Abortion is Not Permissible, Period!

[Immanuel Can]

You can't prove either as it happens, but there are fewer steps needed to argue for mind, so if anything, it's easier.

Well, as you said, Will, "proof" is for mathematics, not for empirical situations. What we might ask is which one is easier to believe in -- although this would not actually indicate to us that we had the right answer (some people get confused on that, and think that William of Occam was giving us an absolute rule; but you and I probably don't), but then we run into a different problem: the criterion for "easier."

Descartes might tell us that to believe in the existence of one's own mind is all one can do. But a Common-Sense Realist, like perhaps Hume, would say, "Bosh: what's simplest to believe in is what seems to us to be the case by way of ordinary intuitions or common sense." And we'd need to show that "easier" necessarily meant something like "seeming more unshakeable, after gnostic reflection," as in Descartes, not "the first thing a sensible person assumes," like Hume.

So maybe neither is universally "easier" than the other. It all depends on the epistemological route one has chosen, and the criterion one has applied.

[henry quirk]

You can't prove either as it happens

Well, that doesn't seem right. But, then, I never read Discourse on Method and so know nuthin' about Western Philosophy. You, though, you have and you do, so give a brother a hand and tell me why you can't prove either. The plain, Dim Man's, simple english version, please.

[henry quirk]

Bosh: what's simplest to believe in is what seems to us to be the case by way of ordinary intuitions or common sense.

That's what Reid *sez...but I guess he didn't know diddly about Western Philosophy either.




*me too

[henry quirk]

Not to worry: Uwot, bein' a good egg, will give me a micro-education, a little sumthin'-sumthin' to illuminate my dim mind. At least, I hope he will...

[Will Bouwman]

...the evidence for a physical brain is the same as for an ideal brain.

It's not, actually. Idealism has to assume the existence of the real, in order to account for the existence of any non-hallucinogenic/mystical ideas or perceptions, and to distinguish the idea from reality.

What you don't understand is that to some idealists, ideas are reality. I have already suggested that you substitute 'phenomenon' for 'idea' to avoid the naïve linguistic analysis, that leads you to believe that ideas have to be about something; the standard answer to which in 'unicorn'.

But Physicalism is of a different kind; it recognizes ONLY physical reality as real, and simply denies any evidence that ideation has any real-world effect.

Like idealists, physicalists don't all agree on every detail; most admit that explaining how our thoughts arise from matter is a problem, some propose solutions, but very few, some epiphenomenalists perhaps, deny "any evidence that ideation has any real-world effect." So this:

What the first positively requires, the second simply refuses to recognize: namely, the existence of an "other" to reality.

is just uneducated nonsense. As is this:

Descartes (or more precisely, Descartes chosen gnostic methodology, not the man himself, obviously) is squarely in the epistemological not ontological realm. It's nowhere near denying the existence of reality, which Descartes does not even bother to interrogate; but rather it's interrogating the extent and possibility of human certainty or knowledge about reality. The question of whether there actually IS a reality is really not on the table; whether or not human beings can know with certainty there IS an external reality is his question-of-the-moment.

So I'm not sure you get any mileage from Descartes...at least, not on ontology. You'd have to show me you do.

As quoted above:

...whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat...

René Descartes: Discourse on Method
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/59/59-h/59-h.htm

[Will Bouwman]

Well, as you said, Will, "proof" is for mathematics, not for empirical situations. What we might ask is which one is easier to believe in -- although this would not actually indicate to us that we had the right answer (some people get confused on that, and think that William of Occam was giving us an absolute rule; but you and I probably don't), but then we run into a different problem: the criterion for "easier."

Descartes might tell us that to believe in the existence of one's own mind is all one can do. But a Common-Sense Realist, like perhaps Hume, would say, "Bosh: what's simplest to believe in is what seems to us to be the case by way of ordinary intuitions or common sense." And we'd need to show that "easier" necessarily meant something like "seeming more unshakeable, after gnostic reflection," as in Descartes, not "the first thing a sensible person assumes," like Hume.

The only bit of that which isn't ill-informed drivel is the bit you attribute to me.

