Philosophy Now Forum

iambiguous wrote: ↑Tue Sep 10, 2024 1:31 am Really? You actually believe that in the dream itself you are freely choosing what to think and feel and say and do? If so -- click -- run that by those who explore dreams. I'd certainly be interested in what they have to say about that.

I was careful to say that I wasn't saying that I had free will in dreams or in waking life. I was saying that the experience is really quite similar. I don't wake up and think 'oh, gosh that felt like I was making decisions in the dream, but now I am awake and I know I wasn't.'

I do wake up and think 'Oh, thank goodness, I don't have to give a lecture on a topic I know nothing about' or 'Oh, my goodness, I did not forget to pay my taxes this year.' The 'facts' in the dreams I wake up and have the experience of no longer taking literally, but I my decision-making in these often fantastic or not real scenarios still, upon waking, seems like waking decision making. I do not look back and see it is more fixed, more determined.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Mon Sep 02, 2024 8:43 amWhy could it not be like waking life where things happen that we do not control, but we make decisions in reaction to it. It seems just as clear in the dream to me that I am making decisions as when I make decisions in waking life.

Yes, this may actually be a more accurate account of dream interactions. But what seems clear to you here is, from my own frame of mind "here and now", as just another wild ass guess.

Again, you just agreed with me, but then called it a wild-assed guess.

Again. I am not asserting that I have free will in dreams. I am specifically focusing one what we experience and saying I don't experience a difference between dream decision making and dreaming decisions making in terms of the experience: for example one as free and the other as determined.

I am not guessing, I am describing my experience, not positing some ontological conclusion.

I do wake up and conclude that the things that happened in the dream are not happening in waking life and as facts about what is happening I give them a different status as not literally real. I do not wake up, as your post suggested, and realize oh, all my choices that seemed free choices in the dream, I can now see as not free.

I haven't met people who do that either. If I read your response, here, it seems like you do not have the waking up and realizing that, hey, that decision-making in my dreams was obviously not me making decisions. And that's how you used the example of dreams. Hey, we seem free in dreams, until we wake up and realize we weren't making decisions. But when probed it seems like even you don't have this experience.

And just for over-clarity: This is in contrast to the waking up and realizing that the facts of the dream were not real. That is indeed and experience people have, generally. Gosh it seemed so real that I was living again in my childhood home, but I'm not.

The whole point of your example seemed to be that our apparant free choosing may be just like our free choosing in dreams, be we know when we wake up that we really weren't making decisions in the dream. Well, all I can say is not for me and I haven't heard anyone say that. Though I certainly have, nearly universally about the facts that seem real in dreams.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Mon Sep 02, 2024 8:43 amNote: this is not me arguing that we have free will in dreams. This is me arguing that within the parameters of the options in the dream and my dream attitudes, I see no reason to say my waking life decisions are more free willish than my dream decisions.

Dreams as, what, a manifestation of compatibilism? Mary aborts Jane in her dream when in fact she is not even pregnant.
Is that something the brain is trying to broach with her. Why? Because Mary is reckless sexually and needs to be warned? Maybe on a sub-conscious or unconscious level Mary herself is nudging the brain to go there.

Mary dreaming she has an abortion could be about all sorts of things.

Criticising Strawson’s Compatibilism
Nurana Rajabova is wary of an attempt to dismiss determinism to keep free will.

Strawson then inquires about the influence of determinism on such [moral] responsibility. He asks rhetorically, “Would or should the acceptance of determinism lead to the decay or repudiation of all such attitudes? Would or should it mean the end of the gratitude, resentment, forgiveness and of all essentially personal antagonisms?” He expects that the answer is ‘no’.

Click.

Then back to how we mere mortals in a No God world would go about pinning down whether the questions we ask, the answers we give, our acceptance or rejection of things either are or are not autonomous.

As for someone expecting the answer to be yes or no, nothing changes. Or "somehow" when it comes to things like expectations does the brain manage to intertwine everything into...compatibilism?

Strawson now mentions some exceptional cases where we modify our reactive attitudes and choose to look at things more objectively, or, to use his own words, where we choose to move away from ‘participatory reactions’ to ‘objective attitudes’.

We'll need a context, of course. Otherwise, how exactly is it applicable to human interactions? How, in other words, is it applicable in your life?

It's not that over and again we react as we do to things "out in the world", but whether or not in any capacity our reactions are autonomous.

