Philosophy Now Forum

Never mind.
EB

Speakpigeon wrote: ↑Fri Apr 19, 2019 8:18 pm Never mind.
EB

Yeah. Run back to your mommy and tell her "I want to be a lazy thinker and use only deduction, but the bad-Logik-man just won't let me....".

Waaaaaaah!

Speakpigeon wrote: ↑Fri Apr 19, 2019 7:46 pm

Logik wrote: ↑Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:54 pm

Speakpigeon wrote: ↑Fri Apr 19, 2019 5:38 pm
So, what's the value of knowing how we know if knowing is possibly deceptive as you all claim.

The value is quite literally being able to spot which one of your own beliefs are bullshit.
Self-awareness, self-skepticism and self-correction.
The value is autodidactism

???
Let me repeat myself, since apparently you didn't understand my question: What would be the value of knowing how we know if knowing is possibly deceptive as you all claim?

only the second 'know' in this question refers to a possible deception, since in knowing how we know we'd know whether our 'know' (second 'know', i.e. intent to know rather than knowledge itself) is correct and therefore constitutes knowledge.

so in actually we are meaning different things by the two 'know' in the question/issue: how do we 1) know that we 2) know?

the second 'know' reflects merely the intent to know, then we apply a confirmation or test (meta-knowledge) to tell us whether our efforts have been fruitful or in vain or need to be adjusted, whether what we have is knowledge.

so there are three components here that i see:

meta-knowledge (the test for knowledge)
knowledge (the product of the test)
intent-to-know (the product to be tested, the product of the intent to know but not yet confirmed knowledge)


which incidentally harkens back to my notion of knowledge as confirmed thought, that that is the essence of knowledge.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 10:14 am only the second 'know' in this question refers to a possible deception, since in knowing how we know we'd know whether our 'know' (second 'know', i.e. intent to know rather than knowledge itself) is correct and therefore constitutes knowledge.
so in actually we are meaning different things by the two 'know' in the question/issue: how do we 1) know that we 2) know?
the second 'know' reflects merely the intent to know, then we apply a confirmation or test (meta-knowledge) to tell us whether our efforts have been fruitful or in vain or need to be adjusted, whether what we have is knowledge.
so there are three components here that i see:
meta-knowledge (the test for knowledge)
knowledge (the product of the test)
intent-to-know (the product to be tested, the product of the intent to know but not yet confirmed knowledge)
which incidentally harkens back to my notion of knowledge as confirmed thought, that that is the essence of knowledge.

I can't countenance equivocating. There is just one possible understanding of the word "know" or else we throw rationality out the window.
You mean different things, then use different words.
The only difference between the two words "know" in "How do we know that we know?" can only be that the first is preceded by "How do we" and the second by "know that we". And that's enough to understand what is meant.
If you start speaking in tongues, I leave you sort out what you mean all by yourself.
Essentially, we're not talking about the same thing. I'm reporting an empirical fact, the fact that I know something, for example pain (not now, though) or impatience, exactly as I would report the empirical fact that I see a tree or an Alien (not that there is a tree or an alien). Why do you feel the need to ask me to define my terms? Are you asking scientists to define their terms? Observe? Empirical? etc. Me, I'm always using English words according to dictionary definitions, precisely to avoid the kind of problem you have here. So, I'm reporting an empirical fact, but you yourself are insisting on the necessity of a prior reasoning to validate my claim. I don't need your reasoning. Maybe you do but that's your problem. If you don't know pain, well, good for you, though I doubt it very much. I could also ask you to prove that you don't know pain when you experience pain. How would you do that? You don't believe me when I say I know pain, well, I don't believe you when you say you don't know pain.
In effect, you are insisting on the necessity of your assumption that knowledge needs to be justified. But how would you then justify the justification? Infinite regress and therefore no possibility of the kind of knowledge you are insisting on. There is no knowledge at all if by knowledge you mean justified belief, as you do. You know something when you do and that's just an empirical fact, just like existence. Are you going to deny that you exist since you can't possibly justify that you do using any assumption since you would have to justify the assumption itself. So, do you believe you don't exist or that you're not quite sure you exist? What would that even mean?! Your position is absurd.
In any case, your elaboration is special pleading. I take it you don't even understand what I say so conversation is useless. You asked me to define knowledge and we now discover you are equivocating and that you seem to feel good about it. Sounds like explaining away what doesn't fit into you ideology. I don't need you to know what I know. Whether you understand is also rather not my problem. So, help yourself.
EB

