Philosophy Now Forum

raw_thought wrote:Private means that only I experience the sensation. You will never see the shape of a triangle in my brain that is the triangle that I am visualizing.
Remember, a quale is defined as a private experience. Materialist's deny that private experiences exist. Therefore,if they are consistent and believe that I can visualize a triangle,they must believe that it is not a private experience, others must be able to see it (a triangular shape in my brain)

This is not actually correct. Qualia cannot be solely defined as private experiences, this is clearly the sticking point. This is why I suggested we look at the literature in terms of mental states that have qualia and mental states that don't. I am not saying this is exercise has resulted in a large degree of consensus. What I am saying is that you are putting proponents of qualia in an impossible position when you claim that all mental states are qualia states. No proponent of qualia will accept this. Do you see why?

Name a thought or feeling that can be experienced by looking into the brain. Suppose I know what neurons are firing when I visualize a triangle. I then visualize those neurons firing (there are so many neurons firing that that would be impossible, but lets provisionally accept that we can) are my neurons firing in the shape of a triangle? No,because I am visualizing neurons firing.

Lets provisionally assume that the materialist is correct and that pain is and only is c fibers firing. To use the language of materialists, "there is nothing it is like to feel pain." In other words pain doesn't hurt (it isnt a feeling) it is only c fibers firing.
I would then not care if I got tortured. There is nothing unpleasant about torture if it only causes my c fibers to fire.
Similarly, a materialist should not care if he gets tortured. Torture doesnt feel like anything according to him. Obviously, materialists do care if they are tortured. Therefore, they contradict themselves and so therefore cannot be correct.

raw_thought wrote:Name a thought or feeling that can be experienced by looking into the brain. Suppose I know what neurons are firing when I visualize a triangle. I then visualize those neurons firing (there are so many neurons firing that that would be impossible, but lets provisionally accept that we can) are my neurons firing in the shape of a triangle? No,because I am visualizing neurons firing.

You are not actually visualizing neurons firing. This is not the physicalist/ materialist position.

Arising uk,
There would be a physicsl triangle on the television screen of the instrument that translates my neurons firing. There is no physical triangle in my brain. Are you saying that the television experiences a triangle? If there is no conscious observer. If you say yes, a computer can be designed that can experience thattriangle on the screen one gets an infinite regress. As Wittgenstein said,simply reproducing a newspaper many times does not add to the information in that newspaper. If I say,"the cat is on the mat" and then say," the cat is on the mat. The cat is on the mat. The cat is on the mat" I have not proven that the cat is on the mat.

Ginkgo wrote:

raw_thought wrote:Name a thought or feeling that can be experienced by looking into the brain. Suppose I know what neurons are firing when I visualize a triangle. I then visualize those neurons firing (there are so many neurons firing that that would be impossible, but lets provisionally accept that we can) are my neurons firing in the shape of a triangle? No,because I am visualizing neurons firing.

You are not actually visualizing neurons firing. This is not the physicalist/ materialist position.

I was not addressing the materialist's position. I was adressing your contention that a mental state does not necessarily have to be private.

raw_thought wrote:

Ginkgo wrote:

raw_thought wrote:Name a thought or feeling that can be experienced by looking into the brain. Suppose I know what neurons are firing when I visualize a triangle. I then visualize those neurons firing (there are so many neurons firing that that would be impossible, but lets provisionally accept that we can) are my neurons firing in the shape of a triangle? No,because I am visualizing neurons firing.

You are not actually visualizing neurons firing. This is not the physicalist/ materialist position.

I was not addressing the materialist's position. I was adressing your contention that a mental state does not necessarily have to be private.

That wasn't my contention.

Ginkgo wrote:

raw_thought wrote:Private means that only I experience the sensation. You will never see the shape of a triangle in my brain that is the triangle that I am visualizing.
Remember, a quale is defined as a private experience. Materialist's deny that private experiences exist. Therefore,if they are consistent and believe that I can visualize a triangle,they must believe that it is not a private experience, others must be able to see it (a triangular shape in my brain)

This is not actually correct. Qualia cannot be solely defined as private experiences, this is clearly the sticking point?

