FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Fri Jul 05, 2019 12:54 pm
That's why this entire thread is a waste of effort. Zero respect shown for the fact that others don't consider that butchery, or achild.
Dear Flashdangerpants,
This tread is not a waste of effort - it is precisely the opposite. It touches directly on one of the most pressing moral issues of our time, and given what is at stake: mere "meat-grinding" or an ongoing holocaust that makes the NAZIs look like amateurs, it deserves to be vigorously, rigorously and exhaustively debated.
My position is that a human being comes into existence at conception, that is, when a male sperm cell fertilises a female's ovum in the womb. As far as science is concerned this is no longer in dispute; the fertilised ovum IS a unique, individual
bone fide human being. The fertilised ovum then develops into a zygote, the morula, then an embryo, next a foetus, and after nine months is expelled from the womb as a new-born infant. From the moment of conception through all of the different
in utero developmental stages the fertilized ovum passes, it remains a unique, individual human being- a member of the species
homo sapiens. This is not a matter of opinion. This is not up for debate. This is a well-established, incontrovertible, hard empirical scientific fact that is accepted by all members of the mainstream scientific establishment in the West. So we can rule a line under that one, and get down to the "nitty-gritty", which is the vexed question of the personhood of the pre-born child.
Suppose we look to see if substance ontology can shed any light on the matter? I think it can. I'm not sure how familiar you are with the relevant concepts, so I'll assume you have no previous or current interest in the field and explain things from scratch.
A substance ontology is about particular things, objects. (If it helps, you can substitute "particular" for "substance") The idea is that "substances", also known as particulars, are things like: trees; dogs, planets; people.
The next step is to refine things a bit more. A "substance ontology" typically also has a claim to the effect that particulars have
natures Consider water. Typically, water is said to have a chemical nature, given by the formula H
2 O. Pure water freezes at Zero (0) degrees Celcius at sea level, and it boils and forms steam (gaseous water) when it is heated to one hundred (100) degrees Celcius. If you think of a glass full of water, it is colourless, odourless, liquid. It is a glass full of "stuff" in everyday language, but the H
2 O molecules are distinct little "packets of reality" with a certain chemical structure that imparts tendencies to them. So the molecules satisfies the the philosophical concept of a
substance, that is, a
particular with a certain
nature or essence.
Each particular kind of substance has a nature (or essence) that makes certain activities and functions possible. A substances' inner nature is an ordered structural unity of ultimate capacities. A substance cannot change its ultimate capacities, that is, it cannot lose its ultimate nature and continue to exist. Consider again, the water molecule, H
2 O, Here are some technical facts about the water molecule for you to glance through...
* The H 2 O molecule id symmetrical and has two mirror planes of symmetry.
*The mean Van der Waals diameter of the H 2 O molecule is 2.82 Angstrom units.
*The distance between each of the two hydrogen atoms and the oxygen atom they are bonded to in a water molecule is 95.84 pm.
*The molar mass of water, H 2 O, is 18.02 g/mol.
* Water molecules are bent in a "V" shape, with the angle between the two hydrogen atoms being 105 degrees.
* The molecular diameter of H 2 O is 2.75 Angstrom units.
* The distance between each hydrogen atom and the oxygen atom in a water molecule is 95.84 pm.
* Water molecules are electrically dipolar, the oxygen atom has a mean negative charge that is about 70% of an electron, with each of the two
hydrogen atoms sharing the neutralising positive charge.
I could go on and on with the technical data relating to water molecules, but it's terribly boring, so I wont. Rather, just imagine that the each of the bullet points about the water molecule I've listed above is a dial on a sensitive, hi-tech machine that has to be set at a certain,
exact position, for the machine runs smoothly and efficiently. Now imagine that this particular machine is a prototype that is very sensitive and potentially unstable, insofar as if you fiddle with its dials - if you tweak one of them just the
TINIEST bit to the left or to the right of their proper settings, the whole machine will explode in your face and end up as pile of shattered, worthless pieces on the floor of the laboratory. In other words, if you were to alter any of the above structural characteristic of the water molecule just the smallest amount, you would not have a water molecule any longer, you would not have the substance that forms ice or steam or the liquid water that you drink when you are thirsty, the stuff that wets you when you are could in the rain, the stuff that mostly forms the waves at the ocean you can ride on your surfboard and so on.