i understand what you are saying, however i am trying to draw out the greater depth in the epistemological question of: how do we know that we know? or how do you know that you know

when you are insisting on your empirical definition of knowledge and that is what i believe to be the main point of our difference.

i understand where you are coming from. 'you' (the experiencing self) know. all that can be known to 'you' (as the singular experiencing self) is their own experience. this your angle on this matter, and it is sound to a point.

my issue is that it flatly denies the possibility of existences outside of 'you's' awareness. it denies the depth that the epistemological question of 'how do we/you know that we/you know' gets out.

i am not making up meanings here, i am trying to convey to you that depth in the question, depth that is also addressed and interpreted by other philosophers.

brain-in-vat argument for example.

i am talking about the ontological possibilities outside of 'you's' experience and awareness, and the implications of this for what you 'know' now. is that so irrational?

i am also trying to get at the meaning of know in the epistemological context. i think this term should be reserved for conveying the connotation it has, which is that of unerroring.

if you claim to know something, and it proves to be false by your own sight later, you didn't know in the first place. do you deny this?

there can be no deception in knowledge, not true knowledge. that is what the term 'know' conveys.

if you say this is merely my idiosyncratic definition - which it isn't, it is most certainly shared by others - then how are we to distinguish knowledge from any sort of belief or perception?

don't you understand that this is about categorizing different kinds of information across the spectrum of human experience or what can possibly be known?

if this is really just an argument over whose definition of knowledge we should accept, then let it be so.

don't you think 'belief' is a more appropriate term for what you are calling knowledge?

this is not mere semantics because in calling belief 'knowledge' we lose - literally lose the notion of - knowledge as something that is not belief, something that is unerroring, undeceptive.

also re your last post,

the justification would have to be self-evident, which is different from an assumption.

you also made a point about: what is the point of this kind of knowledge? how is it useful?

it isn't very useful, not as useful broadly as beliefs based on experience. but that does not justify conflating the concept of knowledge with beliefs. the concept of knowledge as i am articulating it - that is in contrast to belief - is still philosophically useful because it gives us a perspective on human experience, which is then necessary to understand/situate that experience in order to procure more beliefs and perhaps one day knowledge.

i am saying this concept of knowledge ironically is actually useful to experiential beliefs by situating those beliefs within a larger picture, one that does not regard them as the universe it, but a mere part.

it is an important perspective to have, just in analyzing and thinking about things, and not just things in philosophy. you cannot think at higher level without it.

so my justification for defining knowledge is that it captures the depth and intent contained in epistemological questions like how do we know that we know, and it gives us perspective by not limiting perception of what exists to our own minds eye which limiting if not dangerous.

and the very fact that we can be deceived and often are in our perceptions suggests real knowledge may exist 'out there'; that to call such error-prone perceptions or beliefs 'knowledge' is to seriously degrade the term, collapsing different grades of information or perceptions into one or two crude concepts. on this issue we need MORE concepts to describe the nuance, not less.

imo, conflating knowledge as i am articulating it now with belief as you describe is a bullsh*tty attempt to 1) give your perceptions more authority than they deserve and 2) normalize deception in our world/universe when it is not really inevitable or acceptable.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 3:35 pm i understand what you are saying, however i am trying to draw out the greater depth in the epistemological question of: how do we know that we know? or how do you know that you know

You claim to understand what I say but apparently no you don't.
I'm also perfectly aware of the metaphysical depth of the question.
The question of knowledge of the world outside our mind has been debated for a very long time and there is no resolution and my view is that there won't ever be one. As soon as you accept that any knowledge of the world outside our mind requires some assumption, you also either deny the possibility of this kind of knowledge or redefining it as a kind of belief, essentially as a justified true belief, which is what many people do without realising the implication, which is that they redefine knowledge as a belief.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 3:35 pm when you are insisting on your empirical definition of knowledge and that is what i believe to be the main point of our difference.
i understand where you are coming from. 'you' (the experiencing self) know. all that can be known to 'you' (as the singular experiencing self) is their own experience. this your angle on this matter, and it is sound to a point.

