Does the "Free Will" point of view affect morals and character?

[phyllo]

And why is it that Junior "must accept the nipple" according to determinists?

What exactly is forcing him to do it?

In determinism, Junior is an event, not a cause. He's a link in a causal chain (a whole bundle of chains) stretchin' back to the Beginning. He isn't forced, he just is. He, as Popeye sez, is nuthin' more than a re-actor. zhe never actually responds to anythings. He never chooses. Free will (having it or bein' one) is an illusion, an illusion that in itself must be. Junior is just a collection of particles interacting with collections of particles.

How can he both be a "re-actor" and also "never actually responds"??

Reacting is responding.

[Flannel Jesus]

And why is it that Junior "must accept the nipple" according to determinists?

What exactly is forcing him to do it?

Important to note that, in terms of predictions regarding the hypothetical scenario, Henry's predictions about Willy are exactly the same as a determinists predictions about Willy.

In other words, if a determinist sees willy accept the nipple, then the determinist would predict that every time he rewinds and presses play, every subsequent time Willy would accept the nipple as well.

And Henry has, I believe, affirmed the same.

No change. Henry and determinists all agree on this very central point.

[phyllo]

And why is it that Junior "must accept the nipple" according to determinists?

What exactly is forcing him to do it?

Important to note that, in terms of predictions regarding the hypothetical scenario, Henry's predictions about Willy are exactly the same as a determinists predictions about Willy.

In other words, if a determinist sees willy accept the nipple, then the determinist would predict that every time he rewinds and presses play, every subsequent time Willy would accept the nipple as well.

And Henry has, I believe, affirmed the same.

No change. Henry and determinists all agree on this very central point.

And then there is a disconnect.

[henry quirk]

Reacting is responding.

Not as I see it, no. A reaction is unthinking, instinctual; a response is driven by intent and consideration. My perspective, however, is as someone who believes himself to be a free will. You, as sumthin' other, see it differently.

[henry quirk]

Henry and determinists all agree on this very central point.

We agree he takes the nip, sure. There's no agreement on why he takes it or on the necessity of him taking it.

[Flannel Jesus]

Henry and determinists all agree on this very central point.

We agree he takes the nip, sure. There's no agreement on why he takes it or on the necessity of him taking it.

"Necessity" is, I think, word play. When a determinist says he "necessarily must take it", that determinist isn't actually saying anything tangibly different from what you already confirmed - that if you rewind time a million times, a billion times, etc, he would always, always take it.

When you break it down, away from abstract terms and into "what would you predict?", your view of Willys first choice and the determinist view are identical

[phyllo]

Reacting is responding.

Not as I see it, no. A reaction is unthinking, instinctual; a response is driven by intent and consideration. My perspective, however, is as someone who believes himself to be a free will. You, as sumthin' other, see it differently.

Clearly, a determinist is thinking. Unless you want to argue that thinking itself is proof of free-will.

[henry quirk]

When you break it down, away from abstract terms and into "what would you predict?", your view of Willys first choice and the determinist view are identical

Yes. And if this weren't a conversation about libertarian free will that yes would be the end of it. But the conversation is, at least in part, about libertarian free will. We can't simply leave out necessity and choice from the circumstance.

[Flannel Jesus]

When you break it down, away from abstract terms and into "what would you predict?", your view of Willys first choice and the determinist view are identical

Yes. And if this weren't a conversation about libertarian free will that yes would be the end of it. But the conversation is, at least in part, about libertarian free will. We can't simply leave out necessity and choice from the circumstance.

But the difference in your view in "necessity" and the determinists view, in this case, is nilch. Not only is there not any real-world prediction you would make differently, there's not even any thought experiment where you have god-like powers to rewind time where you would make a different prediction. The difference is so deeply abstract that it doesn't seem to refer to *anything*. There's no experiment you could do, not only in reality, but even *in your imagination*, that could demonstrate that your view of the "necessity" here, or the determinists view, is correct.

That's not a small point to make.

[henry quirk]

Reacting is responding.

Not as I see it, no. A reaction is unthinking, instinctual; a response is driven by intent and consideration. My perspective, however, is as someone who believes himself to be a free will. You, as sumthin' other, see it differently.

Clearly, a determinist is thinking. Unless you want to argue that thinking itself is proof of free-will.

I say: clearly, a free will is thinking.

If determinism is true, there's only the illusion of thinking. I'm a free willist becuz I can be nuthin' but; you are sumthin' other becuz you can be nuthin' but. We're just clusters of particles involved in a comlex set of interactions and reactions.

[phyllo]

If determinism is true, there's only the illusion of thinking.

What's the difference between "thinking" and the "illusion of thinking"?

