compatibilism

[promethean75]

Um btw IC the quotes u reply to... the one's u took from the quoted text in my post... are your comrade Rosa's words, not mine.

It would be decent to see u two go some rounds, but I predict reaching a quick impasse and then a cancelation of the fight around five. One or both fighters will leave the ring after an exchange in a debate about religion that sprang from some other orginal subject becomes quasi-hostile and the ad homs, red herrings and strawmanning begins. That or Rosa will be so appalled by your opinion of Karl that she shant speak to u ever again.

[iambiguous]

As noted by others, however, sure, I might be misconstruing his point. For all I know the author herself might be misconstruing it. Strawson seems [to me] to be making a distinction between acting and reacting. Mary acts by aborting her unborn baby/clump of cells. Others react to this in conflicting ways...all up and down the moral, political, and spiritual spectrum. But Mary's behavior itself derives from her own subjective reaction to the unwanted pregnancy. Then the billions and billions of human actions/reactions day after day after day after day going back millenia.

Like clockwork?

He's not drawing a distinction between actions and reactions in any way that implies that one is a free thing and the other is determined.

More to point, however, some argue that the distinction he drew was the only distinction he was ever able to draw.

Or, perhaps, it's like hard determinists asking, "what part of everything that we think, feel, say and do we were never able not to think, feel, say and do" don't you understand?"

And let's get back to how Strawson might have explained his argument to Mary above.

I don't think she is saying that about his thoughts but one can read Strawson's arcticle here, for example
https://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/P._ ... ntment.pdf

Then the part where some compatibilists will argue that even though you were never actually able to read the article, you are still responsible for, what, understanding what it said?

We have evolved to have bodily reactions and mental processes that ultimately serve the evolutionary purpose of our preservation, and our reactive attitudes are part of that.

This could certainly be the case. So, how do we go about attempting to actually demonstrate it?

that sentences is, more or less, darwinism. The only problem with it is that it overreaches: we may inherit traits that are slightly negative or neutral. But that sentence holds for most traits.

On the other hand Strawson does not mention evolution. She's going off on her own and adding interpretations. He does call the reactions natural.

Going off on her own? In other words, the possibility that when she does this, she may well have never been able not to. It's not what he calls reactions, some argue, but his capacity to demonstrate that all other rational men and women are obligated to describe them in the same way.

Just out of curiosity, if you were to take his assumptions to a convention of neuroscientists, how might they, well, react to it? Would they be able to connect the dots between the human brain and the human mind here? Such that a chemical and neurological distinction between human action and human reactions can be noted. Can be established?

Neurosciensts tend to assume what you say here.

Or, perhaps, neuroscientists, just like all the rest of us, assume nothing they were ever able not to assume.

Also, as noted before, imagine the universe had locations where free will prevailed and locations where determinsm prevailed.

We can certainly do that, but Strawson is not saying anything like that.

Well -- click -- maybe he should have.

She isn't saying he is claiming that.

Well -- click -- maybe she should have.

He is saying that the fact of deteminism does not undermine our moral reactions and assigning responsibility.

Right, and then the part where "somehow" the brain has managed to make that distinction between acting and reacting. And even though it would seem to make sense that we be held responsible for things that we opted freely to do, it doesn't make sense [to me] that we be held responsible for reacting to the actions of others if the laws of matter compelled our brain to compel that and only that reaction.

But then the part where I do keep missing the point about compatibilism and moral responsibility. Only in that case how am I not straight back to the assumption "here and now" that I could never have not missed it.

Note to compatibilists:

Please attempt again to explain how you would hold someone morally responsible for something they were never able not to do. If I do keep missing something truly important here then note why you do not keep missing it yourself.

In an argument [since that's as far as we seem able to go here], note how Strawson's assessment above is applicable to your own value judgments...to your own actions and reactions. Note what you would suggest neuroscientists ought to do experientially and experimentally in order to pin this down more...substantively?

And he makes that case and nowhere argues that this is because our actions are free or there are areas of free will (a phrase he does not use) and areas of determinism in the universe.

Uh, how foolish of me to make my point because it's not the point that he is making?

He believes that moral reactions are utterly compatible with determinism, and part of what he does is to show how we decide in a determinist universe if some one is responsible and that how we determine that does not entail arguing that person X was determined and person Y was not.

From my frame of mind -- click -- he was just doing what all the rest of us here are still just doing...accumulating sets of assumptions about the human condition that permit some to believe "in their head" there to be free will.