He reduces such attitude changes to two cases: (1) When a person did something by accident, with no ill will; and (2) When we judge that a person isn’t an appropriate target of any reactive attitude because they lack some relevant capacity – say a child, or someone with severe mental illness.

And around and around and around we go. Children and those afflicted with a mental disease are not held responsible because it is assumed they are either too immature or their brain has become afflicted with one of these...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurological_disorder

...disorders. And, increasingly, things become "beyond their control" .

Unless, perhaps, we were, are and never will really be in control at all. But what does that mean? I merely suggest that given determinism as some understand it, and given what we simply do not know yet about how -- why? -- matter evolved into minds like ours, your guess is as good as mine.

As for this...

Nevertheless, he argues that even “when the suspension of such an attitude or such attitudes occurs in a particular case, it is never the consequence of the belief that the piece of behavior in question was determined… In fact, no such sense of ‘determined’ as would be required for a general thesis of determinism is ever relevant to our actual suspensions of moral reactive attitudes.” In other words, the idea of determinism is irrelevant to the application of our reactive attitudes.

That's exactly what it is...a philosophical argument. Now, someday it might be possible to take these dueling definitions and deductions over to the neuroscientists. They do their thing and step by step they are able to demonstrate exactly how the brain accomplishes certain tasks autonomically while "somehow" accommodating the Libertarian in all of us?

iambiguous wrote: ↑Wed Sep 11, 2024 9:30 pm Criticising Strawson’s Compatibilism
Nurana Rajabova is wary of an attempt to dismiss determinism to keep free will.

Strawson then inquires about the influence of determinism on such [moral] responsibility. He asks rhetorically, “Would or should the acceptance of determinism lead to the decay or repudiation of all such attitudes? Would or should it mean the end of the gratitude, resentment, forgiveness and of all essentially personal antagonisms?” He expects that the answer is ‘no’.

Click.

Then back to how we mere mortals in a No God world would go about pinning down whether the questions we ask, the answers we give, our acceptance or rejection of things either are or are not autonomous.

As for someone expecting the answer to be yes or no, nothing changes. Or "somehow" when it comes to things like expectations does the brain manage to intertwine everything into...compatibilism?

Strawson now mentions some exceptional cases where we modify our reactive attitudes and choose to look at things more objectively, or, to use his own words, where we choose to move away from ‘participatory reactions’ to ‘objective attitudes’.

We'll need a context, of course. Otherwise, how exactly is it applicable to human interactions? How, in other words, is it applicable in your life?

It's not that over and again we react as we do to things "out in the world", but whether or not in any capacity our reactions are autonomous.

He reduces such attitude changes to two cases: (1) When a person did something by accident, with no ill will; and (2) When we judge that a person isn’t an appropriate target of any reactive attitude because they lack some relevant capacity – say a child, or someone with severe mental illness.

And around and around and around we go. Children and those afflicted with a mental disease are not held responsible because it is assumed they are either too immature or their brain has become afflicted with one of these...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurological_disorder

...disorders. And, increasingly, things become "beyond their control" .

Unless, perhaps, we were, are and never will really be in control at all. But what does that mean? I merely suggest that given determinism as some understand it, and given what we simply do not know yet about how -- why? -- matter evolved into minds like ours, your guess is as good as mine.

As for this...

Nevertheless, he argues that even “when the suspension of such an attitude or such attitudes occurs in a particular case, it is never the consequence of the belief that the piece of behavior in question was determined… In fact, no such sense of ‘determined’ as would be required for a general thesis of determinism is ever relevant to our actual suspensions of moral reactive attitudes.” In other words, the idea of determinism is irrelevant to the application of our reactive attitudes.

That's exactly what it is...a philosophical argument. Now, someday it might be possible to take these dueling definitions and deductions over to the neuroscientists. They do their thing and step by step they are able to demonstrate exactly how the brain accomplishes certain tasks autonomically while "somehow" accommodating the Libertarian in all of us?

Well, you can keep interpreting Strawson as saying there is free will and autonomy, but he didn't really care about the ontology and did not suggest either free will or determinism was the case. You call it a philosophical argument. Then assume he is saying that the brain accomplishes certain tasks autonomously. He certainly didn't use those words and then if one looks at what he does say, he isn't saying it with other words. And then he wasn't a believer in free will. That just ain't his position.

In other words, the idea of determinism is irrelevant to the application of our reactive attitudes. Therefore, for Strawson, we cannot seek an answer to the question of moral responsibility in the metaphysical realm. For this reason, he criticizes both determinists and compatibilists equally for over-intellectualizing the subject.