Because substance ontology is such a tricky philosophical art let me re-emphasise two points for you before we continue. They are...
(1) A substance's inner structure IS ITS ORDERED STRUCTURAL UNITY of ultimate capacities.
(2) A substance cannot change in its ultimate capacities; that is, it cannot lose its ultimate nature and continue to exist.
DACHSHUND DOGS, FOETUSES AND ABORTION
NB: The term "foetus" is Latin for "small child." When I use it I an referring to the pre-born baby a pregnant woman carries from the moment of conception to the time it is delivered as an infant 9 months later. In other words, I use the term foetus as an umbrella concept that subsumes the pre-born baby human being in what ever stage of development it happens to be: fertilised ovum, zygote, morula, embryo, etc.
I own dachshund dogs; there are 6 different types of dachshund and mine are the kind called miniature, smooth, red (MSR) dachshunds. Now an MSR dachshund dog, because it has a particular nature, has the ultimate capacity to develop the ability to bark. It may die as a puppy and never develop that capacity. Regardless, it is STILL a MSR dachshund dog as long as it exists, because it possesses a particular nature, even if it never acquires certain functions that by nature it has the capacity to develop. In contrast, a frog is not said to LACK something if it cannot bark, for it is by nature not the sort of being that can have the ability to bark. A dog that lacks the ability to bark is STILL a dog because of its nature.
A human person who lacks the ability to think rationally (because s/he is too young or s/he suffers from a mental disorder like schizophrenia, socialism or feminism

)
IS STILL A HUMAN PERSON because of his/her nature. Consequently, it makes sense to speak of a human beings lack IF AND ONLY IF s/he is an actual person.
Second, a MSR dachshund dog remains the same particular MSR dachshund dog over time from the moment it comes into existence, Suppose I buy an MSR dachshund dog as a puppy and I name him "Mr Peanut." When I first bring him home I notice that he is tiny in comparison to his parents and lacks their physical and intellectual abilities. But over time "Mr Peanut" develops these abilities, learns a number of things his parents never learned, sheds his hair, has his nails clipped and teeth regularly cleaned, becomes 10X larger than he was as a puppy, and undergoes significant development of his cellular structure, brain and cerebral cortex. Yet this grown-up "Mr Peanut" is IDENTICAL to the puppy "Mr Peanut", even though he has gone through significant physical change. Why ? Because living organisms, or SUBSTANCES, maintain absolute
IDENTITY through change. If not, then YOU, Flashdangerpants (FDP), never were literally the same person you were last week (or 5 minutes ago), a teenage FDP, ten-year-pld FDP, 3 -year-old FDP, infant FDP or new-born FDP. But you KNOW that you were, right ? Even though the physical changes between you as an infant and you as an adult are considerable. In fact, the same YOU was also once a FDP fertilised ovum, a FDP zygote and a FDP embryo and so on. To be sure, you HAVE changed. But it is YOU who has changed. Geddit ? It's very important to understand that YOU remain YOU through all the changes. Thus, if you are a valuable person now (and you are) then
YOU WERE A VALUABLE PERSON AT EVERY MOMENT IN YOUR PAST, including when you were a tiny pre-born human being in your mother's womb. Got it, Flash ?
OK, the first thing the abortion advocate will typically do in response to the argument I have just set out (above) will be to deny that there is a substantial self that remains the same through all of the accidental changes the human being undergoes, i.e; there is no absolute identity between any stages in the existence of a human being from the moment of conception to death. The abortion advocate will maintain that personal identity consists in a series of experiences that do not require and underlying SUBSTANCE that has the experiences. Thus, my personhood is merely a string of psychological experiences connected by memory, beliefs and/or character as well as causal, bodily and temporal continuity. And because this continuity does not extend to the foetal stages of existence, and perhaps, even to infancy, the unborn are not persons. Let's call this the "no-subject view." Before I rebut it, we need to look at the various personhood criteria that are proposed by abortion advocates and what the main problems are with these criteria. I will conclude this post by dealing with these criteria, and then set out the remainder of my case against abortion in a follow up post because to set out my entire "substance ontology argument" against abortion in this post alone would make it far too lengthy. And I realise that forum members find reading long posts on complex philosophical matters very taxing. Still, the issue of abortion cannot be meaningfully discussed in 2 and 3 brief paragraphs, it is a tremendously complex moral issue, and I am doing my level best to try and be as succinct as possible.
