easily measured or to give it an arbitrary quantitative value. This is artificial and misleading. The third step is to presume that what can't be measured easily really isn't important. This is blindness. The fourth step is to say that what can't be easily measured really doesn't exist. This is suicide.

It's practically impossible to conduct any philosophy with idiots like you who only pay lip-service to the principle of charity.

You and your ilk are precisely the reason why the only philosophical position one should care care to assume against contrarianism is that of a pyromaniac.Burn the fucking house down!

[Veritas Aequitas]

• 'Ought' is 'Is'
  Here is the argument and explanation;
  • P1 IS = Reality, being, all-there-is.
    P2 All-there-is comprises and includes 'ought_ness'.
    C1 Thus 'ought' is "is"
    C2 Therefore ought is derivable from "is'.

circular at P2

A slight editing,

• P1 IS = Reality, being, all-there-is.
  P2 All-there-is comprises and includes 'ought_ness'.
  C1 Thus 'ought' is an "is"
  C2 Therefore ought is derivable from "is'. [verified and justified within a FSK]

P2 is a subset of P1, i.e.
P1 subsumes P2.
Where's the circularity?

It is the same as,

• Feline = having XYZ characteristics,
  A tiger has XYZ characteristics
  Therefore, a tiger is a feline.

Or in another version of Ought from IS,

• P1. Existence [IS] = reality, being, all-that-exist [is-es].
  P2 All-that-exists contain ought_ness.
  C1 Ought_ness is an 'is' [existence].
  C2 Ought_ness is derivable from IS [existence] within a credible FSK.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I read all your answers but I am not satisfied. Let's see how do you fill the gap between is and ought given the definition.
Ought: used to indicate the correctness of an action.
Is: exist.
How does the very fact that we exist leads to what is correct to do?

The issue of Hume's "No Ought From IS" [NOFI] had been discussed earlier and I had raised 13 threads to show it is possible for "ought" to emerge from "IS".
There were many counters, but I have not received any convincing counters to the 13 threads I raised.

Here is one critical thread

'Ought' is 'Is' within Reality, i.e. All-there-is.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30737

• 'Ought' is 'Is'
  Here is the argument and explanation;
  • P1 IS = Reality, being, all-there-is.
    P2 All-there-is comprises and includes 'ought_ness'.
    C1 Thus 'ought' is "is"
    C2 Therefore ought is derivable from "is'.
  The point is reality, being, is just all-there-is.
  However, humans being self-aware is imbued with the awareness of duality for various reasons.
  
  When Hume insisted 'there can be no ought from is' he was trapped in a world of duality but unable to realize the original and more fundamental truth of all-there-is encompasses the human self as well.
  The above entrapment is also suffered by the blinded and they failed to realize the fundamental truth of reality just as all-there-is
  
  Note this all-there-is has nothing to do with any God at all but merely refer to what is really-real, i.e. all-there-is, being_ness.
  
  Re the above argument is applicable to Morality [as defined generally];
  
  • P1 IS = Reality, being, all-there-is.
    P2 All-there-is comprises and includes moral 'ought_ness'.
    C1 Thus a real moral 'ought' is a real "is"
    C2 Therefore a moral-ought is derivable from "is'.

In any case the issue of No Ought From IS [NOFI] is a trivial issue for Morality:

Peter Singer: The Triviality of Is-Ought in Morality
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29758

But reality also includes wrongness. Therefore, C1 does not follow. Therefore, C2 does not follow.

I don't get your point.
Reality as ALL-there-is comprises every thing that is justifiable to be real.
Thus reality can include oughtness, wrongness, etc. etc. as long as they are justifiable to be real.

Note I did not mention earlier,
whatever is a real moral oughtness must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK.
That real moral oughtness is part and parcel of reality.
Therefore C1 does follow.

C2 then follow C1 but it must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a framework and system of knowledge.

[Veritas Aequitas]

But reality also includes wrongness. Therefore, C1 does not follow. Therefore, C2 does not follow.

Don't forget unicorn_ness and magic_ness, both of those are now ISes too.

I am restating here,
whatever that is claimed as real must be verified and justified empirically and philosophical within a credible framework and system.

Unicorns are an empirically possible but subject to the empirical evidences to confirm its existences.

A square-circle, God, and the likes are empirically impossible, thus cannot be real [is, exists] from the start.

[bahman]

The issue of Hume's "No Ought From IS" [NOFI] had been discussed earlier and I had raised 13 threads to show it is possible for "ought" to emerge from "IS".
There were many counters, but I have not received any convincing counters to the 13 threads I raised.