His final sentence:

When we do remember this, and modify the optimist’s
position accordingly, we simultaneously correct its conceptual deficiencies and ward off the dangers it seems to entail, without recourse to the obscure and panicky metaphysics of libertarianism.

Is it even possible to encompass this more abstractly, academically, analytically? Same thing then: what do you imagine Strawson would say to a woman he believed was determined -- by the laws of nature? -- to have an abortion. Does he just define determinism in such a way that "in his head" he is able to accomplish this? He "just knows" she's morally responsible. Strawson's own rendition of an Intrinsic Self.

Libertarians, unless they are very radical panpsychist, do in fact compartmentalize the universe into those parts that are free agents and the rest being dull matter. Strawson is critical of that position and does not assume areas of freedom, along some action vs. reaction line. He does talk about actions and reactions, but nowhere does he assign one freedom the other determinism.

Right, and how is that not all just unfolding autonomically "in their heads" as well? Unless and until the hard guys and gals out there are able to substantiate which of the worlds of words we exchange here comes closest to what unfolds physiologically in the human brain.

Your sense that libertarians are saying brain cells or humans are regions of free will in a determinstic universe is accurate. I think that's fair, for example, with Henry Quirk. I think nearly by definition compatiblists are not saying that brain tissue or humans are exceptional regions of free will. But in any case there is nothing inherent in compatibilism as a category of belief systems that means some matter is determined and some is not. Libertarians my come from this idea of soul that is free. Some may argue that once there is a level of complexity in matter it no longer has to follow the mechanistic world of the rest of matter. There is an exceptionalism in Libertarian free will positions, unless, as said they consider all matter to be conscious and free. But that's a minority position.

We'll need a context.

Given an interaction you had with others in the past in which value judgments came into conflict precipitating conflicting behaviors, how did you reconcile determinism with moral responsibility.

Then those like peacegirl over at ILP who kept insisting it all comes down to how we define the meaning of determinism and compatibilism and moral responsibility.

Trust me: it will almost always be the way they encompass the meaning of it. Like God, in other words, it's all defined into existence.

My sense is that the only way you can imagine a compatibilist supporting resposibility for our actions is if they think that there is a human/brain exception to determinism.

No, the manner in which I respond to those like Strawson revolves more around the extent to which their brains are no less compelling them to think what they were never able not to think about it.

[iambiguous]

Also, as noted before, imagine the universe had locations where free will prevailed and locations where determinsm prevailed. Those in the free will sector visit Earth in a spaceship from time to time. They gaze down at us in the determined sector. They see us acting, they see others reacting to that, they see us reacting to their reations. But they know that both the actions and reactions observed are wholly programmed by our brains. Basically, they see us interacting the way we see ants interacting...all in sync with brains in sync with the laws of matter.

These space aliens would have to have bodies which do not operate according to rules.

And, going back to the Big Bang, to God, to whatever or whoever is behind the existence of existence itself, what rules might those be? And given the astounding diversity of life forms here on planet Earth [bacteria to blue whales], try to imagine how alien bodies may well be different from our own. Think Arrival, for example: "seven-limbed aliens, whom they call 'heptapods'".

Yet you note things like this...

That's the only way that they could get out of synch with "the laws of matter" or some other rules ... 'the laws of mind energy' maybe.

...as though it actually does go a long, long way towards establishing the objective truth.

Still, given that assessment, how would you encompass moral responsibility in a determined universe? Mary, Jane and "the laws of mind energy".

Going back to...God?

How could they function within a structured universe without structure in themselves? Even if the rules within their own bodies were different from the rules governing the rest of the universe, they would still need consistent rules to function.

Of course, given all of the simply astounding things that astrophysicists have discovered about the Cosmos to date -- Start here: https://www.google.com/search?q=latest+ ... URT-reRWmz

-- why should we imagine them discovering life forms with structures different from ours in regard to brain functions.

[Iwannaplato]

As noted by others, however, sure, I might be misconstruing his point. For all I know the author herself might be misconstruing it. Strawson seems [to me] to be making a distinction between acting and reacting. Mary acts by aborting her unborn baby/clump of cells. Others react to this in conflicting ways...all up and down the moral, political, and spiritual spectrum. But Mary's behavior itself derives from her own subjective reaction to the unwanted pregnancy. Then the billions and billions of human actions/reactions day after day after day after day going back millenia.

Like clockwork?