PERSONHOOD CRITERIA AND THE PROBLEMS WITH THEM
The pro-choice abortion movement's advocates deny that the unborn child is a person, what they affirm is that the unborn does not become a human PERSON until some decisive moment AFTER conception.
There are various positions they take. Some, for example, argue that personhood does not arrive until brain waves are detected (at 40-43 days after conception). Others insist that what defines a person, is that s/he is a being who can engage in: cognitive acts such as rational thought and sophisticated communication; consciousness; solving complex problems; self-motivated activity; having a self-concept and such like. This would put the arrival of personhood at sometime AFTER birth. Then there is the more moderate view that human personhood does not arrive until the foetus is sentient, i.e; has the ability to feel and sense as a conscious being. This is thought to possibly occur as early as the middle weeks of the 2nd trimester and definitely by the end of the 2nd trimester.
Although the personhood criteria above differ from each other in important ways, they all have one thing in common: each maintains that IF AND ONLY IF an entity FUNCTIONS in a certain way are we warranted in calling that entity a PERSON.
Defenders of these criteria argue that once a human being, whether born or unborn, acquires a certain function or functions - whether it is brain waves, rationality, sentience, etc; - it is then and only then that a person actually exists. The abortion advocates who defend these personhood criteria typically make a distinction between "being a human" and "being a person". They have no option but to agree with the science that has unequivocally confirmed a (biological) human being, that is, a member of the species homo sapiens exists at the moment of conception - that a fertilised ovum is a
bone fide homo sapien, but it is not truly a human PERSON until such time as it develops to the stage where it is able to fulfill a particular set of personhood criteria.
Although functional definitions of personhood may tell us SOME conditions that are sufficient to say that a being is a person, they are not adequate in revealing to us all the conditions that are sufficient for a particular being to be called a person. For example, when a human being is asleep, unconscious, or temporarily comatose, s/he is not functioning as a person as described by some personhood criteria. Nevertheless, most people would reject the notion that a human being is not a person while in any of these states. In other words, while the personhood criteria such as the ability to solve complex problems, engage in sophisticated communication; exercise rational thought; possess consciousness; perform self-motivated activity, possess a self-concept, etc; can tell us that a being is a person, these criteria are not adequate to declare a being a non-person. The exercise of rational thought tells us that a being is a person; when that person is asleep, and thus is not exercising rational thought, that lack of exercise of rational thought does not make for a non-person at that time. Given this it seems more consistent with our moral intuitions to say that personhood is not something that arises when certain functions are in place, but rather is something that GROUNDS these functions, whether or not they are ever actualised in the life of a human being. Thus defining personhood strictly in terms of function is inadequate.
The response to this of the abortion advocate - not wanting to abandon her personhood criteria - will often be to argue that the analogy between sleeping/unconscious/comatose persons and functions breaks down because the former AT ONE TIME in their existence functioned as persons and will do so again in the future, while the later did not. But the point seems to ignore the significant flaw in defining personhood strictly in terms of function. For to claim that a human being can be functional, become non-functional, and then return to a state of function is to assume there is some UNDERLYING UNITY to the individual. Thus it is unintelligible for us to say that the person who has returned to being functional is the same person who was functional prior to being in a non-functional state and yet continued to exist while not functioning. If not, then we would have to make the absurd claim that a new "person" has popped into existence and that the original "person" ceased to exist upon the cessation of his/her personhood functions. If, however, we were to identify both the first person and the second person with the
HUMAN ORGANISM from which these personhood functions have arisen, then the human person
IS the human organism as long as the human organism exists.
EXCITING CONCLUSION TO FOLLOW IN MY NEXT POST
Kindest Regards
Dachshund