Philosophy Now Forum

Belinda wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 12:10 am

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri Feb 05, 2021 10:44 pm

Belinda wrote: ↑Fri Feb 05, 2021 5:55 pm
I figure that reason is more "real" because of my psychological attachment to reality. This attachment is practical and does not integrate with my philosophical belief in non-realism. I pick and choose my ontology according to what problem I want to solve.

Just a sidebar. My understanding was that the analytic/synthetic distinction applies to factual assertions (some propositions), not features of reality, with regard to which the distinction is meaningless.

Yes. Analytic / synthetic or deductive/inductive are to do with how we know , but not what sorts of stuff there is.
However if reality is mind-dependent , and what we know is protean, then reality is unstable. It is therefore wise to regard all synthetic statements such as "killing people is wrong" or " metal sinks in water" as provisional.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 1:28 pm My starting point is that there are three separate and fundamentally different things: features of reality ; what we believe and know about them

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 1:28 pm And I think it's a mistake to muddle up these three things - for example, by mistaking talk about propositions for talk about knowledge.

And the strange idea that logic deals with thinking or reasoning,

Belinda wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 9:54 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 5:22 am

Belinda wrote: ↑Fri Feb 05, 2021 9:41 am "A credible FSK" is the product of reasoning.
However much as I agree with what you have written there is survival value in a positive attitude towards realism. It is one credible attitude to be anti-realist when wearing the philosopher's cloak, and another credible attitude when garbed as a scientist exploring the things of nature which of course include human beings.

The problem with "Philosophical Realism" [especially those of Analytic Philosophy] is that it is an ideology which is dogmatic, political, emotional and uncompromising. Look at how people like PantFlasher, Sculptor and PH [where unable to give sound arguments] go in a frenzy [due to dissonance] when the views of others do not reconcile with their ideological thoughts.

In philosophy-proper what is more relevant is, whether whatever the view, the question is whether it is realistic/pragmatic or not?
This is why we need to fall back of various credible FSKs which is a produce of reasoning and critical thinking plus wisdom.

Philosophical realism is as you say. However when a scientist tries to explain an event he needs to use language that implies there is real truth to be discovered.

Skepdick wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 1:39 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 1:28 pm My starting point is that there are three separate and fundamentally different things: features of reality ; what we believe and know about them

Your "starting point" assumes too much.
There's reality - all there is. To claim that reality has "features" requires knowing that.
How do you know that reality has features?

Model-dependent realism is a view of scientific inquiry that focuses on the role of scientific models of phenomena.[1] It claims reality should be interpreted based upon these models, and where several models overlap in describing a particular subject, multiple, equally valid, realities exist.

It claims that it is meaningless to talk about the "true reality" of a model as we can never be absolutely certain of anything.
The only meaningful thing is the usefulness of the model.[2]

The term "model-dependent realism" was coined by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow in their 2010 book, The Grand Design.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 4:01 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 1:28 pm And I think it's a mistake to muddle up these three things - for example, by mistaking talk about propositions for talk about knowledge.

Is this because you're thinking of how-to-knowledge and/or knowledge by acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge? Or is it just a point that we can talk about propositions from perspectives where we're not worrying about whether they're justified or true? (For example, via meta-level talk about propositions?)

It can generally be used to refer to some or all of the following:
1. The primary bearers of truth values (such as "true" and "false");
2. the objects of belief and other propositional attitudes (i.e. what is believed, doubted, etc.);
3. the referents of "that"-clauses (e.g. "It is true that the sky is blue" and "I believe that the sky is blue" both involve the proposition the sky is blue); and
4. the meanings of declarative sentences.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition

And the strange idea that logic deals with thinking or reasoning,

Logic is a subset of thinking on my view as well. Logic arises from thinking about relations, especially implicational relations, on the most general level of abstraction.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Feb 07, 2021 4:56 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 4:01 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 1:28 pm And I think it's a mistake to muddle up these three things - for example, by mistaking talk about propositions for talk about knowledge.

Is this because you're thinking of how-to-knowledge and/or knowledge by acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge? Or is it just a point that we can talk about propositions from perspectives where we're not worrying about whether they're justified or true? (For example, via meta-level talk about propositions?)

Russell admitted 'knowledge by acquaintance' has critical limitations.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sun Feb 07, 2021 1:57 pm What would you say your comment has to do with the clarification comment I had made?

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 4:01 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 1:28 pm And I think it's a mistake to muddle up these three things - for example, by mistaking talk about propositions for talk about knowledge.

Is this because you're thinking of how-to-knowledge and/or knowledge by acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge? Or is it just a point that we can talk about propositions from perspectives where we're not worrying about whether they're justified or true? (For example, via meta-level talk about propositions?)

And the strange idea that logic deals with thinking or reasoning,

Logic is a subset of thinking on my view as well. Logic arises from thinking about relations, especially implicational relations, on the most general level of abstraction.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Feb 07, 2021 3:44 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 4:01 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 1:28 pm And I think it's a mistake to muddle up these three things - for example, by mistaking talk about propositions for talk about knowledge.

Is this because you're thinking of how-to-knowledge and/or knowledge by acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge? Or is it just a point that we can talk about propositions from perspectives where we're not worrying about whether they're justified or true? (For example, via meta-level talk about propositions?)

And the strange idea that logic deals with thinking or reasoning,

Logic is a subset of thinking on my view as well. Logic arises from thinking about relations, especially implicational relations, on the most general level of abstraction.

In my view, what we mean when we say we know things is what constitutes what we call knowledge. So the classic philosophical questions - what is knowledge and where does it come from? - demonstrate the ancient metaphysical delusion that an abstract noun, such as 'knowledge', is the name of a thing of some kind that exists somehow, somewhere. Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational.