He's not drawing a distinction between actions and reactions in any way that implies that one is a free thing and the other is determined.

More to point, however, some argue that the distinction he drew was the only distinction he was ever able to draw.

Which would hold also for scientists and of course anyone they communicate with, so the is ought distinction and the science vs philosophy distinctions you emphasize are meaningless.

Or, perhaps, it's like hard determinists asking, "what part of everything that we think, feel, say and do we were never able not to think, feel, say and do" don't you understand?"

And let's get back to how Strawson might have explained his argument to Mary above.

I don't think she is saying that about his thoughts but one can read Strawson's arcticle here, for example
https://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/P._ ... ntment.pdf

Then the part where some compatibilists will argue that even though you were never actually able to read the article, you are still responsible for, what, understanding what it said?

Could you show me any article or text by any compatibilist that leads to that conclusion?

We have evolved to have bodily reactions and mental processes that ultimately serve the evolutionary purpose of our preservation, and our reactive attitudes are part of that.

This could certainly be the case. So, how do we go about attempting to actually demonstrate it?

that sentences is, more or less, darwinism. The only problem with it is that it overreaches: we may inherit traits that are slightly negative or neutral. But that sentence holds for most traits.

On the other hand Strawson does not mention evolution. She's going off on her own and adding interpretations. He does call the reactions natural.

Going off on her own? In other words, the possibility that when she does this, she may well have never been able not to. It's not what he calls reactions, some argue, but his capacity to demonstrate that all other rational men and women are obligated to describe them in the same way.

What's not that? What are you asserting here?

Just out of curiosity, if you were to take his assumptions to a convention of neuroscientists, how might they, well, react to it? Would they be able to connect the dots between the human brain and the human mind here? Such that a chemical and neurological distinction between human action and human reactions can be noted. Can be established?

Neurosciensts tend to assume what you say here.

Or, perhaps, neuroscientists, just like all the rest of us, assume nothing they were ever able not to assume.

Right, so will you stop framing the issue as if scientists weighing in is what is needed, given that you now acknowledge that not only their thoughts and conclusions may well be determined, but then anyone listening to the may be compelled to misinterpret them or believe them not for rational reasons?

Also, as noted before, imagine the universe had locations where free will prevailed and locations where determinsm prevailed.

We can certainly do that, but Strawson is not saying anything like that.

Well -- click -- maybe he should have.

Why should he have? Are you now saying that he should have, and that's why you responded as if he did? Does that make sense to you?

She isn't saying he is claiming that.

Well -- click -- maybe she should have.

Why? Are you now saying that he should have, and that's why you responded as if he did? Does that make sense to you?

He is saying that the fact of deteminism does not undermine our moral reactions and assigning responsibility.

Right, and then the part where "somehow" the brain has managed to make that distinction between acting and reacting. And even though it would seem to make sense that we be held responsible for things that we opted freely to do, it doesn't make sense [to me] that we be held responsible for reacting to the actions of others if the laws of matter compelled our brain to compel that and only that reaction.

Obviously. Could you present the reasoning for your position and perhaps why the reasoning of those who have said it does make sense are incorrect?

But then the part where I do keep missing the point about compatibilism and moral responsibility. Only in that case how am I not straight back to the assumption "here and now" that I could never have not missed it.

Well, first off you could try stopping saying that compatibilists in general and in individual cases are saying that there are regions of free will (in brains for example) and respond to what they do say.

Note to compatibilists:

Please attempt again to explain how you would hold someone morally responsible for something they were never able not to do. If I do keep missing something truly important here then note why you do not keep missing it yourself.

People have done this. I did it over at ILP with the man hitting a stranger with a hammer for no reason. You opted not to respond to that. If you are not going to respond to explanations, why ask for them? I think I've done it here. I know Phyllo has. I believe FJ has done it here. This doesn't mean we proved anything, but as far as I can tell you don't interact with the explanations you request.

In an argument [since that's as far as we seem able to go here], note how Strawson's assessment above is applicable to your own value judgments...to your own actions and reactions. Note what you would suggest neuroscientists ought to do experientially and experimentally in order to pin this down more...substantively?

It's not a neuroscientist issue. Neuroscientists could certainly weigh in on determinism vs free will in the nervous system including the brain. Just as physicists could. But that's not the issue with compatibilists.

And, again, why do you think neuroscienstists should be more convincing: their conclusions, in a deterministic universe would also be determined, and your interpretation and 'being convinced' by them would also be determined.