So maybe neither is universally "easier" than the other. It all depends on the epistemological route one has chosen, and the criterion one has applied.

Right, now we're getting somewhere. One chooses one's epistemological route, doesn't one?

[Will Bouwman]

You can't prove either as it happens

Well, that doesn't seem right. But, then, I never read Discourse on Method and so know nuthin' about Western Philosophy. You, though, you have and you do, so give a brother a hand and tell me why you can't prove either. The plain, Dim Man's, simple english version, please.

I'll do me best. I've said before that the standard for philosophical proof is absurdly high. If you can bear a little of the Discourse on Method this is how Descartes put it:
...I think, therefore I am, was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it...
The reason it is so unshakeable is that it cannot be expressed without being true; you can't say I think, therefore I am if you don't exist. Nothing else can be said about the world with the same absolute certainty, because there are possible extravagant grounds for doubt. Descartes lists a few such as he could be dreaming, delusional or under the spell of an evil demon. These days we're more likely to think in terms of simulated realities, as in The Matrix.
However extravagant those ideas might seem, there is a tiny chance that they are true, and as long as that chance remains, you can't prove them wrong. Idealism springs from the fact that since thinking is the only thing we can prove exists, maybe that's all that does exist.

[henry quirk]

Nothing else can be said about the world with the same absolute certainty, because there are possible extravagant grounds for doubt.

That's a little underwhelming.

Even I know that...

As for the impossibility of truly knowing: technically, you're right. It's impossible to know with complete certainty. Seems to me, though, the pursuit of complete certainty is the pursuit of madness. At the least such a pursuit is a kind of Zeno's paradox with a person always gettin' closer to complete certainty but never achievin' it. Reason, parsimony, experience get us damn close, I think, close enough to confidently say 'the apple on my table is real, it exists independently of me, and it is pretty much as I perceive it to be'.

As for the impossibility of truly knowing: technically, you're right. It's impossible to know with complete certainty.

You surprise me, Henry. Are you not certain that heavier than air human flight is possible, that many diseases are caused by microscopic organisms, that the circulation of the blood leaves and returns to the heart, that lased light, geo-stationary satelites, and wireless communication are possible. These are all things once doubted, but today are certain. Have a look at the periodic chart of chemical elements and tell me which attributes of which elements indicated on that chart are not certain? Of course we are not omniscient or infallible, but that does not mean we nothing with certainty, does it?

I'm absolutely as certain (of those things and others) as I need to be.

I have no doubt, for example, my apple is real, exists independent of me, and is pretty much as I see it, smell it, taste it, feel it.

But, in deference to my Robot Overlord, I accept some minuscule possibility that I'm, for example, a disembodied brain, maintained in a jar in a Cleveland lab, bein' fed impressions of an apple through embedded copper wires. The possibility doesn't keep me up at night, though.

As T Reid sez...

In this unequal contest betwixt Common Sense and Philosophy, the latter will always come off both with dishonour and loss; nor can she ever thrive till this rivalship is dropt, these encroachments given up, and a cordial friendship restored: for, in reality, Common Sense holds nothing of Philosophy, nor needs her aid. But on the other hand, Philosophy, (if I may be permitted to change the metaphor) has no other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them, and draws its nourishment from them: severed from this root, its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots.

And that brings me to the second question...

You say...

there are fewer steps needed to argue for mind, so if anything, it's easier.

Even takin' into account I'm mebbe experiencing a hallucination or simulation, I can still take myself to the local mortuary and open a corpse head with a bone saw. Proving there's a brain doesn't seem difficult. Mind, though, that's a bird of a different color. So how is it easier to prove?

[henry quirk]

This too...

The reason it is so unshakeable is that it cannot be expressed without being true; you can't say I think, therefore I am if you don't exist.

...is underwhelming.

Who, 'cept for some nutjobs, doubts their own existence?

[Immanuel Can]

...the evidence for a physical brain is the same as for an ideal brain.

It's not, actually. Idealism has to assume the existence of the real, in order to account for the existence of any non-hallucinogenic/mystical ideas or perceptions, and to distinguish the idea from reality.