Here is one critical thread

'Ought' is 'Is' within Reality, i.e. All-there-is.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30737

• 'Ought' is 'Is'
  Here is the argument and explanation;
  • P1 IS = Reality, being, all-there-is.
    P2 All-there-is comprises and includes 'ought_ness'.
    C1 Thus 'ought' is "is"
    C2 Therefore ought is derivable from "is'.
  The point is reality, being, is just all-there-is.
  However, humans being self-aware is imbued with the awareness of duality for various reasons.
  
  When Hume insisted 'there can be no ought from is' he was trapped in a world of duality but unable to realize the original and more fundamental truth of all-there-is encompasses the human self as well.
  The above entrapment is also suffered by the blinded and they failed to realize the fundamental truth of reality just as all-there-is
  
  Note this all-there-is has nothing to do with any God at all but merely refer to what is really-real, i.e. all-there-is, being_ness.
  
  Re the above argument is applicable to Morality [as defined generally];
  
  • P1 IS = Reality, being, all-there-is.
    P2 All-there-is comprises and includes moral 'ought_ness'.
    C1 Thus a real moral 'ought' is a real "is"
    C2 Therefore a moral-ought is derivable from "is'.

In any case the issue of No Ought From IS [NOFI] is a trivial issue for Morality:

Peter Singer: The Triviality of Is-Ought in Morality
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29758

But reality also includes wrongness. Therefore, C1 does not follow. Therefore, C2 does not follow.

I don't get your point.
Reality as ALL-there-is comprises every thing that is justifiable to be real.
Thus reality can include oughtness, wrongness, etc. etc. as long as they are justifiable to be real.

Note I did not mention earlier,
whatever is a real moral oughtness must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK.
That real moral oughtness is part and parcel of reality.
Therefore C1 does follow.

C2 then follow C1 but it must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a framework and system of knowledge.

It is obvious. Reality has both rightness and wrongness. Rightness and wrongness do not directly follow from the existence of reality. To help you with this further you need to change P2 to All-there-is comprises and includes moral rightness and wrongness. Now C1 does not follow from P1 and P2.

[Veritas Aequitas]

...
Re the above argument is applicable to Morality [as defined generally];

• P1 IS = Reality, being, all-there-is.
  P2 All-there-is comprises and includes moral 'ought_ness'.
  C1 Thus a moral 'ought' is "is"
  C2 Therefore a moral-ought is derivable from "is'.

[/list]

But reality also includes wrongness. Therefore, C1 does not follow. Therefore, C2 does not follow.

His C1 is okay: if we're making an inventory of all existent phenomena, that inventory will include oughts, simply because people say and think things like "one ought not remove toast from a plugged-in toaster with a fork" and "one ought not force someone else to remove toast from a plugged-in toaster with a fork."

At least you could agree with C1 which is very basic logic.

The problem is with C2.
The issue is that no is implies any ought. That oughts exist a la people saying and thinking them doesn't itself imply any ought.

It is not a question of "no 'is' implies any ought."
Rather the question is about No Ought From Is [NOFI].

The original intention of Hume re NOFI was, one cannot derive an 'ought' from 'is'.
Hume's focus was on theists who insisted God commanded 'oughts' that are imposed on believers and non-believers.
Hume's question was, where the F... did you theists get your 'oughts' from to impose on humans?

According to Hume [an empiricist] what is real is a matter of fact, 'oughts' are merely thoughts, feelings arising from relation of ideas. So what right [] has theists to impose their holy-oughts on others?

But Hume did admit his ignorance of what is beyond human feelings, sympathy [empathy] in his Treatise and Enquiry. Hume during his time did not have access to neurosciences, evolutionary psychology and other advance knowledge.

Based on the latest research, what I am claiming as moral oughtness is based on a matter-of-fact that has its corresponding physical referent, i.e. neurons and neuronal processes in the brain.
I presented the example of 'all human ought to breathe else they die' and this ought [more like 'must' and an imperative] to breathe is represented by its corresponding neural sets of neurons and processes.
Similarly the moral oughtness [not as glaring as ought-to-breathe] is also represented by its corresponding neural sets of neurons and processes.

I have said many times, this moral oughtness is physical in the brain, body and mind and not an opinion, belief, decision, nor judgment from individual[s] or group[s].

[Veritas Aequitas]

But reality also includes wrongness. Therefore, C1 does not follow. Therefore, C2 does not follow.

I don't get your point.
Reality as ALL-there-is comprises every thing that is justifiable to be real.
Thus reality can include oughtness, wrongness, etc. etc. as long as they are justifiable to be real.

Note I did not mention earlier,
whatever is a real moral oughtness must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK.
That real moral oughtness is part and parcel of reality.
Therefore C1 does follow.

C2 then follow C1 but it must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a framework and system of knowledge.