Why post in a philosophy forum, or two at least, and request explanations when you don't interact with them when they come? If you want neuroscientists to answer your question, why not go to science forums or contact neuroscientists directly?

And he makes that case and nowhere argues that this is because our actions are free or there are areas of free will (a phrase he does not use) and areas of determinism in the universe.

Uh, how foolish of me to make my point because it's not the point that he is making?

Strawman. I have suggested that you simply make your points. The foolishness comes in when you quote someone, then attribute to them a position that they are not asserting. God, it'd be refreshing if you actually presenter YOUR case for why people should not be held responsible given that they are determined, rather than repeating your incredulity about how they could be held responsible.

You quote people, then do not interact with what they are saying. Strawson actually answers your request for an explanation. You quote someone writing about him and then immediately go into regions of matter that are not determined. Somehow, you consider it inappropriate to point out that you are misinterpreting people, not responding to explanations that fit your request and/or simply repeating your assertions.

He believes that moral reactions are utterly compatible with determinism, and part of what he does is to show how we decide in a determinist universe if some one is responsible and that how we determine that does not entail arguing that person X was determined and person Y was not.

From my frame of mind -- click -- he was just doing what all the rest of us here are still just doing...accumulating sets of assumptions about the human condition that permit some to believe "in their head" there to be free will.

What? He is not arguing for free will.

Again, if someone came and quoted from your posts and said Clearly Iambigious is a Bible Thumper, spewing his deontological morality and is willing to force people with violence to agree with him, I''d pop in and say they were mistinterpreting you and back it up by showing whatever they quoted did not support that position. I suspect you would start saying that my interpretation of you is compelled - even if you agree with it in the abstract. You might even, [shock] point out that you did not assert those things and ask for some evidence you did.

If all interpretations are equally suspect because of determinism, then there is no reason to quote anyone, or even to read anyone. You could just present your position. But then, of course, people might expect you to support that position, instead of simply repeating it. I can't see where an unsupported intellectual contraption is better than one that is justified. Appeals to incredulity are not somehow more to the point, or?

[phyllo]

These space aliens would have to have bodies which do not operate according to rules.

And, going back to the Big Bang, to God, to whatever or whoever is behind the existence of existence itself, what rules might those be?

You keep referring to the "laws of nature" ... but now you don't know what they are???

What have you been talking about all these years?

And given the astounding diversity of life forms here on planet Earth [bacteria to blue whales], try to imagine how alien bodies may well be different from our own. Think Arrival, for example: "seven-limbed aliens, whom they call 'heptapods'".

It doesn't matter how many limbs they have or what they look like. Their bodies still function according to the same physical laws as our own bodies.

Yet you note things like this...

phyllo wrote: ↑Wed Sep 25, 2024 7:35 am
That's the only way that they could get out of synch with "the laws of matter" or some other rules ... 'the laws of mind energy' maybe.

...as though it actually does go a long, long way towards establishing the objective truth.

That's just the straight application of reasoning and logic to the problem that has been presented to me. You ought to try it sometimes.

How could they function within a structured universe without structure in themselves? Even if the rules within their own bodies were different from the rules governing the rest of the universe, they would still need consistent rules to function.

Of course, given all of the simply astounding things that astrophysicists have discovered about the Cosmos to date -- Start here: https://www.google.com/search?q=latest+ ... URT-reRWmz

-- why should we imagine them discovering life forms with structures different from ours in regard to brain functions.

The form may be different but the rules that created the form and allow it to function are the same. Therefore, the "laws of nature" will be "compelling" the behaviors of these lifeforms. They would not be able to avoid determinism.

[Flannel Jesus]

The form may be different but the rules that created the form and allow it to function are the same. Therefore, the "laws of nature" will be "compelling" the behaviors of these lifeforms. They would not be able to avoid determinism.

I have a feeling iambiguous is understanding the phrase "laws of nature" in a way that's drastically different from what most people are talking about, given his reference to aliens, as if they have their own laws of nature.

[phyllo]

I assume it's the stuff that one learns in physics and chemistry classes. I don't know what else it could be.

[Atla]

Yes, compatibilists believe in both free will and determinism. They hold that free will can exist even in a deterministically structured universe. According to compatibilists, an action can be considered free as long as it aligns with the agent’s desires, motivations, and rational deliberations, even if those desires and motivations have deterministic causes.

