Philosophy Now Forum

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Mon Sep 18, 2023 6:03 pm

henry quirk wrote: ↑Mon Sep 18, 2023 2:38 pm So, for the subjectivist, morality is nuthin' but a personal matter. For him it can't be anything else. He has no measure for right or wrong outside of his opinion of the moment. In weight, choosing not to rape or slave or murder, or steal or defraud is of no more consequence than choosing not to have coffee before bedtime. How it conveniences or inconveniences him is his only measure.

neither moral realism nor subjectivism are a guarantee of caring about rape or slavery.

It seems to me the subjectivist would probably have some view, would care, if he were the target of a rapist or slaver, same as the moral realist. The difference, of course, is the moral realist could tell us exactly what his objection to being raped or slaved is (something like it's a violation of my exclusive moral claim to my life, liberty, and property) while the subjectivist can only say it's against the law or I don't wanna be raped or slaved or some such. It also seems to me the moral realist is more apt to care about the the rape or enslavement of others. How can he not?

In fact there were periods where the majority of moral realists believed the latter was fine in many countries. And rape was also OK to moral realists in many contexts.

Well, I din't know that the majority of avowed moral realists were like that. As for those who were we have to look at why moral realists would assess so wrongly. In every such case the target of their assessments was viewed as less than or other than. It's nonsensical to me why a black man or a woman might be thought of as less than or other than, but they, and others, have been and are. The difference, of course, is when a subjectivist rapes or slaves his defense, as hollow and untrue as it is, is that neither rape or slavery is wrong objectively while the moral realist must justify his assessment of his target for rape or enslaving. The subjectivist is at least self-consistent while the moral realist reveals himself as a hypocrite on top of being a violater.

Just because someone has a metaethical position that morals are subjective does not mean they think actions do not have consquences. Nor does it mean they are indifferent. It just means they don't think there is a way to determine objective morals.

Sure, as I say: the subjectivist can say it's against the law or I [or another person] don't [doesn't] wanna be raped or slaved or some such. And he can feel strongly about it.

Their loathing of rape might lead them to all sorts of reactions to it.

Sure.

And moral realists are capable of convincing people all sorts of atrocities are good. That's right to believe that kiling all the jews or raping the women of the enemy or torturing people for blashemy or whatever anyone here might think of as either morally wrong or simply as acts they despise can and has been justified through moral realism.

That's right. Moral realists can choose to violate others.

subjectivists need not and most do not consider not getting coffee and rape as on a par with each other.

Yes, but I didn't say any subjectivist would view his opinion on rape (and let's remember: the subjectivist can only have a moral opinion) as lightly as he might choosing to forgo coffee. I said: In weight, choosing not to rape or slave or murder, or steal or defraud is of no more consequence than choosing not to have coffee before bedtime. How it conveniences or inconveniences him is his only measure. His personal investment aside, on the grand scale, choosing not to rape, for the subjectivist is as morally neutral, or amoral, as choosing to forgo coffee. He may loath rape, but he has nuthin' but his own opinion as a measure. He can't say rape is objectively wrong becuz, for example, it violates an exclusive moral claim. He can only say people don't like being raped or it's against the law.

Empathy, disgust, dislike, yearnings for a safe society and many other facets of subjective humans can all lead to very similar positions on acts in society as some moral realists have.

I say those strivings are becuz moral realism is true and subjectivism is false. I say the subjectivist is as much a moral realist as the avowed moral realist. I say his aversion to murder, slavery, theft, fraud, rape is becuz he knows in his bones, like anyone, like everyone, such acts violate a person's natural, moral, exclusive claim to his, and no other's, life, liberty, and property. Why he denies moral reality while living as a moral realist is akin to why necessitarians deny they're free wills while living as free wills.

henry quirk wrote: ↑Tue Sep 19, 2023 1:36 am It seems to me the subjectivist would probably have some view, would care, if he were the target of a rapist or slaver, same as the moral realist. The difference, of course, is the moral realist could tell us exactly what his objection to being raped or slaved is (something like it's a violation of my exclusive moral claim to my life, liberty, and property) while the subjectivist can only say it's against the law or I don't wanna be raped or slaved or some such. It also seems to me the moral realist is more apt to care about the the rape or enslavement of others. How can he not?