Irrelevant, not wrong. He doesn't give a shit about the metphysical issue

.“What is needed is not the metaphysical ‘free will’ that is sometimes sought but a recognition of the essential connectedness of our personal and moral life with these attitudes."

“But to ask whether such attitudes are rational or irrational is to misunderstand their role in human life, and to seek to justify them by appeal to the existence or non-existence of a certain kind of free will is to misunderstand their foundation."

He not arguing there is free will. He is not arguing that after some time brains developed autonomy. He's making a very different kind of argument, a non-metaphysical one, in favor of humans continuing to blame, resent etc. It is specifically and clearly non-metaphysical - in other words it is not weighing in on deteminism or free will.

I am getting it that you don't seem to think this matters. Oh, well.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Sep 11, 2024 9:47 pm Well, you can keep interpreting Strawson as saying there is free will and autonomy, but he didn't really care about the ontology and did not suggest either free will or determinism was the case.

More to the point [mine from time to time] he cared only about that which his brain compelled him to care about. In other words, in a determined universe as some construe it to be, Strawson is just one more manifestation of Nature. We're still stuck, however, trying to figure out how -- why? -- matter managed to become living biological entities in the first place and then, how, given the evolution of biological matter over millions of years, it all ended up becoming us.

God, anyone?

You call it a philosophical argument. Then assume he is saying that the brain accomplishes certain tasks autonomously. He certainly didn't use those words and then if one looks at what he does say, he isn't saying it with other words. And then he wasn't a believer in free will. That just ain't his position.

More to the point [mine] how on Earth would any of us actually go about demonstrating the extent to which Strawson had any degree of autonomy when he wrote what some insist -- in arguments -- that he could "for all practical purposes" never have not written.

In other words, the idea of determinism is irrelevant to the application of our reactive attitudes. Therefore, for Strawson, we cannot seek an answer to the question of moral responsibility in the metaphysical realm. For this reason, he criticizes both determinists and compatibilists equally for over-intellectualizing the subject.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Sep 11, 2024 9:47 pm Irrelevant, not wrong. He doesn't give a shit about the metphysical issue.

Okay, but then back to actually demonstrating that what he did give a shit about he did so...autonomously? We can all speculate about what the metaphysical parameters of the human condition might possibly be. And, sure, just presume that it includes free will or does not. I simply note how far removed that might possibly be from, say, an assessment provided by an omnsicient frame of mind?

.“What is needed is not the metaphysical ‘free will’ that is sometimes sought but a recognition of the essential connectedness of our personal and moral life with these attitudes."

“But to ask whether such attitudes are rational or irrational is to misunderstand their role in human life, and to seek to justify them by appeal to the existence or non-existence of a certain kind of free will is to misunderstand their foundation."

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Sep 11, 2024 9:47 pm He not arguing there is free will. He is not arguing that after some time brains developed autonomy. He's making a very different kind of argument, a non-metaphysical one, in favor of humans continuing to blame, resent etc. It is specifically and clearly non-metaphysical - in other words it is not weighing in on deteminism or free will.

Back down to Earth....

Given your own assessment of his assumptions, how do you imagine him discussing them with Mary after her abortion? Other than in a "world of words" argument, how much closer will he take us to knowing for sure if Mary really is or is not morally responsible for aborting her unborn baby/clump of cells.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Sep 11, 2024 9:47 pm I am getting it that you don't seem to think this matters. Oh, well.

Of course, over and again -- click -- I note things here that from my own frame of mind, you don't seem to think matters.

Criticising Strawson’s Compatibilism
Nurana Rajabova is wary of an attempt to dismiss determinism to keep free will.

In other words, the idea of determinism is irrelevant to the application of our reactive attitudes.

Unless, perhaps, reactive attitudes themselves are in turn no less an inherent manifestation of the only possible reality.

Therefore, for Strawson, we cannot seek an answer to the question of moral responsibility in the metaphysical realm. For this reason, he criticizes both determinists and compatibilists equally for over-intellectualizing the subject.

Same here. The "metaphysical realm" is in turn no less a necessary component of a wholly determined universe.

He says,

“The optimist’s [compatibilist’s] style of over-intellectualizing the facts is that of a characteristically incomplete empiricism, a one-eyed utilitarianism. He seeks to find an adequate basis for certain social practices in calculated consequences, and loses sight (perhaps wishes to lose sight) of the human attitudes of which these practices are, in part, the expression."

