Philosophy Now Forum

raw_thought wrote:"Sanborn" [coffee] is from "Quineing Qualia". Yes, I am familiar with his arguments and have destroyed them in my seminal (pun intended). paper.
I have also showed (here) why his "argument " is silly!

Yes, but I am wanting to know if your "ineffable" argument in relation to Dennett is making the claim that he (Dennett) is promoting qualia as intrinsic and non-intentonal properties?

Who knows whatDennett is saying? I am sure he does not either. He says that we have no feelings (qualia) and then that we do. He says that we have "free will" and then that we do not.
Ironically, I like con men. But I do not like Dennett.

As much as Dennett lies, at least he knows* that acknowledging feelings destroys materialism. Epiphenomonolists lack the honesty of a con man!
* With all his disingenuousness!

Anyone that acknowledges the ineffably, intrinsic,private nature of feelings,acknowledges the reality of qualia!

Non - intentional? Matter is only signifiers without a signified. Yes, I acknowledge the absurdity. A signifier without a signified is not a concept,, only the ink pattern.Unfortunately, English (and especially philosophical terms).fails us.

Ginkgo wrote:

raw_thought wrote:"Sanborn" [coffee] is from "Quineing Qualia". Yes, I am familiar with his arguments and have destroyed them in my seminal (pun intended). paper.
I have also showed (here) why his "argument " is silly!

Yes, but I am wanting to know if your "ineffable" argument in relation to Dennett is making the claim that he (Dennett) is promoting qualia as intrinsic and non-intentonal properties?

He rejects intentionality. At least when he is consistent.
Google," cognitive qualia" or "cognitive phenomenology ".
Meaning makes no sense without subjective experience. For example, "1+1=2" is only an ink pattern until understood by consciousness. I gave the sites. Scroll back.

There is no intentionality without qualia.

raw_thought wrote:There is no intentionality without qualia.

No, there are no qualia at all. Though what you speak of does exist, but by another(other) name(s). You speak of programming (learning) which is memory + recall; the essence of a recording. Of course it is also to do with associations thus permutation. And yet more even, as it's to do with a unique set of experiences, where for each of us they differ, in their order, intensity, and thus our resolve. Of course all of that is physical in nature, (material) as outlined by the physics of the universe. You know, electrons, protons, neutrons, the four forces, etc. In your mind, what ever you visualize, is a representation created by physical means. There is no discernible ghost in the machine. Though just like gods and beons, anyone can argue that the illusory does in fact exist in their minds, and feel good about being right. Why? Because just like those that believe in them, no one can prove otherwise. And that's a fine way for some to believe they're original, that they're capable, that they're smarter than others. It's a fine pacifier.

The problem with your ghost (qualia), beons or gods that you/others say is inside of you, is that you are also then trying to thrust them into me, and all other humans as well. And you're going to get some major resistance then because no one wants you putting imaginary things in their head. Keep your hands out of my head will you? I don't want anyone thrusting, gods, beons or qualia into my head. It's my head I tell you! And since your type is so hell bent on placing things in our heads, we all have to wonder what the hell is in your head? That is that you can't understand that we don't want your hands in there.

Keep it up and I'll try and put leprechauns, and pots of gold in your head.

No, not really, because I couldn't stand my self for trying to do something so absurd. Or I'd at least sincerely listen to your argument knowing how I was invading your space. That would be the least I could do, right?

raw_thought wrote:There is no intentionality without qualia.

How are the two necessarily connected?

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

raw_thought wrote:There is no intentionality without qualia.

How are the two necessarily connected?

Well of course he's saying that the program can't run until someone presses the enter key. Of course the human computer is automatic. I would argue that ones intentions to drive their car would have to do with programming (intention) to get food, because one has to eat, thus has to have money to buy food, thus has to go to work to get money, thus has to drive their car to get to work. That it's not qualia that drives the intention, rather physical necessity that drives the intention. Does a baby have that intention, as presented above? Of course not, because they have not been programmed to seek nourishment via cars yet. Their programming (intention) is to cry when things are unpleasant, as the parent checks to see exactly what the problem is.

Of course you can keep trying the ways of Socrates, if you're capable, but I think you're fighting a loosing battle. I think he's being obstinate for it's sake alone.

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

raw_thought wrote:There is no intentionality without qualia.

How are the two necessarily connected?

See "Cognitive qualia" and/or "cognitive phenomenology " and/or "symbol grounding problem". I gave those sites. I am on my tablet but will reintroduce them tomorrow.

Spheres,
I know that you do not believe that you have feelings (qualia).
However, your only argument is to accuse me of believing in ghosts because I believe in subjectivity. Please, scroll back. You keep implying that I do not believe that the brain facilitates qualia. I never claimed that. I am tired of repeating myself over and over and over.

SpheresOfBalance wrote:

Hobbes' Choice wrote:

raw_thought wrote:There is no intentionality without qualia.

How are the two necessarily connected?

Well of course he's saying that the program can't run until someone presses the enter key.

Umm no, I am not claiming that one cannot run the program without pressing the key. Which is in a way true but has nothing to do with what we are talking about. Your metaphor has nothing to do with what we are talking about.
I am saying that intentionality cannot be physical because matter lacks the ability to refer. For example, the ink pattern "on" does not refer to an on light.
See "symbol grounding problem".

You are obviously confusing the philosophical term "intentionality " (which means that something can refer to something else) with "intentionality " in its common useage ( that I purposely do something).

raw_thought wrote:Who knows whatDennett is saying? I am sure he does not either. He says that we have no feelings (qualia) and then that we do. He says that we have "free will" and then that we do not.
Ironically, I like con men. But I do not like Dennett.

Well I do. As far as free will is concerned Dennett is a compatibilist.