Really? The moral realist needs some kind of abstract theory to not want others to be raped?
That would, to me, make the moral realist heavily brain damaged in relation to others. No self care, no empathy. A very strange person. There are such people, but they are rare.

Do you really need abstract priniciples to find your strong negative reactions to rape of yourself and others?

Well, I din't know that the majority of avowed moral realists were like that.

Slavery was a norm and most people were religious, that is they were one kind of moral realist. And there are modern versions of moral realists who are moving society towards what I could call slavery.

As for those who were we have to look at why moral realists would assess so wrongly. In every such case the target of their assessments was viewed as less than or other than.

Yes. Either via race or because they lost wars. But it doesn't really matter why they were like that. My point was that moral realism doesn't really guarantee very much. And how do you get people to see others as less than...often if not usually via some kind of moral realist system. You need to fight the natural impulse to find the suffering of others unpleasant, horrifying and emotionally painful to watch.

It's nonsensical to me why a black man or a woman might be thought of as less than or other than, but they, and others, have been and are. The difference, of course, is when a subjectivist rapes or slaves his defense, as hollow and untrue as it is, is that neither rape or slavery is wrong objectively while the moral realist must justify his assessment of his target for rape or enslaving.

So, when the moral realist justified rape and slavery he or she does is somehow better because they do it via moral realism?

The subjectivist is at least self-consistent while the moral realist reveals himself as a hypocrite on top of being a violater.

Reveal is projecting their actions into some viewer from another time or culture.

Sure, as I say: the subjectivist can say it's against the law or I [or another person] don't [doesn't] wanna be raped or slaved or some such. And he can feel strongly about it.

Great. In your first description it sounded like a subjectivist by definition must be indifferent.

That's right. Moral realists can choose to violate others.

And not call it violation, of course. Or make people think that violations are neutral or good via the creation of a specific moral realist rule. They have a tool to get others to do things, that may be moral from your perspective or may be immoral from your perspective, while the subjectivist, if they are open about their subjectivism would have a real problem convincing others that they should take on the behavior. So, while moral realism gives the moral realists a tool in persuastion, this tool can be used in strongly contrasting ways.

subjectivists need not and most do not consider not getting coffee and rape as on a par with each other.

Yes, but I didn't say any subjectivist would view his opinion on rape (and let's remember: the subjectivist can only have a moral opinion) as lightly as he might choosing to forgo coffee. I said: In weight, choosing not to rape or slave or murder, or steal or defraud is of no more consequence than choosing not to have coffee before bedtime. How it conveniences or inconveniences him is his only measure.

I hope you can see that the wording there could be easily interpreted the way I did. And it also argues that it is only how it inconveniences the S that would lead the S to weigh it. But there is no reason a subjectivist can't have empathy, either direct or abstract.

His personal investment aside, on the grand scale, choosing not to rape, for the subjectivist is as morally neutral, or amoral, as choosing to forgo coffee. He may loath rape, but he has nuthin' but his own opinion as a measure.

Sure. And people's opinions about what is objectively moral have led to incredible acts of all kinds. I don't see why opinions, driven by emotions, can't do the same for anyone, whatever their metaethical position.

He can't say rape is objectively wrong becuz, for example, it violates an exclusive moral claim. He can only say people don't like being raped or it's against the law. Well, in realpolitik he can do whatever to get to his goals. And if he loathes rape he probably won't go to the town meetings, if they are populated with moral realists and argue it that way. Yes, he would be being a hypocrite. So, in a philosophical discussion he cannot, yes, be consistant an claim his or her position is objectively right. I think most would admit that.