If my position was only "sound to a point", surely you would identify this point? You haven't.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 3:35 pm my issue is that it flatly denies the possibility of existences outside of 'you's' awareness.

This is false.
When you make claim like this, explain yourself and quote the relevant bit.
In any case, my only point is that knowledge doesn't require prior assumption.
Given this, try to argue your point that my position "flatly denies the possibility of existences outside of my awareness".
More likely, you inferred this idiotic idea from another position you decided to assume I had.
So, you see, assumption is more likely to produce error than to produce knowledge.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 3:35 pm i am not making up meanings here, i am trying to convey to you that depth in the question, depth that is also addressed and interpreted by other philosophers. brain-in-vat argument for example. i am talking about the ontological possibilities outside of 'you's' experience and awareness, and the implications of this for what you 'know' now. is that so irrational?

What is irrational is to try to convince yourself you know something that you don't know. "Belief" is good enough a word to qualify what we believe.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 3:35 pm i am also trying to get at the meaning of know in the epistemological context. i think this term should be reserved for conveying the connotation it has, which is that of unerroring. if you claim to know something, and it proves to be false by your own sight later, you didn't know in the first place. do you deny this?

Why would I? I didn't say anything that suggested this.
It's you who asserted that knowing can be deceptive, which can only imply that one would know X even though X wouldn't exist as known.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 3:35 pm there can be no deception in knowledge, not true knowledge. that is what the term 'know' conveys. if you say this is merely my idiosyncratic definition - which it isn't, it is most certainly shared by others - then how are we to distinguish knowledge from any sort of belief or perception.

It's you who equivocated on the word "knowledge" by asserting that knowing can be deceptive.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 3:35 pm if this is really just an argument over whose definition of knowledge we should accept, then let it be so.

There is just one definition of knowledge.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 3:35 pm don't you think 'belief' is a more appropriate term for what you are calling knowledge?

???
You think that when you experience pain, it is more appropriate to say that you "believe" you experience pain rather than know you experience pain?! Whoa. Please justify.
Rather, the question is whether what you see as knowledge, for example the belief that you know that there is a tree in your garden because you see a tree in your garden is more than a belief. Philosophers have long tried to work out a theory, called "justified true belief", whereby such a belief would constitute knowledge. The definition is logically unsound since it is subject to regress. Basically, a belief is said to be knowledge if true and if it is justified. However, there's no procedure to ascertain that a belief is true and, furthermore, any justification can only introduce an infinite regress, i.e. you would need to justify that you know your justification is correct. So, for now at least, that is no rational theory of knowledge that we could accept as correct. So, any knowledge of the physical world, such as afforded by our senses, common sense, technique and science is in fact a belief.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 3:35 pm this is not mere semantics because in calling belief 'knowledge' we lose - literally lose the notion of - knowledge as something that is not belief, something that is unerroring, undeceptive.

The question is not the definition of the notion of knowledge. It is perfectly understood and not subject to equivocation. The question is whether knowledge exist and what kind of knowledge. Knowledge exists because knowledge by acquaintance exists, i.e. the knowledge of things like pain. Whether knowledge of the world outside your mind also exists remains undecided as of now.
However, if you want to insist that knowledge of the world outside your mind requires prior assumptions then you are effectively denying its possibility since you would need to justify your assumption, which introduces an infinite regress.
EB

In any case, my only point is that knowledge doesn't require prior assumption.

that's right, knowledge doesn't require prior assumption, IF you can gain knowledge from experience, but can you?

that is the issue here.