Does this seem reasonable to you? If so, note how it is applicable to you given the thoughts you think, the emotions you feel, the things you say and the things you do in interacting with others. Again, in particular, when you are engaged in interactions that revolve around conflicting value judgments. How might it be applicable in regard to Mary's abortion?

The pessimist [determinist] does not lose sight of these attitudes but is unable to accept the fact that it is just these attitudes themselves that fill the gap in the optimist’s account. Because of this, he thinks the gap can be filled only if some general metaphysical proposition [ie free will] is repeatedly verified, verified in all cases where it is appropriate to attribute moral responsibility.”

The same thing though. The pessimists/determinists don't lose sight of things and accept things as they are because they were never able not to. If the gap was never able to be other than what it must be and what we fill it with or extract from it is simply another mind-boggling manifestation of all Nature's dominoes toppling over on cue.

Whatever that means, of course.

As for bringing this...

"...only if some general metaphysical proposition [ie free will] is repeatedly verified, verified in all cases where it is appropriate to attribute moral responsibility."

...down to Earth? Well -- click -- who wants to start?

Criticising Strawson’s Compatibilism
Nurana Rajabova is wary of an attempt to dismiss determinism to keep free will

Assigning Moral Responsibility

Admittedly, the natural human disposition to react to interactions, to which Strawson draws attention in his first point, is an undeniable reality. It’s a quality humans carry as both embodied and social beings.

As noted by others, however, sure, I might be misconstruing his point. For all I know the author herself might be misconstruing it. Strawson seems [to me] to be making a distinction between acting and reacting. Mary acts by abortimg her unborn baby/clump of cells. Others react to this in conflicting ways...all up and down the moral, political, and spiritual spectrum. But Mary's behavior itself derives from her own subjective reaction to the unwanted pregancy. Then the billions and bilions of human actions/reactions day after day after day after day going back millenia.

Like clockwork?

We have evolved to have bodily reactions and mental processes that ultimately serve the evolutionary purpose of our preservation, and our reactive attitudes are part of that.

This could certainly be the case. So, how do we go about attempting to actually demonstrate it?

Just out of curiosity, if you were to take his asssumptions to a convention of neuroscientists, how might they, well, react to it? Would they be able to connect the dots between the human brain and the human mind here? Such that a chemical and neurological disctinction between human action and human reactions can be noted. Can be established?

Also, as noted before, imagine the universe had locations where free will prevailed and locations where determinsm prevailed. Those in the free will sector visit Earth in a spaceship from time to time. They gaze down at us in the determined sector. They see us acting, they see others reacting to that, they see us reacting to their reations. But they know that both the actions and reactions observed are wholly programmed by our brains. Basically, they see us interacting the way we see ants interacting...all in sync with brains in sync with the laws of matter.

But to then become conscious of that? But only because you were never able not to become conscious of it?

iambiguous wrote: ↑Tue Sep 24, 2024 10:05 pm

Assigning Moral Responsibility

Admittedly, the natural human disposition to react to interactions, to which Strawson draws attention in his first point, is an undeniable reality. It’s a quality humans carry as both embodied and social beings.

As noted by others, however, sure, I might be misconstruing his point. For all I know the author herself might be misconstruing it. Strawson seems [to me] to be making a distinction between acting and reacting. Mary acts by abortimg her unborn baby/clump of cells. Others react to this in conflicting ways...all up and down the moral, political, and spiritual spectrum. But Mary's behavior itself derives from her own subjective reaction to the unwanted pregancy. Then the billions and bilions of human actions/reactions day after day after day after day going back millenia.

Like clockwork?

He's not drawing a distinction between actions and reactions in any way that implies that one is a free thing and the other is determined.

I don't think she is saying that about his thoughts but one can read Strawson's arcticle here, for example
https://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/P._ ... ntment.pdf

We have evolved to have bodily reactions and mental processes that ultimately serve the evolutionary purpose of our preservation, and our reactive attitudes are part of that.

This could certainly be the case. So, how do we go about attempting to actually demonstrate it?

that sentences is, more or less, darwinism. The only problem with it is that it overreaches: we may inherit traits that are slightly negative or neutral. But that sentence holds for most traits.

On the other hand Strawson does not mention evolution. She's going off on her own and adding interpretations. He does call the reactions natural.

Just out of curiosity, if you were to take his asssumptions to a convention of neuroscientists, how might they, well, react to it? Would they be able to connect the dots between the human brain and the human mind here? Such that a chemical and neurological disctinction between human action and human reactions can be noted. Can be established?