I say those strivings are becuz moral realism is true and subjectivism is false.

And they say different.

I say the subjectivist is as much a moral realist as the avowed moral realist. I say his aversion to murder, slavery, theft, fraud, rape is becuz he knows in his bones, like anyone, like everyone, such acts violate a person's natural, moral, exclusive claim to his, and no other's, life, liberty, and property.

Unfortunately moral realists seem to have an incredible variety of beliefs in their bones.

Why he denies moral reality while living as a moral realist is akin to why necessitarians deny they're free wills while living as free wills.

Could be.

And it could be that the moral realists in relation to morals, belief the way they do for the precise reason you saw the S as handicapped (my wording). The S cannot claim objectivity (at least not in an honest philosophical discussion), while the moral realist feels entitled to tell people that their morality is the correct one, period. That is an advantage in convincing others. So, perhaps that's why they prefer not to think of it as subjective.

Harbal wrote: ↑Mon Sep 18, 2023 11:16 pm I'm glad I didn't post that.

I think the postman posted it.



Maybe he got bored of being a lying policeman.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Tue Sep 19, 2023 5:23 am

Do you really need abstract priniciples to find your strong negative reactions to rape of yourself and others?

Of course not. You punch me, out of the blue, for no reason: I'm gonna get mad. You go after my kid, out of the blue, for no reason: I'm gonna get mad. The topic is is morality opinion or fact? not are principles required to feel or have emotion?

My point was that moral realism doesn't really guarantee very much.

Of course it doesn't. A compass is worthless if you ignore the needle. And no one is forced to mind the needle.

And how do you get people to see others as less than...often if not usually via some kind of moral realist system.

I don't know that overall, over the span of history, that's been true.

And not call it violation, of course.

Of course, hence the mental gymnastics to make the other less than or other than.

I hope you can see that the wording there could be easily interpreted the way I did. And it also argues that it is only how it inconveniences the S that would lead the S to weigh it. But there is no reason a subjectivist can't have empathy, either direct or abstract.

Point taken.

Unfortunately moral realists seem to have an incredible variety of beliefs in their bones.

I don't disagree, but can you give me a concrete example? I wanna illustrate sumthin' and I'd like your help.

henry quirk wrote: ↑Tue Sep 19, 2023 11:14 am of course not. You punch me, out of the blue, for no reason: I'm gonna get mad. You go after my kid, out of the blue, for no reason: I'm gonna get mad. The topic is is morality opinion or fact? not are principles required to feel or have emotion?

I was respönding to

It also seems to me the moral realist is more apt to care about the the rape or enslavement of others. How can he not?

That is focused on emotions. It's a claim that the moral realist will care more, which means have more intense emotions related to X.

My point was that moral realism doesn't really guarantee very much.

Of course it doesn't. A compass is worthless if you ignore the needle. And no one is forced to mind the needle.

So, neither S nor MR guarantee engagement or caring.

And how do you get people to see others as less than...often if not usually via some kind of moral realist system.

I don't know that overall, over the span of history, that's been true.

Religious schisms are often put in objective moral terms. The communists gave moral justifications for both revolutionary acts that then for purges, and whatever they did in other countries. Hitler certainly justified things on moral realist grounds.

I don't know how to come up with a percentage, and in a sense it's unfair to moral realists since most people have been moral realists or at least claimed to be. We don't really have good numbers or ways to analyze subjectivists.

And not call it violation, of course.

Of course, hence the mental gymnastics to make the other less than or other than.

Right. I think to get, for example, mass killing or slavery you need some kind of moral realism to justify it. Rape happens on a more individual basis. Systematic rape however, like in the Balkans, unsually has some kind of moral realism behind it.

Unfortunately moral realists seem to have an incredible variety of beliefs in their bones.

I don't disagree, but can you give me a concrete example? I wanna illustrate sumthin' and I'd like your help.