It is obvious. Reality has both rightness and wrongness. Rightness and wrongness do not directly follow from the existence of reality. To help you with this further you need to change P2 to All-there-is comprises and includes moral rightness and wrongness. Now C1 does not follow from P1 and P2.

My moral oughtness is not about moral rightness and moral wrongness.
see my thread;
Judgments and Decisions [re Rightness or Wrongness] are not Morality Per se.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615

See my post above, my moral oughtness is represented by something physical thus a matter of fact.

[bahman]

I don't get your point.
Reality as ALL-there-is comprises every thing that is justifiable to be real.
Thus reality can include oughtness, wrongness, etc. etc. as long as they are justifiable to be real.

Note I did not mention earlier,
whatever is a real moral oughtness must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a credible FSK.
That real moral oughtness is part and parcel of reality.
Therefore C1 does follow.

C2 then follow C1 but it must be verified and justified empirically and philosophically within a framework and system of knowledge.

It is obvious. Reality has both rightness and wrongness. Rightness and wrongness do not directly follow from the existence of reality. To help you with this further you need to change P2 to All-there-is comprises and includes moral rightness and wrongness. Now C1 does not follow from P1 and P2.

My moral oughtness is not about moral rightness and moral wrongness.
see my thread;
Judgments and Decisions [re Rightness or Wrongness] are not Morality Per se.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31615

See my post above, my moral oughtness is represented by something physical thus a matter of fact.

You need to combine what you said in another thread with this one to make any conclusion. I will go through your other thread later.

[Skepdick]

A square-circle, God, and the likes are empirically impossible, thus cannot be real [is, exists] from the start.

For like the 10000th time now.

You don't have criteria for "impossibility" None. Zip. Nada. To say "X is impossible" is to make a claim.
A claim of impossibility requires a proof of impossibility.

A proof of impossibility requires a proof-theoretical framework in which you can prove that square-circles are "impossible"

Clarke's first law.

When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is very probably wrong.

So. Here I am a scientist (neither distinguished nor elderly). Telling you that square circles are possible. I am certainly right. And here you are claiming that they are impossible. You are certainly wrong.

The limits of your language are the limits of your world. In this case your language made square circles "impossible". I gave you a language in which they are possible.

And I can certainly give you languages in which God is possible - languages which can express contradictions. But I don't think you are ready for that.

[Advocate]

>You don't have criteria for "impossibility" None. Zip.

Those of us who are not trying to be skeptical dicks understand that it means having supposed attributes that are untestable or mutually exclusive with itself or the laws of physics. The rest of you can fuck off because you're being disingenuous at best.

[Terrapin Station]

But reality also includes wrongness. Therefore, C1 does not follow. Therefore, C2 does not follow.

His C1 is okay: if we're making an inventory of all existent phenomena, that inventory will include oughts, simply because people say and think things like "one ought not remove toast from a plugged-in toaster with a fork" and "one ought not force someone else to remove toast from a plugged-in toaster with a fork."

At least you could agree with C1 which is very basic logic.

The problem is with C2.
The issue is that no is implies any ought. That oughts exist a la people saying and thinking them doesn't itself imply any ought.

It is not a question of "no 'is' implies any ought."
Rather the question is about No Ought From Is [NOFI].

The original intention of Hume re NOFI was, one cannot derive an 'ought' from 'is'.
Hume's focus was on theists who insisted God commanded 'oughts' that are imposed on believers and non-believers.
Hume's question was, where the F... did you theists get your 'oughts' from to impose on humans?

According to Hume [an empiricist] what is real is a matter of fact, 'oughts' are merely thoughts, feelings arising from relation of ideas. So what right [] has theists to impose their holy-oughts on others?

But Hume did admit his ignorance of what is beyond human feelings, sympathy [empathy] in his Treatise and Enquiry. Hume during his time did not have access to neurosciences, evolutionary psychology and other advance knowledge.

Based on the latest research, what I am claiming as moral oughtness is based on a matter-of-fact that has its corresponding physical referent, i.e. neurons and neuronal processes in the brain.
I presented the example of 'all human ought to breathe else they die' and this ought [more like 'must' and an imperative] to breathe is represented by its corresponding neural sets of neurons and processes.
Similarly the moral oughtness [not as glaring as ought-to-breathe] is also represented by its corresponding neural sets of neurons and processes.

I have said many times, this moral oughtness is physical in the brain, body and mind and not an opinion, belief, decision, nor judgment from individual[s] or group[s].

Just in general, I'm not a follower of any other philosopher. Even the philosophers that I consider myself a "fan" of are people with whom I disagree at least 50% of the time. So I'd never be making general comments from a stance of presenting and/or defending some other philosopher's views.

[Skepdick]

Just in general, I'm not a follower of any other philosopher. Even the philosophers that I consider myself a "fan" of are people with whom I disagree at least 50% of the time. So I'd never be making general comments from a stance of presenting and/or defending some other philosopher's views.

