Pascal's wager

[ReliStuPhD]

ReliStuPhD and raw_thought, I for one am enjoying your discussion and I am glad you are both here. You raise the philosophical tone. Thank you!

Regards
Mick

Thanks Mick.

As for the "foe" option, I've debated it with H.C. insofar as he adds nothing of substance to the various debates.

[Lawrence Crocker]

I apologize for inserting here an utter irrelevancy to the thread in its most recent entries. It is more relevant to some earlier thread segments. I intrude here, at the risk of thread-boorishness, because I contend that there is a sound, or nearly sound, variation of Pascal’s argument and because I believe that it is a good thing for participants in the Philosophy Now Forum to peruse from time to time Philosophy Now, I invite those of you who have a current web subscription or the back issue, to read “The Existence of God: Two New Proofs.”

https://philosophynow.org/issues/82/The ... New_Proofs

The first of the two new proofs is the Wager-variant. Disclaimer: it is not a close variant. To quote a sufficiently short section as to fall within the fair use safe harbor of copyright: My proofs conclude "to hope [in the existence of God, not the justification of belief in that existence.] Their ancestry lies in traditional proofs, although their forefathers would surely disown them.”

Still, even if you are not interested in question whether we ought to hope for the existence of God, as I do so hope, and Tom Nagel does not, you will find some points in the article going to Pascal’s original argument and debated earlier in this thread.

[raw_thought]

My position is not that Pascal (in his wager) tried to prove that God exists. My position is that he is saying that the math says that it is wise (benefits self) to believe that God exists. I disagree. Pascal's wager does not even do that. Any proposition works!!! Therefore, if Pascal's wager is sound, then it is also sound to believe that an elf lives under the Washington monument.

[Hobbes' Choice]

Now, kids, play nicely!

ReliStuPhD and raw_thought, I for one am enjoying your discussion and I am glad you are both here. You raise the philosophical tone. Thank you!

May I suggest you try not to engage with Hobbes' Choice and Greylorn Ell at all? In my view each of them in their own way has proved themselves unwilling (due, I think, to incapacity) to respect and follow any argument that threatens their determined views. All you can expect from them in the end is mindless personal abuse.

If you have trouble ignoring their posts, remember the board's [Add foe] option. Just navigate to their profile page (there's a button to do this at the bottom of every post) and click the [Add foe] button on the left hand side. Then it's as if you had personally banned them from your forum.

Regards
Mick

You respond to one post of personal abuse by abusing the abuser with your own personal abuse.
Tut tut

[ReliStuPhD]

My position is not that Pascal (in his wager) tried to prove that God exists. My position is that he is saying that the math says that it is wise (benefits self) to believe that God exists. I disagree. Pascal's wager does not even do that. Any proposition works!!! Therefore, if Pascal's wager is sound, then it is also sound to believe that an elf lives under the Washington monument.

I somewhat agree with raw_thought's conclusion here. My primary point of contention has been that he's not presented Pascal's Wager correctly (he leaves out the first two premises). Presented correctly, I think it's a sound argument, and would apply to elves, Thor, or Brahma. I think what raw_thought doesn't understand (perhaps I've not said it) is that I think the premises are invalid, both with respect to God and with respect to Brahma, Thor, or elves. As such, I think his substitutions fail to show the argument to be unsound (with respect to any entity) or invalid (with respect to God). Showing that the wager is invalid comes from attacking the premises themselves (specifically, the first two). I don't think the wager can be shown to be unsound, however.

[raw_thought]

When any proposition can be proven via a syllogism, then the syllogism is invalid.
For example.
1. Any proposition that promises reward if one believes in it and if untrue has no bad consequenses in believing it.
2. Therefore one should believe in that proposition.
It is bad logical form because one can contradict oneself.
For example,
1. God does not want us to believe in him because then our actions would not be altruistic. We would do good out of self interest (heaven).
2. If we do not believe in God and God exists,we will be rewarded.
3. If we do not believe in God and God does not exist nothing bad will happen to us.
4. Therefore, it is in our best interest to not believe in God.
If "Pascal's wager" works then the syllogism I just gave also works. Since two contradictory statements cannot both be true there must be something wrong with the logical form of "Pascal's wager."

[ReliStuPhD]

< Double post>

[ReliStuPhD]

1. Any proposition that promises reward if one believes in it and if untrue has no bad consequenses in believing it.

This is an incomplete sentence. Maybe a typo?

2. Therefore one should believe in that proposition.
It is bad logical form because one can contradict oneself.

Well, it's bad logical form because it's not a syllogism (though again, that may result from a typo). Still, the following example looks solid, so if you don't revisit these points, no worries.

1. God does not want us to believe in him because then our actions would not be altruistic. We would do good out of self interest (heaven).
2. If we do not believe in God and God exists,we will be rewarded.
3. If we do not believe in God and God does not exist nothing bad will happen to us.
4. Therefore, it is in our best interest to not believe in God.

You claim there are contradictory atatements here, but I don't see them. I see an invalid statement or two, but they do not contradict themselves. They may contradict what we know to be true, but that would be a sign that the syllogism is untrue, not that it's illogical. (Her's a good peer-reviewed resource to help with this: http://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/)

I want to keep coming back to the next two points because, if I recall correctly, you said you had a disorder that made it difficult to follow arguments sometimes (I don't remember the exact nature, so apologies if I'm wrong). I agree that Pascal's Wager is invalid (untrue). I do not agree that it's illogical (unsound). Also (and more importantly) my primary contention in all of this has been that you are not presenting Pascal's Wager correctly (you leave out the piece about Reason not being able to help us). I do enjoy this debate, but I confess to more than a bit of frustration that you seem to routinely ignore this last point, and sometimes the first.