BUT CAN YOU

can you gain knowledge from experience?

in order to answer this question, we have to answer the question:

what is knowledge?

i asked you this and you gave me some dictionary definitions. do you think that's appropriate for philosophy?

your reasoning is circular. you choose a particular definition of knowledge, a lay one that doesn't reflect epistemological concerns, and then say A HA!

if knowledge can be obtained from experience, which this definition says is possible, then assumptions are not required for knowledge!

..............

like are you serious?

i am telling you right now 'what is knowledge' is at the heart of this issue of whether all knowledge proceeds from assumption. i made that claim and have subsequently qualified my words. by knowledge i meant belief, since there is no way for us to know, strictly speaking, at present, so all our current knowledges represent beliefs of a certain sort (i.e. gained from various methods) which proceed from assumptions. empirical knowledge proceeds from the assumption experience can afford knowledge, among others.

it is not knowledge without assumption. your deciding that experience = knowledge without caveat is just your stupid assumption.

you are assuming knowledge can be obtained from experience, pathetically justifying this assumption on the basis of what? if we can't know based on our experience than knowledge is impossible and therefore...experience must afford us knowledge?

do you know how insane that is? why don't you just say you're not sure if experience affords us knowledge, but it affords us some useful and reliable information.

why do you insist on calling it knowledge? <-- this is my fundamental question to you

so far all i've gotten from you on this is 'well if we don't call experience knowledge then we can't know anything'

THAT'S CRAP REASONING and doesn't justify shoehorning the concept of knowledge to fit your empirical definition

also trying to argue the appropriate use of language in philosophy by saying stuff like 'does saying you believe you're experiencing pain sound right to you?' just goes to show how unbelievably unrigorous you're being about all this.

since when does how something sound determine its validity in philosophy you dork

yes, it is in fact more accurate to say that you belief you're experiencing pain. you do not know that you - are - experiencing - pain, you believe based on subjective experience, it is not a fact, at least not a meaningful one. i mean, what factual information are you actually conveying? if it is a deception, and you are for example dreaming, then what are you even saying? you don't know. and that's the point.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 6:01 pm

In any case, my only point is that knowledge doesn't require prior assumption.

that's right, knowledge doesn't require prior assumption, IF you can gain knowledge from experience, but can you?

???
Read again. I'm a bit fatigued by your systematic misrepresentation of what I say. Please keep close to what I say. Don't invent stuff. Don't assume.
I'm not saying and never said that knowledge of pain is "gained" from experience but that it IS experience. Experiencing pain is knowing pain. And we all know that.
Knowledge gained from experience would be knowledge of the physical world, which as I explained is very unlikely to ever be proved to be actual knowledge, but... who knows?

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 6:01 pm what is knowledge? i asked you this and you gave me some dictionary definitions. do you think that's appropriate for philosophy?

???
Are you insane?! It was you asking me what was MY definition of "knowledge". I provided you MY definition, which is indeed the dictionary definition, i.e. the only definition of the word "knowledge" reflecting common usage, and therefore the more likely to be correct.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 6:01 pm your reasoning is circular. you choose a particular definition of knowledge, a lay one that doesn't reflect epistemological concerns, and then say A HA! if knowledge can be obtained from experience, which this definition says is possible, then assumptions are not required for knowledge!

OK, you are insane. You believe I am the one making up all the definitions found in English dictionaries!!!
No. I'm using the STANDARD notion of knowledge as expressed by dictionary definitions, this is the definition that reflect how the word is understood and used by most people. Who cares what philosophers say?

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 6:01 pm by knowledge i meant belief, since there is no way for us to know, strictly speaking, at present, so all our current knowledges represent beliefs of a certain sort (i.e. gained from various methods) which proceed from assumptions. empirical knowledge proceeds from the assumption experience can afford knowledge, among others.

Good. Apparently my quoting the dictionary definition has been very informative for you. You've learned something.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 6:01 pmyour deciding that experience = knowledge without caveat

I didn't say that.
Again, if you can't read without misrepresenting my words, then there's no conversation possible.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 6:01 pm your deciding that experience = knowledge without caveat is just your stupid assumption. you are assuming knowledge can be obtained from experience, pathetically justifying this assumption on the basis of what? if we can't know based on our experience than knowledge is impossible and therefore...experience must afford us knowledge?