The general notion of "defending one's views" is pretty much in agreement with any and all Philosophers and Philosophies.

Why would you have to "defend" your views if they weren't being attacked?

And if your views are being attacked when you didn't ask for your views to be attacked... the best defence is always offence.

People in glass houses shouldn't throw stones.

[Veritas Aequitas]

A square-circle, God, and the likes are empirically impossible, thus cannot be real [is, exists] from the start.

For like the 10000th time now.

You don't have criteria for "impossibility" None. Zip. Nada. To say "X is impossible" is to make a claim.
A claim of impossibility requires a proof of impossibility.

A proof of impossibility requires a proof-theoretical framework in which you can prove that square-circles are "impossible"

Clarke's first law.

When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is very probably wrong.

So. Here I am a scientist (neither distinguished nor elderly). Telling you that square circles are possible. I am certainly right. And here you are claiming that they are impossible. You are certainly wrong.

The limits of your language are the limits of your world. In this case your language made square circles "impossible". I gave you a language in which they are possible.

And I can certainly give you languages in which God is possible - languages which can express contradictions. But I don't think you are ready for that.

This is the first time I read of the above.
What you claimed above is related to mathematical proofs.

Yes, one can use language to claim God is possible linguistically.
God is definitely possible theistically to theists-only - theism.
God is also possible by crude and raw reason - deism.

BUT the "impossibility" I mentioned is always qualified as 'empirically' and reality. So my claim is confined to the empirical & reality framework and system.

God is an Impossibility to be empirically and philosophically real.
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=24704

In this case it is also a logical fallacy of equivocation if based on non-empirical elements.
Logically one cannot conflate what is empirical with something that is non-empirical.

Caveat: there is no absolute certainty, thus I am not claiming 100% absolute certainty.
What I claimed is a qualified certainty of impossibility based on the above context.

[Advocate]

God is absolutely real as a concept, absolutely fiction as a testable entity.

[Veritas Aequitas]

His C1 is okay: if we're making an inventory of all existent phenomena, that inventory will include oughts, simply because people say and think things like "one ought not remove toast from a plugged-in toaster with a fork" and "one ought not force someone else to remove toast from a plugged-in toaster with a fork."

At least you could agree with C1 which is very basic logic.

The problem is with C2.
The issue is that no is implies any ought. That oughts exist a la people saying and thinking them doesn't itself imply any ought.

It is not a question of "no 'is' implies any ought."
Rather the question is about No Ought From Is [NOFI].

The original intention of Hume re NOFI was, one cannot derive an 'ought' from 'is'.
Hume's focus was on theists who insisted God commanded 'oughts' that are imposed on believers and non-believers.
Hume's question was, where the F... did you theists get your 'oughts' from to impose on humans?

According to Hume [an empiricist] what is real is a matter of fact, 'oughts' are merely thoughts, feelings arising from relation of ideas. So what right [] has theists to impose their holy-oughts on others?

But Hume did admit his ignorance of what is beyond human feelings, sympathy [empathy] in his Treatise and Enquiry. Hume during his time did not have access to neurosciences, evolutionary psychology and other advance knowledge.

Based on the latest research, what I am claiming as moral oughtness is based on a matter-of-fact that has its corresponding physical referent, i.e. neurons and neuronal processes in the brain.
I presented the example of 'all human ought to breathe else they die' and this ought [more like 'must' and an imperative] to breathe is represented by its corresponding neural sets of neurons and processes.
Similarly the moral oughtness [not as glaring as ought-to-breathe] is also represented by its corresponding neural sets of neurons and processes.

I have said many times, this moral oughtness is physical in the brain, body and mind and not an opinion, belief, decision, nor judgment from individual[s] or group[s].

Just in general, I'm not a follower of any other philosopher. Even the philosophers that I consider myself a "fan" of are people with whom I disagree at least 50% of the time. So I'd never be making general comments from a stance of presenting and/or defending some other philosopher's views.

If you are not relying on any philosophers or philosophical traditions then you are inventing 'wheels' of philosophy afresh which is a very mammoth, immense, monumental task.

• If your philosophical views are credible you should be world famous within the philosophical communities by now and would have presented many papers in various philosophical journals.
  
  On the other hand, if you are not a famous and well-known philosophers who do not stand on the shoulders of any giant philosopher or philosophical traditions, then your personal philosophical views are of low or no credibility.
  It would appear this point is the truth for you.

Btw, which are the notable philosophers you are a 50% follower of?

I am a 90% Kantian re philosophical anti-realism as in empirical realism and transcendental idealism, 75% Buddhist philosophies [core], other Eastern philosophies [50%]. Analytic Philosophy is 20%. There are others.