In this view, determinism (the idea that all events, including human actions, are determined by preceding causes) does not negate the notion of free will. Instead, compatibilists redefine free will in a way that focuses on autonomy, rational choice, and the absence of external constraints, rather than on the ability to have acted differently in an absolute sense. Thus, compatibilists affirm both the reality of determinism and a meaningful concept of free will.

According to this AI summary, compatibilists are just determinists, they don't believe in free will. They just redefine free will to no longer mean free will, but still call it free will.

[Flannel Jesus]

Yes, compatibilists believe in both free will and determinism. They hold that free will can exist even in a deterministically structured universe. According to compatibilists, an action can be considered free as long as it aligns with the agent’s desires, motivations, and rational deliberations, even if those desires and motivations have deterministic causes.

In this view, determinism (the idea that all events, including human actions, are determined by preceding causes) does not negate the notion of free will. Instead, compatibilists redefine free will in a way that focuses on autonomy, rational choice, and the absence of external constraints, rather than on the ability to have acted differently in an absolute sense. Thus, compatibilists affirm both the reality of determinism and a meaningful concept of free will.

According to this AI summary, compatibilists are just determinists, they don't believe in free will. They just redefine free will to no longer mean free will, but still call it free will.

Do you personally believe that the ability to have acted differently in an absolute sense, as the basis for free will, makes sense?

[Atla]

Yes, compatibilists believe in both free will and determinism. They hold that free will can exist even in a deterministically structured universe. According to compatibilists, an action can be considered free as long as it aligns with the agent’s desires, motivations, and rational deliberations, even if those desires and motivations have deterministic causes.

In this view, determinism (the idea that all events, including human actions, are determined by preceding causes) does not negate the notion of free will. Instead, compatibilists redefine free will in a way that focuses on autonomy, rational choice, and the absence of external constraints, rather than on the ability to have acted differently in an absolute sense. Thus, compatibilists affirm both the reality of determinism and a meaningful concept of free will.

According to this AI summary, compatibilists are just determinists, they don't believe in free will. They just redefine free will to no longer mean free will, but still call it free will.

Do you personally believe that the ability to have acted differently in an absolute sense, as the basis for free will, makes sense?

That's the definition of free will. I don't understand what you're asking, what could my personal belief have to do with it a definition?

[Flannel Jesus]

That's the definition of free will. I don't understand what you're asking, what could my personal belief have to do with it a definition?

I'm just asking you if you think it makes sense. Are you unavailable to talk about that?. It's okay if you are. If you don't want to express your belief in regards to if it makes sense conceptually to have that absolute ability, I won't make you.

[Atla]

That's the definition of free will. I don't understand what you're asking, what could my personal belief have to do with it a definition?

I'm just asking you if you think it makes sense. Are you unavailable to talk about that?. It's okay if you are. If you don't want to express your belief in regards to if it makes sense conceptually to have that absolute ability, I won't make you.

But I still don't know what you're asking.

Whether it's the right definition of free will? Yes I'd say so

Whether the concept itself can be made sense of? Yes I'd say so

Do I subscribe to it? I don't have a certain position, but I strongly tend towards determinism. So no, I'd say I don't subscribe to it.

[Flannel Jesus]

Whether the concept itself can be made sense of? Yes I'd say so

This.

This is where I get off the libertarian free will train. I don't think that makes sense at all. Not because I'm a determinist - because even if the universe weren't deterministic the concept still wouldn't make sense.

[Atla]

Whether the concept itself can be made sense of? Yes I'd say so

This.

This is where I get off the libertarian free will train. I don't think that makes sense at all.

The concept is that you can choose to do anything, including breaking the known laws of physics. Why doesn't the concept itself make sense?

[Iwannaplato]

Whether the concept itself can be made sense of? Yes I'd say so

This.

This is where I get off the libertarian free will train. I don't think that makes sense at all.

The concept is that you can choose to do anything, including breaking the known laws of physics. Why doesn't the concept itself make sense?

I can't say it doesn't make sense, but the laws of physics is a kind of third person perspective. Let's come from a first person perspective: I am free to choose to do anything. What leads me to whatever choice I make within mass of options? Is it causeless? In what sense is it a choice? or my choice? If I decide, hey, I'll go out dancing, didn't my desire lead to that choice? Is not the choice affected by what I know is available nearby, my budget? If I decide not to do what I desired, isn't that also a desire? a perverse or curious one, but also a desire?
Forget atoms and chemical reactions. Let's pretend were' pre-Democritus. What leads to the choice?