Neurosciensts tend to assume what you say here.

Also, as noted before, imagine the universe had locations where free will prevailed and locations where determinsm prevailed.

We can certainly do that, but Strawson is not saying anything like that.

She isn't saying he is claiming that.

He is saying that the fact of deteminism does not undermine our moral reactions and assigning responsibility. And he makes that case and nowhere argues that this is because our actions are free or there are areas of free will (a phrase he does not use) and areas of determinism in the universe. He believes that moral reactions are utterly compatible with determinism, and part of what he does is to show how we decide in a determinist universe if some one is responsible and that how we determine that does not entail arguing that person X was determined and person Y was not.

His final sentence:

When we do remember this, and modify the optimist’s
position accordingly, we simultaneously correct its conceptual deficiencies and ward off the
dangers it seems to entail, without recourse to the obscure and panicky metaphysics of
libertarianism.

Libertarians, unless they are very radical panpsychist, do in fact compartmentalize the universe into those parts that are free agents and the rest being dull matter. Strawson is critical of that position and does not assume areas of freedom, along some action vs. reaction line. He does talk about actions and reactions, but nowhere does he assign one freedom the other determinism.

Your sense that libertarians are saying brain cells or humans are regions of free will in a determinstic universe is accurate. I think that's fair, for example, with Henry Quirk. I think nearly by definition compatiblists are not saying that brain tissue or humans are exceptional regions of free will. But in any case there is nothing inherent in compatibilism as a category of belief systems that means some matter is determined and some is not. Libertarians my come from this idea of soul that is free. Some may argue that once there is a level of complexity in matter it no longer has to follow the mechanistic world of the rest of matter. There is an exceptionalism in Libertarian free will positions, unless, as said they consider all matter to be conscious and free. But that's a minority position.

My sense is that the only way you can imagine a compatibilist supporting resposibility for our actions is if they think that there is a human/brain exception to determinism. But if you look directly at their arguments, that is not the basis of their argument. Nor was it, for that matter, the basis of mine.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Sep 25, 2024 5:46 am

Just out of curiosity, if you were to take his asssumptions to a convention of neuroscientists, how might they, well, react to it? Would they be able to connect the dots between the human brain and the human mind here? Such that a chemical and neurological disctinction between human action and human reactions can be noted. Can be established?

Neurosciensts tend to assume what you say here.

Neuroscientists assume what specifically?

Also, as noted before, imagine the universe had locations where free will prevailed and locations where determinsm prevailed.

We can certainly do that, but Strawson is not saying anything like that.

She isn't saying he is claiming that.

How many more years of iambiguous reading more about compatibilism than every human being on earth do you think it will take before he understands what the very most basic claim of compatibilism is?

Also, as noted before, imagine the universe had locations where free will prevailed and locations where determinsm prevailed. Those in the free will sector visit Earth in a spaceship from time to time. They gaze down at us in the determined sector. They see us acting, they see others reacting to that, they see us reacting to their reations. But they know that both the actions and reactions observed are wholly programmed by our brains. Basically, they see us interacting the way we see ants interacting...all in sync with brains in sync with the laws of matter.

These space aliens would have to have bodies which do not operate according to rules.

That's the only way that they could get out of synch with "the laws of matter" or some other rules ... 'the laws of mind energy' maybe.

How could that possibly work?

How could they function within a structured universe without structure in themselves? Even if the rules within their own bodies were different from the rules governing the rest of the universe, they would still need consistent rules to function.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Sep 25, 2024 11:56 am Neuroscientists assume what specifically?

Yeah, I was sloppy there to the degree that I ended up supporting, with that wording, Iambiguous' false interpretation. I was reacting to him being critical of what she said Strawson was saying. I should have written that neuroscientist would support what Strawson was saying, not Iambiguous' usual unjustified interpretation. In fact what Strawson was saying is not controversial in this part of his essay. What he thinks Strawson is saying would be controversial to neuroscientists.

Also, as noted before, imagine the universe had locations where free will prevailed and locations where determinsm prevailed.

We can certainly do that, but Strawson is not saying anything like that.

She isn't saying he is claiming that.

How many more years of iambiguous reading more about compatibilism than every human being on earth do you think it will take before he understands what the very most basic claim of compatibilism is?

It seems like he thinks they must be saying that. They must be asserting that matter in brains doesn't follow determinism. But they aren't saying that, at least most of them. And Strawson is not saying that, in fact he emphasizes in his article that deteminism not only is not in conflict with moral reactions, but fits well with them. We could then go on to try to see if his argument holds, but he is not saying what Iamb seems to think he is saying.