Name one mental event that is not a private experience.

raw_thought wrote:

Ginkgo wrote:

raw_thought wrote:Private means that only I experience the sensation. You will never see the shape of a triangle in my brain that is the triangle that I am visualizing.
Remember, a quale is defined as a private experience. Materialist's deny that private experiences exist. Therefore,if they are consistent and believe that I can visualize a triangle,they must believe that it is not a private experience, others must be able to see it (a triangular shape in my brain)

This is not actually correct. Qualia cannot be solely defined as private experiences, this is clearly the sticking point?

Name one mental event that is not a private experience.

Or a private experience that is not a mental event - equivalences go both ways.

Private means that only I experience the sensation.

No, you are saying much more than that. You are saying that only you can possibly experience the sensation - rather than actually. For instance, if I am the only one looking at the night sky and see a falling star, then only I actually experience it, so it is private. You are saying that, to be a private experience, it would have to be impossible for anyone else to see the event.

Materialists only deny that private experiences of the strong type - where it is impossible for another to ever observe the event - do not exist. We have been saying that the events in your brain that you describe are like the falling star that no one else sees, in so far as although it happens that no one else sees it, it is not impossible - some day, technology will advance to the point where such events are observable by others.

One example of where this may occur is with language. We speak to ourselves when we think. If you were to ask me to tell you what I am thinking, I could easily tell you in spoken language. At present, no technology can 'hear' your thoughts (as you would quickly point out) - however, isn't it imaginable to you that a brain scanner could some day read patterns of neurons firing (which probably resemble patterns which fire when you talk out loud) and translate them into language? In that case, at least some of the thoughts you have would cease to be private in the strong sense you are advocating.

Sure,I can add intrinsically private. But the philosophical literature assumes the intrinsic part.

raw_thought wrote:Arising uk,
There would be a physicsl triangle on the television screen of the instrument that translates my neurons firing. There is no physical triangle in my brain. ...

Tell me where this physical triangle is on or in this TV because if it is then the triangle you are imagining is physical in the same sense.

Are you saying that the television experiences a triangle?

No, I'm saying that if we can produce such an image every time you say you are imaging a triangle and it matches what you imagine then the triangle you imagine has a material cause, viz the CNS.

If there is no conscious observer. If you say yes, a computer can be designed that can experience thattriangle on the screen one gets an infinite regress. As Wittgenstein said,simply reproducing a newspaper many times does not add to the information in that newspaper. If I say,"the cat is on the mat" and then say," the cat is on the mat. The cat is on the mat. The cat is on the mat" I have not proven that the cat is on the mat.

You are introducing something called 'experience', what do you mean by you 'experience' this imaginary triangle, other than just 'seeing' it in a phenomenological 'visual' field?

For the materialist phenomenology is gibberish.

I never denied or embraced the idea that my neurons firing causes me to experience a triangle. It has nothing to do with my argument. Cause does not equal definition. If I find the cause of A,I have not defined A. The definition of "broken vase " is not "throwing it".

raw_thought wrote:For the materialist phenomenology is gibberish.

No it's not, at least not for this materialist, as I take materialism, maybe physicalism is better, to be the idea that all phenomena have material or physical causes, as I'm a monist with respect to 'mind' at least and a monist who think having a body with senses in an external world will be enough of an answer to the issue of being conscious and having two of them with a language to the issue of being self-conscious. What do you understand by the term Phenomenology?

Phenomenology is the study of what we refer to when.we use first person narratives. Materialists deny first person narratives. For example, if I bracket (a phenomenological term) all preconceptions, I am dealing with what the experience feels like (qualia).
Another example, a phenomonologist will analize a cup. All the preconceptions (that it is a cup, used for drinking etc) are bracketed out, leaving only the experience.