Rhizome 9/3/16 in which I approach the precarious but useful nature of the informal fallacies via Henrik Schoeneberg’s article, “Bad Arguments that Make You Smarter” (
https://philosophynow.org/issues/115/Ba ... ou_Smarter( in Philosophy Now, Aug/September 2016:
I would start by pointing to the example Schoeneberg offers for the red herring:
Peter: “I don’t think we should build a new homeless shelter right now. We need more money to maintain the power grid.”
Sandy: “How can you not care about the homeless? That’s just heartless.”
Schoeneberg then goes on to argue:
“Sandy attacks a different argument than Peter’s own point. Peter didn’t say he didn’t care about the homeless; he might be volunteering at a soup kitchen for all Sandy knows. It just so happens that he thinks that energy supply is also important, and that priorities have to be chosen.”
Fair enough. But now let us imagine Sandy arguing:
“You only argue that, Peter, because you value the power grid, which benefits you more than the homeless, over the needs of the homeless. That seems a little selfish to me.”
Of course, Schoeneberg might then turn to the argument that Sandy is engaged in a circumstantial Ad Hominem: that she is going after his motivations rather than his argument. The problem with this is that Peter’s motivations are deeply entwined with his argument and therefore very relevant. And until Peter can supply a solid foundation to what he values, it will remain relevant. And in this sense, we have gotten Sandy beyond the accusation of offering a Red Herring. But the problem gets more subtle when we compare her two different statements:
“How can you not care about the homeless? That’s just heartless.”
“You only argue that, Peter, because you value the power grid, which benefits you more than the homeless, over the needs of the homeless. That seems a little selfish to me.”
Both are basically the same. The only difference is that she tones down the appeal to galley (also referred to as an appeal to emotions) in the second. And even the second statement:
“That seems a little selfish to me.”
:still holds logical weight in that she qualifies it with the word “seems”.
The problem here is that while, as Schoeneberg suggests in the artcle, the informal fallacies are useful tools, they are just that: tools. All arguments, ultimately, break down to assumptions based on values which are impervious to tools such as informal fallacies. Therefore, the informal fallacies (or a knowledge of them), can, at best, be looked at as powerful (though not conclusive (moves in a language game. In this sense, Schoeneberg's argument:
“Sandy attacks a different argument than Peter’s own point. Peter didn’t say he didn’t care about the homeless; he might be volunteering at a soup kitchen for all Sandy knows. It just so happens that he thinks that energy supply is also important, and that priorities have to be chosen.”
:becomes a red herring in itself.