Sure. And I appreciate the tone of our interaction.
So, well proslavery antislavery. This even had moral realists within Christianity on both sides.

Morality is a socially constructed process, no individual, standing alone, can ever be moral or immoral.

Man created God to make society moral. And now there are two of you. You and God battling for the same one good place.

Dontaskme wrote:no individual, standing alone, can ever be moral or immoral

Nah.

Just watched a drama about the Irish Catholic church's monstrous cruelty in its treatment of 'fallen women' in the 'Magdalen laundries'.

An observation. It's much easier to justify atrocities if you think there are moral facts - and that you know what they are.

Moral objectivity is an insidious evil, because it can give people permission to dress up their wickedness as goodness. IC on the 'moral abomination' of homosexuality is an example.

Magnus Anderson wrote: ↑Tue Sep 19, 2023 1:16 pm

Dontaskme wrote:no individual, standing alone, can ever be moral or immoral

Nah.

Exactly, unless you think torturing kittens isn't immoral.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Sep 19, 2023 7:21 pm Just watched a drama about the Irish Catholic church's monstrous cruelty in its treatment of 'fallen women' in the 'Magdalen laundries'.

An observation. It's much easier to justify atrocities if you think there are moral facts - and that you know what they are.

Moral objectivity is an insidious evil, because it can give people permission to dress up their wickedness as goodness. IC on the 'moral abomination' of homosexuality is an example.

Peter, Peter, Peter...

It CAN'T be "wrong" to declare ANYTHING a "moral abomination," remember? You said that morality is merely subjective. If somebody has the subjective state of finding homosexuality abominable, you've lost any ability to say anything at all about it...at least, if you want to make sense with what you've already declared to be true...namely, that morality is no more than that.

So there's no "wickedness" for you. And there's no "insidious," or "evil." Nobody needs "permission" for anything...where would they get it from, anyway, in a subjectivist world?

But I don't think you believe your own argument. You think there ARE objective values, and you think that declaring homosexuality "abominable" or "dressing up evil" or "cruelty" or "atrocities" are WRONG, and objectively so. If you don't, nothing you say above even makes sense.

If you can't even keep faith with yourself about that, why should anybody believe you even know a thing about rational consistency, let alone morality.

( wrong thread )

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Tue Sep 19, 2023 11:55 am

That is focused on emotions. It's a claim that the moral realist will care more, which means have more intense emotions related to X.

In context: I used care about as I would have moral concern for.

Religious schisms are often put in objective moral terms. The communists gave moral justifications for both revolutionary acts that then for purges, and whatever they did in other countries. Hitler certainly justified things on moral realist grounds.

Anyone can use moral language or moral-sounding language. That doesn't make them moral realists. We have to examine what is said and the morality undergirding what is said.

Two examples...

A person, any person, every person, has an exclusive claim on his, and no other's, life, liberty, and property. It is wrong, therefore, to murder, to slave, to rape, to steal, to defraud. In short, it's wrong to treat another's life, liberty, and property as though his were your own. -H. Quirk

The stronger must dominate and not mate with the weaker, which would signify the sacrifice of its own higher nature. Only the born weakling can look upon this principle as cruel, and if he does so it is merely because he is of a feebler nature and narrower mind; for if such a law did not direct the process of evolution then the higher development of organic life would not be conceivable at all. A. Hitler

Both examples use moral language: which is actually moral?

Which brings us back to definitions of morality. I think such definitions are only coherent if universally applicable.

In the first example the principle offered applies to everyone. In the second, not so much.

We don't really have good numbers or ways to analyze subjectivists.

As most subjectivists are atheists, we can start with them. Communists, as you say, use moral arguments (I say they use moral sounding arguments). Communists are atheists. And, I think, like the author of the second statement, they are not moral realists (perhaps I should say moral objectivists where I say moral realists: the two are close but not synonymous; the first mebbe is more accurate, in the context of our conversation).