[Flannel Jesus]

When you break it down, away from abstract terms and into "what would you predict?", your view of Willys first choice and the determinist view are identical

Yes. And if this weren't a conversation about libertarian free will that yes would be the end of it. But the conversation is, at least in part, about libertarian free will. We can't simply leave out necessity and choice from the circumstance.

But the difference in your view in "necessity" and the determinists view, in this case, is nilch. Not only is there not any real-world prediction you would make differently, there's not even any thought experiment where you have god-like powers to rewind time where you would make a different prediction. The difference is so deeply abstract that it doesn't seem to refer to *anything*. There's no experiment you could do, not only in reality, but even *in your imagination*, that could demonstrate that your view of the "necessity" here, or the determinists view, is correct.

The reason this is all important is because, up to this point in the conversation, many different things you've said have aligned in a very, very "compatibilist" direction. He has free will, even though he's guranteed to make a particular choice. He COULD make a different choice, in SOME sense, even though you fully expect that if you were to rewind time a million billion times, he never ever would.

So "could" ends up meaning something a bit more subtle than what it normally means. Normally (or at least frequently), "could" is connected to something with a non-0 probability. "That could happen" means "that has a chance of happening". But in this case, we've established that he's guaranteed to go for the booba. 100% chance of boob. 0% chance of no boob. So what does "could" mean here?

Well, the compatibilist interpretation says, "he could have, *if he wanted to*". Right? "He doesn't want to, in this moment, but he could if he did". That seems to really, really closely mesh with what you've been saying. You've been saying things like "He could, but why would he?"

Counter-factually, he could, if he wanted to. Apparently (and please correct me if I'm wrong), you think this. Compatibilists (or at least some types of them) think this too. And, he has a 0% chance of doing something different. You think this (please correct me if I'm wrong). Compatibilists think this too.

It's really starting to look to me like the type of free will you believe in isn't necessarily incompatible with determinism at all.

[henry quirk]

That's not a small point to make.

From where I sit it appears as a trivial observation. Junior always takes the nip can't be anything but trivial when divorced from the topic. In context it becomes remarkable as it leads to conversation about the topic.

Really, is Henry and the determinist both think Junior will take the nip of consequence?

If it is: I'm not seein' it.

The reason this is all important is because, up to this point in the conversation, many different things you've said have aligned in a very, very "compatibilist" direction. He has free will, even though he's guranteed to make a particular choice. He COULD make a different choice, in SOME sense, even though you fully expect that if you were to rewind time a million billion times, he never ever would.

As I say: all things bein' equal, why would Junior choose differently? This, I think, is not a small point.

So "could" ends up meaning something a bit more subtle than what it normally means.

Not really. In my work, I travel a lot. Early on, I mapped out the best routes. I could take any number of routes, but I stick religiously to those that get me where I wanna go the fastest. All things bein' equal from day to day, I have no reason to alter my routes. I could, but choose not to. So could means what it's always meant. There's no need to reframe it or give it subtly its use doesn't require.

So what does "could" mean here?

That he could.

Well, the compatibilist interpretation says, "he could have, *if he wanted to*". Right? "He doesn't want to, in this moment, but he could if he did". That seems to really, really closely mesh with what you've been saying. You've been saying things like "He could, but why would he?"

That's not compatibilism. Compatibilism attempts to reconcile free will with determinism. Unless you wanna redefine one or the other or both, this reconciliation isn't possible. You, for example, are a compatibilist, yeah? Please, define free will and determinism. Don't try to reconcile them. Just tell me your definitions. I reckon at least one will differ significantly from mine.

he has a 0% chance of doing something different. You think this

I don't. Junior declining the nip; my takin' different routes: there's a chance, no matter how small, either of of us might.

It's really starting to look to me like the type of free will you believe in isn't necessarily incompatible with determinism at all.

If I were a materialist, you'd be right. My problem then, of course, would be avoiding promissory materialism. But wait! I've already been down that road! I was a materialist and a compatibilist. It was confronting promissory materialism (among other things) that moved me from materialism, compatibilism, and atheism to a kind of dualism/hylomorphism, libertarian free will, and deism.

[henry quirk]

If determinism is true, there's only the illusion of thinking.

What's the difference between "thinking" and the "illusion of thinking"?

One is real; the other *ahem* is illusion.

[Flannel Jesus]

he has a 0% chance of doing something different. You think this

I don't. Junior declining the nip; my takin' different routes: there's a chance, no matter how small, either of of us might.

How did you go from "no, he wouldn't make a different choice" to now saying there's a small chance? You weren't disagreeing with me every time I used the word "guranteed". I'm getting whiplash here