[raw_thought]

I am confused once again! So phenomenology (the idea that qualia,feelings exist) can not be true and one can still feel God's presence? In other words the mystics talk in phenomenological terms. So therefore they are idiots???
Greylorn rejected any phenomenological terms. That was his "reason" for rejecting mysticism.*
*
I am talking about mysticism (not in the new age way) but in the philosophical sense. For example, Meister Eckhart was not an idiot.

I was not saying that I have a mental problem. I was raised to say, "I'm confused" as a polite way to question my opponent's position.

[ReliStuPhD]

I am confused once again! So phenomenology (the idea that qualia,feelings exist) can not be true and one can still feel God's presence? In other words the mystics talk in phenomenological terms. So therefore they are idiots???
Greylorn rejected any phenomenological terms. That was his "reason" for rejecting mysticism.*
*
I am talking about mysticism (not in the new age way) but in the philosophical sense. For example, Meister Eckhart was not an idiot.

I was not saying that I have a mental problem. I was raised to say, "I'm confused" as a polite way to question my opponent's position.

Then my deepest apologies. I completely misunderstood. (That, or I've confused you with someone else)

[raw_thought]

If the logical form of Pascals wager is valid (there is a difference between validity and truth *). then two contradictory statements must be true. 1. It is in one's best interest to believe in God. 2. It is in one's best interest to not believe in God.
* Here is an argument that is true and valid.
1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates was a man.
3. Therefore, Socrates was mortal.
Here is an argument that is valid but not true.
1. All Martians eat snakes.
2. Bob is a Martian.
3. Therefore, Bob eats snakes.
Here is an argument that is true but invalid.
1. Nixon was president.
2. Carter was president.
3. Therefore, Eisenhower was president.

[raw_thought]

It is perfectly legitimate to substitute any thing (Thor for God etc) when deciding the validity of an argument.
For example,
We wish to determine if the following argument is valid (remember that truth does not = validity)
1. All snorks are borks.
2. All Smurfs are borks
3. Therefore all smurfs are snorks.
Lets substitute ( remember that validity does not equal truth. We can therefore substitute anything if consistently because validity must occur in all cases)
Gorillas=snorks
Humans=Smurfs
Primates =Borks
We then get
1. All gorillas are primates
2. All humans are primates
3.Therefore. all humans are gorillas.
We can instantly see that the argument is imvalid.

Pascal's argument is invalid. And yes, his propositions are also probably not true.

[ReliStuPhD]

OK, first, I just realized I've been swapping "sound" and "valid" in the above comments. Where I wrote "valid" I meant "sound" and visa versa. Embarrassing mistake.

there is a difference between validity and truth *).

Certainly. An argument can be valid but untrue:
All bicycles are made of wood.
All things made of wood can fly.
Therefore, all bicycles can fly.

So we agree on that (and, despite my terminological juxtaposition, have been for quite some time).

Pascal's argument is invalid.

You continue to assert this, but I'm still waiting for you to show it. What I suspect is that you're letting the truth of the propositions seep into your evaluation of the validity of the argument (which is why you think elves, Thor, etc show it to be illogical). If what Pascal says about God were true about Thor, then yes, it would be in your self-interests to believe in Thor. Or elves. Or Brahma. Or Toasters. Even your reverse examples had a conclusion that followed from the premises. Of course, the premises are untrue (in all cases presented so far), so the argument (in all cases presented so far) is only valid, not sound.

So, in sum: what is the contradiction? Lay it out clearly. I don't see how continuing to say "if we substitute x for God" works, because I am claiming that no logical contradiction arises when you do that. State clearly what it is you find to be the contradiction. You obviously believe one is there. So what is it? Maybe I've missed it, so I'm certainly interested to hear what you think is the contradiction. So, until such time as you can make what you see to be the contradiction clear, I can only assume you can't prove it's not a valid argument. And since we both agree that it's not sound, there wouldn't be any point in continuing the debate, despite the fact that it's been thought-provoking.

PS I found what I was thinking of about your "disability"! It was the TBI example you offered in another thread. I was skimming at the time and missed your "I'm speaking metaphorically" disclaimer. That's two embarrassments for the night.

EDIT: Made a few edits to shorten the post.

[raw_thought]

But the validity (logical form) of Pascal's wager must be invalid because its form leads to two contradictory positions. That it is benificial to believe in God and also that it is beneficial to not believe in God.
Interesting!!!
Each argument (Pascal's wager and my argument that not believing in God is beneficial ) seem valid. However, they cannot both be valid because they lead to contradictory conclusions.
Remember, we are talking about validity not truth. It does not matter if proposition 1 (that it is beneficial to believe in God) and it does not matter if proposition 2 (that it is beneficial to not believe in God) is true or false.
Anyway, I just got off from work, so my IQ is not as high as usual. However, my argument in this post seems valid!

[raw_thought]

I am just curious. What thread was that,and on what page. I am curious as to how I used TBI as a metaphor for a philosophical point. I hope I was not being rude!