It follows that claims about kinds of knowledge - such as the acquaintance/description distinction, and the distinction of 'how-to' knowledge - are always-already down the rabbit hole. And the expressions 'propositional knowledge' and 'propositional belief' are nice examples of how deep the confusion goes. There are only beliefs and knowledge-claims expressed by means of propositions - which are themselves nothing more than assertions - typically linguistic expressions. The absurdity of talk about 'assertional knowledge' would expose how muddled 'propositional knowledge' really is as an idea.

Propositions are misleading metaphysical fictions. The so-called logical form of a declarative is just another declarative - a linguistic expression - in a special code. And propositions have grammatical subjects and predicates, and some but not all have factual truth-value - so they're nothing more than declaratives: such-and-such is the case - as Wittgenstein put it.

As for logic, the idea that it's 'a subset of thinking' demonstrates the extraordinary power of the myth of propositions: mistaking what we say about things for the way things are. Logic deals with linguistic expressions - the clue's in the name - what can be said consistently, without contradiction. The delusion that logic deals with thought on the one hand, or on the other reality, shows the depth of our bewitchment by the devices of our language.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Feb 07, 2021 3:44 pm In my view, what we mean when we say we know things is what constitutes what we call knowledge. So the classic philosophical questions - what is knowledge and where does it come from? - demonstrate the ancient metaphysical delusion that an abstract noun, such as 'knowledge', is the name of a thing of some kind that exists somehow, somewhere. Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sun Feb 07, 2021 3:53 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Feb 07, 2021 3:44 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 4:01 pm Is this because you're thinking of how-to-knowledge and/or knowledge by acquaintance rather than propositional knowledge? Or is it just a point that we can talk about propositions from perspectives where we're not worrying about whether they're justified or true? (For example, via meta-level talk about propositions?)



Logic is a subset of thinking on my view as well. Logic arises from thinking about relations, especially implicational relations, on the most general level of abstraction.

In my view, what we mean when we say we know things is what constitutes what we call knowledge. So the classic philosophical questions - what is knowledge and where does it come from? - demonstrate the ancient metaphysical delusion that an abstract noun, such as 'knowledge', is the name of a thing of some kind that exists somehow, somewhere. Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational.

It follows that claims about kinds of knowledge - such as the acquaintance/description distinction, and the distinction of 'how-to' knowledge - are always-already down the rabbit hole. And the expressions 'propositional knowledge' and 'propositional belief' are nice examples of how deep the confusion goes. There are only beliefs and knowledge-claims expressed by means of propositions - which are themselves nothing more than assertions - typically linguistic expressions. The absurdity of talk about 'assertional knowledge' would expose how muddled 'propositional knowledge' really is as an idea.

Propositions are misleading metaphysical fictions. The so-called logical form of a declarative is just another declarative - a linguistic expression - in a special code. And propositions have grammatical subjects and predicates, and some but not all have factual truth-value - so they're nothing more than declaratives: such-and-such is the case - as Wittgenstein put it.

As for logic, the idea that it's 'a subset of thinking' demonstrates the extraordinary power of the myth of propositions: mistaking what we say about things for the way things are. Logic deals with linguistic expressions - the clue's in the name - what can be said consistently, without contradiction. The delusion that logic deals with thought on the one hand, or on the other reality, shows the depth of our bewitchment by the devices of our language.

On my view, propositions and logic are both ways that we think, and they're only ways that we think--propositional thinking being meanings we assign to certain sorts of sentences, and logical thinking being generalized thinking about the implications of relations (and then extrapolations about those sorts of relations). Again, they're just ways that we think. Would you say that that view is problematic?

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Feb 07, 2021 4:29 pm I reckon that as long as we remember that 'ways of putting it' - such as talk about minds and mental things and events - are just that - and that the meanings of words can only be in the ways we use them - there should be few conceptual problems.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Feb 07, 2021 4:29 pm But I think a sharp distinction between features of reality, what we believe and know about them, and what we say about them is methodologically essential - for example, in clarifying what we call truth, facts and objectivity - and showing why there can be no moral facts.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sun Feb 07, 2021 4:29 pm But I think a sharp distinction between
features of reality,
what we believe and
know about them,
and what we say about them
is methodologically essential
- for example, in clarifying what we call truth, facts and objectivity
- and showing why there can be no moral facts.

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sun Feb 07, 2021 4:01 am

Belinda wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 9:54 am

Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Sat Feb 06, 2021 5:22 am
The problem with "Philosophical Realism" [especially those of Analytic Philosophy] is that it is an ideology which is dogmatic, political, emotional and uncompromising. Look at how people like PantFlasher, Sculptor and PH [where unable to give sound arguments] go in a frenzy [due to dissonance] when the views of others do not reconcile with their ideological thoughts.

In philosophy-proper what is more relevant is, whether whatever the view, the question is whether it is realistic/pragmatic or not?
This is why we need to fall back of various credible FSKs which is a produce of reasoning and critical thinking plus wisdom.

Philosophical realism is as you say. However when a scientist tries to explain an event he needs to use language that implies there is real truth to be discovered.

Science is leveraged on empirical evidences and induction.
Science starts with an abductive hypothesis which is based on empirical evidence and used induction to arrive at its scientific truth which is not the real truth but a truth relative to the scientific FSK.

However within the scientific FSK, science merely ASSUMES there are real things to be discovered. Whether these ASSUMED real things are independent of humans is debatable within scientists; whatever it is, it is ultimately ASSUMED.
Science, without empirical evidences, would not be that dogmatic [like the ideological philosophical realism] in insisting there are really real things categorically and independent of its FSK.