I don't think he at any point in this thread or the one in ILP where he posts the same posts, he has actually responded to the specific arguments made by those he quotes nor to specific arguments in support of considering people responsible for their actions in a deterministic world made by posters here or there.

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Sep 25, 2024 1:21 pm It seems like he thinks they must be saying that. They must be asserting that matter in brains doesn't follow determinism. But they aren't saying that, at least most of them. And Strawson is not saying that, in fact he emphasizes in his article that deteminism not only is not in conflict with moral reactions, but fits well with them.

If they were saying that, that wouldn't be compatibilism. The idea that you need to carve out an exception to determinism within a human brain in order to allow for free will is the opposite of compatibilism. Iambiguous has had this explained to him at least a dozen times by now, but he's determined to not get the message.

And if he responds to me at all, it will be to call me a stooge objectivist because I had the nerve to understand what the word "compatible" means. Hint: it doesn't mean carving out exceptions!

He's got a fixed idea of what is required to have moral responsibility ... the ability to choose otherwise.

And he alters compatibilism to fit into that idea.

No amount of talking can make him change his idea of moral responsibility.

Maybe moral responsibility is something else? He doesn't even consider it.

Flannel Jesus wrote: ↑Wed Sep 25, 2024 1:28 pm

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Sep 25, 2024 1:21 pm It seems like he thinks they must be saying that. They must be asserting that matter in brains doesn't follow determinism. But they aren't saying that, at least most of them. And Strawson is not saying that, in fact he emphasizes in his article that deteminism not only is not in conflict with moral reactions, but fits well with them.

If they were saying that, that wouldn't be compatibilism. The idea that you need to carve out an exception to determinism within a human brain in order to allow for free will is the opposite of compatibilism. Iambiguous has had this explained to him at least a dozen times by now, but he's determined to not get the message.

And if he responds to me at all, it will be to call me a stooge objectivist because I had the nerve to understand what the word "compatible" means. Hint: it doesn't mean carving out exceptions!

There certainly seems to be moral judgments on his part and the sense that he holds other people (objectivists, those he labels Stooges) responsible for their actions. I mean, what's the point of calling someone a negative term with moral connotations, it you don't hold them responsible? Can we conclude he doesn't believe in determinism?

If he finds a post he doesn't like, he could react with 'Damn the Big Bang'. But for some reason he aims the judgment at specific humans.

phyllo wrote: ↑Wed Sep 25, 2024 1:41 pm He's got a fixed idea of what is required to have moral responsibility ... the ability to choose otherwise.

And he alters compatibilism to fit into that idea.

No amount of talking can make him change his idea of moral responsibility.

Maybe moral responsibility is something else? He doesn't even consider it.

And thinking that only with freedom can we have responsibility is a postion that he could argue for. This would entail making an argument, rather than expressing incredulity and merely asserting his position, and I'm not sure why he doesn't make that argument.

Other people have explained why they think determinism is compatible with holding people responsible. Instead of a making his case for the necessity of freedom or countering their arguments - which would mean specifically pointing out the flaws in the argument, for example - he simply repeats his assertions

Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Wed Sep 25, 2024 1:47 pm

phyllo wrote: ↑Wed Sep 25, 2024 1:41 pm He's got a fixed idea of what is required to have moral responsibility ... the ability to choose otherwise.

And he alters compatibilism to fit into that idea.

No amount of talking can make him change his idea of moral responsibility.

Maybe moral responsibility is something else? He doesn't even consider it.

And thinking that only with freedom can we have responsibility is a postion that he could argue for. This would entail making an argument, rather than expressing incredulity and merely asserting his position, and I'm not sure why he doesn't make that argument.

Other people have explained why they think determinism is compatible with holding people responsible. Instead of a making his case for the necessity of freedom or countering their arguments - which would mean specifically pointing out the flaws in the argument, for example - he simply repeats his assertions

I think that there are two reasons why he doesn't present an argument or counter-argument.

1 - His idea that arguments are useless, ineffective and merely represent dasein, compelled thoughts and/or intellectual contraptions. Let's call that the failure of philosophy.
Therefore, he asks for demonstrations and the input of scientists and neurologists who actually go beyond arguments.

2 - Presenting an argument requires effort and work. He doesn't want to do the work. And he doesn't want the hassle of being criticized and having to defend his argument.