???
What's that?! Is that what you understand of what I say?! Whoa.
Again, knowledge of pain is not gained from experience, it IS experience. All subjective experience is knowledge of what is experience: pain, memory, colours, intuition, thought, etc. And you know these things at the moment you experience them and only then. So, the notion of knowledge gained from experience is misinterpretation.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 6:01 pm why do you insist on calling it knowledge? <-- this is my fundamental question to you

Because it is obviously knowledge, i.e. we you are in pain, you can't possibly be wrong as to what exactly it is you are experiencing. It is immediate, unmediated, exact knowledge.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 6:01 pm so far all i've gotten from you on this is 'well if we don't call experience knowledge then we can't know anything'

Yes, because it is bloody obvious.
The totality of what we believe about the physical world is based on nothing else but our subjective experience. Without it, not knowledge at all and not even any beliefs about the physical world.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 6:01 pm THAT'S CRAP REASONING and doesn't justify shoehorning the concept of knowledge to fit your empirical definition

No "my" definition, the definition of the dictionary that I accept as representative of current usage. You should read the dictionary more often.
And if you assert "crap reasoning", then please articulate your argument. Oops! No argument. Just vacuous capital letters. Rhetoric. Bravo.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 6:01 pm also trying to argue the appropriate use of language in philosophy by saying stuff like 'does saying you believe you're experiencing pain sound right to you?' just goes to show how unbelievably unrigorous you're being about all this.

LOL.
I guess you've ran out of anything cogent to say.

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 6:01 pm you dork

???
Why don't you try to argue your position rather than throw pathetic insults at me. That's all you can do?

11011 wrote: ↑Sat Apr 20, 2019 6:01 pm yes, it is in fact more accurate to say that you belief you're experiencing pain. you do not know that you - are - experiencing - pain, you believe based on subjective experience, it is not a fact, at least not a meaningful one. i mean, what factual information are you actually conveying? if it is a deception, and you are for example dreaming, then what are you even saying? you don't know. and that's the point.

I doubt very much you can experience something while dreaming that you could mistake for pain. In fact, if you ever experience such a thing, then you would be in pain, and then that would be experiencing pain, and therefore knowing pain.

OK, thank you for your time. You haven't any cogent argument to offer. You prefer to insult me. You misunderstand what I say even though what I say is rather simple and in plain English, and proper dictionary English to boot, and you keep misrepresenting my words. So, just a waste of time through and through. Grow up.
EB

no this is wrong, although calling it belief isn't really accurate either, although it conveys the same message as far as not being knowledge.

what you are describing is perception not knowledge.

since i can anticipate how you'll respond to this i'll preempt you with a question: tell me in your view how perception and knowledge are different.

as i learned in psych 101, it is at the point of perception that we begin experiencing following raw sensory input. knowledge however is a higher cognitive process of organizing and assigning meaning to experience/perception. it is not experience/perception itself.

don't you think perception is a more fitting term for what you're referring to?

i also think you are using an informal meaning of 'know', one that is not really intended in epistemology.

like saying you have an experience of pain is not the same as saying you have a knowledge of pain. knowledge refers to understanding something - it's nature, cause, etc.

however, saying you know pain in the informal (non-academic) sense is roughly equivalent to saying you've had an experience of pain. like, 'oh ya, i know pain. burnt my hand on the element yesterday!'

is this interpretation of what you're saying correct?

if it is then we have indeed been under the impression of a different sense of knowing, each of us. probably i was not expecting you to use such an informal sense of 'know' in an epistemological discussion, and assumed a more academic sense all the way through.

though i'm afraid yours has limited epistemological relevance, even just within this thread. it's not an example of knowledge without assumptions, not knowledge in the sense used in epistemology.

the bottom line is, 'i experience pain' is not the same as 'i have a knowledge of pain'.

also my understanding of knowledge is mirrored in the dictionary definitions you posted, such as knowledge gained from experience. those definitions do not equate experience with knowledge, unless designated informal, which many will explicitly indicate.

also you are simply describing the empiricist position on this matter, correct?