I think to get, for example, mass killing or slavery you need some kind of moral realism to justify it.

Well, you have to use forceful language. You must assert. Subjectivism doesn't offer that.

Take Adolph's statement from above recast as an avowed subjectivist might say it...

In my opinion those I see as stronger must dominate and not mate with the weaker. Such couplings, in my view, signify the sacrifice of what I believe is their higher nature. In my opinion, only the born weakling can look upon this principle as cruel, and if he does so it is, I think, merely because he is of a feebler nature and narrower mind; for if such a law did not direct the process of evolution then, it seems to me, the higher development of organic life would not be conceivable at all.

Not very pursuasive.

You: Unfortunately moral realists seem to have an incredible variety of beliefs in their bones.

Me: I don't disagree, but can you give me a concrete example? I wanna illustrate sumthin' and I'd like your help.

You: proslavery antislavery. This even had moral realists within Christianity on both sides.

I can forgo my illustration for now. I said what I wanted just above. Thanks, though.




edited for clarity

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Sep 19, 2023 7:48 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Sep 19, 2023 7:21 pm Just watched a drama about the Irish Catholic church's monstrous cruelty in its treatment of 'fallen women' in the 'Magdalen laundries'.

An observation. It's much easier to justify atrocities if you think there are moral facts - and that you know what they are.

Moral objectivity is an insidious evil, because it can give people permission to dress up their wickedness as goodness. IC on the 'moral abomination' of homosexuality is an example.

Peter, Peter, Peter...

It CAN'T be "wrong" to declare ANYTHING a "moral abomination," remember? You said that morality is merely subjective. If somebody has the subjective state of finding homosexuality abominable, you've lost any ability to say anything at all about it...at least, if you want to make sense with what you've already declared to be true...namely, that morality is no more than that.

So there's no "wickedness" for you. And there's no "insidious," or "evil." Nobody needs "permission" for anything...where would they get it from, anyway, in a subjectivist world?

But I don't think you believe your own argument. You think there ARE objective values, and you think that declaring homosexuality "abominable" or "dressing up evil" or "cruelty" or "atrocities" are WRONG, and objectively so. If you don't, nothing you say above even makes sense.

If you can't even keep faith with yourself about that, why should anybody believe you even know a thing about rational consistency, let alone morality.

We have to be generous and assume Pete meant in my opinion all the way thru.

henry quirk wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 2:23 pm Anyone can use moral language or moral-sounding language. That doesn't make them moral realists. We have to examine what is said and the morality undergirding what is said.

In my experience most people believe some things are just wrong, period. Not a matter of preference, taste, empathy or desire, but there is write and wrong. There are sociopaths and psychopaths who don't believe and there is a small percentage of people who do not believe in objective morals but who are not psychopaths. IOW they have empathy for other people but are nto moral realists. The vast majority of people, in my experience, are moral realists. They may think God made it this way or have other reasons for believing that some things are good and some are bad/evil.

Two examples...

A person, any person, every person, has an exclusive claim on his, and no other's, life, liberty, and property. It is wrong, therefore, to murder, to slave, to rape, to steal, to defraud. In short, it's wrong to treat another's life, liberty, and property as though his were your own. -H. Quirk

The stronger must dominate and not mate with the weaker, which would signify the sacrifice of its own higher nature. Only the born weakling can look upon this principle as cruel, and if he does so it is merely because he is of a feebler nature and narrower mind; for if such a law did not direct the process of evolution then the higher development of organic life would not be conceivable at all. A. Hitler

Here Hitler doesn't speak/write in particularly moral terms despite the must. But in other places he was definitely speaking moral language, and I do believe he thought he was doing good in the world.

