Re: compatibilism
Posted: Tue May 27, 2025 11:13 pm
Pereboom's Four Case Argument against Compatibilism at Philosophical Disquisitions
The rest seems to be embedded in The Gap and Rummy's Rule. Especially the part where we don't even know what we don't even know yet about the human condition.
On the other hand, how do we determine definitively whether or not in calling a decision free this is not in turn just another entirely determined component of the only possible reality? What if none of the "mechanisms" used here are autonomous? We might encounter any number of "reasons-for-action" sets but that may well be just another inherent manifestation of determinism.Reasons-responsive account: A decision can be said to be free if it is caused by a decision-making mechanism that is sufficiently responsive to reasons. In other words, if the mechanism had been presented with a different set of reasons-for-action, it would have produced a different decision (in at least some possible worlds). This is the account associated with Fischer and Ravizza, and comes in several different forms (weak, moderate and strong responsiveness).
Over and over and over again, we come upon those here with conflicting assessments of a functioning human brain. In particular pertaining to moral responsibility. That's really the bottom line for many. In other words, we have to possess at least some measure of free will or we become little more than nature's automatons.Moral reasons-sensitivity account: A decision can be said to be free if it is produced by a decision-making mechanism that is capable of grasping and making use of moral reasons for action. This is the account associated with R. Jay Wallace. It is similar to Fischer and Ravizza’s account, but pays particular attention to the role of moral reasons in decision-making.
The rest seems to be embedded in The Gap and Rummy's Rule. Especially the part where we don't even know what we don't even know yet about the human condition.