well i decided to look it up, finally acknowledging the possibility that i may not have the adequate background/foundation to participate meaningfully in this discussion (i don't read much philosophy), and found that you've been somewhat misrepresenting the empirical position on the matter:

A priori knowledge is a way of gaining knowledge without the need of experience. In Bruce Russell's article "A Priori Justification and Knowledge"[31] he says that it is "knowledge based on a priori justification," (1) which relies on intuition and the nature of these intuitions. A priori knowledge is often contrasted with posteriori knowledge, which is knowledge gained by experience.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemol ... _knowledge

obviously this is just wikipedia rendition but i've heard it put in these terms before, i.e. knowledge gained by/from experience.

so i don't know what the hell you're doing man. i mean the least you could do is follow the book...if you're going to follow the book...instead of acting like you're following the book

if you faithfully represented the position i'd have gotten you long ago. from this point on, if i decide to continue this discussion, i'll just read up on it above and then engage you because you can't exactly be trusted, oh well i guess it's my responsibility anyway...i just like the novelty factor and so i avoid learning anything 'official' on the topic until it becomes a barrier to engagement

i also believe learning the background on something predisposes and narrows your thought process but i guess that's incidental

11011 wrote: ↑Sun Apr 21, 2019 1:31 am no this is wrong, although calling it belief isn't really accurate either, although it conveys the same message as far as not being knowledge.
what you are describing is perception not knowledge.
since i can anticipate how you'll respond to this i'll preempt you with a question: tell me in your view how perception and knowledge are different.
as i learned in psych 101, it is at the point of perception that we begin experiencing following raw sensory input. knowledge however is a higher cognitive process of organizing and assigning meaning to experience/perception. it is not experience/perception itself.
don't you think perception is a more fitting term for what you're referring to?

You certainly lack in imagination.
Clue: Fabc ⊢ Gab ∧ Hac
If you don't understand the symbolism, ask your 101 teacher.
If anyone can come up with a reasonable interpretation of this formula, I'll tell you whether the interpretation is correct or not.
Fair?
EB

11011 wrote: ↑Sun Apr 21, 2019 1:31 am i also think you are using an informal meaning of 'know', one that is not really intended in epistemology.

I already told you the definition I'm using and it's the dictionary definition. If you think it's too informal, you should write to the dictionary editors to offer your own definition.
I also complemented with the view of Bertrand Russell on knowledge by acquaintance, including the link where you could get more information. You think Russell only really meant an "informal meaning"?! Maybe you should be told Russell wrote a whole book on human knowledge, called "Human knowledge", 446 pages. You think that's informal?
EB

11011 wrote: ↑Sun Apr 21, 2019 1:31 am knowledge refers to understanding something - it's nature, cause, etc.

LOL. Now, you're just making stuff up! That's just two out of the eight senses given by the dictionary below, and probably none of these two are what you have in mind:

know
1. To perceive directly; grasp in the mind with clarity or certainty.
2. To regard as true beyond doubt: I know she won't fail.
3. To have a practical understanding of, as through experience; be skilled in: knows how to cook.
4. To have fixed in the mind: knows her Latin verbs.
5. To have experience of: "a black stubble that had known no razor" (William Faulkner).
6a. To perceive as familiar; recognize: I know that face.
6b. To be acquainted with: He doesn't know his neighbors.
7. To be able to distinguish; recognize as distinct: knows right from wrong.
8. To discern the character or nature of: knew him for a liar.

But maybe you could give some authoritative references supporting your claim?!
Or do you intend to keep making gratuitous claims?!
EB

11011 wrote: ↑Sun Apr 21, 2019 1:31 am however, saying you know pain in the informal (non-academic) sense is roughly equivalent to saying you've had an experience of pain. like, 'oh ya, i know pain. burnt my hand on the element yesterday!'
is this interpretation of what you're saying correct?

No. I already told you.
Subjective experience, like that of pain, or the subjective experience of seeing a tree etc., are all instances of knowledge. There is nothing informal in that. Russell already understood that more than a century ago. Descartes probably understood that, and it was 300 years ago. Where have you been all this time?
EB