The leaders of the Third Reich propagated a particularistic morality that was to replace the universalistic tradition of Christian and Enlightenment ethics and compassion to Aryan Germans, the Volksgemeinschaft. The Nazi regime saw empathy, pity, and mercy towards ‘racial aliens’, especially Jews, to ‘community aliens’, and other individuals and groups as a threat to or burden on the Volksgemeinschaft and denounced them as immoral. This morality built upon pre-Nazi ideologies, social Darwinism and racial hygiene, the code of honour, the ideal of emotional hardness, and the priority of the community over individualism. While motivating the deeds of many Nazi perpetrators, it also affected larger parts of Nazi society as it challenged the old moral standards.

Both examples use moral language: which is actually moral?

Which brings us back to definitions of morality. I think such definitions are only coherent if universally applicable.

In the first example the principle offered applies to everyone. In the second, not so much.

Moral realism varies. Your morality includes the idea that everyone should have certain rights - you didn't use that word but I think it fits. Other peoples morals do not have this idea. You may well say that they aren't moral. And they may well say your aren't. That's part and parcel of moral realisms. They vary and judge each other.

We don't really have good numbers or ways to analyze subjectivists.

As most subjectivists are atheists, we can start with them. Communists, as you say, use moral arguments (I say they use moral sounding arguments). Communists are atheists. And, I think, like the author of the second statement, they are not moral realists (perhaps I should say moral objectivists where I say moral realists: the two are close but not synonymous; the first mebbe is more accurate, in the context of our conversation).

I think they dislike, for example, capitalism because they see it as being unfair, and thus wrong/immoral. They are great moralizers. They just have a different set of morals, though certainly with overlaps, from you are others.

I think to get, for example, mass killing or slavery you need some kind of moral realism to justify it.

In my opinion those I see as stronger must dominate and not mate with the weaker. Such couplings, in my view, signify the sacrifice of what I believe is their higher nature. In my opinion, only the born weakling can look upon this principle as cruel, and if he does so it is, I think, merely because he is of a feebler nature and narrower mind; for if such a law did not direct the process of evolution then, it seems to me, the higher development of organic life would not be conceivable at all.

Not very pursuasive.

Sure. If you present things to moral realists in subjectivist terms, they remain unconvinced, generally. Of course, a subjectitivst and promote the goals he or she wants in moral realist language. And most moral realists will make means to ends compromises also.

henry quirk wrote: ↑Wed Sep 20, 2023 2:42 pm

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Tue Sep 19, 2023 7:48 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Tue Sep 19, 2023 7:21 pm Just watched a drama about the Irish Catholic church's monstrous cruelty in its treatment of 'fallen women' in the 'Magdalen laundries'.

An observation. It's much easier to justify atrocities if you think there are moral facts - and that you know what they are.

Moral objectivity is an insidious evil, because it can give people permission to dress up their wickedness as goodness. IC on the 'moral abomination' of homosexuality is an example.

Peter, Peter, Peter...

It CAN'T be "wrong" to declare ANYTHING a "moral abomination," remember? You said that morality is merely subjective. If somebody has the subjective state of finding homosexuality abominable, you've lost any ability to say anything at all about it...at least, if you want to make sense with what you've already declared to be true...namely, that morality is no more than that.

So there's no "wickedness" for you. And there's no "insidious," or "evil." Nobody needs "permission" for anything...where would they get it from, anyway, in a subjectivist world?

But I don't think you believe your own argument. You think there ARE objective values, and you think that declaring homosexuality "abominable" or "dressing up evil" or "cruelty" or "atrocities" are WRONG, and objectively so. If you don't, nothing you say above even makes sense.

If you can't even keep faith with yourself about that, why should anybody believe you even know a thing about rational consistency, let alone morality.

We have to be generous and assume Pete meant in my opinion all the way thru.

Of course. Any moral assertion has 'in/my opinion' has a prefix. It's precisely the denial that that's the case that undergirds moral objectivism. "It's just a fact that homosexuality/abortion/capital punishment/eating animals/X is morally right/wrong'.

Anyone who says/thinks it's a fact that X is morally right/wrong is a moral egotist and a fuckwit. The end.