What you don't understand is that to some idealists, ideas are reality.

I completely understand that. Do you understand the implication, Will? It implies there is something else that is not-ideas.

That might seem counterintuitive to you, so let me see if I can explain. Let's suppose that everything was made out of water...you, me, the walls, the sky, stars, galaxies...everything, without exception. Now let's suppose that there isn't even a membrane between all the things that exist that is not also made of nothing but water. The entirety of the universe flows together into one undifferentiated thing, with not even one object, line, or dot to make anything at all different from anything else.

In such a universe, what "exists"? Nothing exists. Astonishingly, we can even say that water itself doesn't "exist," because there's nothing to make a difference between "water" and "not-water." And the sine qua non of existence is that there has to be at least one other thing in existence for something to actually "exist."

So let's take out "water," now, and speak of "ideas." All is "ideas."

If all is "ideas," then nothing exists. Only if there is something that is not-ideas will even the concept "ideas" be something that can exist. So Idealism has to be an affirmation not just of the real existence of ideas, but of the real existence of something not-ideas. If it's total, it's Mysticism; and then it decays immediately into both incoherence and non-existence...which explains why, for example, in Buddhism, Nirvana is not conceived of as a "place" but as a state of "non-being." It's getting off the wheel of existence, of samsara, by being liquidated into the universal.

That's a brain-stretcher, maybe; but I'm sure you can get it.

But Physicalism is of a different kind; it recognizes ONLY physical reality as real, and simply denies any evidence that ideation has any real-world effect.

Like idealists, physicalists don't all agree on every detail; most admit that explaining how our thoughts arise from matter is a problem, some propose solutions, but very few, some epiphenomenalists perhaps, deny "any evidence that ideation has any real-world effect."

And yet, the minute they include "ideas" as a genuine initiator of causal chains, they're really no longer Physicalists. What they think themselves to be becomes moot...they've abandoned the faith of Physicialism, which is to assert that there are NO non-physical causes.

I never promised you, Will, that all Physicalists were consistent. They're not. They're actually logically incapable of being consistent, since even the most ardent among them still has to get up in the morning and live life. So by their actions, they all betray that they believe in their own cognition, and on their own decisions, and in the possibility of volition, and on mind, identity, consciousness...and dare we say it...even morality, as if these things are determinative of what happens to them, and have real effects in the physical world. But none of that can make sense with Physicalism.

[Immanuel Can]

One chooses one's epistemological route, doesn't one?

I have always said that's the case.

However, not all routes are equal, of course.

[Will Bouwman]

Nothing else can be said about the world with the same absolute certainty, because there are possible extravagant grounds for doubt.

That's a little underwhelming.

Ah well, no one is expecting you to be whelmed, much less overwhelmed.

[Will Bouwman]

What you don't understand is that to some idealists, ideas are reality.

I completely understand that. Do you understand the implication, Will? It implies there is something else that is not-ideas.

No it doesn't. Phenomena exist. Therefore what?

[Immanuel Can]

What you don't understand is that to some idealists, ideas are reality.

I completely understand that. Do you understand the implication, Will? It implies there is something else that is not-ideas.

No it doesn't.

Yes, it does. Try to follow the explanation, if you will, Will.

Phenomena exist. Therefore what?

Therefore there is something that is stimulating the existence of the phenomena. And there is something not-phenomenal, even if I don't know exactly what it is.

If not, there are no phenomena. Nothing "exists." All is water/ideas. Therefore, there is no "this" and "that," no "phenomena," and no anything. There is only undifferentiable blankness.

[henry quirk]

Ah well, no one is expecting you to be whelmed, much less overwhelmed.

Got the feelin' I'm gettin' brushed off.

meh

Anyway, what about my 2nd question?

Even takin' into account I'm mebbe experiencing a hallucination or simulation, I can still take myself to the local mortuary and open a corpse head with a bone saw. I can poke it with my finger, lick it if I want. I can pull it from the skull and waggle it in your face. Proving there's a brain doesn't seem difficult. Mind, though, that's a bird of a different color. Some say mind is just brain process and product. Some say it's a thing in its own right. So how is it easier to prove?