Harry Baird wrote: ↑Sat Jul 23, 2022 7:02 pmAs I responded when you first suggested this, this seems to me more to set the context in - or to - which first principles apply than to be a(n outcome of a) first principle itself, but sure, the unavoidability of a cognitive being having some sort of "intuitive feeling about the immanent nature of reality" could be seen as axiomatic and in some sense a "first principle". Two points seem worth making though:
Firstly, it doesn't seem to get us very far. I don't see how it helps with the derivation of any further truths - certainly not of the sort[1] which Weaver presents. There must be some other first principle(s) on which these are based, unless they are "arbitrary" in a
cultural sense as RW defines that term: being of "a proposition behind which there stands no prior" (page 19). If they are arbitrary in this sense, though, then they are not objective, and thus can't be those "objective truths" which RW claims are being denied in modernity (page 4) - in which case, it seems that he has largely left objective truth out of his book.
If all men have a metaphysical dream, and that being human involves the necessity of living through a metaphysical dream, I would agree that not only is this a first principle but it is also a sort of human condition. So I agree that such is a 'context'. But that bolsters the fact that if that is true, and that a metaphysical dream is a realization or projection of patterns said to be 'transcendental', that therefore we live in and through the impingement of transcendental ideas into our plane of existence. I use the term 'imposition' but impingement expresses a similar sense.
Be that as it may your request -- a demand in
deadly seriousness -- was that I present to you an example and, given my time limitation and that I do not generally respond very positively to demands of this sort (
"Do thus and such for me right now!") still I made the effort.
To further understand Weaver we would have to firmly grasp that he is a Platonist and so if there are first principles that he recognizes and subscribes to, and this is certainly the case, and if you yourself wished to understand why and how he recognizes them as such (and as
logical irreducibles) you need look no further than the sort of proofs offered in Platonic dialogues. So here is an example of a set of Platonic proofs for the immortality of the soul:
Plato's 19 Proofs of the Immortality of the Human Soul
If ever you did choose to examine Weaver's other work -- and especially for example his exposition on rhetoric -- you would see that he deals pretty exclusively in Platonic terms of understanding.
The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric
See the pages included there from
Language is Sermonic and
The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric.
So it should be clear that to understand Weaver's perspective a backgrounding in Platonism is needed. And again I assume that he assumed that those who read him would have such a background. Since, as I also suggest, Plato was until very recently the stuff of grammar school education. But since he is not, and since culturally we do not deal in these ideas, except in forms that could be described as partial and degenerate, in this sense Weaver laments
the falling away from transcendentals. The idea is powerful: what is transcendental is always understood as 'coming from above' as guiding principle. When one falls down -- and here is a very Platonic idea -- one falls from Being (the real, the true, the constant) down into the mutable, the changing, the not-constant.
So what is 'salvation' in this particular sense? A set of ideas through which one recovers a sense of what is upper and higher; that which empowers the living of life on higher planes, and also that which cures and heals (the fallen, degenerate condition).
So:
Firstly, it doesn't seem to get us very far. I don't see how it helps with the derivation of any further truths - certainly not of the sort[1] which Weaver presents.
It sets the stage -- the entire conceptual basis for human cognition and metaphysical dreams -- for the capture and elucidation of those 'transcendentals' Weaver deals on.
There must be some other first principle(s) on which these are based, unless they are "arbitrary" in a cultural sense as RW defines that term: being of "a proposition behind which there stands no prior".
I am uncertain if the core ideas, or the first principles, brought to the logical fore in Plato's arguments should be classed as 'arbitrary'. But isn't that the real issue here? How is truth defined? And is it possible to say anything that is truthful? Behind that question is, of course, the larger question: are transcendentals real or 'invented'? The nominalists say, as I assume you know, that they are 'arbitrary' (or in any case they began an idea movement that made such assertions). So when Weaver speaks of a deal made with the *witches* on the *heath* and asks us to consider how it has come about that transcendentals were -- what is the right word? -- undermined, invalidated? Well right there you see very clearly what ultimately concerns Weaver.
Now I have to make a few statements to clarify my own position. I say that I am a 'friend' of Christianity and I say that there is a great deal that is important in Christianity. But I do not see 'the story' as being the most relevant part. And as you say the story is riddled with contradictions. However, behind the Story are concepts, and these are metaphysical concepts, and they can be arrived at through rational and discursive methods. So whenever it is necessary to talk and communicate through ordered ideas, the ideas within and if you will behind Christianity, must be dealt with in philosophical terms not in religious terms. I mean to say not in emotional-religious terms of "I believe!" but rather "I understand!"
And this all turns back again toward the ways and means that first principles are arrived at rationally, discursively. The real world in which we are ensconced, is a fantastic and utterly strange world of processes
but not ideas. Ideas enter our world uniquely through the human being. What is 'transcendental' therefore refers to that stuff or to that content. Is it 'substantial'? That would be rather impossible to assert. Is it consequential? Indeed it is. What comes through man's psyche -- that is transcendental ideas -- is the stuff that makes the human world.
Is it possible to locate within these 'transcendentals' ideas that are irreducible? Is this not what we are talking about
ultimately?